Punishing with care: treating offenders as equal persons in criminal punishment by Coverdale, Helen
1 
 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Punishing with Care: treating offenders as 
equal persons in criminal punishment 
 
 
 
 
 
Helen Anne Brown Coverdale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Law of 
the London School of Economics for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy, London, October 2013 
  
2 
 
Declaration 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the 
MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political 
Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly 
indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any 
work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly 
identified in it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is 
permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made.  This thesis 
may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. 
 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, 
infringe the rights of any third party. 
 
I declare that my thesis consists of 100,000 words.  
 
 
Statement of use of third party for editorial help  
 
I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, 
spelling and grammar by Rebeka Cohen Editorial.    
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Kris 
 
 
 
4 
 
Acknowledgements 
There are many people to whom I owe a debt of gratitude. My thanks are due first to my 
Mother, Anne, who cared for me and taught me how to care for others; and to my Father, 
Chris, who cared for me and showed me how to value caring; and who both continue to 
provide love and support. 
 
I am deeply indebted to my Co-supervisors, Professor Nicola Lacey and Professor Anne 
Phillips for their generous and patient feedback and support during the process of 
developing and marshalling my arguments. I am grateful to Professor Lacey, Professor 
Phillips, and to my second supervisor, Dr Peter Ramsay, for their guidance and many 
thought-provoking questions and discussions. I am grateful to the Law department at LSE 
for the opportunities and support they have provided. I have had several opportunities to 
share my work at conferences, and I am grateful to participants for their insightful feedback 
and questions. 
 
I am indebted to Professor Hillel Steiner, who supervised my undergraduate dissertation 
and fostered my passion for theory, and Professor Angelia R. Wilson, who also taught me as 
an undergraduate at the University of Manchester; for their support and encouragement to 
continue my studies. I am further grateful to Dr Ruth Cigman, who taught a night class I 
attended on Women in Philosophy, who inspired my return to full-time study. Thanks are 
also due to Professor Richard Bellamy, who supervised my Masters dissertation for his 
support. I am grateful to the Political Theory Group in the LSE Government Department, 
who kindly allowed me an additional opportunity to present my work to my LSE doctoral 
student peers, providing a fresh perspective. 
 
I am immensely grateful for the dedicated work of library staff at the LSE in particular and 
at far too many other academic libraries to mention, although I have particularly enjoyed 
working in the libraries at King’s College London and the University of Liverpool. I am 
grateful to Dr Austin Chambers, who was hugely supportive in the very early part of my 
undergraduate studies as a physics student at the University of York, for his help to identify 
an academic discipline in which I have been able to flourish. I owe a debt I cannot repay to 
my late Uncle, Dr John ‘Adrian’ Wiseman for his encouragement to move into the 
humanities and social sciences. As I was still an undergraduate physics student at the time 
of his sudden death, I have been unable to thank him. 
 
My family have been very supportive, understanding and accommodating of the research 
project I have undertaken. I am particularly grateful to my parents, who have provided 
boundless moral support, and to my husband Kris, whose everyday caring has made this 
thesis possible. Kris has supported me through the inevitable low points, listened to me 
‘think out loud’, and provided 24 hour technical support. Undoubtedly his skill at planning 
weekend hikes and getting me outdoors has provided valuable conceptual distance. Finally, 
his willingness to take on the ‘double shift’, full-time work and almost single-handed 
household management, over the last few months has allowed me to focus on my thesis. I 
am also grateful to Ms Rebeka Cohen, for her assistance in copy editing my work for 
conventions of language, spelling and grammar, in accordance with LSE regulations. 
 
My research has been kindly funded by an Arts and Humanities Research Council Block 
Grant Partnership Doctoral Studentship Award, and by an LSE Law Department Research 
Studentship. I am extremely grateful for the security and opportunities this funding has 
provided.  
5 
 
Abstract 
 
Most punishment theories acknowledge neither the full extent of the harms which 
punishment risks, nor the caring practices which punishment entails. Consequently, 
I shall argue, punishment in most of its current conceptualizations is inconsistent 
with treating offenders as equals qua persons. The nature of criminal punishment, 
and of our interactions with offenders in punishment decision-making and delivery, 
risks causing harm to offenders. Harm is normalized when central to definitions of 
punishment, desensitizing us to unintended harms and obscuring caring practices. 
Offenders may be partially silenced and excluded by mainstream criminal justice 
practices which limit interaction between offenders and practitioners. When we 
ignore significant harms, or silence and exclude, we treat others as passive non-
subjects. This partially objectifies offenders, and is inconsistent with treatment as 
equals. Penal theories employing harm-centred and harm-normalizing definitions of 
punishment can provide few resources to help practitioners either avoid, or 
recognize and respond to, harms. Care ethics, by contrast, motivates the avoidance 
of harm, ongoing inclusive engagement, and respectful interaction with others. I 
argue that defining punishment without presupposing harm facilitates the 
identification of morally problematic harms, and recognition of caring practices. I 
offer a principled argument, and political and pragmatic supplementary arguments, 
for responding to offenders without intentional harm and with care. Principles 
drawn from care ethics can help to strengthen mainstream criminal practices by 
structuring decision-making and action. Bottom-up alternative criminal justice 
practices share some values with these proposed guiding principles, allowing a 
partial test of the principles. I consider examples of restorative justice practices, 
therapeutic jurisprudence, community justice and other problem-solving court 
practices, in addition to considering how well mainstream punishment practices 
measure up to these principles. My analysis illuminates the strengths and 
weaknesses of the principles, and how they might contribute to securing treatment 
as equals for offenders in mainstream practices.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Overview 
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’ (1948 art1). These limits are 
informed by the ways in which it is morally acceptable to treat persons. Offenders’ 
conduct cannot change their status as persons. We are obliged to treat offenders in 
ways reflecting their status as equals; both as politically equal citizens, and 
recognizing their intrinsic human dignity as equal concrete persons. We ought to 
treat persons as equals and we ought not to objectify human beings. Some persons, 
such as the mentally incapacitated or minors, are not held criminally responsible. 
But all convicted offenders are persons,1 and deserve to be treated as such. While 
we may treat offenders differently in response to their offending, compared with 
non-offenders, there are still limits on how we may treat offenders qua persons.  
 
I develop an argument that practices of care are both present in, and necessary to, 
our present practices of punishment. I offer an archetype of the conceptual 
anatomy of care ethics: those features of caring as a practice, value set and attitude 
which will help us to identify caring in practice. One of the features of the 
conceptual anatomy of care ethics is that good care can only be delivered when we 
are open to, and engaged with, care-receivers about the care we provide. It is not 
possible to discuss our caring with recipients when we fail to recognize our act as 
care.  
 
I challenge the usual definition of punishment, arguing that the inclusion of a harm-
like characteristic as one defining feature of punishment, and the only substantive 
content defining feature, centres our conception of criminal punishment on harm, 
                                                     
1
 With apologies to readers from Hartlepool (a coastal town in North East England), where during the 
Napoleonic Wars the only ‘survivor’ from a wrecked French vessel was tried and punished as a 
French spy. According to local legend, the ‘survivor’ was in fact the ship’s monkey. Yet the ‘spy’ was 
punished because locals mistakenly believed the monkey to be a French person. 
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restricting our thinking. Theories built on this restricted definition can only provide 
restricted guidance for punishment decision-making and delivery, for two reasons. 
 
Firstly, this normalizes and hence desensitizes us to harm, which is simplistically 
understood. When we expect an ambiguous level of harm, it becomes less clear 
when the presence of harm in punishment is non-trivial and morally problematic. 
We fail to consider whether harms are morally significant and whether they are 
avoidable and/or addressable, treating the offender as one who may be acceptably 
harmed. If we further fail to at minimum acknowledge and, where possible, address 
non-trivial morally significant harms to offenders, we confirm our objectifying 
assessment of the offender. This is a problem if we are to treat offenders as equals 
qua persons, as liberal democratic states claim. Secondly, harm-centred definitions 
obscure the necessary caring work present in punishment practices. I adopt a care 
ethics perspective in this thesis, since it offers a clear way to recognize existing care 
practices. I offer a procedural-only definition of punishment to allow consideration 
of these problems. 
 
Moving towards a system of punishment enabling us to recognize offenders as 
equals is the core concern of this thesis. By taking account of the practices of care 
and designing punishments which address needs, we can treat offenders as equals 
and move towards a non-objectifying system of punishment. This research 
principally aims to provide more comprehensive normative guidance for sentencers 
and practitioners in punishment decision-making and delivery, which enables: 
i. Treating offenders2 as equals and without objectification; 
ii. Considering personal and social contextual detail, accessed 
through respectfully hearing parts of offenders’ narratives, 
avoiding objectification and achieving interactional justice; 
iii. Recognizing the practices of care existing within and essential 
for contemporary punishment practices, and acknowledging 
and avoiding or addressing morally significant harms; 
                                                     
2
 And ultimately victims and communities, although my focus of this study is the punishment of 
offenders. 
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iv. Providing guidance principles that strengthen institutional 
oversight practices with the internal resources of care.  
 
Three arguments run in parallel through this thesis: principled, political and 
pragmatic. The principled argument from the perspective of care is that it is simply 
good or morally right and appropriate to respond to the needs of those around us, 
in chosen and unchosen relationships, with support where we are so able. This 
reflects the nature of human beings, as mutually interdependent and variably 
vulnerable. For care theory, to eschew care-receiving and care-giving misses 
something fundamental to the human experience. From a classical liberal 
perspective, responding to offenders with care and not harm permits treating 
offenders as equals and respects their inherent human dignity.  
 
Two supplementary arguments add weight in favour of the normative principles for 
guiding punishment decision-making and delivery. Firstly, a political argument: 
democratic states are required to treat citizens in a way which respects their equal 
status, and to treat non-citizens in a way commensurate with their intrinsic human 
dignity. In order to achieve this, we must treat offenders inclusively, respecting their 
status as equals even as we censure their acts. This is provided through institutional 
mechanisms of procedural justice, at which classical liberal informed mainstream 
criminal justice is reasonably good; and through interactional justice, at which 
mainstream practices are not. Interactional justice is the quality of interpersonal 
treatment (Chiaburu & Lim 2008) and respectful inclusion of weaker parties by 
institutionally stronger parties (Bottoms & Tankebe 2012, p.121), which I shall argue 
mainstream approaches are less able to deliver, given the risks of objectification.  
 
Finally, from a purely pragmatic perspective, it is instrumentally useful for all 
community members to contribute to producing the benefits and efficiency gains of 
socio-economic life. Responding to offenders with harm can only damage and 
deplete their resources for self-care or self-sufficiency and social co-operation. 
Responding supportively to offenders cannot guarantee positive, socio-economic 
participation in the future, but at least avoids guaranteeing that in future offenders 
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will require more support and be less able to contribute. This pragmatic argument 
lacks the political obligation and legitimacy motivation of the political argument, but 
shadows the idea that responding to offenders supportively may improve 
offenders’ ability to engage co-operatively with others, as an active citizen and 
family member. In principle at least, offenders’ social participation and engagement 
might be something that could be empirically tested.3 
 
 
Inception 
My academic background is in legal and political theory, and my work is informed 
by non-academic experience in practical politics and the criminal justice sector. I 
seek to produce theory with real-world relevance. This means attending to contexts 
and constraints found in social science. In addition to producing normative theory, I 
include a policy proposals. This is intended as a springboard for wider academic, 
practitioner and policy-maker discussion, and not envisaged as an ideal 
prescription.  
 
This primarily normative, theoretical project has grown from my personal practical 
experience in the criminal justice sector. I worked for two years as a Helpline 
Information Officer for Nacro, the crime reduction charity. The helpline dealt with a 
range of enquiries from serving prisoners, ex-offenders, friends and family, and 
employers; providing information and advice on ‘resettlement’ issues, very broadly 
understood. Working in the criminal justice sector I learned not only about the 
‘collateral damage’ harms caused by punishment, which sentencers had not 
necessarily envisaged or intended, but also about the unrecognized caring work. 
These harms arise not only by the fact of being punished, but through the nature of 
the punishment and practitioners’ interactions with offenders. These harms add to 
the harms already caused by the offence. Yet caring work aiming to repair harm and 
rebuild lives through meeting needs and repairing relationships is also a part of 
                                                     
3
 Although there may be difficulties in comparing changes to the offender’s pre-conviction level of 
co-operation, the change over time for one offender during and after a community punishment 
might be considered.  
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punishment. Further, some of the caring associated with the harms caused by 
punishment practices occurs after the sentence has ended. Penal theory neither 
questions the full extent of the harm, nor notices the care. Why? 
 
 
Method 
John Braithwaite & Heather Strang4 make an instructive observation: ‘there is 
nothing as practical as a good philosophy and the best philosophy is informed by 
practice’ (2000, p.203). A similar method is employed in this thesis. I begin by 
challenging the usually accepted definition of punishment, excluding harm as a 
definitive feature and thereby leaving room for care. My theory is developed over 
Chapters two to four, and then tested by comparison with theory and practice in 
Chapters five to seven. Where some practices run parallel to the theory advanced 
here, I am able to consider problems arising as unintended or unforeseen 
consequences in practice. This allows some discussion of the limitation of the care 
principles I propose, and how these principles might tackle these difficulties. In the 
development of the ideas, I have adopted a reflective equilibrium method (Rawls 
1973, pp.48–51); revising existing conceptualizations with one offering broader 
explanatory power, and checking the principles derived from care against the 
possibility for coherent, as-intended application.  
 
The research objectives of this thesis are: 
 To examine the normative guidance for punishment decision-
making and delivery provided by existing penal theory for 
sentencers and practitioners; 
 To propose an alternative definition of punishment, 
incorporating practices of care; 
 To reflect on the care ethics perspective and the implications 
of the care ethics approach to practical moral reasoning; 
                                                     
4
 Throughout this thesis I shall use the ampersand to indicate that the parties are joined in a relevant 
way. Most obviously I shall use this to indicate joint authorship, as in the present example, but also 
to reflect the single area of jurisdiction that is England & Wales.  
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 To investigate the presence of care in existing punishment 
practices; 
 To explore the instrumental value of personal and social 
contextual information to punishment and caring; 
 To highlight the intrinsic value of listening respectfully to parts 
of offenders’ narrative in gathering contextual information, as 
a means of treating offenders as equals and providing the 
interactional justice, which Tom R. Tyler has identified as 
contributing to procedural justice and evaluations of 
legitimacy in criminal justice (Tyler 2003, p.286); 
 To propose principles based on the care ethics approach to 
propose normative guidance for punishment practitioners 
 To reflect on how these principles cohere with, and extend, 
existing theory 
 To test the principles in both punishment decision-making and 
delivery, insofar as this is possible, through the natural 
experiment provided by bottom-up alternatives to mainstream 
criminal justice 
 
 
Context, significance and limitations 
H. L. A. Hart drew a parallel between criminal punishment and Locke’s 
consideration of property, suggesting related but distinct questions of definition, 
justification and distribution. He further divided the distribution question into 
questions of title (who is liable to punishment) and amount (the amount of 
punishment to which they are liable) (Hart 1978, p.11). Hart’s parallel with Locke’s 
conception of property was enormously helpful in separating out these questions 
and allowing separate reflection of different answers. Yet this misses an important 
point. Considering property necessarily relates to defining and justifying the 
distribution of objects, and the conditions under which objects might be 
transferred. Even in the condition of slavery, a person is ‘owned’ qua object, a slave, 
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not qua person. Punishment, on the other hand, requires reflection on dealings 
with persons: state agents interact with the subject of punishment, who is a person.  
 
The justification of punishment is the focus of much existing penal theory. I have 
not attempted to make a contribution to this discussion since it has already 
received much attention. While this is an important question, I believe it has 
diverted our attention away from the treatment of offenders during punishment 
decision-making and delivery. My work here follows the justificatory arguments of 
others considering criminal punishment as socially necessary to provide a 
sufficiently secure environment for social and economic co-operation. Human 
beings remain the type of beings prone to making mistakes and where some 
individuals will wilfully choose that which we know to be (legally or morally) wrong 
(Ministry of Justice 2010, p.1). While our political societies are composed of human 
beings, we will need responses for offending. Punishment becomes an essential 
part of upholding the rule of law (Lacey 1988, p.182) and an ‘unavoidable feature of 
social life’ (Cragg 1992, p.204).  
 
Likewise, I shall also take the aim of punishment, which for Hart is linked with the 
justification, to be a social-benefit aim. Ideally, the offence would not have 
occurred. We do not live in an ideal world, and we cannot prevent an offence which 
has already happened. What we can do is look to address the harm caused, and try 
to minimize potential harms in future. Minimizing harms might be achieved through 
reform, rehabilitation, education, healthcare treatments and deterrence. I shall 
raise questions about which harms it is appropriate to address through punishment, 
which is the state response to offenders for their offences.  
 
I am interested in the treatment of, and interaction with, offenders during post-
conviction practices of punishment decision-making and delivery, and the 
normative guidelines that are available to help sentencers and punishment 
practitioners, to enable treating offenders as equals and without objectification. I 
am interested in how we conceptualize punishment decision-making and delivery, 
since how we think informs the ways in which we carry out these practices, even if 
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this makes ‘no practical difference’ (Cohen 2003, p.243) to punishment decisions. 
This question about the nature of punishment as an interaction between a state 
agent and a human subject is the question that is partly obscured by Hart’s property 
analogy. The nature of punishment is intimately related to Hart’s distributive 
amount question. The nature of criminal punishment is of course related to Hart’s 
other questions, but not as closely as the amount question.  
 
I note above the socially necessary position I take on justification, and address the 
definition of punishment in Chapter one. I will however bracket off Hart’s liability 
question from the amount question of distribution. The liability question will be 
outside of my scope, but the amount question will fall partially within it. Firstly, I 
take this approach since the proposals presented here begin after conviction. How 
should we, the community; or more accurately, how should the sentencer acting on 
our behalf as a state agent, punish this particular offender? Beginning from this 
point must assume that questions of definition, justification and liability have, for 
better or worse, been addressed in practice. Secondly, I do not purely address a 
question of distributive amount, but rather a question about the nature of our 
official interactions with offenders during punishment: how can we structure our 
punishment response to offenders for their offences in a way that recognizes 
offenders’ status as equal persons?  
 
Finally, I am not the only scholar to seek to make this separation. In response to 
Braithwaite & Pettit’s broad, holistic theory of criminal justice, von Hirsch & 
Ashworth make the same separation. Desert theory, von Hirsch & Ashworth argue, 
‘offers mainly a conception of sentencing’, hence they focus on ‘the application of 
Braithwaite and Pettit’s theory to sentencing policy’ only (von Hirsch & Ashworth 
1992, p.84). Sentencing necessarily only applies to the subset of those persons 
liable to criminal punishment who have been convicted, and so is separated from 
the liability question. My consideration will be the nature of sentences, the ways in 
which sentencers and punishment practitioners interact with offenders during 
punishment decision-making and delivery, and whether individual offenders are 
treated as equals qua persons.  
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Feminist informed 
Feminist scholarship aims to take account of the complexities in real life (Sherwin 
1988, pp.20–4), obscured by the balance of power. These complexities are reflected 
in the approach of care ethics, which seeks to take account of each individual’s 
unique personal and social context. This thesis draws on, and applies, feminist 
scholarship, since care ethics has been mostly (although not solely) developed by 
feminist theorists and philosophers, building in some cases on the experience of 
women. The thesis is therefore heavily informed by feminist thought. It is however 
not a feminist piece of work of itself, in that it does not seek to take account of, or 
explore, the specific experiences of women, nor advance the practical, social and 
political inclusion on equal terms of women specifically. I apply the care ethics 
perspective, drawing on the different conception of individuals and sensitivity to 
particular personal and social contexts, to the treatment of offenders. This 
contributes to the wider concern for equality, to include all persons as equals, 
treating each person with equal concern and respect.  
 
Following feminist concerns with complexity, there are many overlapping 
understandings of care. The understanding of care I employ in this thesis is one that 
sees care as a learned practice and mode of practical moral reasoning of which all 
human beings are capable to some degree. There has been debate over whether 
care ethics and the classical liberal ‘justice’ perspectives are compatible. Following 
Grace Clement, I take the view that they are not inconsistent, but that each 
perspective provides different responses by asking different questions (Clement 
1996, p.5). By attempting to assimilate the distinct perspectives, we lose the 
differences which make both valuable.  
 
Differences between care ethics and classical liberal justice perspectives are 
valuable in considering criminal punishment. ‘[T]he ethic of care is now an 
undisputed part of feminist challenges to the conventional post-Enlightenment 
assumption that individual citizens must be free to act in their own interests’, and 
requires our recognizing ‘responsibility for others’ (Davis et al. 2006, p.9). Care 
ethics and other relational perspectives have differing ontological expectations of 
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individuals to liberal models, prioritizing different modes of response. This provides 
a critical lens for challenging the response of the liberal democratic state to 
individual offenders. I offer proposals for guiding principles for sentence decision-
making and punishment delivery, but I do not seek to challenge the existing 
mainstream mechanisms of law for determining guilt. Finally, I take a public 
understanding of care, following Joan Tronto (1993) Grace Clement (1996), Selma 
Sevenhuijsen (1998; 2003) and Daniel Engster (2007). Just as individuals can have 
responsibilities of care in chosen and unchosen relationships, so too can the state. 
States have a role in facilitating our personal caring, as the arrangement of social 
and political institutions directing who cares for whom is a social and political 
question (Robinson 1999, p.33). States may also have a public role in addressing of 
victims’ and offenders’ needs.  
 
Feminist critiques often focus on the excluded and oppressed, on who is left out 
and why, and the broader impact of exclusion on the affected individuals and 
society. Persons with a criminal record are a stigmatized group in society. This is not 
to say that different, less favourable treatment of offenders is never appropriate. 
But different treatment may become discriminatory if it becomes exclusionary or 
objectifying, or a disproportionate blanket response.5 The thesis will develop a set 
of principles which may help to guide punishment decision-making and delivery 
from the care ethics mode of practical moral reasoning. 
 
Feminist criminology  
Although criminal punishment is a comparatively small section of feminist 
criminology, it has previously been considered in relation to care ethics. British 
criminologist Frances Heidensohn offered a view of criminal justice processes from 
both liberal justice (Portia) and connected, less formal, care ethics (Persephone) 
model (1986), arguing that greater attention ought to be paid to the relational and 
caring aspects of the ‘Persephone’ model of justice. M. Kay Harris suggests including 
                                                     
5
 The European Court of Human Rights condemned the suspension of convicted prisoners’ voting 
rights in England & Wales on this ground, since this response does not take account of the gravity of 
the offence or length of prison sentence (Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) 19 BHRC 546 at 41). 
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the values associated with the ‘care/response’ mode of reasoning (Harris 2003, 
p.34), to raise awareness of the role of society in the development of conflicts such 
as criminal offending (Harris 2003, p.35). We will see this resonates with Anthony 
Duff’s concern for systematic social exclusion (2001, pp.75–6), noted in Chapter one 
and developed in Chapter five. Heidensohn also recognizes that criminal justice 
proceedings involve matters of social justice (1986, p.297).  
 
Building on Heidensohn’s work, Guy Masters & David Smith invite us to temper the 
processes of justice (Portia) with the values of care (Persephone) (1998, p.21). The 
obvious place to look for care in punishment is restorative justice, with its clear 
focus on repairing harms and restoring victims. Masters & Smith’s article, and 
Masters’ doctoral dissertation (Masters 1997), focuses on restorative practices of 
mediation, conferencing and circle sentencing, described as relational justice 
practices, which they draw together with John Braithwaite’s reintegrative shaming 
(1989) and Carol Gilligan’s ethic of care (1982). I draw on Jennifer Llewellyn’s 
framing of restorative justice as a relational practice in the discussion of relational 
equality (2012) in Chapter two. 
 
The proposal I offer here refers to mainstream post-conviction procedures around 
punishment decision-making and delivery. Kathleen Daly has forcefully argued that 
gendered understandings of ‘care’ and liberal ‘justice’ were unhelpful, but 
contended that ‘the female voice is the voice of criminal justice practices’ (Daly 
1989, p.2) since courts already consider the particular details of each unique 
offence. I shall suggest this focuses on the social context of the offence, rather than 
including offenders’ interpretations of their own personal contexts. Daly stresses 
that the work of this voice, expressing relational concerns, needs to be 
documented, understood and analysed (Daly 1989, p.13). Julie Stubbs & Kathleen 
Daly argue that Gilligan’s ‘different voice’ metaphor was ‘superseded by more 
complex and contingent analysis of ethics and moral reasoning’ (Daly & Stubbs 
2007, p.153) during the 1990s, criticizing Masters & Smith’s use of Gilligan’s work in 
their 1998 article. Yet their article builds on Heidensohn’s earlier work, and the 
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metaphor of Portia and Persephone eloquently captures the essential features of 
two contrasting perspectives.  
 
Margaret Urban Walker identifies an overlap between the practices and language of 
restorative justice and the moral perspective of caring (Walker 2006, p.146). While 
stressing no intention to claim ‘that what [was] “really” going on … is care ethics’, 
she indicates the overlapping moral content with care ethics, allowing a hearing of 
‘values wholly consistent with and central to’ caring, not necessarily afforded ‘when 
advanced as care ethics’ (Walker 2006, p.154). I draw on the practices and values of 
care ethics, as mapped out by Joan Tronto, to show the presence of care in many 
punishment practices, not just restorative justice.  
 
Hudson raises particular concerns around ‘insufficient regard for offenders’ 
interests and moral status’ (Hudson 2003a, p.206), particularly within restorative 
justice (Hudson 2003b, p.187). I shall suggest that care ethics’ ontological 
expectations about individuals and contextual method of practical moral reasoning 
offer one way of attempting inclusion. I believe the guidance principles I shall 
develop from care ethics can help us to recognize offenders’ moral status as equals, 
by avoiding exclusion and objectification; and providing treatment as equals and 
interactional justice more reliably than existing practices. 
 
More broadly, feminist criminology has taken a specifically gendered perspective, 
employing a gendered lens, through which to consider two core problems. Firstly, 
‘the generalizability problem’ (Daly & Chesney-Lind 1988, p.508): is it appropriate to 
employ theories of crime developed through the study of men and boys, to women 
and girls? Secondly, ‘the gender ratio problem’ (Daly & Chesney-Lind 1988, p.508) 
or gender gap (Heidensohn & Silvestri 2012, p.339): how can we explain the 
empirical observation that men commit more crimes than women? Women 
generally commit fewer, less serious and less violent crimes than men, and the 
offending behaviour of women and girls peaks earlier (mid-teens) than the 
offending of men and boys (late-teens) (Gelsthorpe & Sharpe 2006, p.50). 
Heidensohn problematized the practical treatment of women within criminal 
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justice. While strides have been made in bringing the status of women up to that of 
men in the eyes of the law, Heidensohn argues women defendants are judged 
according to androcentric norms, rather than the neutral norms that classical 
liberalism claims (1986, p.294). Feminist criminology has explored the treatment 
and experiences of women offenders and the ‘double punishment’ (Heidensohn 
1986, p.291) for criminal and social ‘double deviance’ (Gelsthorpe 2004, p.16; 
Heidensohn & Silvestri 2012, p.351), in relation to the generalization and gender 
ratio problems. Baroness Corston also suggests that the proposed changes could be 
applied to other groups of prisoners, notably young men (2007, chap.5 & 6).  
 
Adrian Howe credits Pat Carlen with putting ‘women’s imprisonment firmly and 
decisively on the critical penal agenda’ (1994, p.215). Carlen reports evidence of 
infantilization of women prisoners, reporting one extreme example of the Governor 
of a Women’s prison conceiving the establishment as ‘an extended family … or a 
boarding school’, a ‘blatantly patriarchal attitude’ (1990, p.110). Separately, Carlen 
notes problems in community punishment for women offenders. Some probation 
officers were reluctant to recommend community service for women where 
projects lacked childcare facilities. Some officers felt projects permitting women to 
bring their children would unfairly require women to do unpaid work and care for 
their children at the same time. Other work supervisors would only take women 
offenders on work placements if there was some ‘traditional 'women’s work' 
available’ (Carlen 1990, p.75).  
 
Gender 
While Heidensohn & Silvestri remind us that a key contribution of feminist 
criminology ‘is the push to recognize gender is a social construct and not simply a 
statistical 'variable'’ (2012, p.338), Sandra Walklate cautions that gender is not the 
only variable with explanatory power (2004, p.10). Both claims resonate with the 
understanding of gender as a socially constructed variable, including socially and 
culturally learned behaviours, and intersecting with other socially constructed 
identities. The social category of ‘gender’ divides ‘people into two differentiated 
groups, 'men' and 'women'’ (Davis et al. 2006, p.2). This hierarchical social 
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construction is ‘maintained by both the dominants and the oppressed because both 
ascribe to its values in personality and identity formation’ (2006, p.2). The gender 
binary influences our self-understanding, as well as informing all other areas of our 
personal relationships and public lives, which are organized according to these 
socially constructed differences. Gender is one of many such socially constructed 
hierarchies, and such socially constructed binaries can be problematic since often 
the ‘foundational assumptions and ubiquitous processes are invisible, unquestioned 
and unexamined’ (2006, p.2). As Heidensohn & Silvestri note: ‘we need to raise at 
least as many points about what happens to men, especially if they are young and 
poor, and come from minorities, as we do about women’ (2012, p.361). 
 
Gender binaries interact with other socially constructed differences: ‘racial 
categorization, ethnic grouping, economic class, age, religion, and sexual 
orientation’, interact ‘to produce a complex hierarchical system of dominance and 
subordination’ (Davis et al. 2006, p.2). I will argue for the importance of attending 
to offenders’ identification of the relevant parts of their own narrative, and their 
interpretation of their own personal context. This offers instrumentally useful 
information for punishment, and also provides a means to respect the individual’s 
knowledge and expertise in their own position, and to treat them as equals. Yet our 
narratives are at least in part socially constructed (Sherwin 1998, pp.34–5). Shared 
understandings of socially constructed differences intersect and interact to 
influence and inform our individual, lived experiences.  
 
Walklate restates her note of caution that while gender is a significant variable, it is 
not the only one. She concludes her book Gender, Crime and Criminal Justice by 
noting some issues which her gendered approach has drawn out. While I do not 
provide a specifically gendered approach, these allow me to make some remarks 
about what I provide in this thesis. Firstly Walklate raises a ‘need for an 
appreciation of both diversity and specificity’ (2004, p.209). The ontological 
expectations of individuals from the perspective of care ethics anticipate that each 
person will be socially embedded within a network of relationships with others with 
whom they are interdependent. Attempting to understand any individual apart 
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from these relationships, the social reality they construct and share with others and 
other personal contextual information is not possible. I shall argue that 
proportionate punishment without this understanding of the individual is not 
possible. Accessing this information by respectfully engaging with offenders, as I will 
argue a care ethics approach prompts, is a means to providing interactional justice 
and hears the offender as an equal.  
 
The care ethics approach I offer prioritizes the gathering of specific personal and 
social contextual information to inform decision-making practices. This allows room 
for hearing directly about the diverse experiences of individuals, and for including 
and exploring the ways in which these are socially constructed and individually 
interpreted. I shall argue that mainstream practices risk partly objectifying 
offenders. This objectification will have a greater impact (cause more harm and give 
rise to needs the individual cannot address alone) where the offender is already 
disadvantaged: on the weaker side of power inequalities, on the lower end of 
socially constructed hierarchies and with fewer socially acceptable conventional 
options (Heidensohn 1986, p.290). Heidensohn observes that core examples of such 
disadvantaged positions include women, ethnic minorities, unskilled workers and 
young people (1986, p.291). The argument in this thesis proceeds at a relatively 
abstract level, precisely to leave room for practitioners to use active, respectful 
listening, and to take account of a variety of contextual details including the impact 
of intersecting socially constructed hierarchies. These are precisely the concrete 
details of personal and social context, the ‘specific circumstances’ which care ethics 
anticipates ‘will raise the quality of judgement’ (Sevenhuijsen 1998, p.60), and 
ideally gathered through respectful open engagement with the other. By bringing 
the different perspectives of offender and sentencer (or practitioner) together, as I 
shall propose, we may increase our chance of identifying ‘unquestioned’ 
assumptions which perpetuate oppression and disadvantage, causing harms and 
giving rise to needs. As Benhabib observes, ‘more knowledge rather than less 
contributes to a more rational and informed judgment’ (1986, p.417). 
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Secondly Walklate notes a concern to draw ideas from outside criminology into the 
field in order to enrich debate. She suggests ‘Cain (1989) was certainly correct in her 
assertion that feminism transgresses criminology, as was Smart (1990) in her 
assertion that criminology needs feminism more than feminism needs criminology’ 
(Walklate 2004, p.210; citing Cain 1989, p.1; Smart 1990, p.84). I propose bringing 
care ethics from feminist ethics into mainstream post-conviction, punishment 
decision-making and delivery practices. This aims to better explain punishment 
practices and offers a means of providing treatment as equals to offenders. Thirdly, 
Walklate raises the question of whether politics will work ‘progressively or 
regressively’ (2004, p.210) in engaging with, and applying, criminological findings. 
Since Walklate observes that progressive or regressive application of findings 
depends on the willingness of politicians (2004, p.210), I have provided a starting 
proposal for policy discussion. 
 
Finally, Heidensohn notes of Shiner, ‘women are generally invisible in most’ 
mainstream male criminological work (Heidensohn 2006, p.1, quoting a personal 
communication with Shiner 2005). We may consider that offenders are in some 
ways somewhat similarly politically and socially, ‘generally invisible’ as citizens, non-
citizen community members and persons during punishment. I will argue that 
mainstream practices are desensitized to harms and further risk objectifying 
offenders. In this way, we fail to treat them as equals qua persons. It is this 
exclusion which interests me, and which I seek to acknowledge and address. In this 
thesis I will consider the risks to offenders of all social backgrounds, of being 
objectified and/or harmed by mainstream criminal justice practices. These harms 
will have different impacts for offenders with different social backgrounds, and 
different positions in socially constructed hierarchies. An offender’s social context 
will in part inform the resources they are able to draw on in response to needs. 
Whether these resources allow for the individual’s personal needs-meeting, 
through either self-care or self-arranged and funded care, or whether the individual 
will need assistance to overcome the harms they encounter.  
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The present thesis 
The theory advanced here begins from an offender’s conviction, and considers how 
best to respond to the needs associated with the offence. I shall identify the 
essential practices of caring within contemporary punishment practices, and 
employ the values and practical moral reasoning of care ethics to propose 
systematic guidance for post-conviction mainstream processes, in order to facilitate 
the treatment of offenders as equals. My work acknowledges both small and large-
scale contextual details, aiming to treat offenders as equals. Care ethics offers a 
framework for thinking differently about punishment decision-making and delivery. 
By thinking about punishment differently, I shall argue that we can raise our 
chances of including offenders as equals, as intended and claimed by existing 
mainstream classical liberal informed criminal justice practices.  
 
Since punishment is a response to offenders following offences, I argue it is 
unrealistic to expect this response alone to meet victims’ needs. While the 
community will in some cases bear responsibility for helping to meet victims’ needs, 
this may be best done outside of punishment, which addresses offenders. Because 
my work here is on punishment, I do not discuss how victims’ needs ought to be 
met. Victims’ needs, greater victim inclusion (which I note is important and 
desirable) and questions of criminalization and liability are topics for future 
research, and fall outside the scope of my present project.  
 
I do not claim that the principles I derive from care ethics to guide punishment 
decision-making are the only principles available from care ethics, or that care 
ethics is the only method of arriving at a similar approach. I believe that other 
theoretical routes could potentially achieve similar principles to those derived from 
care ethics here. Broader relational theory (Koggel 1998; Llewellyn 2012) might 
have been employed. Similar results might have been achieved through the work of 
Hume and the Scottish Sentimentalists, who made cases for values similar to those 
of care ethics.6 Indeed, Tronto draws on the Scottish Sentimentalists to illustrate 
                                                     
6
 I do not claim that it is possible to achieve similar results through these approaches, only that it 
appears as though this may be a possibility. 
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that care ethics values are not gendered (Tronto 1993, pp.35–50), and Noddings 
draws on Hume’s cultivation of moral sentiment to illustrate how caring practices 
might be learned (Noddings 2002, p.24). I adopted the care ethics approach given 
the presence of care practices in punishment practices. Care practices are obscured 
and devalued by harm-centred definitions of punishment, which also desensitize 
our perception of harm. Care ethics, however, leaves room for both recognizing 
harms, as necessary for acknowledging and addressing needs and providing care. 
 
 
Chapter summary 
Chapter one begins by considering existing penal theory and the guidance 
retributivist and consequentialist perspectives provide for sentencers in considering 
how to punish. I introduce the concepts of personal and social context as they will 
be used in this thesis, and pay particular attention to the theories of Anthony Duff 
(in particular 2001), and John Braithwaite with Phillip Pettit (in particular 1990), 
since these theories explicitly consider the inclusive treatment of offenders. The 
‘harm-like’ component of most leading definitions of punishment is challenged. I 
argue this adds little and obscures the potential for non-harm practices such as 
caring. Harm-centred definitions of punishment normalize ambiguous levels of 
harms to offenders, making theories built on this understanding insufficiently 
sensitive to morally problematic, non-trivial harms. This treats offenders as less-
than equal, persons who may be acceptably harmed. By failing to acknowledge 
and/or address this harm, we confirm this less-than evaluation, treating offenders 
as objects. Objectifying unacceptably fails to treat offenders as equals. To identify 
the kinds of conduct which might treat offenders as equals, I introduce the concept 
of interactional justice. This will be used in Chapter four to highlight what may be 
missing from mainstream processes. Given the risks of morally problematic harm 
under harm-centred definitions, I propose an alternative procedural-only definition 
of punishment, which presumes no particular substantive content. I note the steps 
forward made by some bottom-up practices for responding to offending in treating 
offenders inclusively.  
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Chapter two provides some background on care ethics, and develops the 
conceptual anatomy of care ethics. The method of moral reasoning and ontological 
expectations of persons distinguishes classical liberalism from care ethics (and other 
relational) approaches. I explore treatment as equals in the light of relational 
understandings of concern, respect and dignity, and the prioritization of contextual 
information for relational perspectives. Given these differences, classical liberal and 
care ethics perspectives each offer different approaches to what constitutes the 
equal ‘concern and respect’ (Dworkin 2000, p.227). Ronald Dworkin tells us that 
equal concern and respect represents ‘treatment as equals’ (2000, p.227), which 
Dworkin argues the state ought to provide to citizens (2001, p.6). This state 
treatment as equals is relevant since in criminal punishment, the state interacts 
with citizen and non-citizen community members. These differences, and Daniel 
Engster’s definition and aims of care, will ultimately inform the principles derived 
from care at the end of Chapter two. I note some criticisms of care ethics, and offer 
a systematic presentation of the limits of caring identified in the literature.  
 
I discuss positive limits of caring, which help us to identify who is ‘best-placed’, 
according to association, suitability and the gravity of needs, to provide care. With 
the contextual information prioritized by care ethics, this helps to identify who 
should do what and when, rather than requiring an empty form of blanket civility. I 
discuss negative limits, which acknowledge and respond to non-ideal, practical 
limits on the care we can provide; and operational limits, the practical limits which 
may arise from non-ideal applications of caring. These limits leave room for 
identifying harm in caring practices and reasoning. I argue a response to these limits 
is implied by the care ethics conceptual anatomy, ontological expectations and 
method of practical moral reasoning. A process of initial (before application) and 
ongoing (during the process of caring) review, providing self-scrutiny and supportive 
mutual moderation, helps to identify poor practices, which in turn implies our best 
available response to address the harms caused. From the method of practical 
moral reasoning and conceptual anatomy, based on care ethics’ ontological 
expectations, I draw a generic set of principles to guide decision-making and action. 
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These will be developed in Chapter four to apply specifically to punishment 
decision-making and delivery. 
 
Chapter three offers a brief note on penal history in England & Wales. This provides 
useful context for understanding the changes in recent years in the delivery of 
community and prison sentences, and will help track the presence of caring 
practices. Having argued in Chapter one that punishment may cause significant, 
non-trivial harms, which may be morally problematic, I briefly indicate some of the 
problems that can typically arise from standard punishment practices. I then offer 
an analysis of the ideals and aims imprisonment, community punishment, and of 
restorative justice in turn, identifying the presence of caring practices within, and as 
necessary to, each punishment practice. The explicit identification of caring 
practices as necessary parts of punishment, particularly imprisonment practices. 
 
Chapter four develops the general principles I drew from care ethics in Chapter two, 
and contains the core arguments of my thesis. I begin by noting the importance of 
contextual information in mainstream criminal justice, but criticizing present 
attempts to gather such information in mainstream practices in England & Wales. 
Present means of gathering this information has strong potential to at least partly 
silence, exclude and objectify offenders, thereby failing to provide interactional 
justice. Because our criminal justice system prioritizes liberal values of non-
interference, our interactions with offenders are reduced (limiting opportunity for 
interactional justice). This becomes more troubling when combined with a 
definition of punishment insensitive to morally problematic harms. Drawing on 
Benhabib’s generalized and concrete understandings of others (1986, p.414), I 
argue for the importance of gathering contextual information directly from 
offenders by listening respectfully to their telling of parts of their narrative. This 
gathers instrumentally valuable information, and offers a means to provide 
interactional justice.  
 
I discuss how we might punish with care, and develop the principles derived from 
care ethics in Chapter two for application to punishment contexts. Yet punishment 
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is more than caring, and I note that censure and disapproval of criminal conduct can 
also be grounded in care ethics aims. Building on my procedural-only definition of 
punishment, which presumes no particular substantive content, I offer three 
arguments, principled, political and pragmatic for responding to offenders with care 
and without harm in all cases; and note the benefits this offers over harm-based 
punishments.  
 
I turn next to address some core concerns about these principles, and limits for 
their use in response to these concerns. I discuss the similarities and differences 
between caring for citizens in general and offenders in particular. I suggest that, 
when the needs of victims and offenders inescapably conflict, we can help resolve 
the practical difficulty of how to act by prioritizing the protection of basic rights and 
the needs of the more vulnerable party. I then argue that, despite these concerns, 
we ought to punish all offenders with care, in order to treat them as equals.  
 
Some readers may be concerned that proportional punishment may be damaged if 
we include elements of offenders’ personal and social context. I argue that, with a 
slightly revised understanding of proportionality and a more detailed, particularistic 
assessment of the ‘seriousness’ of punishment, the intuition can still be followed, 
and still has useful features. Classically, punishment seriousness is measured in 
terms of anticipated harm. While this measure is generalized and I propose a 
contextualised, offender-specific approach, retaining an element of likely harm in 
the description of punishment is consistent with my procedural-only definition, and 
importantly ensures that we do not forget the reality that most punishments do 
cause harms, the level of which should be open to moral scrutiny.  
 
Classical, generalized proportionality maybe employed to provide maximum 
punishments, and the traditional scale of punishments can help us to identify 
punishments expected to cause less harm in general, in cases where the anticipated 
harm for a particular offender is morally significant. Both features can help to 
minimize avoidable harm, consistent with care ethics aims. I note three key 
normative limits to listening to offenders’ narratives: cases where the offenders’ 
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speech fails to treat others as equals, where the offender unfairly minimizes the 
harm for which they are criminally responsible, or where the offender is 
demonstrated to be grossly and maliciously lying. 
 
One core problem that arises is that mainstream practices offer some protection to 
offenders, against bias and state intrusion, through treating offenders as 
generalized. Once we include offenders’ context, to treat offenders as equals, avoid 
harms and identify needs, we risk exposing the offender to these problems. I cannot 
detail a full response to this concern here, but I sketch some possibilities for 
addressing this difficulty. Firstly, classical generalized proportionality might be 
treated as a maximum punishment. Offenders’ context may allow generally less 
‘serious’ but not more ‘serious’ punishments, where seriousness is assessed in the 
classical generalised anticipated harm sense, in line with the care ethics end of 
avoiding preventable harm. Secondly, the protection of offenders’ basic rights 
might help to protect offenders against the intrusion and bias risked on the context 
specific approach I propose, in the same way this might help to protect victims’ 
needs when offenders’ and victims’ needs conflict. Thirdly, the needs and basic 
rights of the more vulnerable party might be prioritized. I also note the difficulty of 
coerced caring, given that punishment is compulsory, and finish with further 
remarks on victims’ needs.  
 
From the care ethics perspective we should be equally concerned to learn about, 
consider and respond to victims’ needs, considering them equally with the needs of 
others as part of the total distribution of needs. Ideally offenders should be involved 
in meeting victims’ needs. But because, as many authors observe, apology and 
forgiveness are ‘gifts’ which cannot be demanded (eg Braithwaite 2002b, p.570), it 
may not be appropriate for the state to shape or script an offender’s response to 
victims’ needs as a part of punishment. Where offenders will not or cannot help to 
meet victims’ needs, I will argue the community bears some responsibility to meet 
victims’ needs. This follows the positive limits of care; the community has an 
appropriate association with crime victims, is suitable by virtue of appropriate skills 
and resources, and the gravity of victims needs requires that these are met. 
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Sentencers should avoid frustrating attempts to address victims’ needs outside of 
the criminal justice response. 
 
Chapter five explores how the principles advanced in this thesis are compatible 
with, develop and extend the existing penal theories of Duff, and Braithwaite & 
Pettit. Duff is concerned with systematic social exclusions (2001, pp.75–6); I argue 
that my work allows us to take account of lesser social exclusions, which 
nonetheless are relevant to the offender’s context, potentially extending Duff’s 
work. The proposals I offer in Chapter six for pre-sentence dialogue resonate with 
Duff’s proposal for occasional negotiated sentences.  
 
Braithwaite & Pettit share my concern for the inclusion of offenders, although I 
note their concern to express their theory in specifically civic republican terms, 
reflecting their broader project. I argue that the ongoing review implicit in care 
practices can contribute to their concern for the checking of power, by providing 
information about where these might be best used, and for consideration in formal 
processes. The aims of informal review practices implied in care ethics is to avoid 
new harms may also help to strengthen Braithwaite & Pettit’s position against lack 
of power-checking and the possibility of sentence inflation that von Hirsch & 
Ashworth note.  
 
Both Duff and Braithwaite & Pettit, however, build their theories not only on harm-
centred definitions of punishment, but on liberal expectations of the individual. 
Adopting a relational, connected approach resonates with Braithwaite & Pettit’s 
holistic, inclusive civic republican approach, and Duff’s communitarian concerns. I 
note the clear overlaps between the care ethics approach I advocate and three 
leading psychological models for offender treatment. Even the least similar model 
recognizes and values the quality of relationships between practitioners and 
offenders. I finish with a consideration of blame. Hannah Pickard’s innovative work 
allows us to separate the negative stigmatizing effects of blame from holding others 
responsible for wrongful conduct, even when applying negative consequences in 
response to wrongful behaviour. Pickard identifies this in the treatment of 
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personality disordered patients. Treatment presupposes that individuals are 
responsible for their behaviour, but stigmatization is counter-productive to 
treatment. Pickard & Lacey have already proposed exporting this practice of 
blaming to criminal justice. I suggest this practice might be used in care-guided 
punishments, allowing us to censure and disapprove criminal acts, while minimizing 
harmful stigmatization. 
 
Chapters six and seven respectively draw on secondary social science literature to 
discuss the decision-making and delivery practices of bottom-up punishment 
practices, including restorative justice, community justice, therapeutic 
jurisprudence and problem-solving courts, which better deliver treatment as equals 
for offenders. These practices are explored for similarities with, and divergences 
from, the principles advanced in Chapter four. In so far as the principles are 
reflected, it is possible to test how these function in practice, and whether 
unintended or side-consequences tend to cause difficulty in practice. This provides 
a limited opportunity to offer some assessment of the principles, and indicate 
possible refinements. I suggest the care ethics value of competence may help 
strengthen the reduced oversight mechanisms in bottom-up processes. The self-
scrutiny and mutual monitoring of care ethics review processes may help in 
mainstream practices, which only implicitly value contextual information. Care 
ethics approaches also explicitly reinforce listening respectfully, which is necessary 
for providing interactional justice and avoiding objectification. I close Chapter 6 with 
a proposal for pre-sentence dialogue, to develop information gathering for 
mainstream sentencing along the lines of the principles derived from the ethic of 
care. 
 
In Chapter seven I observe how far the delivery of bottom-up practices considered 
in Chapter six fit with the care ethics guidelines I propose. Self-scrutiny and mutual 
moderation may help to inform and strengthen procedural protections for 
offenders in mainstream justice. While no approach is perfect, care ethics is better 
placed to guard against mistakes. The care ethics approach acknowledges the 
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likelihood of misapplications, and contains an internal, principled commitment to 
identifying and addressing problems, rather than as an external policy aim.  
 
 
A note on language  
Before commencing the main body of the thesis, I must make some remarks about 
my use of the term ‘offender’. Of itself, this term is stigmatizing, degrading, 
potentially insulting and potentially an inaccurate description of a person in the 
present. This might describe one brief moment of a person’s past, and yet we label 
and define the individual indefinitely on this basis. The term ex-offender, indicating 
a convicted offender, is a very minor improvement, still carrying the same stigma, 
and can be similarly degrading. Through labels like this we force individuals to 
consider themselves permanently in relation to some increasingly distant past 
event, ignoring all other substantive content about the individual. I recall vividly 
being asked by a frustrated Nacro helpline caller ‘When? When do I become an ‘ex-
offender’?’ Naively, I took the question to be about the rehabilitation period 
specified under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. What the caller wanted to 
know was when society would treat them as an ordinary person, as an equal; a 
question I could not answer.  
 
During the preparation of this thesis I have noticed debate among criminal justice 
practitioners, about what a more appropriate term might be. About the best 
alternative to ‘ex-offender’ I have seen is the rather cumbersome ‘people who have 
offended’.7 ‘People who have offended’ is a preferable term to ‘offender’ because it 
is inclusive and recognizes the offence as a past occurrence; not definitive of the 
individual’s present or future, or indeed of the whole person. However in this 
thesis, I continue to use the term ‘offender’.  
 
                                                     
7
 I would personally prefer, ‘people’, since criminal behaviour appears to be a normal, ie statistically 
significant minority human behaviour. A study carried out for the Ministry of Justice shows that 33% 
of men and 9% of women born in 1953 had been convicted (Ministry of Justice 2010, p.1).  
38 
 
Primarily I employ the term ‘offender’ for consistency with the present literature. I 
believe there is a case for changing the terms employed in scholarly debate, but this 
thesis is not that place, especially given the challenges I make to the definition of 
punishment. Secondly, my work focuses in part on punishment decision-making and 
I have used the term ‘offender’ for consistency with practice. At the start of the 
trial, the defendant is accused of having been an offender on a specified past 
occasion. On conviction, the defendant is identified as this past offender and 
sentenced accordingly. Although not often considered, this may be understood 
specifically as a reference to the person in the past, not the present. My work also 
considered the treatment of persons during their sentence, and how punishment 
practitioners might use the same guidelines to provide non-objectifying treatment 
as equals. Again, I use the term offender for consistency with practice. It will be also 
somewhat less laborious for the reader to use one word rather than four to identify 
the concrete individuals in the discussion to which I now turn.  
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Chapter One 
 
 
Slipping the shackles: the problems with penal 
philosophy 
 
 
What values should inform us, and what practical guidance is provided for, 
punishment decision-making and delivery? This chapter will argue that core existing 
theories of punishment provide relatively little guidance about how we should treat 
offenders during punishment decision-making and delivery. This is not to say the 
appropriate treatment of victims and communities is irrelevant or unimportant for 
the reading of care ethics for which I will argue: without doubt, these are. 
 
I focus on the nature of our punishment interactions with offenders. The approach 
presented here begins following conviction. How should we determine how to 
punish this offender for that offence? How should we treat or interact with 
offenders during punishment decision-making and delivery? I will argue that 
common definitions of punishment artificially restrict our conception of punishment 
to thinking in terms of harm. This definition normalizes harm, desensitizes us to 
harm, and makes morally significant harm harder to recognize. Additionally, harm 
restricts our view of what punishment may be, by obscuring caring practices. 
Without normative guidance about how to acknowledge or avoid harm, our ability 
to treat offenders as equals qua equal human beings is threatened by these limits. 
This is problematic for any social democratic or liberal theory claiming to treat 
persons as equals before the law. 
 
 
Existing penal theory 
I begin by discussing archetypes of mainstream penal theory, from the classical 
perspectives of retributivism and consequentialism. Both perspectives have shaped 
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and contributed to our existing practices. Retributivism provides proportionate, 
horizontal equality concerns, and consequentialism has influenced various attempts 
to reform, rehabilitate or ‘treat’ offenders, from behavioural psychology to welfare 
approaches. These leading conceptions of punishment have been dominant in 
different periods. Consequentialist conceptions were to the fore during Garland’s 
penal welfarism, focusing on rehabilitating and treating offenders (1890 - 1970) 
(2003, p.3). Retributive ‘hard-treatment’ ideals, particularly Du Cane’s8  prison 
regime, with solitary confinement and work deliberately ‘tedious, unpleasant and 
unconstructive’ (Edwards & Hurley 1982)9 competed in the Victorian era  with ideals 
of prisoner welfare and reform (Hostettler 2009, p.244). Retributive influences 
reappear in the New Right ideologies of the 1970s and 1980s (Garland 2003, 
pp.120–1; Easton & Piper 2008, p.43).10  
 
Retributivist and consequentialist archetypes are discussed to reflect on the 
guidance these perspectives provide for the treatment of offenders as equals during 
punishment decision-making and delivery. I will argue that both retributivism and 
consequentialism are relatively silent on the nature of our interactions with 
offenders, and on what information is needed and how this is gathered. I examine 
how far implicit and explicit organizing principles of existing penal theory provide 
guidance for punishment decision-making and delivery, which: 
 
I. Allows conceptual space for practical caring work and 
identification of problematic, morally significant harms 
II. Facilitates inclusive, non-objectifying treatment as equals qua 
human beings for offenders 
 
I shall argue that existing mainstream penal philosophy provides restricted guidance 
for punishment decision-making and delivery, threatening our ability to treat 
                                                     
8
 Director on the Board of Convict Prisons since 1863, Du Cane became Chairman in 1869, and was 
the first Chairman of the Board of Prison Commissioners, between 1877 and 1895 (Cross 1971, p.7 
p.13).  
9
 However it must be noted that this regime provided prisoners with basic security and hygiene, not 
guaranteed in earlier prison regimes, reflecting the move towards penal welfarism. 
10
 Recent penal history is summarized briefly in the opening of Chapter three. 
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offenders as equals, before considering the definition of punishment, exploring the 
theoretical problem from first principles.  
 
 
Retributive, past-regarding theories 
Retributivism is a deontic justification for punishment. Yet punishments may be 
retributive in two senses: distribution (punishing only offenders) (Hart 1978, p.9), or 
nature (requiring hard treatment) (Daly 2003b, p.199). For retributivists, offenders 
are punished (and non-offenders not) as the morally appropriate response. Hence 
retributivists speak of offenders’ ‘right’ to punishment (Hegel 1967, p.71), following 
their autonomously chosen offending. Without holding offenders accountable 
where we would hold ourselves accountable, we fail to treat offenders as equals 
(Moore 1997, p.165).  
 
Retribution provides for principled non-punishment of the innocent, since non-
offenders do not deserve (have no right to) punishment. Retributive theory has its 
roots in the lex talionis concept of Roman law. As the adage ‘an eye for an eye’ 
suggests, offences are revisited upon offenders in measure and kind. While there is 
no ‘like for like’ punishment for driving without insurance, retributivism provides 
valuable ideas of horizontal equality (those committing similar offences should 
receive similar punishment) and proportionality (serious offences warrant ‘stronger’ 
punishment than minor ones).  
 
For strong retributivists (eg Moore 1997) desert is necessary and sufficient to justify 
punishment. Ted Honderich criticizes this justification as circular, since it essentially 
argues that punishment is justly deserved, because offenders (morally) deserve 
punishment (2006, p.24). For weak retributivists, desert is necessary for 
punishment, but not sufficient. Other supplementary justifications may include: 
deterrence (von Hirsch 1995, p.13); tacit rights forfeiture (eg Goldman 1982, pp.67–
8) following criminal violation of others’ rights; or removing ‘advantages’ (eg Morris 
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1968, p.478) gained through non-cooperative free-riding (Matravers 2000, p.246) 
disrupting the balance11 of resources and opportunities.  
 
Retributive-informed punishment stresses proportionality, but proportional to 
what? The most common answer is the harm caused in light of the offender’s 
culpability. Robert Nozick suggests that proportional punishment is determined by  
r x H (1981, p.363): ‘r’ represents offender responsibility (a variable that could take 
account of both culpability and mitigation) and ‘H’ is the harm caused, later 
expanded to include harms caused and harms intended (1981, p.389). However, 
harm is neither a simple scalar variable nor easy to measure.  
 
Nigel Walker complains it is unclear how different penalties relate to each other in 
seriousness: is six months’ imprisonment twice the suffering of three months and 
two-thirds that of nine months? How do fines compare? Further, how do harms 
caused by offences relate: is theft or assault more harmful? Finally, how do these 
separate scales of offences and punishment relate to one another (Walker 1991, 
p.102)? Andrew von Hirsch argues that there is no reason why the scale of 
punishments should be broad or include ‘harsh’ penalties, advocating a modest 
punishment scale with a future-regarding ‘prudential disincentive’, supplementing 
the primary moral-desert retributive justification for punishment (von Hirsch 1993, 
p.13, p.42). Retributivism offers neither a minimum nor maximum penalty, nor a 
metric to calculate what punishment applies. Measurement difficulties persist and 
there is no retributive reason to prefer a modest distribution. 
 
How should we punish for retributive theories? 
If we are to design sentences proportionate to harm and culpability, then we must 
consider three factors. Firstly, why proportional harm? Retributivism, it is argued, 
reflects a strong intuition that offenders ought morally to be punished (eg Moore 
1997, p.163). This implies an official response that acknowledges and censures the 
wrong, and perhaps makes offenders pay. It does not follow that ‘payment’ requires 
                                                     
11 Assuming socio-economic balances of advantages exist, are simple enough to calculate and 
possible to restore (Dagger 1993, pp.480–2).  
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harm (Bennett 2004, p.326). We could equally require proportionate apology, 
restitution or Duff’s ‘secular penance’ (2001, p.106), and there is no shortage of 
moral positions advocating harm avoidance.12 Even if we have a strong intuition 
that offenders should suffer, it does not follow that this is morally appropriate.  
 
Secondly, if we accept that punishment ought to be proportional in terms of harm 
and culpability, which harms count? Offending harms direct victims and 
communities, and offenders, in many forms.13 Which should we include? Nozick 
gives some account for this in his formula for proportional punishment, by including 
both harm caused and harm intended (1981, p.389). But no adequate explanation is 
offered as to why some kinds of harm (harms to persons other than the direct 
victim; harm to the community; emotional harms; damage to social trust?) should 
be left out.  
 
Thirdly, identical punishments affect different individuals in unique ways, reflecting 
offenders’ internal dispositions (Bentham 1996, p.600). Alternatively, different 
impacts may follow from the offender’s external, personal circumstances: relations 
with others (perhaps family or employers), future implications (eg job loss) and the 
impact on offenders’ resources or ability to meet their own needs (eg to find 
housing). These side consequences are termed ‘incidental punishment’ by Walker 
(1991, p.108). 
 
Horizontal equality demands like cases should be treated alike, but what does it 
mean for two punishments to be ‘alike’ if they can be experienced differently? To 
design punishment to produce particular effects requires an understanding of 
offenders’ personal and social contexts. This allows consideration of how Walker’s 
incidental punishment is likely (although not certain) to affect this particular 
individual. Without this, calculating punishments to be experienced as proportional, 
                                                     
12
 Consider Christ's injunction to turn the other cheek, or the Wiccan Rede to harm none. For a 
variety of religious perspectives on the ‘primacy of peacemaking’ see Mackay 2007, p.122 
13
 Anger or fear on the part of the victims, broken trust and outrage on the part of the community, 
and the regret or indignation of offenders (depending on their view of their conduct) (De Haan & 
Loader 2002, p.243). In addition there might be a financial impact, physical damage, loss or personal 
injury. 
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or with horizontal equality, is impossible (Walker 1991, p.110). It follows implicitly 
that sentencers must understand offenders’ context.14 Retributivist theory neither 
explicitly considers this complexity nor provides normative guidance for gathering 
contextual information about offenders.  
 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to make a brief diversion to explain what I intend 
by offenders’ personal context and broader social context. This is informed by care 
ethics, a perspective I shall introduce in Chapter two, and I shall keep my remarks to 
the minimum necessary to clarify the use of these terms here. Seyla Benhabib 
distinguishes two ways of conceptualizing persons. The generalized conception 
abstracts away the content of our lives identifying others as like us (1986, p.415).15 
We assume others have personal context: ‘concrete history, identity, and affective-
emotional constitution … specific needs, talents, and capacities’ (1986, p.411), but 
dismiss the content as morally irrelevant. Full personal and social contextual detail 
makes up the individual’s life story or narrative as a concrete other (1986, p.414). 
Individual narratives are shaped by, and entwined with, those of others, in the 
broader, social and political context, through our networks of relationships and 
membership of social groups (Koggel 1998, p.164). Our narratives must ‘cohere with 
reality’ to be understood by others (Baylis 2012, p.114). Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, 
p.213) stresses that we ‘co-author’ our narratives, which are at least partly socially 
and culturally constructed (Sherwin 1998, pp.34–5).  
 
I shall use ‘holistic’ in two separate contexts, both discussing a particular piece of 
information in context with other information. Firstly, personal contextual details 
are best considered in relation to all of the personal and social details of the 
individual. A particular need is best understood when considered holistically with 
information about the individual’s other needs, resources and capabilities for 
meeting them, and other responsibilities. For example, an individual need for 
                                                     
14
 Although retributivism still lacks a conversion metric between the scales of offence and 
punishment. 
15
 Sevenhuijsen similarly argues that universalist ethical perspectives abstract ‘from specific 
circumstances’ (1998, p.59), whereas we will see care ethics ‘stands with both feet in the real world’ 
(1998, p.59). 
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democratic inclusion is important. But an individual may rightly prioritize concerns 
about having enough to eat. In relation to personal context, or understanding 
individuals holistically, I shall intend this sense of taking together all the known 
information about the individual to consider them holistically as a whole concrete 
person. Separately, the social context can be considered ‘holistically’. We can 
consider the situation of a particular person in their broader social context: where 
are they located in a range of socially constructed hierarchies, and how does this 
impact the personal and social resources to which they have access? We can also 
consider the gravity of the needs of a particular individual in relation to the needs of 
others in their society, and importantly whether these conflict. For example, I might 
need support in addressing a substance misuse problem, but many more people in 
my society might need access to clean drinking water.  
 
Personal contextual details flesh us out as concrete individuals, and are necessary 
for decisions about how to act and interact with others. Ronald Dworkin implied 
that treatment as equals, or equal concern and respect (2000, p.227), requires us to 
take account of concrete differences using an example of two sick children. Dworkin 
argued that ‘if there is one dose of life-saving drug and two sick children, one at 
death's door and one merely uncomfortable’ (Coverdale 2013, p.72, my retelling of 
Dworkin’s example (Dworkin 2000, p.227)), then equal treatment such as tossing a 
coin to allocate the medicine, does not show equal concern and respect. This equal 
treatment misses the concrete differences between the children.  
 
For Dworkin's example, to provide treatment as equals we must contextualize each 
child’s ‘specific needs’ (Benhabib 1986, p.411). We consider the uncomfortable 
child’s personal needs in the social context of, or in relation to, the dying child’s 
needs. In order to treat offenders as equals we must likewise understand their 
personal context. Benhabib argues some concrete history and character 
information is necessary for making moral judgements (1986, p.414). This 
information makes up a part of the offender’s narrative, distinguishing the offender 
as a concrete individual. Which details are important will differ since each 
individual’s context is unique. Contextual information is necessary to understand 
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offenders as concrete others, providing the evidence-base necessary for treating 
offenders as equals: ‘more knowledge rather than less contributes to a more 
rational and informed judgement’ (Benhabib 1986, p.417). This basic outline of 
personal and social context information, as components of complete narratives and 
as necessary for treatment as equals, will be developed in Chapter two. But this is 
sufficient for following the present argument, to which I return. 
 
Perhaps, as a past-regarding theory, it is hard for retributivists to look as far forward 
as sentencing. Although retributive accounts of punishment do have valuable 
features, the only organizing principle offered is that punishments should be 
proportional, although it is not always clear to what or how this should be 
measured. This is not to say no suggestions are made: retributivists stress 
punishment should be proportional to the seriousness of the offence, as measured 
by offenders’ culpability for the gravity of harm caused. But they do not specify 
which harms should count or explain how to weigh or relate different harms. 
 
How far do the organizing principles identified for retributive theories provide 
guidance for punishment decision-making and delivery, which:  
 
I. Allows conceptual space for practical caring work and 
identification of problematic, morally significant harms 
II. Facilitates inclusive, non-objectifying treatment as equals qua 
human beings for offenders  
 
Retributivism is centrally concerned with harm and proportionality. Elements other 
than harm are visible, since retributivism acknowledges mitigating and aggravating 
factors. Yet these past circumstances are relevant insofar as they relate to the 
offence, not the offender. While retributivism is keenly interested in detail about 
offenders that indicate their culpability, these details are only of importance in their 
relevance to the offence, not as they are relevant to understanding the offender as 
a concrete person.  
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A conscientious retributive sentencer may seek offenders’ personal contextual 
information to understand how a punishment is likely to affect the offender. But 
retributivism’s lack of interest in the outcomes for offenders militates against this. 
Retributivism is only interested in offender outcomes insofar as the likely harm to 
an offender through punishment is likely to be proportional to the offence. 
Retributivism does not usually question whether harm is a morally appropriate 
response to offenders qua persons. Retributivism is unconcerned with outcomes, 
therefore the treatment and wellbeing of victims, offenders or others, is 
unimportant. The importance of personal contextual information, in order to 
understand the other as a concrete person, is implicitly accepted by restorative 
theories, but guidance on how this information should be gathered is largely 
missing from the theories. Principles to guide reflection on the information 
gathered about offenders as persons is also limited, since the importance of this 
information is only implicit.  
 
Retributivist simplistic scalar views of harm neither assist us in making the 
proportionality calculations that retributivist reasoning requires, partly through 
inattention to offenders’ personal context, nor help us to recognize potentially 
problematic harms. 16  Retributivism provides little guidance for sentencers’ 
punishment decision-making, or for practitioners’ punishment-delivery, beyond 
proportionality and horizontal equality. The lack of interest in the outcomes for 
offenders, victims and communities makes it difficult if not impossible to identify 
either non-trivial harm, or seek particular forms of offender interactions during 
punishment (such as treatment as equals).  
 
 
Consequentialist, future-regarding theories 
I turn to the other historically dominant stream of Western penal thought: 
consequentialism. Based on Beccaria’s thought (1992, p.108), Bentham’s 
utilitarianism (1996, pp.585–6), argued for a principle of maximizing general 
                                                     
16
 Potential unintended outcomes, such as damage to the offenders’ mental health, aggravated or 
unchallenged addiction and/or substance misuse problems, damage to family relationships.  
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‘happiness’ or ‘utility’. Whereas retributivism is a past-regarding, deontic theory, 
reasoning according to articulated moral principles; consequentialist reasoning is 
based on the expected qualities of future outcomes. Consequentialists indicate a 
particular end goal as intrinsically desirable, and offer a future-regarding 
justification for practices seeking to further this desirable goal. 17  For 
consequentialist punishment, a variety of practices is permissible, provided we 
reasonably expect it to achieve a specific outcome. Matt Matravers argues 
maximizing aggregate utility (2000, p.15), is a common primary goal. Other common 
consequentialist ends are: 
 
 Offender incapacitation for public protection (Walker 1991);  
 Particular (offender) or general (public) deterrence (eg Ellis 
2003); 
 Rehabilitation or reform (Cullen & Gilbert 1982; Rex 1998, 
pp.38–9).  
 
Incapacitation is limited. Home curfews protect the public, but not the offender’s 
household. Imprisonment does not protect other prisoners and staff. Removing the 
means of offending fares little better, suspending a drink driver’s licence only 
prevents their lawful driving. This teaches an important lesson: risk can be 
managed, it cannot be eliminated (Hudson 2003a, p.46). Only execution fully 
incapacitates offenders, but permanently denies all other lawful activities. Further, 
if our aim is to reduce crime, and incapacitation services this end, does this 
unreasonably suggest we should incapacitate as many as possible, regardless of 
guilt (Brooks 2012, p.37)?  
 
Thom Brooks regards incapacitation as a form of deterrence, since the ‘public 
threat’ of imprisonment deters the general population from crime, and the actuality 
deters offenders from repeat offences (2012, pp.36–7). We might object that 
                                                     
17 Although I am not aware of any examples, nothing in consequentialist traditions prevents a 
consequentialist argument for retributive hard treatment: offenders should suffer because the 
intrinsically preferable end goal is a future where offenders suffer for their offences.  
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particular deterrence is coercive. But interference aiming to prevent harm to others 
is consistent with liberal thought (Hampton 1984, p.219). Provided we restrict 
punishment to those who have caused harm through offending, coercions through 
incapacitation and deterrence is permitted. If general deterrence unacceptably 
‘uses’ offenders to deter others, from the Kantian principles of respect for persons 
(Kant 2002, p.229), this concern is side-stepped by viewing general deterrence as a 
serendipitous side-consequence. 
 
Rehabilitation might be undertaken following a deterrence or community 
protection approach, instrumentally aiming to lower offenders’ likelihood of 
reoffending as noted above; or from an offender welfare perspective, helping 
offenders to build skills necessary for living in society (eg Ward 2010). Jean 
Hampton distinguishes two forms of rehabilitation: therapeutic and educative. 
Therapeutic forms might include access to mental healthcare, support for addiction 
and substance misuse problems, or participation in psychology-led offending 
behaviour programmes (addressing anger and/or building thinking skills). Educative 
rehabilitation might include basic remedial education or vocational training, and 
personal support, such as debt management advice, or guidance on seeking work 
and accommodation. The aims of these practices are enabling offenders to 
‘conform to society’s behavioural expectations and be economically productive’ 
(Hampton 1998, p.39).  
 
Rehabilitation may be better understood as habilitation (Jablecki 2005, p.32), 
developing practical and social skills offenders may never have had (Braithwaite 
2002a, p.98). Pat Carlen has recently argued against broad rehabilitative practices, 
since rehabilitation is applied to already poor and disadvantaged offenders, who 
‘have nothing to which they can be advantageously rehabilitated’ (2013, p.32). 
Instead, Carlen argues, rehabilitation returns the poor to their place. By contrast 
‘rehabilitation programmes have not been designed for corporate criminals’ (2013, 
p.32). Carlen argues attempts to support offenders are ‘undermined’ by the 
perception of offenders as less deserving than non-offenders, and we shall see in 
Chapter three that penal policies have moved away from rehabilitative or welfare 
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ideologies which more clearly indicate caring, towards methods of control and 
containment. However I shall argue in Chapter three that the caring practices, 
which may strengthen the provision of support to offenders as Carlen recommends 
(2013, p.33), remain necessary to, and part of, contemporary punishment delivery 
practices, albeit in a limited form.  
 
We know past offenders with stable jobs and homes are less likely to re-offend 
(May et al. 2008, p.6). Reiman argues powerfully that we know disadvantage 
contributes to crime, even if we do not know the complex causal link explaining why 
some individuals offend and others do not (2007, p.29). Therefore providing such 
support may be reasonably supposed to reduce re-offending. For consequentialists, 
if educative support (eg job training) achieves the desired end (reforming or 
deterring by getting offenders into employment) then it is a justified response. 
Retributivist Michael Moore objects that providing offenders with educative 
support is unfair: offenders benefit ahead of law-abiding (implicitly more deserving) 
disadvantaged people (1997, p.86). This is as much an argument for widening 
access, as for withdrawing support from offenders.  
 
While voluntarily undertaken rehabilitation is preferable, there is space for 
autonomy in compulsory attendance in rehabilitative programmes. Hampton notes 
offenders choose whether to listen to moral lessons (1984, p.232). Offenders may 
likewise ignore rehabilitative support. We may engage reluctant offenders by 
obliging their attendance.18 That our attempts will not always succeed is no reason 
not to try. Another objection is that each individual’s unique context makes 
standardized programmes less effective. Rehabilitative programmes tailored to 
personal circumstances are more effective, but more expensive and difficult to 
deliver (McNeill 2012, p.4; see Sherman & Strang 2007, p.14 regarding 
individualized restorative justice). Yet measuring sentence impacts on offenders’ 
                                                     
18
 Anstiss et al.’s study supports the view that some approaches to sentence delivery (motivational 
interviewing) may succeed in engaging offenders, enabling them to choose desistance, even where 
offenders expected no change in their own offending (2011). 
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future behaviour remains difficult (Martinson 1974; eg Cullen & Gilbert 1982; Brody 
1998).  
 
Whereas retributivism suggests proportionate punishment, consequentialism does 
not initially limit punishments: on the face of the basic consequentialist argument, 
anything reasonably hoped to achieve the desired end is admissible.19 We could 
disincentivize prolific petty offences through heavy penalties: ‘boiling oil for bicycle 
thieves’ (Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, p.46). There is no immediate, basic 
consequentialist reason against disproportionately strong punishments (or 
terrifying ‘treatments’, such as the drugging and brainwashing described in A 
Clockwork Orange (Burgess 1962)). Neither does consequentialism provide scruples 
against punishing innocent persons. Consider a panic-stricken populace following 
frightening offences. Disorder can be quelled by framing an innocent person and 
pretending the matter resolved. Although this has a very bad outcome for the 
innocent person, everybody else benefits from restored public order. If we have a 
reasonable claim that the consequentialist goal will be achieved, it seems draconian 
punishments are permissible. The flip side of over-punishment is under-
punishment. Consequentialism does not require that all offenders who can be, are 
punished. 20  Suppose an unfortunate person nobody much liked is horribly 
murdered. The known killer escapes punishment, because the victim’s demise 
better serves utility.  
 
Retributivism seeks proportional punishment of all offenders, whereas 
consequentialism need not. There is no immediate consequentialist reason for 
minimum or maximum punishment, provided we reasonably expect to achieve the 
consequentialist goal. Act consequentialists argue we should choose whichever act 
will have the most desirable consequences. But since this requires complex, 
problematic utility calculations at every turn, rule consequentialists suggest 
following rules reasonably expected to achieve the desired end. Rule 
                                                     
19
 Although we will see below, such limits become possible in the case of rule consequentialist 
variants. 
20
 Although only a small minority of offenders can be punished (Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, p.197). 
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consequentialist variants offer some response to these problems: limiting rules 
regarding maximum and minimum punishment would protect offenders, victims 
and communities from an authority’s over-zealous application of pure utilitarian 
calculus. Following such rules provides public confidence in criminal justice, another 
legitimate consequentialist end. Rule consequentialist variants of consequentialism 
can provide consequentialist limits to the scale of punishments. 
 
How should we punish, following consequentialist theories? 
Consequentialist punishment looks to achieve a particular goal, justifying in 
principle any measure with these results. Limiting rules protect offenders, victims 
and communities from over (or under) punishment. Yet concerns remain that this 
protection is incomplete. How far do the organizing principles identified for 
consequentialist theories provide guidance for punishment decision-making and 
delivery, which:  
 
I. Allows conceptual space for practical caring work and 
identification of problematic, morally significant harms 
II. Facilitates inclusive, non-objectifying treatment as equals qua 
human beings for offenders  
 
The types of practices on the consequentialist table for discussion depend on the 
ends in question. This leaves room for non-harm practices, but how much room 
depends on the ends. It may not be relevant to, say, public protection, whether 
offenders are harmed or whether we acknowledge and address harms.  
 
While retributivists were uninterested in outcomes, for consequentialists 
unintended and unforeseen consequences matter since these contribute to the 
consequentialist calculation. Yet these matter only in relation to achieving the 
endorsed goal. Some consequentialist ends, such as offender welfare, reform, 
rehabilitation or healing allow us to consider supportive practices. Harmful 
outcomes conflict with these ends. However consequentialist theories of 
punishment generally say little about how such ends should be delivered. This is left 
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to practitioners’ judgement, and few guiding principles are provided for 
practitioners, beyond any rule consequentialist limiting rules. But the particular 
treatment of any party is unimportant, unless part of the consequentialist goal. 
Information about offenders may be ‘equally’ ignored in the same way as anyone 
else, unless the consequentialist goal involves an individual welfare or preference 
satisfaction element. 
 
I observed earlier that retributivism is uninterested in outcomes, including impacts 
on offenders. However, I also argued that for truly proportionate punishment, it 
was necessary for retributivists to understand an offender’s position. Likewise, 
because different individuals respond differently to the same punishments, 
consequentialists must understand something of the offender’s context in order to 
determine a punishment to facilitate the consequentialist end from the offender’s 
particular start-point. This applies regardless of the ends. Implicitly, 
consequentialist theories value contextual information prior to the consequentialist 
ends. Conscientious sentencers should include this in decision-making. Yet no 
guidance is offered for collecting these details beyond what the separate ends may 
imply.  
 
 
Defining Punishment 
 
The usual suspects 
We have seen that consequentialism and retributivism supply little guidance for our 
interactions with offenders. I turn now to explore the theoretical problem from first 
principles, beginning with the definition of punishment influentially employed by H. 
L. A. Hart: 
i. It must involve pain or other consequences normally 
considered unpleasant 
ii. It must be for an offence against legal rules 
iii. It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his 
offence 
iv. It must be intentionally administered by human beings 
other than the offender 
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v. It must be imposed and administered by an authority 
constituted by a legal system against which the offence is 
committed  
(cf Benn 1958, pp.325–6; Flew 1954, p.291)  
(Hart 1978, pp.4–5) 
 
Above, Hart defines punishment as (ii) for legally defined prohibited offences; (iii) of 
persons who have culpably and wrongfully committed such offences; (iv) by an 
external legal authority (Magistrates guilty of drink-driving may not lawfully punish 
themselves); and (v) imposed as a compulsory legally defined appropriate response 
within the relevant jurisdiction. These procedural criteria state the conditions in 
which an act counts as lawful punishment. What of (i) ‘pain’ or ‘unpleasant 
consequences’? This criterion alone specifies punishment’s substantive content, 
and does so ambiguously. No other potential content (restoration, discussion, 
reparation or interaction with the offender) or impact (deterrence, reform and 
rehabilitation) is included, only an ambiguous harm-like concept: there is a great 
deal of difference between ‘pain’ and ‘burdensomeness’. Why harm, and why only 
harm? I shall argue this is not helpful and potentially morally problematic. 
 
What is harm?  
Most punishment definitions include a statement to the effect that punishment 
should be harmful to offenders. Nicola Lacey (1988, pp.7–8) and Hart (1978, pp.4–5) 
refer to ‘unpleasant’ consequences, for Duff these are ‘burdensome’ (1992, p.49). 
Hart and Duff include ‘pain’, Honderich suggests ‘distress or deprivation’ (2006, 
p.15) while Brooks uses ‘loss’ (2012, p.5). This introduces expectations that 
punishment practices will be ambiguously ‘harmful’ into the definition, which we 
then use in our broader theorizing about punishment and which may inform 
practice. Trivial harms are not concerning, but since other understandings of harm 
are morally significant, the ambiguity will cause problems. Distinctions can be made 
regarding the recipients, intentionality and gravity of harms. 
 
As I shall argue in Chapter two, relational understandings of persons emphasize our 
connectedness. It becomes clearer on this account that harms to offenders will 
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have consequences for those with whom they have relationships. ‘Obiter’ harms 
(Walker 1991, pp.106–8) follow from offenders’ punishments and affect others. 
Families lose bread-winners and care-givers; employers lose workers; friends suffer 
stigmatization by association. Consider victims fearing unrestricted offenders, or 
denied much-wanted contact with the offender and potential closure. While obiter 
harms are outside my scope, all unwanted harm ought to be minimized where 
possible according to the argument I shall offer. These concerns harmonize with my 
arguments about the treatment of offenders. 
 
Intention might describe our primary purpose: we quarantine the sick primarily to 
prevent contagion (Korman 2003, p.570). These are intended consequences. 
Primarily intending morally significant harm to offenders is incompatible with the 
approach I take. Alternatively, harm might be (at least partly) foreseeable, if not a 
primary aim. When we quarantine despite foreseeing liberty curtailment, these 
unwanted ‘incidental’ consequences are unavoidable. Walker’s ‘incidental 
punishments’, are distinct from the primarily intended ends, arising as integral to 
the means of achieving these ends. However, some unintended harms may be 
partly avoidable. Quarantine separates patients from their families. Telephone 
contact might help address the problem. Finally, harms may be unforeseen 
consequences (eg the patient reports undocumented side effects of treatment). We 
imprison for the intended consequence of temporarily curtailing liberty, at risk of 
the unintended consequences incidental (and obiter) harms of damage to family 
relationships, and perhaps unforeseen-consequences of acquiring addiction 
problems (PRT 2012, p.57). Both unintended and unforeseen consequence harms 
may be understood as incidental collateral damage, resulting from the means of 
achieving a separate primary end. In practice all unforeseen harms are unavoidable, 
whereas some foreseen unintended harms may be avoidable with planning. This 
does not prevent after-the-fact responses to minimize the impact of unintended 
harms.  
 
Finally, there is the gravity of the harm. Democratic decisions about which 
behaviours should be criminalized indicate rough social agreement on which acts 
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are significantly harmful or threatening enough to warrant criminalization. Trivial 
inconvenience harms to offenders caused by punishment should not concern us: eg 
an offender is able to buy fewer luxury goods than they would otherwise choose. 
However, if we are concerned with offenders’ status as equal human beings, or as 
equal community members, as Duff and Braithwaite & Pettit are, then significant 
unintended or unforeseen consequences of non-trivial harm (non-negligible 
personal, social, emotional or mental and/or physical health problems) cannot be 
dismissed. Even if intended-consequence harm is justified, we may question 
whether it is morally acceptable to stand idly by when another’s morally significant 
suffering occurs as the ‘collateral damage’ of our actions.  
 
Other things being equal, we ought not to remain indifferent to morally significant 
harms. In ordinary life, if we cause harm by accident we are expected to 
acknowledge the harm and take steps to repair the damage. On accidentally spilling 
another’s drink, usually we apologize (acknowledge the unintended collateral 
damage) and replace the drink (attempt to repair harm). Even if punishment entails 
intended-consequence harm, ignoring unintended and unforeseen harm fails to 
treat offenders as equals. Malaysia and Singapore employ corporal punishment, 
despite opposition from Human Rights groups (Human Rights Watch 2013). While 
physical harm is intended during caning, medical treatment is provided afterwards 
to prevent incidental infection. Medically unfit offenders are not caned (addressing 
avoidable harm), and overseeing doctors may intervene during caning on medical 
grounds (scrutinizing for, and addressing, unforeseen harms as soon as problems 
arise) (Farrell 2012). Deliberately causing harm is antithetical to care ethics, and 
practices assuming the justification of causing harm as a primary aim are not 
included in the approach I offer. But even where harm is viewed as justifiably 
intended in the caning example above, the potential for unintended, ‘collateral 
damage’ harms are nonetheless acknowledged and addressed. We might find 
similar examples in caring practices: suppose a patient needs a hip replacement 
operation. The operation will unavoidably cause unintended ‘collateral damage’, 
but the patient will receive medical treatment to help prevent infection in the 
resulting wound, and relieve pain, attempts to actively avoid harm where possible. 
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Yet the operation will only be undertaken in the first place if the patient is 
considered well enough, to avoid unnecessary harm.  
 
Except when three conditions are met, all punishments cause trivial unintended-
consequence harm since punishments are imposed. All punishments minimally 
curtail individual agency, unless offenders: 
 
1. Are in perfect agreement with the sentencer on the sentence; 
2. Are in perfect agreement with the punishment practitioner’s 
directions on sentence-delivery; 
3. Readily undertake the sentence. 
 
Even where these conditions are met, offenders’ autonomy is minimally restricted: 
offenders are ordered to do only as they happen to choose. This may count as harm 
(eg under a procedurally unfair tyrannical regime), but need not. Such ‘lucky’ 
offenders do not experience harm. It is absurd to have to say these rare offenders, 
duly treated in accordance with law, are not punished because they do not 
experience harm.  
 
Since trivial harms occur in most cases, perhaps this is intended by the ambiguous 
reference to harm in the definition of punishment. Trivial harms seem less likely to 
be morally problematic. Consider offenders who acknowledge their criminal 
behaviour21 and reluctantly concede that they cannot avoid punishment. They 
prefer not to serve their community punishment but grudgingly comply. It is true, 
just, to observe this is trivially harmful, but not particularly helpful. Many non-
punishment activities are similarly trivially harmful. I reluctantly concede that I 
cannot prepare a conference presentation on time without working on Saturday. I 
prefer not to, but grudgingly comply. Significantly, punishments are imposed rather 
than, to some degree, reflecting individual choices. But the academic example 
illustrates how we begin to stretch the definition of ‘harm’ if trivial harm is 
                                                     
21
 67% and 73% of defendants plead guilty in the Magistrates’ (CPS 2012, p.83) and Crown (2012, 
p.85) court respectively in 2011-12. 
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intended. Trivial harm might occur in most case, but it is not clear what this adds to 
the definition of punishment. Alternatively, non-trivial harm may be morally 
problematic rather than reasonably acceptable, trivial consequences. Such 
unintended harms ought at least to be acknowledged and where reasonably 
possible addressed, rather than noted as one defining feature.  
 
What’s wrong with harm-centred penal theories?  
So far we have a technical complaint about the language used in defining 
punishment. But the restricted concept of punishment produced raises practical 
concerns about providing non-objectifying, morally appropriate treatment of 
offenders qua human beings in punishment decision-making and delivery. 
Conceptually shackling our definition of punishment to harm restricts us to the 
conceptual space described by harm: the chain is at its full extent and we cannot 
step outside. Further, this is the only framework we have. Because only harm is 
present as substantive content in the definition of punishment, this both normalizes 
and elevates harm as the only necessary substantive content. Because ‘harm’ is 
ambiguously described, we expect harm simpliciter, without qualification, and 
presume this is acceptable because it is one defining feature of punishment. This 
ambiguous, normalized, elevated and thus, distorted, understanding of harm 
informing our definition leaves our conception of punishment insufficiently 
sensitive to the moral significance of non-trivial harms. This further obscures the 
possibility of non-harmful acts within punishment practices. This hampers our 
acknowledgement of morally problematic harms, and our assessment of whether, 
and indeed how, these should be addressed. This does not help us to define 
punishment and desensitizes us dangerously to the moral significance of harms. For 
these reasons, it is too strong, and potentially dangerous, to include harm as one 
defining feature of punishment. 
 
I have stated the problem starkly for clarity: the distorting way harm is used in 
defining punishment creates a vicious circle which desensitizes us to the potential 
for morally significant harms and obscures caring practices. When we begin from 
harm, we fail to consider caring. Without caring practices and values we fail to 
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consider the nature and acceptability of harms. But not all theories of punishment 
suffer equally from the problems of presuming harm as one defining feature. Firstly, 
some theorists do mean to say intended-consequence harm is necessary for 
punishment (Korman 2003, pp.570–1). This position cannot be accommodated by 
the approach proposed here, but is still vulnerable to the complaints raised above. 
Morally significant harm may also arise as unintended or unforeseen consequences. 
Distinct from identifying harm as a desirable, primarily intended outcome, other 
theorists intend descriptively that all punishments unavoidably cause (ie are 
experienced as) pain or harm (Duff 2001, p.107; Daly 2003a, p.198). I have 
challenged this description: while most punishments will cause unavoidable trivial 
harm, this does not help us distinguish punishment from other activities, and some 
offenders do not experience harm. Where potentially morally significant harms 
arise, I shall argue this ought to be acknowledged as potentially problematic for 
treatment as equals, and where possible addressed.  
 
I have problematized harm-centred definitions, but not all penal theories and 
practices rely on these. Separately, practical and theoretical restorative justice 
approaches do not necessarily offer accounts of punishment that are harm-centred 
(bottom-up alternative approaches to punishment will be discussed on p.75 of this 
Chapter). There is a myriad of subtly different positions that can confuse the issue. 
Restorative justice is often defined broadly as seeking restoration and healing 
(Okimoto et al. 2009, p.157), but not all proponents of this view describe restorative 
responses as ‘punishment’. Restorative justice aims for restoration, but when 
poorly practiced can cause unacknowledged harm (Daly 2003a, p.206). What is 
needed is a definition of punishment that is open to the existence of non-harm 
practices, including, but not limited to, restoration, honesty about the risks of 
morally significant harms and alertness to the dangers of ignoring these harms. 
 
The problems for existing theory 
By ambiguously including harm as one of the hallmarks of punishment we skew our 
perception of harms, become desensitized to the gravity of harms and obscure 
caring in a vicious, self-reinforcing circle. I argue in Chapter three that caring is 
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present in, and essential to, existing punishment practices. How can sentencers and 
practitioners: 
 
1. Identify morally significant non-trivial harms; 
2. Recognize caring practices? 
 
Dworkin argues powerfully that ‘treatment as equals’, recognizing the politically 
equal status of citizens, requires ‘equal concern and respect’ (Dworkin 2000, p.227). 
Non-citizens are still subject to criminal law, but ‘every human being, even a 
criminal, is entitled to the respect granted to humans’ (Margalit 1998, p.262). These 
liberal concerns are political and moral respectively. Identifying and responding to 
morally significant harms relating to punishment is important since those punished 
are persons. This is not to say that we may not respond differently to offenders for 
their offending behaviour, only that whatever demands differential treatment 
(punishment) makes of the offender, must be within the limits of treatment as 
equals qua persons. 
 
While we should avoid morally significant harms, I do not argue that all harm should 
or can be forbidden. Again, trivial harm is not my concern. Some unintended 
(including unforeseen) harm is unavoidable in many areas of social policy. When 
unintended morally significant harm occurs, we must first identify this to respond 
accordingly. For example, the state cannot guarantee full employment: 
unemployment is unavoidable. Unemployment benefit acknowledges and 
addresses the foreseeable side-consequence harms that unemployment may cause 
(inability to adequately feed and clothe oneself). For individuals without private 
resources, these harms would be unavoidable but for this state provision. This 
demonstrates the ‘equal concern and respect’ (Dworkin 2000, p.273) the state owes 
citizens.  
 
If intentionally causing persons harm at the very least signals a lack of ‘concern and 
respect’ (Dworkin 2001, p.106) for persons as equals, then intentional harms should 
be prohibited. Not all unintended morally significant harms can be avoided, but 
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these ought not to be ignored. Ignoring such harms implies others may be 
acceptably harmed, treating them as passive, inert objects. This risks objectifying 
offenders, inconsistent with the morally appropriate treatment of persons as 
equals. There are then two forms of morally significant harm to consider: ‘collateral 
damage’ unintended harms associated with 22  punishment practices and our 
interactions with offenders, and that caused when we objectify offenders by 
ignoring the first kind.  
 
Chapter four develops the argument that mainstream criminal justice processes 
exclude and risk at least partly objectifying offenders. This is a problem for theory. 
Penal theories built on harm-centred definitions, and the practices built on these, 
cannot challenge the framework of considering punishment in terms of harm, 
because they lack the language with which to do so. The expectation of harm 
simpliciter normalizes the presence of harm, desensitizing us to harm and obscuring 
other practices. The ambiguity of harm simpliciter discourages consideration of the 
gravity of harm.  
 
Because harm is expected and normalized, incidents of harm are not a cause for 
examination of our practices. These theories struggle to identify morally significant 
harm as problematic, since our reflection on the appropriateness of offender 
treatment is not invited. Accordingly, penal theories built on harm-centred 
understandings of punishment and the practices they inform provide only restricted 
normative guidance to avoid such harm in punishment decision-making and 
delivery. We risk causing unnoticed morally significant harm (for example, the 
offender becomes homeless as a result of their punishment). This communicates to 
the offender that it is acceptable to cause morally significant harm to them. This 
fails to provide treatment as equals. When we fail to notice the morally significant 
harm we cause, and thus fail to address it or correct the devaluing message, we 
                                                     
22
 Again, I use harms ‘associated with’ punishment to include harms resulting at the time of 
punishment, harms where pre-existing needs are worsened by punishment and harms which occur 
after the sentence has ended (such as financial exclusion, or anxiety or stress disorders caused by 
the offender’s experiences during punishment).  
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treat the offender as an object that may be acceptably harmed, not as a person and 
an equal. What organizing principles will help sentencers and practitioners to: 
 
3. Make and implement punishment decisions, which; 
4. Treat offenders as equals qua human beings? 
 
The problems above are stated in the order in which they arise when questioning 
the use of harm in defining punishment. To at least some extent, mainstream harm-
centred penal theory: 
 
1. Has a skewed understanding of harm, is insufficiently sensitive 
to and therefore less able, to identify morally problematic non-
trivial harms;  
2. Thus fails to recognize non-harm practices, especially care;  
3. Offers only restricted guidance for the reasoning processes 
used in punishment decision-making and delivery, resulting 
from an impoverished understanding of punishment; and  
4. Produces restricted guidelines that compromise our ability to 
treat offenders as equals. 
 
It has been helpful to frame these questions in an amended format. How far do 
implicit and explicit organizing principles of existing penal theory provide guidance 
for punishment decision-making and delivery, which: 
 
I. Allows conceptual space for practical caring work and 
identification of problematic, morally significant harms 
II. Facilitates inclusive, non-objectifying treatment as equals qua 
human beings for offenders 
 
Treatment as Equals? 
I have argued that we are desensitized to harm and thus may fail to notice morally 
significant harms as unintended or unforeseen consequences of punishment 
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practices. We risk at least partly objectifying offenders, inconsistent with treatment 
as equals. Not all exclusion is objectifying, but objectification is a particularly 
harmful possibility. If objectification identifies one failure of treatment as equals, 
what kind of practice would illustrate its success? Dworkin argues treatment as 
equals conveys ‘equal concern and respect’ (Dworkin 2000, p.227). This is helpful, 
but we have seen that equal concern and respect results in different treatment 
according to context, making it hard to specify. What practices might link this 
different, context-responsive, treatment as equals? The answer I offer (although 
this need not be the only one) draws on the study of organizations, and has 
previously been applied to the legitimacy of authority in criminal justice, particularly 
the police and courts (Bottoms & Tankebe 2012, p.121) by Tom R. Tyler: 
interactional justice.  
 
Interactional justice helps illustrate what is missing when treatment as equals fails. 
The term was coined in 1986 by Bies & Moag: ‘[b]y interactional justice we mean 
that people are sensitive to the quality of interpersonal treatment they receive’ 
(Bies & Moag 1986, p.44). Interactional justice may be further divided into 
‘interpersonal justice’, reflecting an authority’s treatment of persons with 
‘politeness, dignity and respect’; and ‘informational justice’, providing information 
about processes, explaining how decisions are made (Kumar et al. 2009, p.147). 
Organizational justice literature debates whether interactional justice, perceptions 
about the fairness and quality of ‘interpersonal treatment’ (Chiaburu & Lim 2008), is 
best conceptualized as a distinct complementary concept, or a sub-category within 
procedural justice, acknowledging both ‘structural and social aspects of procedures’ 
(Bobocel & Holmvall 2001, p.86).  
 
Tyler & Bies appear to prefer a sub-category understanding of ‘the interpersonal 
context of formal decision-making procedures’, which they develop as the ‘missing 
link’ for a broader conception of procedural justice (1990, p.88). Later, Bies argues 
forcefully that interactional justice is conceptually distinct (Bies 2005, pp.94–5). 
Tyler meanwhile subsumes both ‘quality of decision making’ and ‘quality of 
treatment’ under the heading of ‘procedural elements’, in relation to the legitimacy 
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of law enforcement (Tyler 2003, p.284). Bottoms & Tankebe offer a helpful précis of 
Tyler’s categories across his wider work. They summarize ‘quality of 
decisionmaking’ as the less powerful party ‘being allowed to have their say, without 
interruption or harassment, prior to a decision being made’ (Bottoms & Tankebe 
2012, p.121).23 Meanwhile the ‘quality of treatment’ reflects ‘proper respect as 
human beings, each with his or her own needs for dignity’ (Bottoms & Tankebe 
2012, p.121).  
 
For my purposes, interactional justice, as ‘quality of treatment’ and important for 
‘proper respect as human beings’, encapsulates what is required for treatment as 
equals. There is a strong resonance between respect for dignity and inclusiveness, 
and the ‘attentive, responsive and respectful manner’ (Engster 2007, p.31; original 
emphasis) associated with care ethics, introduced in Chapter two. While I will argue 
to the contrary, caring attitudes might be initially dismissed as having no place in 
criminal, let alone punishment decision-making and delivery. Yet Tyler argues 
interactional justice is necessary for procedural justice. If mainstream practices risk 
objectifying offenders, as I argue in Chapter four, then interactional justice fails, 
preventing us from treating offenders as equals.  
  
Redefining punishment: slipping conceptual shackles 
My definition echoes Hart’s, but presumes nothing of the punishment’s content. 
This permits us to step outside the harm-centred framework of other penal 
theories: 
 
i. Any formal, imposed response (via state criminal justice 
agencies); 
ii. Determined by a legally empowered agent; 
iii. Determined for offenders, regarding their criminal conduct; 
iv. Following admission or finding of guilt; 
                                                     
23
 Bies & Moag likewise highlight the importance of the procedural element of ‘voice’ in their prior 
study of procedural justice, implying ‘the importance of communication’ (Bies & Moag 1986, p.46). 
This has overtones of Habermas’ inclusion condition for ideal discourse: ‘no one who could make a 
relevant contribution may be prevented from participating’ (Habermas 2008, p.82). 
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v. Following diligent adherence to provide due process. 
 
I take punishment to be any official criminal justice response to a criminal offender 
for their offence. Punishment is the formal response of the community to the 
offender, whatever the content. It must be noted that all definitions of punishment 
necessarily close off some practices that might be justifiable. The definition of 
punishment I propose is deliberately broad, and suffers from this limitation much 
less than the main alternative candidates in the penal theory literature. This allows 
me to focus on the central concerns of this thesis, the obscuring of caring practices 
and effective insensitivity to morally significant harms, both of which contribute to 
the failure to treat offenders as equals in our interactions with them. Harm is 
neither ruled in nor out by my definition, although I develop arguments for 
acknowledging and addressing, or where possible avoiding, morally significant 
harms. This definition of itself specifies no particular mode of response, however I 
will argue for treating offenders without harm and with care.  
 
There are examples of penal theories that are concerned about the treatment of 
offenders. Anthony Duff identifies his theory as retributivist, although others 
consider his work a hybrid approach (Brooks 2012, pp.103–6), given future-
regarding purposeful aims. Duff is concerned with the inclusion of citizen offenders 
and their treatment as full members of the normative political community. John 
Braithwaite & Philip Pettit identify their theory as consequentialist, and are 
concerned with treating citizens as equals, which is essential for their civic 
republican understanding of liberty. However, some suggest their approach is a 
modified form of consequentialism (Matravers 2000, p.24), given their focus on 
‘promoting dominion’, rather than maximizing aggregate utility (Matravers 2000, 
p.15). Bottom-up practices (such as the restorative justice, community justice, 
therapeutic jurisprudence and problem-solving court approaches introduced on 
pp.76-7) developed following dissatisfaction with the treatment of both victims and 
offenders in mainstream criminal justice, also share concerns around inclusion for 
offenders and victims. Restorative theories, for example John Braithwaite (1989; 
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2002b) and Wesley Cragg (1992), make important advances, and are introduced at 
the end of the chapter.  
 
 
Duff’s penal theory 
Duff’s theory is sympathetic to my concerns to treat offenders as equals. His work is 
concerned with the legitimacy of punishment where offenders have suffered 
systematic social exclusion (exclusion from political voice, material goods, 
normative community membership and linguistic exclusion from democratic debate 
(2001, pp.75–6)). Duff’s theory has communitarian roots (2001, chap.2), positing 
shared values within a political community. Law is communicative: ‘our collective 
voice’, expressing shared values (Duff 2007, p.46). Crime is a ‘public wrong’: 
criminalization is grounded in appropriate public concern for wrong against an 
individual victim, the community's sympathetic response to victims, and censure of 
offenders for transgressing shared values (2007, p.52, p.302; 2010a).  
 
Members of the normative moral community (for Duff, the political community) by 
hypothesis understand the language used in the expression of law, morally 
persuading citizens against offending. Fellow citizen offenders ought to be treated 
with the concern and respect due as human persons and as members of the 
normative political community (Duff 2001, pp.90, 113; Duff & Marshall 2004, p.40; 
Duff 2007, pp.191–3). Holding offenders accountable for their wrongdoing treats 
them as moral equals and community members (Duff 2001, p.113; 2007, p.192), as 
offenders deserve.  
 
Duff’s theory is described as ‘humanist’ (Duff 2001, p.77), engaging offenders as 
citizens, as the subject not object of punishment (Cruft et al. 2011, p.18; see also 
Duff 2001, p.77). Transparent rational persuasion invites offenders to accept their 
conduct as wrongful, encouraging them to seek reconciliation with direct victims 
and the community through repentance (Duff 2001, p.177). Trial and punishment 
initiate dialogue with offenders (1996, pp.81–2), on appropriate ‘secular penance’ 
67 
 
(2001, p.106), guided by loose sentencing guidelines and occasionally ‘negotiated’ 
between offender and sentencer (2001, pp.158–63). 
 
Duff’s retributive theory spotlights the significance of the offender’s equal 
membership of the (political) community. Punishment is both retributively justified 
and purposive (Duff 2001, p.88). Punishment’s purpose is to reconcile penitent 
offenders with ‘those wronged’: victim(s) and the wider community. These future-
regarding aims are not contingently desirable consequentialist goals but 
intrinsically, morally appropriate responses to offenders (Duff 2001, p.89; 
Matravers 2011, p.71). Punishment communicates censure, understood as ‘moral 
criticism’ (Matravers 2011, p.69), to facilitate offender’s repentance (Duff 2001, 
p.107).  
 
Duff’s ‘transparent rational persuasion’ is not moral education. Offenders know 
their conduct is wrong since the law expresses citizens’ commonly held values. 
Offenders ‘do not care enough’ (Duff 2001, p.91) to avoid the wrong. Moral 
education, suggests Duff, aims to persuade offenders to reform themselves, rather 
than reforming them. Rational persuasion for Duff goes a little further. Reasoning 
about why the conduct is wrong enough to avoid (why the offender should ‘care 
enough’) may be morally educative. Duff includes repairing harm and damaged 
relationships through reparation (2001, p.92). Deterrence is insufficient justification 
for punishing citizens, but grounds non-citizens’ compliance with the law, since 
values are not necessarily shared (2001, p.86). 
 
Duff discusses ‘hard treatment’ penalties as necessary (2001, p.29) eliciting 
repentance in reluctant offenders. For spontaneously penitent offenders, apology is 
insufficient for reconciliation with and reintegration to the community (2001, p.95); 
penance as hard treatment is still needed (2001, p.109). Brooks reminds us that 
Duff considers ‘prisons as they should be and not as they are found’ (2012, p.104). 
We should then bear in mind that when Duff describes ‘hard treatment’ he does not 
intend the present ‘pains of imprisonment’ (Sykes 2007, pp.63–84; Crewe 2011). 
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Although Duff’s earlier work was explicit on the necessity of intended harm, his line 
has become more nuanced recently.  
 
In 1992 Duff identified that ‘punishment aims to inflict something painful or 
burdensome … nor are this pain and this burden mere unintended side effects’ 
(Duff 1992, p.49). By 2001, hard treatment served to ‘focus’ the offender’s 
attention on the offence, facilitating necessary penance (2001, p.108). Duff argues 
that repentance and hence punishment is necessarily painful, since publicly 
admitting wrongs is unavoidably painful (2001, p.107). Yet in the same volume he 
proposes that punishment ‘should not aim to 'deliver pain' to offenders’ (2001, 
p.129): such harms are regrettable (2001, p.178). In 2010, Duff writes ‘a decent 
system of criminal law will be coercive, burdensome and (since it is human) liable to 
be oppressive’ (2010a, p.294). Note that ‘burdensomeness’ appears to resonate 
most powerfully with trivial harms, which while they may be relatively onerous (for 
example reporting frequently to a probation officer) may be less morally significant. 
Burdensomeness was present in Duff’s 1992 writings, along with ‘pain’. Pain, 
resonating more strongly with non-trivial potentially morally problematic harm, is 
now conspicuous in its absence. The potential oppression noted is intended along 
the lines of Duff’s systematic exclusion critique, but begins to recognize the 
unintended harms that can arise in relation to punishment. Duff continues that the 
ambitions of a decent criminal law ‘must be modest, its operations constrained by a 
recognition of the harm it can do and of the costs (material and moral) it incurs’ 
(2010a, p.293). He goes on: ‘[w]e punish too many people, too harshly and 
destructively’ (2010a, p.294). 
 
This suggests that despite the presence of harm in Duff’s justification of punishment 
and wider theory, there is nothing to prevent Duff adopting a broader definition of 
punishment, avoiding the constraints of thinking in terms of harm. This is a broader 
reading of Duff’s theory, but his position on the regrettable nature of foreseeable 
harms indicates that his position on the necessity of harm may be nearer to 
foreseen but unintended-consequence harm, than to intended-consequence harm 
(2001, p.129). While Duff includes the ‘necessity’ of hard treatment, harm remains 
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part of the definition of punishment practices. Like many authors, Duff is ambiguous 
as to the gravity of the harm. References to suffering worryingly imply that non-
trivial, potentially morally significant harms are normatively expected. As such, 
Duff’s position is also vulnerable to the criticisms I raised: desensitization to morally 
significant harms, and risking objectifying offenders by ignoring these.  
 
I turn now to some criticisms of Duff’s position. Since non-citizens are still subject to 
criminal laws, Dubber criticizes Duff’s reliance on citizenship (2010, pp.195–9). 
‘Crime’, Dubber argues ‘is an interpersonal event, not an intercitizenal one’ (2010, 
p.196), and that considering citizenship ‘adds nothing to the normative account of 
the penal process’ (2010, p.197). Duff responds that the political community of 
citizens, not the moral community of persons, is the appropriate community of 
concern for punishment. This thicker, shared community may better motivate 
appropriate concern and respect than simple species-membership (Duff 2001, 
p.70). The approach I shall offer is not limited to citizens, and applies to offenders as 
persons.  
 
Duff raises concerns about ‘systematic’ social exclusion from the benefits of 
community membership. Where offenders are systematically excluded by the 
socially, economically or politically powerful, Duff’s shared language and shared 
values are less broadly shared. This reduces the community's authority to call 
offenders to account and threatens the legitimacy of punishment (2001, p.185; 
2007, p.191). This problem is Duff’s project. Yet offenders need not be fully 
excluded to suffer the disadvantages of exclusion about which Duff also shows 
concern (2007, p.191; 2001, p.183, p.200). Objectification also treats offenders as 
external to the community of citizens, since citizenship is a status of persons. 
Risking objectifying offenders, through ignoring morally significant harms or 
exclusionary interactions, also threatens their membership of the normative 
political community.  
 
Duff understands punishment as communicative, expecting and valuing dialogue 
during trial, sentencing and punishment. Duff emphasizes engagement with (citizen) 
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offenders and victims allowing citizens ‘equal and mutually respectful participation 
in the civic enterprise’ (2010a, p.300). Language is an important means of 
procedural inclusion, even if a legal interpreter is necessary to help offenders 
understand technical language (Duff 2001, p.189). The tenuous justification of 
present punishment for Duff is underscored by shortfalls in shared understanding 
(2001, p.197).  
 
Iris Marion Young observes norms of ‘deliberation’ and ‘articulateness’ used in 
collective democratic decision-making ‘must be learned; they are culturally specific, 
and … a sign of social privilege’ (Young 1997, p.65). Norms facilitate discussion, yet 
simultaneously exclude. Brownlee recognizes that Duff’s anticipated dialogue is 
necessarily limited by the format of mainstream trial and sentences (2011, pp.59–
61): offenders’ parts in the dialogue are scripted by the state since sentences are 
imposed. Additionally, Duff hints towards, but does not to my mind sufficiently 
develop, the observations that dialogue provides an opportunity for the community 
to admit and address the impact of systematic exclusion (2001, pp.198–201).  
 
Duff’s insights include recognizing the significance of exclusion for offenders’ 
(political) status as equals. Acknowledging that the offender may previously have 
suffered harm, Duff recognizes this relevant information can inform appropriate 
punishment responses. Duff restricts the set of harms he considers to citizenship-
denying systematic social exclusion. Dialogue is valued, providing contextual 
information and treatment as equals. Yet the potential for this is at trial is criticized. 
My concern is that morally significant harms in our punishment practices and 
interactions with offenders, which harm-centred definitions of punishment have 
normalized and obscured through desensitization, objectify offenders and deny 
treatment as equals. My complaint stands for citizen and non-citizen offenders. 
These harms, as Duff recognizes in the case of systematic exclusion of citizens, are 
compounded by our failure to recognize or respond to the harm:  
 
[it is] illegitimate … to try the defendant for his wrongs, whilst 
refusing to answer to him for the wrongs that he has suffered (and 
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still suffers) at our collective hands. For what denies his equal 
citizenship … is not the injustice that he has suffered by itself, but 
that injustice plus our refusal or failure to recognise it, to answer 
to him for it, and to try to provide some appropriate remedy  
(Duff 2010b, p.139; original emphasis). 
 
Duff maintains a harm-centred definition of punishment, which risks ignoring 
morally significant harms, which by his own argument, causes further harm. Duff is 
concerned about our failure to recognize injustice against citizens, and the impact 
for penal legitimacy. What Duff misses is that failure to recognize morally significant 
harms risks objectifying offenders.  
 
 
Braithwaite & Pettit’s penal theory 
Braithwaite & Pettit offer a broad, holistic24 theory, discussing punishment aims, 
methods, decision-making and delivery, and questions of criminalization, 
investigation and prosecution (1990, pp.12–5). They also consider resource 
distribution within this ‘comprehensive’ understanding of interconnected criminal 
justice sub-systems (police, prosecutors, courts, probation and prison officers) as 
nested within and connected to ‘other systems in the legal and social order’ (1990, 
p.19). Their insight is that punishment may cause harms to offenders, unacceptably 
threatening offenders’ status as equals. Our equal status and minimizing harms are 
particularly salient for Braithwaite & Pettit’s civic republican perspective. I turn 
briefly to civic republican liberty, essential to interpreting their theory.  
 
Civic republicanism, an alternative branch of liberal thought, offers a distinctive 
understanding of liberty. Consider a benevolent slave-master who orders the slave 
to do as they please. The master could choose to order the slave to do otherwise: 
the slave’s freedom is restricted by the master’s potential arbitrary interference. 
Republican liberty is the condition of one’s freedom not being subject to another: 
neither wholly negative nor positive (Berlin 1997, pp.393–8). This is distinct from 
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 Braithwaite & Pettit use holistic to indicate the location of punishment within the criminal justice 
system, itself embedded within other social systems, and to consider punishment as it is located in 
this broader social and political context.  
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negative freedom from interference (Pettit & Braithwaite 1993a, pp.67–9) 
prioritized by the dominant strand of classical liberalism over the last two centuries. 
This condition of the equal protection of all persons from unwarranted and 
arbitrary domination by another more powerful agent, supplemented by shared 
knowledge of equally accessible channels of enforcement, is termed ‘dominion’25 by 
Braithwaite & Pettit.  
 
Republican political dominion is necessarily an equally held empowerment of 
individuals against the misuse of vastly stronger state power. If the protection 
against state powers is stronger for only some individuals, this immunity is not an 
increase in dominion. Suppose the law permits a man to beat his wife. Husbands are 
freed from state domination, but the state leaves wives vulnerable to marital 
domination. Dominion must be equal to avoid domination.  
 
Braithwaite & Pettit define crimes, unwarranted and arbitrary harms, as ‘the denial 
of dominion’ (1993a, p.229). Whatever other harms are caused, victims suffer a 
diminishment of dominion. State criminal justice activity is not (in accountable, 
democratic states) arbitrary. Citizens are protected by checks and balances, 
procedural rules and avenues to challenge official decisions. Promoting dominion 
after crime requires minimally restoring citizens’ equal dominion (distinct from 
attempting to return the balance of advantages); and aims to increase protection 
from abuse of state power through accountability.  
 
Braithwaite & Pettit argue promoting dominion is the most appropriate target for 
the criminal justice system. They reject harm reduction as a target for the criminal 
justice system, since this could result in unfairly disproportionate surveillance of 
citizens (1990, p.47). Unlike harm reduction, they argue, dominion promotion is a 
satiable target (1990, p.79). Promoting dominion ‘guards against’ the paradigm 
offence types, particularly against the person or property; and requires the state to 
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 See Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, pp.61–7; 1997; see also Lovett & Pettit 2009 indicative of Pettit’s 
more recent work, where the term ‘dominion’ is replaced by discussion of conditions of domination 
verses nondomination. While I agree the terminology change is helpful, I have retained the 
terminology of dominion for consistency with the work to which I refer.   
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be parsimonious in the application of punishment (1990, p.85). They propose four, 
ordinal, middle-range, policy principles via which criminal justice can promote 
dominion (1990, p.87). These are parsimony, checking of power, reprobation and 
reintegration.  
 
Parsimony, a master principle, advocates fewer, smaller uses of state power; 
reducing occasion for abuse, thus promoting dominion (1990, p.87). Sentencers 
should use the smallest punishment necessary to maximize dominion. Braithwaite 
& Pettit advocate enhanced practitioner discretion in deciding when to use formal 
or informal methods (1990, p.111). Parsimony implies setting maximum penalties, 
providing citizens qua offenders secure knowledge regarding how the state may 
treat them. Minimum penalties are absent, permitting parsimonious, informal 
resolutions (1990, pp.101–2).  
 
Checking of power protects individuals from state agents’ ‘prejudice or caprice’ 
(Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, p.88) through procedural justice mechanisms. 
Reprobation delivers community disapproval of criminal acts (1990, p.88). Carefully 
managed, non-stigmatizing, integrative (1990, p.84) or reintegrative shaming, as it is 
elaborated elsewhere by Braithwaite (1989, pp.100–1), has a core role in their 
theory. Employing informal, social shaming responses, the authors argue, promotes 
dominion, by reducing parsimoniously the need for formal coercive responses; and 
facilitates deterrence and reintegration.26  
 
Finally, reintegration is necessary both for victims and offenders. Degrading 
treatment diminishes victims’ dominion; symbolic reintegration reaffirms their 
equal status (Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, p.91). Braithwaite & Pettit recognize that 
treatment of offenders during punishment, and the effects of punishment, can be 
‘stigmatizing’, according offenders’ a second-class status (1990, p.92). 
Stigmatization should be avoided as contrary to reintegration, inconsistent with 
equal dominion and treatment as equals. Braithwaite & Pettit’s insight is that state 
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 Oversight problems with this approach are taken up in Chapter five.  
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interactions with offenders may result in harms, and our response to offending 
ought to be informed by the social context of the offence.  
 
Braithwaite & Pettit accept relevant harm may result from state actions, arguing 
that parsimony demands its minimization. The concern to minimize harms resulting 
from state actions suggests this is a side consequence, and that my procedural-only 
definition of punishment may be available to Braithwaite & Pettit. Similarly to my 
arguments, they appear to accept that punishment cannot avoid all harms. But the 
‘harm’ to be minimized parsimoniously is once again ambiguous: harm to whom, of 
what gravity?  
 
Andrew Von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth raise concerns about over-punishment 
between the proportionally deserved penalty and Braithwaite & Pettit’s statutory 
maximum (1992, p.88). Further infrequent, serious offences may threaten dominion 
less than frequent petty offences, allowing less punishment for more serious 
offences, thus threatening horizontal equality. Von Hirsch & Ashworth argue 
Braithwaite & Pettit cannot appeal to desert to temper these problems, because 
their consequentialist approach removes undeserved blame and ‘reprobation from 
the quantum of punishment’ (1992, p.88).  
 
Braithwaite & Pettit may have a defence against von Hirsch & Ashworth’s over-
punishment concerns if we attend to their precise definition of dominion, sketched 
above, and apply this charitably. It is unrepublican to be unparsimonious, abuse 
power, or leave over-punishment decisions unchallenged: these reduce dominion. 
Maximizing equal dominion guides ideal republican practitioners’ decisions and 
actions. Yet Braithwaite & Pettit neither make this explicit, nor explain how they will 
account for non-ideal actors in non-ideal circumstances, nor acknowledge the 
likelihood of practical limitations. This explains why von Hirsch & Ashworth reiterate 
their concerns (Ashworth & von Hirsch 1993); and why Pettit & Braithwaite reject 
the criticism as ‘simply not paying attention’ (Pettit & Braithwaite 1993a, p.237). 
Braithwaite & Pettit may have an alternative response; power checking appears 
prima facie to protect against sentence inflation. This however is not without 
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problems, and I return to this in Chapter five. My approach may be able to 
strengthen Braithwaite & Pettit’s power checking, but cannot substitute for formal 
institutional oversight.  
 
 
Bottom-up approaches to punishment 
I move now to a group of bottom-up approaches to punishment, arising in response 
to concerns about mainstream criminal justice exclusion of victims in particular. Nils 
Christie’s influential paper Conflict as property argued the state further wrongs 
victims by denying them proprietary involvement in cases with which they are 
personally entwined: 
 
The victim is so totally out of the case that [s/]he has no chance, 
ever, to come to know the offender ... [s/]he will go away more 
frightened than ever, more in need than ever of an explanation of 
criminals as non-human  
(Christie 2003, p.26). 
 
Developing externally to state criminal justice, restorative justice attempts to 
include and empower victims. There have been other bottom-up developments 
from front-line criminal justice practitioners. Some scholars imply internal bottom-
up approaches are less authentic, seeking to refine rather than replace mainstream 
practice (McCold 200 
 
4, p.18). These developments include therapeutic jurisprudence, community justice 
and problem-solving courts. Shared features of the approaches considered here 
include offender and victim inclusion, discussion of offenders’ problems underlying 
offences and agreement-seeking approach to punishment decision-making and 
delivery. Speaking, listening and engaging with others are essential features of 
these practices.  
 
Restorative justice is particularly interesting. Firstly, there is both an empirical 
(Galaway & Hudson 1996; Morris & Maxwell 2001; Sherman & Strang 2007; 
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Shapland et al. 2011), and theoretical literature on restorative justice (Braithwaite 
1989; Cragg 1992; Braithwaite & Strang 2000; Walgrave 2000). 27  Secondly, 
restorative justice has made in-roads into mainstream practice. Restorative justice 
practices are diverse, but emphasize the importance of repairing harm and 
(re)building relationships, rather than offender suffering. 
 
Restorative justice includes face-to-face conferencing and mediation, discussed 
below, is intended by ‘restorative justice’ in this thesis, unless otherwise stated. Yet 
indirect mediation (without contact) or general victim-focused programmes for 
offenders are sometimes included under the heading of restorative justice in wider 
literature. Causing further confusion, restorative justice may be used as an umbrella 
term (Miller 2011, pp.10–1) for bottom-up responses. Over time this has included 
‘community corrections, informal justice, community service, alternative 
sentencing, community mediation [and] victim offender reconciliation’ (Zehr & Mika 
2003, p.40). Restorative justice methods are additionally used in schools to address 
bullying (Restorative Justice Council 2010). Some community schemes cover minor 
criminal cases and non-criminal disputes (Medows et al. 2010, p.10). Restorative 
justice is understood by different theorists as an alternative to punishment, or as an 
alternative form of punishment, (eg Zehr and Duff respectively). Restorative justice 
dealing with criminal cases, as an alternative form of punishment, will be intended 
here, unless clearly stated. 
 
Restorative justice methods were informed by traditional aboriginal healing 
practices, in Canada, New Zealand and Australia (McLaughlin et al. 2003, p.2), often 
beginning as small-scale local projects. Restorative justice developed externally to 
the criminal justice system, seeking local alternatives to formal criminal 
proceedings. Restorative Justice is used in mainstream punishment for youth 
offending in New Zealand (Maxwell et al. 2010), Australia (Cunneen & White 2011) 
and the UK (Mahaffey 2010). Conferencing and mediation bring together the 
offender and victim by mutual agreement. Conferencing includes support from 
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 Due to their practice-led nature, not all bottom-up approaches have theoretical literature 
associated with them, such as the problem-solving court movement. 
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friends, family and, potentially, local community representatives. Both practices 
include a neutral facilitator and offenders must take some responsibility. These 
approaches seek outcomes acceptable to all through discussion and mutual 
understanding. Victims and offenders both recount the offence and its impact. 
Offenders have an opportunity to apologize (Roche 2004, pp.9–10), victims may ask 
questions (Miller 2011, pp.163–4). Making and accepting an apology is important to 
several theorists (Bennett 2008; Duff 2007; Cragg 1992, p.215), although apology 
and forgiveness cannot be demanded. The literature suggests that when restorative 
justice works well, both sides may find closure (Shapland et al. 2011, p.164).  
 
‘Therapeutic jurisprudence’ is a perspective viewing sentencers’ actions as 
therapeutic or ‘healing’ (Wexler & Winick 2008, p.4). This has given rise to specialist 
court movements, such as Drug and Mental Health Courts, after some American 
judges became dissatisfied with the ‘revolving door’ (Hora 2002, p.1469) the 
criminal justice system offered these offenders. These practices have spread across 
the Western world (McIvor 2010, p.216). While each project is different, 
therapeutic court programmes aim to support offenders with personal difficulties 
underlying offending, using a mixture of practical, personal and clinical support; and 
techniques from motivational interviewing to rewarding offenders who address 
their difficulties (Winick 2003, p.187; Nolan 2009, p.44).  
 
‘Community justice’ followed community policing innovations, centring on the 
concerns of high-crime area residents. Local people are engaged in discussing 
policing and crime prevention priorities, and considering how offenders should be 
dealt with. This goes hand-in-hand with initiatives to improve local services: 
offenders often serve part of their sentence renovating public spaces to provide 
facilities for local people. Prioritizing ‘quality-of-life’ crimes (such as graffiti, street-
corner drug dealing and soliciting) help make communities safer for businesses and 
residents (Clear et al. 2011, p.99). Discursive, sometimes problem-solving methods 
are used to repair the harm to direct victims and the wider community (Clear 2003, 
p.63).  
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Community justice and therapeutic jurisprudence both contribute to problem-
solving courts. Beginning in America, problem-solving courts bring together various 
different services with expertise in different areas to improve ‘inter-agency 
communication’ (Berman 2010, p.8). In problem-solving sessions these agencies 
come together to discuss underlying problems with offenders, and develop a 
problem-solving strategy. Practices differ between projects and jurisdictions, but 
problem-solving courts aim to support offenders completing their sentence and to 
break the cycle of reoffending. The first problem-solving court in Midtown New York 
combined ‘punishment and help … to stem the chronic offending that was 
demoralizing local residents, businesses, and tourists’ (Berman 2010, p.3). This 
includes the supportive strategies of therapeutic jurisprudence, but shares the 
community impact focus and problem-solving techniques of community justice. 
Dialogue, fostering mutual understanding and agreement is central to these 
practices and theories. We can take from these bottom-up practices that 
punishment decision-making and delivery ought to be guided by inclusive dialogue, 
ideally involving many interested parties, as we see in the examples of restorative 
conferencing and problem-solving courts. Inviting dialogue and inclusion goes some 
way to reducing the risk of exclusion, silencing and objectification for offenders and 
victims, and reassuring them that justice has been done.  
 
Restorative theories 
Restorative theories and practices do not always match up. There is no theoretical 
base informing problem-solving courts (Miller & Johnson 2009, p.41). Restorative 
theories offer instructive values to guide punishment decision-making and delivery. 
For restorative justice, crimes are violations of persons and relationships. These 
violations cause harms and give rise to needs, and create obligations. Restorative 
justice aims to engage the parties in identifying who bears responsibility for the 
harm, and to support them in putting the wrong right, or repairing harm (Zehr & 
Gohar 2003, p.17, pp.19-21).  
 
Cragg argues that Duff’s punishment as penance is insufficient. Reconciliation is 
needed for which offenders must repair harm and demonstrate knowledge of how 
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to live within the law. This cannot be facilitated by the offenders’ suffering, which 
Cragg notes can only highlight wrong done. 28  What is needed to facilitate 
reconciliation is outlined by Cragg as ‘forgiveness, compassion, mercy, 
understanding’, which need not ‘frustrate justice’ (Cragg 1992, p.216). Likewise, 
Braithwaite focuses on the eventual reconciliation and reintegration of offenders 
with the community through carefully controlled and limited shaming, without 
denying justice (Braithwaite 1989, p.150). Cragg and Braithwaite’s approaches leave 
room in punishment for practices not understood as harmful.  
 
These bottom-up approaches re-centre criminal justice processes on the victim and 
community, rather than the offence and legal practitioners (Clear 2003, p.63), to 
strengthen community relationships and provide victim restoration. This challenges 
the traditional focus on the state’s response to the offence and top-down theories 
of punishment. The theory that has developed around bottom-up approaches 
blends traditional official state responses with the restorative concern to respond 
directly to offenders themselves as concrete persons with personal contexts, not 
just the social contexts of offences (eg Cragg 1992, p.205). We saw that 
consideration of the offenders’ contextual situations was an implicit aspect of 
retributive and consequentialist thought. Yet the theories discussed in the earlier 
part of this chapter say little on interaction with offenders to gather context. Far 
from being at odds with pre-existing practice and theory, bottom-up practices 
challenge mainstream theory and practice to make good on its implied concern for 
context through engaging with offenders. 
 
Why are these problems for theory?  
Existing penal philosophy and theory provides restricted guidance for sentence 
decision-making and delivery. As a result, practices informed by these theories 
struggle to ensure offenders’ treatment as equals. Definitions of punishment 
shackled to harm hobble penal theory and mainstream practice. Our ability to 
identify morally significant harms, addresses obscured needs associated with 
offending, and to treat offenders as equals is restricted. I have argued that such 
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 Hampton makes a similar argument that ‘pain’ acts like an ‘electric fence’ (Hampton 1984, p.212). 
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definitions desensitize us to morally significant harm, by normalizing harm and 
obscuring caring. This risks the objectification of offenders, inconsistent with 
treatment as equals. Some bottom-up practices address needs in the context of 
individuals’ lives and relationships (however damaged) between offenders, victims 
and community. Yet these are niche practices within overarching mainstream 
criminal justice.  
 
Why should normative theorists care? Perhaps ‘faulty’ practices should be re-
designed to better match the theory’s prescription. Perhaps normative theorists 
should leave practical decision-making to policy professionals. Besides the obvious 
response, leaving the detail to practitioners and ducking the question, these 
problems are relevant for theory. Problems of excluding and objectifying offenders 
arise, and are caused and compounded, because the harm-centred parameters of 
the existing conceptual framework of penal philosophy prevent us from recognizing 
the significance of harms. This results in restricted punishment decision-making and 
delivery guidance, limiting our ability to treat offenders as equals, and to 
acknowledge and address serious harms. Restorative practices do a better job of 
inclusion, highlighting mainstream failings, but have their own difficulties. 
 
In his 2007 work Answering for crime, Duff poses the following problem:  
 
We must ask ourselves how we can begin to remedy the injustices 
that these offenders have suffered … but what can we do 
meanwhile in response to their crimes? Part of an answer is that 
we must ourselves be collectively ready to be called to account ... 
my standing to call you to account for the wrongs that you commit 
against me is at least strengthened if I am ready to be called and 
to hold myself to account for the wrongs I have committed against 
you. Another part of the answer might be to develop more 
nuanced legal procedures, or post-conviction processes, that 
would have room for genuine recognition and discussion of such 
injustices: we could look for inspiration here to ‘restorative justice’ 
procedures, which seek to restore, or to (re)create, the social 
relationships that are damaged by both crime and social injustice 
(Duff 2007, p.193). 
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Care ethics may be able to provide guidance for these ‘more nuanced legal 
procedures’, ‘post-conviction processes’, and ‘room for’ acknowledging and 
addressing ‘social injustices’, by providing guiding principles for practical 
punishment decisions. The usual normative framework, based on a harm-focused 
definition of punishment, is restricted in its ability to allow space for recognising 
both care and harm, and in providing treatment as equals. To offer an improvement 
on the existing normative framework, the principles I will offer need to:  
 
1. Acknowledge the moral significance of harms, to help avoid or 
address harms; 
2. Identify the essential presence of caring practices with 
contemporary punishment practices; 
3. Provide guidance principles for punishment decision-making 
and delivery; which 
4. Enhances our ability to provide treatment as equals. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 
An ethic of care 
 
 
Chapter one argued that offenders’ personal contextual information is implicitly 
valuable to both retributive and consequentialist approaches to punishment. This 
chapter introduces care ethics as a practice and method of practical moral 
reasoning, distinct from liberal approaches in its focus on concrete individuals and 
their personal and social contexts. Guiding principles will be drawn out in a generic 
form here, and applied to punishment in Chapter four. We saw in Chapter one that 
harm-centred conceptions of punishment cannot easily recognize caring work. Yet 
harm is acknowledged in care ethics. Caring work is often restricted to a non-ideal 
form in practice, given the frequent need to address conflicting needs and 
shortfalls. I will argue that there are some implicit responses to these limits within 
care theory. This chapter provides an introduction to the origins of care ethics, 
distinguishes a care approach from both liberal and communitarian perspectives, 
indicates the potential benefits of care ethics and addresses core criticisms. 
 
 
Background 
Contemporary care ethics developed from Carol Gilligan’s path-breaking theoretical 
work in moral development (1982), as a critique of classical liberal moral theory, 
responding to broader, often feminist,29 concerns. Gilligan observed care moral 
reasoning’s ‘different voice’, extending from ‘an injunction not to hurt others to an 
ideal of responsibility’ (1982, p.149), focusing on relationships and recognizing the 
role of connection in avoiding aggression (1982, p.173). This voice was absent from 
Lawrence Kohlberg’s psychological research on moral development (1969), which 
focused on the construction and application of abstract, generalized rules. Gilligan 
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 Not all care theorists are feminist: Slote provides a minimally feminist, largely gender-neutral 
account of care as a virtue (Slote 2001). 
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argued Kohlberg’s method was insufficiently sensitive to this relational and context-
sensitive, psychologically observable alternative model. She found the ‘different 
voice’ empirically associated with women, but resisted readings suggesting an 
essentialist link with gender (Gilligan 1982, p.2). The empirical observation has been 
difficult to reproduce, reflecting the limitations of her small-scale study. Gilligan 
argued methodological insensitivity may explain why Kohlberg’s results suggested 
men reached higher stages of moral development, as classified by Kohlberg, more 
often than women subjects.  
 
The abstract rules reasoning, in contrast to the connected, contextually situated 
‘different voice’, are illustrated by the responses of Gilligan’s child subjects, 
particularly Jake and Amy, to the ‘Heinz dilemma’, used by Kohlberg and 
reproduced by Gilligan. 
 
The Heinz Dilemma: 
Heinz considers whether or not to steal a drug which he cannot 
afford … to save the life of his wife ... the druggist [refuses] to 
lower his price ... Should Heinz steal the drug?  
(Gilligan 1982, p.25) 
 
Gilligan reports that Jake views the moral dilemma as ‘sort of like a math problem 
with humans’, presuming that anyone reasoning logically would reach the same 
conclusion (1982, p.26). Amy however finds the moral puzzle in the druggist’s 
failure to respond to the dying woman’s need. Amy sees ‘a narrative of 
relationships’ extending over time, a ‘fracture of human relationships that must be 
mended with its own thread’ (1982, p.31), rather than ‘a self-contained problem in 
moral logic’ (1982, pp.28–9). 
 
Gilligan’s approach was limited, but her work raised critical questions. Care 
theorists differ in their approaches and foci, but all criticized similar problems 
perceived with the dominant Western, classical liberal informed moral reasoning: 
the Kantian and consequentialist perspectives of liberal legal and political theory 
(Clement 1996, p.1; Held 2006, p.63). Care theorists usually argue that classical 
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liberal perspectives conceptualize individuals abstractly as self-sufficient, 
independent rational actors with (full, enduring) autonomy (Code 1991, p.77). 
Difference-blind treatment is necessarily neutral, abstracted treatment of 
individuals on a generalized conception of others. Brian Barry argued that 
difference-blindness is a requirement of fairness; hence it is a strength of liberalism 
(Barry 2002, p.76, pp.91-2). Feminist theorists responded that many generalized, 
alleged neutral norms entailed bias towards a male norm, excluding the experiences 
of women (Noddings 2002, p.27, p. 45). Some liberal political theorists have 
responded to these concerns, although the implications about how information is 
prioritized are still relevant to my present study. 
  
Care and relational theorists challenge these classical liberal ontological 
expectations of individuals, arguing that individuals are not empirically found to be 
self-sufficient, rational, or fully autonomous over complete lives. ‘Dependency is 
inescapable in the life history of each individual’ (Kittay 1999, p.29). In childhood, 
old age, periods of mental and physical illness or disability, we depend on others. 
Since we inhabit limited, ‘fragile bodies’ (Walker 2006, p.148) and minds we are 
vulnerable to the unpredictable onset of dependence.30 Further, since we are all 
vulnerable and likely to depend on others, we are interdependent: others may 
come to depend on us for care due to their similar vulnerability. For Virginia Held, 
valuing caring relationships and the social practices maintaining relationships, is 
distinctive of care ethics (2006, pp.19–20). Care theorists contend that liberal 
theory devalues or ignores the work necessary to meet basic human needs and 
maintain relationships (Held 2006, p.14).  
 
Including rather than abstracting the complexities of real lives, as characteristic of 
feminist scholarship, produces a diversity of arguments (Clement 1996, pp.1–10). 
Yet most care theorists develop criticisms of liberal moral reasoning through the 
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 Minow (1990, p.51) echoes Mair’s observations that some in the ‘disabled’ community refer to the 
self-sufficient autonomous individuals associated with liberalism as ‘Temporarily Able Persons’ 
(Mairs 1987, col.2), reflecting our vulnerability. 
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following broad alternative understandings, the third of which is particularly 
relevant to my project: 
 
1. Since care and relationships are necessary to the flourishing of 
interdependent, vulnerable beings, these are morally 
significant (Kittay 1999, p.88; Sander-Staudt 2011);  
2. Since experience of caring is historically associated with 
women, drawing on women’s experience is relevant and 
corrects androcentric bias in the existing moral literature 
(Kittay 1999, p.17);  
3. Since experience of practical caring work demonstrates the 
importance of contextual, situational detail in understanding 
and meeting needs and maintaining relationships, a concrete, 
particular perspective is more helpful than a generalized 
abstracted view (Kittay 1999, pp.64–5, p.88);  
4. Since concrete persons are in, and value, relationships, this 
implies a holistic consideration of needs across many 
individuals.  
 
Whereas liberal theory has been characterized as generalized and abstract, 
presuming individual independence and employs allegedly neutral norms, care 
ethics anticipates interdependent and variably vulnerable individuals. 
Interdependence implies personal limits: some things we cannot achieve alone. 
Relationships and practical caring work are morally salient, and best interpreted 
through concrete contextual detail (Clement 1996, p.11). At a minimum, the 
argument is that liberal theories are poorly applied. For many care theorists, liberal 
approaches cannot be internally corrected and an external care-perspective 
supplement is necessary. Kittay seeks to ‘amend’ (1999, p.79) and Noddings to 
‘modify’ (2002, p.30, p.80) rather than replace liberalism, responding to the flaws 
perceived by care theorists in classical liberalism. None discussed here propose 
discarding liberalism completely. Clement argues liberal perspectives and care 
ethics perspectives are not incompatible, but since each offers distinct insights, 
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attempting to express one perspective in the terms of the other, compromises both 
(Clement 1996, p.5). What, then, is care?  
 
Sander-Staudt identifies the description of caring as one or more of several 
overlapping concepts as a ‘leading’ portrayal of care ethics, reflected in my own 
review of the literature. Care theories describe care as at least one (often more) of 
these overlapping, interacting concepts (Sander-Staudt 2011, sec.2):  
 
 An attitude or disposition: concern for care-receiver’s 
wellbeing, providing strong grounds for their actions (Clement 
1996, pp.104–7); 
 A practice: enabling others to meet basic biological or 
developmental needs (Engster 2007, p.16), which recipients 
could not otherwise meet (Bubeck 1995, p.129); 
 A value set or virtue: moral qualities associated with complex 
practical-caring (Slote 2001; Held 2006). 
 
 
The conceptual anatomy of care ethics 
Here I sketch the ‘conceptual anatomy’, distinguishing the ‘overlapping concepts’ of 
caring values, practices and attitudes as separate organs of a greater whole. This 
conceptual anatomy bears a ‘similar but non-identical’ resemblance to everyday 
caring experiences, as any one particular subject resembles all individual members 
of the species. Dissection disassociates an organ from the body, making the 
structure of the particular organ easier to study. But this distorts and obscures the 
relationships between the organ and other dynamic, symbiotic structures that 
ordinarily interact, and influence the organ’s function in the body. In the same way, 
the conceptual anatomy is framed as separate ideals, which in practice overlap and 
interact. These ideals are not always practically achievable, but provide guiding aims 
and will serve as a field-guide for identifying practical caring work in Chapter three. 
This is not a static or complete definitive description, but sketches the minimum 
core components care ethicists suggest caring relationships and practices require.  
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Practice 
Fabric and thread metaphors abound in care writings (Gilligan 1982, p.31). There is 
no ‘best’ place to begin unpicking these tangled, holistically understood, conceptual 
skeins. However, since care ethics is heavily informed by practical experience of 
caring work, this is a reasonable place to start. Which activities count is disputed, 
but the labour of familial caring (for children and elders) is a core example. When 
this work becomes commercialized, writers begin to disagree: is the hired 
childminder primarily providing care to children, or services to parents?31 Caring 
does not demand sacrificing our own needs (Clement 1996, p.36). Self-care is 
identified in Gilligan’s highest stage of care ethics moral development.32 Here we 
recognize ourselves and our needs as equal to others, ‘attempting to balance … 
obligations to self and others’ (1996, p.96).  
 
Joan Tronto and Berenice Fisher provide a popular, broad definition of caring work, 
minimizing cultural specificity: ‘everything that we do to maintain, continue, and 
repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible’ (Fisher & Tronto 1991, 
p.40). However, this definition covers activities we may not wish to include. 
Performing clerical duties for a salary facilitates living in the world as well as 
possible. Tronto attempts to qualify this definition, specifying caring work as 
focused on meeting others’ needs. What appears to be doing the conceptual work 
is the attitude of the act-performing party. Tronto focuses on caring as a value and 
practice, yet this illustrates how these are bound up with the attitude of care, 
discussed below. Tronto terms this linkage the integrity of care (1993, p.136).  
 
Tronto provides the following conceptual structure for the ‘phases’ of practical 
caring work: 
                                                     
31  We might exclude purchased services, since providers might be financially rather than 
altruistically motivated. Yet this perpetuates the presumed priority of economic relationships over 
caring relationships. 
32 Self-care is included by Gilligan in the highest stage of care reasoning (1982, p.75, p.79, p.82, p.95; 
1986, p.319, p.322, p.324). Clement argues this prevents carer’s autonomy from being dismissed 
(1996, pp.35–8). 
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1 'Caring About': making efforts to become aware of others’ 
needs; 
2 'Taking Care Of': logistical arrangement for practical caring work 
delivery; 
3 'Care-Giving': on-the-ground provision of needs-meeting 
practical caring work 
4 'Care-Receiving': the care-receiver’s response helps care-givers 
adapt practical caring work to meet care-receiver’s preferences, 
providing responsive ongoing care.  
(Tronto 1993, pp.106–8. Tronto’s phases, with paraphrased 
explanations.) 
 
Bubeck offers a narrower definition of care work as occurring only when i) ‘face-to-
face’, and ii) where needs ‘cannot possibly be met by the person in need herself’ 
(1995, p.129). Both elements seem too strict. Firstly, Bubeck suggests discussing a 
problem as something one cannot achieve alone (1995, p.132), undermining her 
first stipulation that care must be face-to-face. On telephoning the Samaritans, an 
unknown other provides emotional support. Precisely the lack of face-to-face 
contact responsively facilitates some callers’ preference for anonymity. Providing 
such helplines demonstrates need awareness and arranging for needs-meeting, 
reflecting Tronto’s phases of caring. Bubeck's second stipulation of meeting needs 
which ‘cannot possibly be met by the person in need herself’ (1995, p.129) perhaps 
goes too far. A person with severe arthritis might be able to prepare a meal, but 
they might find it painful, difficult and time-consuming. Supporting someone who 
could address their own need at increased personal cost is arguably the sort of 
action we would want to include as care. If Bubeck intends to include this example, 
then we need to understand her ‘cannot possibly’, as closer to ‘cannot reasonably’. 
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Values 
Tronto provides the following breakdown of the ‘ethical elements’ of caring, implied 
by and informing our practice. These are: 
 
1 ‘Attentiveness’: we are morally required to have regard for 
others’ needs, particularly those with whom we have a 
relationship; 
2 ‘Responsibility’: we take or share responsibility for meeting 
needs. Responsibilities are flexible, allowing the content to be 
moulded according to the need, context and practical possibilities; 
3 ‘Competence’: we have a responsibility to provide good care, 
recognising our limitations and employing the attitude of care; 
4 ‘Responsiveness’: listening and responding to the care-receiver 
helps us better understand the nuances of the need.  
(1993, pp.127–37. Tronto’s elements, with paraphrased 
explanations.) 
 
Tronto highlights the integrity of care (1993, p.136), displaying the interdependence 
of the separate ‘organs’ of the conceptual anatomy of care ethics. The integrity of 
care appears to flow from the value of competence. Insofar as we wish to provide 
‘good’ caring, we must employ the attitude, practices and values of care ethics’ 
conceptual anatomy together. I use Tronto’s ‘practical phases’ and ‘ethical 
elements’ to identify caring in punishment practices in the next chapter. Despite the 
narrowness of Bubeck’s definition, we will see caring practices in punishment 
according to her definition.  
 
Attitude 
One can perform caring activities without a particular attitude (Tronto 1993, p.105). 
Yet for Kittay, caring attitudes represent ‘the open responsiveness to another that is 
… essential to understanding what another requires’ (Kittay 2002, p.259). Both are 
correct within their own terms. Tronto’s conception of caring draws deliberately 
broad boundaries, to include poorly practiced care, enabling constructive criticism 
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(Tronto 1993, p.103). Kittay’s description exemplifies Tronto’s awareness and 
response of practical caring, and the attentive and responsive care values. Without 
this open engagement with the other, our ability to respond to the nuances of their 
need and preference are disabled, impoverishing the caring work provided  
(Clement 1996, p.101). As Noddings stresses, ‘care demands listening, discussing 
and responding’ (2006, p.29). 
 
These are pragmatic requirements: acting in attentive, responsive ways allows us to 
provide better-informed, targeted responses. Yet the attitude or disposition of care 
is present precisely when we are not simply going through the motions, but 
delivering caring ‘in an attentive, responsive and respectful manner’ (Engster 2007, 
p.31; original emphasis). Herring also notes that respect is ‘the attitude reflected in 
good care’ (2013, p.19). This attitude, and the responsiveness values and practices, 
have some resonance with the inclusive treatment and ‘proper respect as human 
beings, each with his or her own needs for dignity’ (Bottoms & Tankebe 2012, 
p.121) of interactional justice, seen in Chapter one. Interactional justice is a concept 
which will help to identify what is missing in mainstream practices. I shall 
characterize the attitude appropriate for caring as a thread of openness to, and 
engagement with, the other, running through our reasoning and practices, drawing 
them together.  
 
Defining care ethics 
More flexible than Bubeck’s but narrower than Tronto’s definition, Daniel Engster 
offers a concise definition of care: ‘help[ing] others to meet their vital biological 
needs, develop or maintain their innate capabilities, and alleviate unnecessary pain 
and suffering’ (Engster 2007, p.31). Engster also provides a set of aims for practical 
caring work, which he argues apply both for caring individuals and governments: 
 
To help individuals meet their basic needs … when they cannot 
reasonably meet these needs on their own. 
 
To help individuals to develop and sustain their basic capabilities 
for sensation, mobility, emotion, imagination, reason, 
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communication, affiliation, literacy, and numeracy when they 
cannot reasonably achieve these goals on their own. 
 
To help individuals to avoid and alleviate unnecessary pain and 
suffering when they need help in meeting this goal.’  
(2007, p.76) 
 
Engster draws on Martha Nussbaum’s basic capabilities approach. Nussbaum’s basic 
capabilities are: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and 
thought; emotion; practical reason; affiliation, including engagement in social 
interaction and treatment ‘as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of 
others’; other species; play; control over one’s environment, including political and 
material aspects (2000, pp.78–80). Tronto also suggests Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach as a promising way of interpreting needs (1993, p.140). Engster argues 
that meeting basic needs, building capabilities, and avoiding unnecessary suffering 
requires ‘an attentive, responsive and respectful manner’ (2007, p.31 original 
emphasis), arguing these attitudes motivate the following questions:  
 
Attentiveness most basically directs us to ask the question: Do you 
need something? […] Responsiveness directs us to ask the 
question: What do you need? […] Respect directs us to ask the 
question: What can I do to help you […] what would help you to be 
able better to meet your needs  
(Engster 2007, pp.30–1)? 
 
Engster’s definition encapsulates, and his aims shadow, the conceptual anatomy of 
caring. I adopt Engster’s definition to meet sceptical readers half way. Engster’s care 
theory is notably framed in more individual-focused terms. Engster grounds a duty 
to care in an obligation to uphold caring as a social institution: since we depend on 
the ‘web of caring for our survival and social existence, we are all morally obligated 
to contribute to its maintenance and reproduction insofar as we are able’ (Engster 
2007, p.151). Within care literature responsibilities to care are more often framed 
as arising from relationships with the needy person. Concern for a particular other’s 
wellbeing (a caring attitude), not a self-interested concern to support social 
institutions, is most often identified as grounding caring responses (Clement 1996, 
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p.56; Kittay 2002, p.101). This difference should not pose a problem. Engster 
displays the conceptual anatomy of care in his definition (2007, p.31) aims (2007, 
p.76), and attention to needs-meeting (2007, pp.61–2). He recognizes the moral 
value of care-giving and relationship maintenance (2007, pp.56–7). His use of web 
imagery reflects the broader care literature and concords with expectations of 
interdependence. Nothing in Engster’s work suggests that our contributions cannot 
be relationally performed or valued.  
 
Following Tronto and Held, Engster sees care as politically valuable, siting care at 
the heart of conceptions of justice (Engster 2007, p.5). For my purposes, considering 
state interactions with individual offenders, Engster’s more individualistic, political 
approach may be helpful. Engster offers a minimal interpretation of respect as ‘the 
recognition that others are worthy of our attention and responsiveness’, intending 
nothing ‘so strong as equal recognition’ (2007, p.31). Yet this can be fleshed out 
either relationally or with a thinner, liberal understanding, discussed in the equality 
section of this chapter. My interest is what guidance we might provide punishment 
decision-making and delivery practitioners regarding interactions, between state 
agents and offenders, to provide treatment as equals. Therefore theorists 
considering the political (Tronto 1993, p.171; Held 2006, p.38, p.77, p.153; Engster 
2007) and policy (Kittay 1999, chap.5; Sevenhuijsen 2003, p.193, pp.181-2, p.195; 
Noddings 2006; 2002) applications of care ethics, are particularly relevant to my 
project.  
 
Tronto identifies care as both a moral and political concept, arguing for the 
inclusion of care concerns within existing political theory, a project which Engster 
takes up. Following Tronto and Engster, I understand caring as a politically 
important value, but an incomplete political theory. While care is not the only 
value, Engster stresses that care theory is ‘central to any adequate theory of justice’ 
(2007, p.5; original emphasis). Tronto argues including care as a political value 
allows a changed ‘sense of political goals’, providing ‘additional ways to think 
politically and strategically’ (Tronto 1996, p.143). In Chapter one, I argued that 
harm-centred definitions of punishment can cause problems. I proposed an 
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alternative definition of punishment to facilitate ‘thinking differently’ about the 
treatment of offenders in punishment decision-making and delivery. In using care 
ethics to provide guiding principles for this, I seek ‘additional ways to think 
politically and strategically’ about the treatment of offenders as equals. Speaking in 
relation to citizenship, Selma Sevenhuijsen also views that the inclusion of care 
ethics in political considerations can help to create discursive space (1998, p.15). 
She argues that ‘placing care within concepts of democratic citizenship … [may] 
enable us to judge with care’ (1998, p.vi). 
 
 
Method of practical moral reasoning 
The most distinctive and useful feature of care ethics for my purposes is the method 
of practical moral reasoning, in broad contrast to liberal perspective methods. 
Clement defines the focus of care ‘based on its contextual decision-making, its 
priority of maintaining relationships, and its social conception of the self’; and the 
liberal justice perspective ‘in terms of its abstract decision-making, its priority of 
equality, and its individualistic conception of the self’ (1996, p.5). These 
fundamental differences in ‘focal point’ (1996, p.5), result in a different ‘primary 
moral commitment’, at the centre of the care approach to practical moral reasoning 
(Friedman 1995, p.73). I offer a general characterization to highlight these 
differences, representing general themes, rather than the specific approach of any 
particular theorist. When we reason from the liberal justice perspective, we begin 
with abstract ‘blank spaces’ (Coverdale 2013, p.74) like an algebraic equation, or the 
‘math problem’ Jake describes. We imagine what rights and duties might inhere 
between parties in a general hypothetical situation (eg promise, contract), and 
extrapolate from this thought experiment to provide ‘action-guiding rules for the 
real world’ (2013, p.74). Consider the following example: 
 
Both A and B have a right to bodily integrity. 
Both A and B have a duty not to hit each other. 
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Contextual real-world details form no part of this reasoning, although on 
encountering real world circumstances which do not appear to fit the rules, we 
might be able to develop exceptions: 
 
If A is acting in proportionate self-defence, then A has a right to hit B. 
If A and B freely agree to a boxing match, then A and B have a right to hit each 
other. 
 
By contrast, when we reason from the perspective of care we begin with concrete 
persons, consider the relationship between them and the needs they presently 
have. Relationships, chosen and unchosen, inform our responsibilities. We consider 
what needs-meeting resources are available in the context of their particular 
situation, and how these can be best employed to efficiently and effectively meet 
needs, or respond to a shared obligation to meet needs and maintain relationships. 
For example, the hospital patient, P, needs a meal. This could be provided by a 
medic, M, orderly, O, or relative, R.  
 
P needs a meal. P is unable to meet this need alone. 
M, O, and R share a responsibility to provide a meal to P. 
 
Who should undertake to bring a meal to the patient? This question asks who is 
‘best placed’ to provide this care. The medic might be nearest, but others need her 
specialist skills. The patient might prefer a relative, but the relative may not be able 
to visit. The orderly might have the most appropriate combination of time and 
resources. Further, is an appropriate meal appropriate to:  
 
 The patient’s medical need?  
 Separate dietary needs?  
 Usual cultural tastes and preferences?  
 What this particular person prefers?  
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The patient may require a gluten-free (medical need) vegetarian (separate dietary 
need) meal, but a cheese salad is inappropriate for the coeliac or vegetarian who 
detests cheese. 33  These examples indicate the importance of contextual 
information, in responding to the individual’s need and preferences, as indicated in 
the practices and values of caring explored above. Finally, how will the patient eat 
the meal? A patient’s condition may inform food choices. Finger food is more easily 
managed by a person with an immobile arm than food requiring a knife and fork. 
This displays appropriate respect for the care-receiver, as highlighted by Engster 
(2007, p.31). Care perspective reasoning prioritizes gathering and employing 
contextual information to inform our practical responses. One way to gather and 
consider this information is through engaging with the care receiver to answer a 
series of questions together: 
 
 What needs are there (considering the place of a particular 
need holistically, with regard to the individual’s other needs, 
and with regard to the wider distribution of needs in the social 
context)? 
 Who should provide care (considering holistically the total 
distribution of resources, relationships and responsibilities, 
individually and in society)? 
 What care is appropriate (given time, resources and 
responsibilities)? 
 What are the care-receiver’s preferences? 
 
Liberal perspectives do not preclude applying contextual information later. But 
prioritizing ‘generalized’ (Benhabib 1986, p.415) understandings of individuals and 
abstract information over contextual and relational considerations, reduces the 
availability of personal and social contextual information to apply later. 
Sevenhuijsen argues that ‘[b]ecause the moral agent is assumed to be detached 
from his or her situated must and connections, he or she is unable to reflect on 
                                                     
33
 As a child, my mother was provided ‘special’ culturally specific school lunches: Catholic students 
were served pilchards every Friday. My mother has never liked pilchards. 
96 
 
moral dilemmas in relation to concrete others’ (1998, p.60). Kittay particularly 
stresses the importance of an open and engaged attitude towards care-receivers for 
contextual information-gathering (2002, p.259). Care reasoning prioritizes thick, 
personally and socially contextually informed, holistically considered decision-
making, shadowing the conceptual anatomy of care wherever possible, and 
permitting flexible, informed responses to particular needs. Helping another dress is 
a task facilitated with contextual detail. Since only the wearer knows whether the 
shoes pinch, we learn through engagement with the other which shoes they find 
more comfortable. Sevenhuijsen also observes that care ethics approaches expect 
situated concrete social circumstance information ‘is exactly what will raise the 
quality of judgement’ (1998, p.60). 
 
A core difference between the practical moral reasoning of classical liberal versus 
care ethics perspectives is that estimates are a ‘second-best’ form of information-
gathering from care perspectives. Indeed, avoidably presuming to know how to 
address needs better than the care-receiver belittles their lived experience of their 
particular situation. Care-givers cannot solicit unconscious patients’ preferences 
and real-life problems require real-time responses: we cannot be ‘paralysed’ by lack 
of information (Harding 2004, p.11). How should we reason when contextual 
information is limited? Care perspectives employ estimates, based on experience 
and the information we do have, only when this represents the best practically 
achievable option to secure a timely response.  
 
There are two related criticisms to the above meal example. Firstly, it is ambiguous 
what exactly we are caring about: the preference not to eat cheese? The 
requirement not to eat gluten? While the preference against cheese may seem 
trivial, the requirement for a gluten-free meal is not. Both are facilitated by an 
engagement with the care-receiver, and demonstrate concern for their wellbeing as 
concrete individuals. Considering these in context as ‘preferences’ and 
‘requirements’, and considering the potential to avoid unwanted harm gives an 
indication of which should carry more weight.  
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Although Bowden argues that care-informed reasoning resists formulation as rules 
(2000, p.179), care theories are not anti-rule per se. The meal example does not 
consider that there will be many other patients in the hospital. In this case, a rule 
approach is more helpful: the needs of many can most efficiently, be met with 
hospital kitchens, cooks and porters to bring prepared food to wards. What the care 
perspective adds to this is the need for some engagement between recipients and 
the catering system, so that individual specific medical requirements beyond basic 
nourishment can be met. Personal taste preferences and cultural requirements34 
may not be ideally met under a central provision scheme. But this may be justified 
in the context of the best use of hospital resources, considering the need to feed 
patients holistically with other needs to provide medical supplies and staff.  
 
What the care perspective adds is the ability to judge contextually whether a 
particular approach is appropriate and to examine why. Care ethics reasoning might 
appear as moral relativism. Taking the care perspective opens principles to context-
informed discussion, permits consideration of which principles should apply, and 
fosters an awareness of the limits of our principles. Rather than offering ambiguous, 
unprincipled thought, we have a flexible selection of principles, responding to 
contexts (Clement 1996, p.97). We have seen that care ethic’s relational concerns 
are distinct from, though not inconsistent with, liberalism. Yet there is an 
alternative perspective viewing individuals as necessarily interdependent: 
communitarianism. I now turn to distinguish care and communitarian perspectives, 
before turning to the relevance of the differences between care ethics and classical 
liberal perspectives for treatment as equals.  
 
 
Individuals, relationships and responsibilities 
Care theorists depict individuals as both interdependent and variably vulnerable 
(Walker 2006, p.148). Unlike liberal self-sufficiency expectations, admitting one has 
reached one’s limit is normalized. Seeking support is desirable, not a personal 
                                                     
34
 MD Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, offers kosher meals but not halal meat (MD Anderson 
Cancer Center 2013). Patients requiring halal meat rely on family provision. 
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failing. For those able to learn, as a child learns to talk, or professionals refine skills, 
this is a development opportunity. But even where individual capabilities cannot be 
developed, these ontological expectations argue against stigmatizing care-receivers 
because they need help with basic needs (Clement 1996, pp.104–7; Engster 2007, 
p.31). This does not mean that we cannot consider independence or individual 
choice as valuable: we can meet needs in ways which enable and empower care-
receivers to exercise individual choice (Noddings 2006, p.28). Self-directed choices 
are available other than through sole self-authorship (Anderson 2003, p.159).  
 
Relationships are important for these interdependent, more communitarian selves 
and are valued accordingly (Held 2006, pp.19–20). Yet, most obviously in Engster’s 
writing (2007, p.99); individuals need not be subsumed by relationships on 
relational understandings. Communitarianism acknowledges that individuals cannot 
understand themselves apart from their social context. Therefore, each individual is 
obliged to contribute to the maintenance of community practices and values. 
Communitarian approaches may prioritize traditional forms of relationship at the 
expense of the parties. In cultures highly valuing marriage, it may be ‘unthinkable’ if 
not (legally) impossible for a spouse to separate from an abusive partner. While 
Michael Walzer proposes ‘there is no self knowledge without the help of others’ 
(1983, p.272), communities do not have a monopoly on relationships enabling self 
knowledge. Relationships change, new ones begin, and previously important 
relationships end. Yet individuals persist and can in part be understood through 
these developing relationships.  
 
Unlike fully communitarian selves, expected to make personal sacrifices for the 
common good, relationships exist to benefit concrete individuals. Engster argues 
that care theory grants individuals moral priority, and responds to conflict with 
dialogue to resolve differences if possible (Engster 2007, p.99). Care ethics 
recognizes that sometimes the appropriate response is to sever relationships in the 
interests of the parties. Care reasoning lends itself to political debate because 
practical caring work and reasoning responds regularly to conflicting needs, beliefs 
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and inadequate resources (Tronto 1993, p.109, p.136; Clement 1996, p.19; 
Noddings 2002, p.247; Held 2006, p.22, p.92, p.139; Engster 2004, p.117).  
 
Responding to needs according to context is a flexible approach allowing for care-
receivers’ preferences. Chosen and unchosen relationships and social and cultural 
expectations are part of the context informing appropriate responses, and may 
imply a caring responsibility (Engster 2007, pp.56–7). When and whether we have a 
responsibility to act, and what we have a responsibility to do, is in part informed 
and limited by what it is socially and culturally conceivable that we might do. This 
becomes complicated if our social and cultural context is different to those of our 
care-receiver, as understandings are not always shared (Tannen 1984).  
 
Cultural factors introduce limits and rigidity into the otherwise flexible approach. If 
my responsibilities are partly defined by social and cultural roles, then I may only do 
what is acceptable or thinkable that someone in my position could do as a diligent 
scholar, a law-abiding citizen etc. On finding a winning lottery ticket in the street, 
the only option available to the law-abiding citizen is to take it promptly to the 
nearest police station (BBC 2009). These social expectations may be restrictive, but 
have benefits in that they allow others to predict how we will act, facilitating co-
operative responses.  
 
Social and cultural expectations may perpetuate oppression: for example 
expectations placing women in subordinate social roles, restricting their options. 
The appropriate response to cultural tradition justifications may be ‘in that case it’s 
high time you stopped’ (Barry 2002, p.254). Discriminatory expectations should be 
challenged, although this may not always be appropriate in needs-meeting 
exercises. Social and cultural expectations are not fixed and might be understood as 
highly viscose: we should expect gradual change over time. This fluidity allows both 
the advent of, and challenges to, discriminatory practices.  
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Treatment as equals: concern, respect and dignity in liberalism 
and the ethic of care 
Equality is a central theme of my project. I begin from a concern that offenders are 
human beings entitled to treatment as equals qua persons, whatever else 
differential treatment in response to the offending (punishment) requires. Care 
theorists do not typically write in terms of equality, presuming this a concern of 
liberal justice (Clement 199 6, p.11). Yet there are exceptions: in her discussion of a 
care/response moral orientation in a ‘feminist vision of justice’, Harris states ‘all 
people have equal value as human beings’ (2003, p.33). Kittay’s connection-based 
equality proposes entitlements to relationships enabling us to receive care, and 
social support in our caring so that no person is coerced to perform more caring 
work than they choose (1999, p.66), to include dependency relations. We will see 
here that there is a prima facie overlap between classical liberal and relational 
perspectives. Christine Koggel and Jennifer Llewellyn separately emphasize that 
liberal and relational equality are both founded on ideals of equal concern and 
respect, yet interpreted differently (Koggel 1998, p.45; Llewellyn 2012, pp.93–4).  
 
An equal moral status between persons is suggested by care ethics ontological 
expectations of individuals. Since we all have personal limits and needs, care-
receivers are ‘not lesser’ (Engster 2007, p.31). Care-givers are in a position of power 
(Baier 1986, p.241), yet are not understood as ‘greater’. We will see later in this 
chapter that care-givers placing themselves ‘above’ care-receivers fall foul of the 
operational limits of care: infantilizing care-receivers, impoverishing understanding 
of needs and providing poor care. As Jonathan Herring repeatedly stresses, care-
receivers might also be care-givers to others; and care-receiving and care-giving 
roles might be reversed between the same individuals in future circumstances 
(Herring 2013, p.4, p.153, p.167, p.174, p.176): A parent might escort a child to 
school (providing care), before attending a medical appointment (receiving care). 
 
If care-receivers are not ‘lesser’, and care-givers not ‘greater’, it follows that we are 
in some sense equal. Clearly, we have differing needs and capabilities (resources to 
meet needs), relational contexts and preferences. The equality is a principled 
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recognition of a moral status as equals, rather than descriptive of outcomes or 
identical practices. If we have an equal moral status, we should be treated in ways 
reflecting this. The language of equal concern and respect, coined by liberal theorist 
Ronald Dworkin and employed by relational theorists Llewellyn and Koggel, best 
expresses this.  
 
Koggel spotlights the central insight of classical liberalism as the recognition that if 
‘treating like cases alike is to have any moral substance, it must rest on the 
fundamental requirement that each person be treated with equal concern and 
respect’ (Koggel 1998, p.45). Following Gilligan’s representation of care as ‘an 
injunction not to hurt others’ (1982, p.149), Koggel argues this also ‘assumes the 
moral principle that each person deserves equal concern and respect’ (1998, p.184). 
In constructing her relational account of equality, Koggel draws on Gilligan’s 
‘different voice’ of caring, which ‘grasps’ the significance of relationships (1998, 
p.141). Koggel argues we should focus on relationships rather than caring attitudes 
(1998, p.187). However, her proposition that an injunction to refrain from harm 
presupposes equal concern and respect also applies to Engster’s aim ‘to avoid and 
alleviate unnecessary pain and suffering’ (2007, p.76).  
 
Classical liberal reasoning applies rules generated in the abstract, and does not 
appear to value the gathering of contextual information prior to decision-making. In 
Chapter one we saw Dworkin’s example of treating two differently sick children 
with equal concern and respect, reflecting the necessity of contextual information. 
Dworkin distinguished between an equal distribution or ‘equal treatment’, and our 
equal, individual ‘right to treatment as an equal … with the same respect and 
concern as anyone else’ (2000, p.227). The children each have an equal right to life. 
But we treat the children ‘as equals by medicating the child in mortal danger 
although (and because) we provide different treatment’ (Coverdale 2013, p.72). 
How are equal ‘concern’ and ‘respect’ fleshed out in this instance?  
 
Llewellyn reminds us that Dworkin’s equal concern and respect is limited to political 
state-citizen interactions (2012, p.91). She characterizes the concern and respect of 
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classical liberal equality as individual-based, valuing abstract non-interference, 
through either disinterestedness or self-interest. Classical liberal dignity she argues 
follows from a commitment to our rational nature, implying equal moral worth 
(2012, pp.93–4). Where liberal dignity is grounded in rationality, and individuals are 
conceptualized as equally independent rational actors, individuals are necessarily 
equally dignified. Therefore equal dignity is an ex-hypothesi property of liberal 
individuals, deserving of respect. This chimes with Benhabib’s generalized 
conception of the other: dignity lies in what we have in common, therefore an equal 
property of individuals (Benhabib 1986, p.411). 
 
If we understand ourselves as self-sufficient alone and see others as potentially 
limiting our autonomy (Code 1991, p.77), it becomes clear why non-interference is 
valued in classical liberalism as a means of respecting equal dignity and/or 
rationality (leaving each to make their own equally rational judgement). Benhabib 
links Rawls’ liberal theory and Kohlberg’s understanding of moral development, in a 
generalized understanding of ‘the autonomous self [as] disembedded and 
disembodied’ (Benhabib 1986, p.409). When based on assumed equal dignity 
and/or rationality of abstractly identical individuals, neutral, generalized rules are 
fair. This explains why Barry identifies difference-blindness as a demand of fairness 
and strength of liberalism (2002, p.76, pp.91-2). On this understanding, contextual 
detail about specific circumstances is ‘a threat to … independence and impartiality’ 
(Sevenhuijsen 1998, p.60). 
 
Yet liberal dignity need not be grounded in rationality alone. Nussbaum ascribes 
dignity across her basic capabilities, not to ‘any single “basic capability” [sic] 
(rationality, for example), since this excludes from human dignity many human 
beings with severe mental disabilities’ (2008, p.362). Nussbaum builds her basic 
capabilities on a connected understanding of liberal individuals, shaping their lives 
‘in co-operation and reciprocity with others, rather than being passively shaped … 
by the world’ (Nussbaum 2000, p.72; my emphasis). She includes relationships and 
relational concerns in the basic capabilities, which imply our dignity, in turn 
deserving our respect. We should treat the other as an equal because we share the 
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same human dignity or generalized basic capabilities even if developed differently. 
Concrete contextual information is still missing.  
 
Clement argues that the liberal prioritization of non-interference and individual 
rights excludes the importance of relationships (1996, p.81). Koggel counters that 
liberals, potentially such as Nussbaum as discussed above, can acknowledge 
relational aspects of individuals. The ‘real objection’, is that these are not 
understood as ‘relevant to an account of what it is to be a person or to treat a 
person with equal concern and respect’ (Koggel 1998, p.128). Llewellyn explains 
relational equality ‘does not require the abandonment’ (2012, p.95) of key liberal 
ideals. Instead, relational theories can offer ‘a deeper and richer sense of these 
aspirations and a better means of achieving them than liberalism’ (2012, p.95; my 
emphasis). Care ethics perspectives are one sub-set of relational perspectives. It is 
this richer understanding of treatment as equals, which I attempt to bring to 
criminal punishment. A care ethics approach provides overlaps with the thin liberal 
understandings of the same concepts, such as concern, respect and dignity. How 
then are relational, care-perspective approaches to equality different to the liberal 
perspectives? To explore this, I turn to Llewellyn’s relational theory.  
 
Drawing on Llewellyn and Benhabib, I argued that liberal dignity is a property of 
generalized individuals, by virtue of which we deserve respect. Llewellyn identifies 
relational dignity as a property of relationships, visible (or visibly absent) in our 
interactions with others (2012, p.95). Herring also notes respect as a ‘key marker’ of 
care (2013, p.18). Respect for the other’s ‘innate humanity’ requires dignified 
treatment (2013, p.19). Relational dignity is a property of our interactions with 
others, which proceeds from our ‘thicker’ respect and concern for the other. This 
ideal is reflected in the attitude of openness and engagement present in the 
conceptual anatomy of care ethics. Open engagement and responsiveness allows us 
to gather information about needs and preferences, and the broader social context 
of others. The care approach prioritizes recognition of concrete persons, situated in 
particular contexts. 
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Llewellyn’s relational respect is founded on relationships, and not self-interested 
concerns for individual reciprocity. Recognizing our connection acknowledges 
others’ ‘rights and needs’ (Llewellyn 2012, p.94), but on a concrete rather than 
abstract level. ‘On recognizing ourselves as relationally connected to others’, 
Llewellyn argues, ’it becomes clear that to respect them requires some knowledge 
and concern for their needs and aims’ (2012, p.94). This is informed by personal and 
social contextual details through ‘listening’ and ‘awareness’ (Herring 2013, 
p.18).The generalized other and our abstract obligations are replaced with the 
concrete other and their personal context, needs, responsibilities and resources, 
and holistic social context. It is this concrete, unique other for whom we show 
respect by attending to their context. 
 
Relational respect requires concrete contextual knowledge of the other, 
instrumental for dignified treatment. In Dworkin’s sick children example, it may be 
obvious that one child is uncomfortable and the other dying. Consider an average 
man. Without seeking further contextual information, we cannot know that he has 
M.E., and needs to rest more often than his peers. Without this information, we do 
not know how to treat him as an equal. Such contextual information is necessary for 
Dworkin’s liberal concern and respect. The problem is that liberal practical moral 
reasoning does not help us to gather contextual information. Benhabib argues in 
favour of concrete understandings of persons, since ‘more knowledge rather than 
less contributes to a more rational and informed judgment’ (1986, p.417). The 
insight of care ethics, highlighted earlier, is that a concrete, particular perspective is 
more helpful than a generalized abstracted view for informing decisions about how 
to act in particular circumstances (Kittay 1999, pp.64–5, p.88). Practices prioritizing 
open, respectful engagements allow greater scope for interactional justice, as 
suggested in Chapter one, than liberal non-interference. Like liberal practices, 
gathering contextual information provides no guarantees of treatment as equals 
but, by facilitating access to the necessary contextual information, this better 
equips us to provide equal concern and respect.  
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Criticisms of care ethics 
 
Female essentialism, male exclusion  
Strands of care theory prioritizing women’s experiences, of mothering (Ruddick 
1990, p.46; Kittay 1999) in particular, are vulnerable to charges of female 
essentialism (claims that all women are a particular way), and the exclusion of men. 
Ruddick (1990), Noddings (2002) and to an extent Held (1995) focus on the caring 
experiences of women. This addresses an imbalance in the literature, which for 
centuries implicitly considered only the perspective of men. While these authors 
use female examples in their discussion, none discussed here claim that men cannot 
be carers or understand care reasoning. We need not make essentialist claims to 
observe that practical caring work has been historically socially coded feminine 
(Clement 1996, p.3; Friedman 1997, p.667), ascribed to women (Kittay 1999, pp.40–
1; Noddings 2002, p.45) and other disadvantaged groups (Tronto 1993, pp.111–5).  
 
These complaints have less purchase here. I take care as a learned method of 
reasoning, following Noddings (2002, p.22), a relational, contextual perspective, 
open to most human beings. I allow that socialization (probably stereotypically 
gender-divided) may render some individuals more practised at this approach than 
others. Some individuals may possess a natural talent, just as most people can sing 
a little, but few are international opera stars. Correspondingly, some individuals 
may find practical caring work or reasoning more challenging.  
 
Patriarchal 
Two related criticisms are that far from being women’s authentic ethical reasoning, 
the ‘different voice’ of care is a patriarchal construction foisted upon women, or will 
at best become a tool of exploitation. Catherine MacKinnon suggests ‘women value 
care because men have valued us according to the care we give’ (1987, p.39). In her 
argument, care ethics is in neither the political, practical nor ethical interests of 
women. Yet the values and practices of caring have been neglected in androcentric 
ethical thought, providing reason to consider whether and how these marginalized 
concerns might be given their proper place. As Held argues and Engster reminds us, 
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care is ‘necessary for any adequate theory of justice’ (Engster 2007, p.5). There can 
be no justice without practical caring work (Held 2006, p.17). This further 
demonstrates the necessity of alertness to oppression, since for much of history 
there has been practical caring work without justice (Held 2006, p.17). This is 
considered in the review responses implicit in care ethics.  
 
Parochialism and maternalism 
One example of this criticism is Noddings’ early attempt to highlight the distinctive 
characteristics of actively providing care directly to another. Noddings argued that 
claiming to ‘care’ for starving children overseas where we can offer little practical 
assistance diminishes the practical value of the direct caring work provided to those 
we feed, clothe, etc (1984, p.86). This leads to concerns of parochialism, favouring 
‘our own’ (family, fellow nationals, co-religionists etc) over others. However, 
Noddings revised her approach to preclude arbitrary favouritism by explicitly 
including considerations of justice within her theory (Sander-Staudt 2011, sec.3d). 
In addition, Tronto argues that parochial care is poor care, failing to live up to the 
values and attitude described in the conceptual anatomy of care.  
 
A related danger of poorly applied caring is that of maternalism. Here, care-givers 
presume to know best, ignoring and infantilizing care-receivers. Tronto recognizes 
these dangers occur when we do not live up to our own standards (Tronto 1993, 
p.170). I discuss these below as the operational limits of practical caring. A further 
criticism of caring remains. If care is not parochial, then caring may be either so 
broad as to be empty, requiring little more than civility; or impossibly demand that 
we care actively for all humanity. This concern will be addressed in the positive 
limits of care, where I argue that the relationships and the nature of needs helps us 
to divide caring responsibilities, but some context-responsive flexibility necessarily 
remains.  
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The parameters of caring  
I have set out the expectations and conceptual anatomy of caring in this chapter. 
These concepts are framed as ideals to guide practical moral reasoning and caring 
work. Below I systematize the parameters of caring and set out the responses, 
which I suggest are implicit in the expectations and anatomy of care, to these 
unavoidable limitations of non-ideal circumstances. This acknowledges a tension 
within care ethics: harm is unacceptable yet unavoidable. These responses allow us 
to manage this tension in caring: intentional harm to others is unacceptable; 
unintended and unforeseen harms are unavoidable and therefore ought to be 
recognized and addressed like any other harm. Since not all harms can be avoided 
or resolved, this tension cannot be removed.  
 
Chapter one suggested that care activities are difficult to see in harm-centred 
understandings of punishment. Everyday caring practices acknowledge and address 
conflicting needs and unavoidable harms aiming to minimize unwanted suffering 
where possible. Consider the impact on young children whose primary carer is 
hospitalized. Despite caring intentions, this separation nonetheless causes harm. 
When one spouse petitions for divorce but the other seeks to restore the 
relationship, whatever the outcome one party will be unavoidably hurt. These limits 
and the implicit responses illustrate that, since harm cannot always be avoided, 
there is always space for acknowledging harm in care ethics. Non-ideal 
circumstances limit care. The negative limits of care admit and respond to practical 
limiting factors. The operational limits of care admit possible errors in applying 
‘good’ care, and indicate a response. I begin with the positive limits of care, which 
help us to identify where our responsibilities end, and those of others begin.  
 
The positive limits of caring  
Positive limits of care address the concern that care ethics is either narrow and 
empty or impossibly broad. With personal and social contextual information, these 
limits help identify what we have a responsibility to do for whom, and on which 
occasion. Slote and Clement separately discuss ‘balancing’ our practical caring work 
and concern for wellbeing between intimate and non-intimate others (Slote 2001, 
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p.90), and between others and ourselves (Clement 1996, pp.95–6). How and when 
it is appropriate to provide care is informed by these factors: 
 
 Association: the closeness of the other’s relationship with us, 
considered in context of their relationships, or any causal 
relationship we have with the need;  
 Gravity: a function of the urgency and seriousness of the need 
in social context; 
 Suitability: the relevance of the care-giver’s capabilities. 
 
Relationships affect when and how it is appropriate to provide care. Responsibility-
implying associations are easier to identify when relationships are closer. Consider 
how we might comfort a distressed friend compared to a distressed stranger. Even 
as community-minded persons, we lack a ‘close’ personal relationship with 
strangers. A person receiving disappointing news on the bus probably prefers to talk 
the problem over with a friend later than the stranger in the next seat now: here a 
closer personal relationship is more appropriate. Whether we have a responsibility 
to act depends on the comparative closeness of our relationship in the context of 
the needy person’s other relationships: is there someone more appropriately 
associated to help, and able to do so? Which relationship is most appropriate, is 
socially and culturally informed. In some cultures it is unacceptable for a female 
patient to be attended by a male physician without an appropriate chaperone.  
 
Further, we may have an appropriate association where we bear some causal 
responsibility for the need. Arguably we have some moral obligation to 
acknowledge and address such harms. However, the needy person may prefer to 
receive assistance from someone (anyone) other than ourselves. In these situations 
we should be sensitive to whether our attempts to help repair harm, as arguably we 
are obliged to do, or rather cause further harm, which we ought to avoid.  
 
Associations imply less responsibility when relationships are weaker: we have no 
prior relationship, we did not cause the need, we are ‘just passing’. Yet sometimes, 
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weak, geo-temporal proximity relationships are sufficient associations to imply a 
caring responsibility. In Singer’s drowning child example, we see a child drowning in 
a shallow pond, and can easily wade to the child’s rescue at only the cost of our 
laundry bill (1972, p.231). While the child’s parents have a closer relationship and a 
relationally informed responsibility for the child’s welfare, in Singer’s example they 
are not present. Our weak association implies action: we may not stand idly by 
when we could easily save the child.  
 
Responsibilities vary with the gravity of the need, combining seriousness and 
urgency. Some needs are comparatively serious or urgent. Suppose two people 
misplace bus-passes. Only the person who must travel today has an urgent need to 
find their bus-pass. A person losing their job and able to pay rent for only three 
months has a serious but non-urgent need for housing. A person in cardiac arrest 
has an urgent and serious need, requiring immediate skilled attention. As the 
gravity of need increases, our weaker association begins to imply responsibilities. 
The parents of Singer’s child might have some responsibility to prevent the child 
from slipping in the damp grass at the water’s edge. As a passing stranger, we have 
no such responsibility. Things change, and our weak geo-temporal proximity 
association with the child implies action when the gravity of the need increases and 
the child’s life is at stake. 
 
Thirdly, our responsibility varies with our suitability to meet the particular need. 
Perhaps we have specialist skills, knowledge or resources. Extending Singer’s 
example, any lifeguards present have a greater responsibility to attempt rescue 
given their special training, enabling them to effect rescue with minimal danger to 
themselves and others.35 In 2012, professional footballer Fabrice Muamba collapsed 
during a match. A fan of the opposing team, who happened to be a leading 
cardiologist, saw that the attending sports medics were performing CPR. Although 
not attending the game in a professional capacity he went onto the pitch to offer 
aid (Deaner 2012). His special skills, despite a ‘team rivalry’ relationship, implied a 
                                                     
35
 On-duty paid lifeguards also have a contractual duty.  
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responsibility to offer care. Medical professionals have professional duties of care, 
but these duties are intimately linked with the life-saving nature of their 
professional skills.  
 
What responsibility a particular relationship requires or implies is informed by social 
and cultural considerations, the gravity of needs and our suitability. Most obviously 
in cases of life-threatening high-gravity needs and/or greater suitability, weaker 
associations will imply caring responsibility. The rescuer in Singer’s drowning child 
case has no special life-saving training and there is no time to fetch skilled help. 
Further, the only association between the child and rescuer is geo-temporal 
proximity. We can lack relevant skills, resources and strong associations, but we 
may still be the only person near enough to attempt to provide timely support.  
 
Here we are called on to care beyond our competence due to the gravity of the 
need: we ought to try to save a life. Interestingly the moral responsibility grounded 
in proximity to another’s abject suffering has been discussed in legal theory and is 
reflected in legal doctrines. Pardun argues the legislative intent behind ‘good 
Samaritan’ laws reinforces just such a ‘moral compass’ (1998, p.606). The 
implication of care reasoning is that we consider contextual information, and to 
make an in-context decision as to what appears most appropriate, based on the 
skills and knowledge we do have, and estimating when necessary. 
 
The guidance sketched above contributes to identifying where our responsibility 
ends and the responsibilities of others begin. This is not the whole story: contextual 
information plays an important role and I noted earlier the role of cultural context 
in responsibility. Care, as Engster and Tronto imply, is not the only value. But it is an 
important political value (Tronto 1993, p.161, p.171; Tronto 1996), which has a 
central role at ‘the heart of justice’ (Engster 2007, p.5) in interpreting needs 
contextually. This allows some ambiguity within care ethics, but this flexibility can 
be a strength, allowing context-sensitive responses. I now turn to the risk of 
practical and operational shortcomings.  
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The negative limits of practical caring 
In Chapter one we saw three different kinds of unintended harm: foreseeable and 
(partly) avoidable harms, foreseeable but unavoidable harms, and unforeseen and 
therefore unavoidable harms. In theory at least, some harms can be predicted, such 
as the pain of separation from family of quarantined hospital patients. This 
foreseeable harm can be at least partly addressed in advance by arranging 
telephone contact between patient and family. We might also foresee the harm of 
the patient not being able to attend work and damage to relationships with their 
employer. This is unavoidable and cannot be addressed in advance. Unforeseen 
harms might include the patient’s unusual reaction to treatment. In theory these 
harms may be addressed after the fact to minimize the impact of the harms. 
Patients might be provided occupational therapy to help them return to work. The 
patient’s unusual reaction can be recognized and a response devised, provided we 
monitor for unforeseen harms, necessarily of an unknown nature.  
 
In real life non-ideal circumstances, it is not always this simple to address harms and 
respond to all needs with ideal care. Tronto’s integrity of care implies we should 
care as well as we are able to, but this cannot guarantee ideal outcomes every time. 
Care ethics accepts that non-ideal circumstances will result in non-ideal caring 
responses. Here, care ethics leaves room for identifying harms. Since some harms 
cannot be avoided, care ethics cannot demand success from us; only our best effort 
in good faith to apply the aims of care as well as possible, given certain unavoidable 
limits: 
 
 Restricted time and scarce resources (shortfalls); 
 Conflicting needs; 
 Insufficient information; 
 Human error. 
 
Limited time and scarce resources demand the prioritization of our caring. We 
choose which needs will be met, and conversely, which needs will be least 
adequately met, or not met at all. We must choose where to provide poor or no 
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care. We consider this information holistically, using our skills and experience to 
make a best-in-the-circumstance (or least-worst) plan for action, rather than an 
ideal ‘best’ choice, taking account of the shortfall. Because we make this 
prioritization decision, we know about these unavoidable harms.  
 
Caring work does not occur in a vacuum: these harms and the cumulative impact of 
‘losing out’ becomes part of the context for future needs-meeting (Noddings 2002, 
p.19) which, following Tronto’s awareness phase, we cannot ignore. In the above 
example, quarantined patients’ foreseeable separation from their family is 
addressed through telephone contact. But suppose we lack the resources to provide 
telephone access to all patients. Whichever rationing method we use (perhaps we 
means-test the service or have patients draw lots, or perhaps there are limiting 
practical factors: some isolation rooms are equipped and others are not), we must 
bear in mind the impact of reduced contact with family on those patients denied 
access as part of the context.  
 
Sometimes needs conflict, or the means of meeting needs might conflict. In the 
above example we may be able to provide either telephone access for patients, or 
occupational therapy, but lack the resources for both. We foresee unavoidable 
harms and must make a decision about which will be avoided and which will not, 
about who is harmed. Lack of information may lead to faulty decision-making in 
both the shortfalls and conflicts cases. Separately, human error in interpreting the 
information we do have, may lead to mistakes.  
 
So far we have considered foreseeable harms. We know the likely nature of their 
impact, and may be able to offer some help to minimize the impact, even if we 
cannot avoid them. But, particularly for insufficient information and human error, 
we cannot know in advance what the nature of these harms will be. We can 
however expect that some unforeseeable harm will occur. We can address this by 
monitoring the impact of our caring (Noddings 2002, p.19; Tronto 1993, p.131); to 
understand developing needs, discussed in the review section in this chapter. While 
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we cannot prevent the patient’s unforeseen reaction to treatment, we can watch 
for unusual symptoms, take the harm seriously and seek a remedy.  
 
The operational limits of care  
The operational limits also leave room for acknowledging the presence of harms in 
non-ideal caring practices. While the negative limits acknowledge non-ideal 
circumstances, the operation limits acknowledge the problems caused by 
(deliberate or incompetent) poor practical caring work, reasoning, or the absence of 
the relevant attitude, and are drawn from Tronto’s discussion of the dangers of care 
(1993, p.170). Firstly, maternalism infantilizes care-receivers when care-givers 
presume to know best how to meet needs. While care relationships are necessarily 
relationships of unequal power (Baier 1986, p.21; Kittay 1999, pp.33–4, p.50), failing 
to interact responsively with care-receivers diminishes their dignity (Engster 2007, 
p.31). Secondly, Tronto’s parochialism occurs when we wrongly prioritize the form 
of care we deliver over other kinds without full consideration. This results in 
inappropriate, inadequate or inefficient36 needs-meeting: for example, the teacher 
presumes the struggling student needs extra tuition, when the student needs 
bereavement support. These problems arise with insufficient openness and 
engagement, allowing poor attentiveness and responsiveness to care-receivers.  
 
Separately, Tronto’s competence value is threatened when needs are masked, due 
to conscious or unconscious incompetence of those directing caring work. Tronto 
describes a school chronically short of maths teachers instructing an unqualified 
teacher to supervise maths classes (1993, p.133). Pupils have ‘maths classes’, 
appearing to have their need met, but in fact learn no maths. Needs that appear to 
be met are masked from the view of others who might have taken them into holistic 
consideration. Circumstances force the teacher to attempt to deliver practical 
caring beyond their competence. Just as a passing untrained stranger might attempt 
                                                     
36
 Care ethics scholarship does not often speak in terms of efficiency, considering this part of the 
contrasting ‘justice’ or ‘universalist’ approach. Yet if we are concerned to care as well as we can 
across several individuals (considering needs in their social context), and scarce resources mean we 
must prioritize our caring, then considering how we can get the best available needs-meeting from 
the available resources, an efficiency question, is an important, legitimate concern. 
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to rescue Singer’s drowning child without skilled knowledge, the untrained teacher 
does their best. The care provided is poor, but this is not the fault of the care-giver. 
In Tronto’s case, either the school is conscious of this need-masking and culpably 
providing poor care, or the school is unconscious of the problem and incompetently 
provides poor care (Tronto 1993, p.133).  
 
 
Initial and ongoing review 
One way we may be able to identify the problems of negative and operational 
limits, to either avoid causing harm, or to acknowledge and address harm, is to 
review the impacts of our caring (Noddings 2002, p.19). Initial and ongoing review 
are intimately linked. Gregory explains care practices as reflexive, requiring our 
‘self-awareness of our impact upon the situation’ (2011, p.66). Initial review is a 
reflexive strategy, interrogating our proposed actions for likely effectiveness and 
appropriateness to individual and social context, in light of the parameters of 
caring. One example is care-givers consideration of their competence to provide 
care, displaying sensitivity to the effects of their actions.  
 
The moral obligation to be aware of others’ needs (Tronto 1993, p.127, p.129) 
implies taking seriously the consequences of our caring decisions. If we apply 
Tronto’s integrity (1993, p.136), we are instructed to consider whether and how we 
can respond to needs of which we become aware. Together with an understanding 
of care as an ongoing process (1993, p.103), this suggests a reflective, ongoing 
review practice, comparing the outcomes of our caring with our intent. Was our 
caring appropriate? Is this care still appropriate? Are needs masked or unexpected 
harms caused? Should changes in the social context, relationships, resources, 
capabilities and responsibilities; change the prioritization of needs? An example 
might be found in the peer observation practices among teachers, who benefit from 
watching colleagues, from colleagues’ feedback and from an opportunity for 
‘critically reflective engagement with teaching practice’ (Donnelly 2007, p.124; 
original emphasis). 
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Review practices resemble a driver checking mirrors to assess safety. If I see a child 
in the road while executing a three-point turn, that I was checking my mirrors 
cannot excuse my hitting the child. This misses the point of checking. The correct 
approach is to continue to check, and implicitly to brake if I see a child in my path. 
While checking is not acting, integrity implies responding accordingly.37 As mirror-
checking throughout our journey is integral to good driving, reviewing our caring 
practice is integral to good caring. As internal to the practice, the absence of 
checking or reviewing is automatic cause for concern about our practice as good 
drivers or carers.  
 
However, interdependence anticipates that we will each have personal limits that 
might cause, or obscure from us, our mistakes. These cannot be understood as 
individual faults since interdependence expects that we could not have done 
otherwise. If our individual review practices may be understood as self-scrutiny; 
interdependence, with our obligation to share responsibility (Tronto 1993, p.131) 
for responding to needs, suggests mutual moderation. We can support one another 
to identify shortcomings in collective and individual caring work. For example, the 
patient or hospital visitor may support the nurse’s caring by calling attention to a 
dressing that has worked loose.  
 
Moderation meets both the care-giver’s need for support, and provides some 
protection to care-receivers against unforeseen or malicious harms. Review offers 
one way to identify and challenge deliberate or accidental oppression by carers. 
Discrepancies of opinion about whether care is appropriate provide occasion for 
discussion, including the responses of those cared-for, to collaboratively refine 
knowledge of best practice through critical reflection. 
 
In search of a less partial, more powerful body to co-ordinate our review practices, 
Tronto recommends the incorporation of care into broader political theory, under 
                                                     
37
 Action is not always possible, such as when a pedestrian emerges without time for the driver to 
react in this example, or when resources restrict needs-meeting. Review helps identify cases where 
we can improve practice, and implies our action where possible.  
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democratic conditions (Tronto 1993, p.170). Engster identifies a role for the state in 
regulating care. Governments have the necessary power and authority to define 
and enforce adequate care standards, given the social and cultural context and 
resources available. These must be open to democratic revision, as state agents do 
not possess special knowledge about how ‘adequate’ care ought to be defined 
(Engster 2007, p.102). Below I propose an example of how this implied review 
process might work. We begin by asking a series of questions, which leads us into a 
feedback loop. These questions shadow the questions asked in care ethics methods 
of practical moral reasoning on p.93. 
 
 
Principles for guiding decision-making and action 
 
Information-gathering 
Through respectful listening and discussion, we identify needs with care-receivers, 
and use the positive limits of care to consider who is best able to meet needs. 
Inquiring about needs includes the immediate care-receiver’s needs in their 
personal context, and those of others in their social context, building an 
understanding of the distribution of needs. These questions are firstly contextual 
(understanding needs in personal and social context) and secondly holistic (in the 
context of the social need and resource distributions). But needs and their gravity 
are only half the story. How we are able to respond is contextually informed, by 
relationships and available needs-meeting resources. The information gathered 
helps to build up a picture of the individual as a concrete person, considering their 
needs, resources and capabilities, relationships and responsibilities. This 
information helps us to prioritize needs according to the negative limits of care. 
Given these relationships, and resources-to-responsibilities ratios,38 how can the 
individual be helped to meet their needs? When is it best, and who is ‘best placed’, 
to provide care? The positive limits of care help us to identify who is ‘best placed’, 
has the most appropriate association and resources, to respond to the needs. 
                                                     
38
 Accounting for the fact that one person may appear to have many resources, but in fact also have 
many competing responsibilities. 
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Response-designing 
Next we begin to design a best-available response creatively considering the 
problem. Following the negative limits, we prioritize where we cannot meet all 
needs. Which of the available options will produce the least unavoidable harm? 
Which of these options best meets the care receiver’s preferences?39 This provides 
an ideal response, should all other things be equal. While other things are seldom 
equal, we can use this ideal response as a guide when we begin to narrow down our 
options according to what is practical.  
 
Suppose Sheila, 23, is looking for accommodation for her release from prison in 
three months. She applies to her local council for housing; however they will be 
unable to offer her housing in time for her release. This is not possible. Sheila’s 
parents want to help, but they live in a small house with their three other younger 
children, and cannot accommodate Sheila. This is not practical. The prison housing 
adviser suggests she applies to hostel accommodation. Sheila is worried about living 
in a hostel and is concerned other residents might encourage her back into alcohol 
misuse or crime. This is not preferable. Sheila’s Grandma lives on the other side of 
town. Sheila’s parents help her to make an agreement with her Grandma. Sheila’s 
Grandma says Sheila can live with her for a few months, provide she does the 
heavier housework, looks for a job and contributes to the bills. Living with Grandma 
will make it easier for Sheila to avoid people and places associated with her past 
offending, and, she hopes, help her to stay out of trouble. This option is possible, 
practical and preferable. 
 
Creative consideration identifies the best available response from the recipient’s 
perspective, informed by the kind of support the care-giver can competently 
provide. Good caring requires that we provide competent care where possible. With 
the exception of emergencies, care-givers should reflexively consider their 
competence to provide the desired care, sensitive to the potential to accidentally 
cause avoidable harm. This might either require revising preferences, or 
                                                     
39
 These might conflict, addressed in the balancing phase of review, discussed presently. 
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reconsidering who is best placed to provide care. Initial review, including self-
scrutiny and mutual moderation, considers holistically the likely impact of the 
preferred solution for the individual, across the social context. We ‘balance’ our 
decision for holistic distributive and cumulative fairness. 
 
The cumulative fairness principle I propose deliberately leaves room for a broader 
political theory to fill in the distributive fairness criteria. I noted on p.92 that caring 
is not the only value. Which theory should be adopted is beyond the issues I wish to 
address in this thesis, although the approach I propose is broadly compatible with 
most social democratic approaches. We begin balancing for distributive fairness 
over time (cumulatively) by employing our earlier ‘monitoring’. If we know some 
have ‘lost out’ (or been harmed) from earlier prioritization, this is relevant 
information (Noddings 2002, p.19). All things considered, is our decision 
distributively and cumulatively fair, or ought it to be rebalanced? In the above 
example, Sheila’s ex-partner may ask her to move in and resume their relationship. 
This option is discarded because Sheila’s ex-partner was abusive and pressured her 
into offending, making this option a poor choice all things considered. There are at 
least two reasons why we might seek to rebalance.  
 
Firstly we may rebalance a caring decision for cumulative fairness in the light of the 
care-receiver’s previous prioritization losses. It is reasonable for a healthy adult 
requiring treatment for a minor wound to wait while more vulnerable patients are 
seen, according to contextually informed triage. But it is unreasonable to ask them 
to wait seven hours in usual contexts; we must not ignore the impact of their 
repeated deprioritization. Secondly, we consider care-givers’ responsibilities-to-
resources ratio, an important part of care-givers’ context. In addition to sharing 
burdens of unaddressed needs in prioritization, we should consider fairness in the 
distributions of practical caring work. Crudely, a couple parenting one child have 
more resources (two pairs of hands) to address fewer needs, than the single parent 
raising three children. This is not to say that we should not be able to choose (or 
accept unchosen) large caring burdens, but rather to argue that larger burdens 
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should be taken into consideration when further responsibilities, or social support 
resources (Kittay 1999, pp.110–3), are distributed.  
 
Harm-avoiding 
Once we have delivered care, seeking to meet needs and build capabilities while 
minimizing harms, the value and practice of responsiveness to care-receivers directs 
us to review our responses when we understand care as an ongoing process or 
string of events. Did we deliver the expected needs-meeting? If the need was met 
unexpectedly, this is a learning opportunity. If the need was not met we must 
understand why. As needs are met over time, is the previous best-available 
response still appropriate? Have needs or resources or relationships changed in 
ways which affect this? If needs have been unsuccessfully met, or if there have been 
relevant changes, does the needs-meeting response option remain appropriate? It 
may be that, while now less appropriate, the measure in place is preferable to 
achievable alternatives. Another reason to reassess changing needs is that the 
cumulative impact of unmet needs may worsen the original need: a minor repair 
postponed can lead to a much bigger problem.  
 
Finally, we reach the rebalancing stage again, checking our responses in the light of 
previous prioritization losses and the responsibilities-to-resources ratio. This feeds 
back around to reassessing the quality of our care, until the needs are as well met 
as they can be, or other needs demand our attention. Understanding practical 
caring as an ongoing process rather than discrete events implies reviewing our 
caring in the light of expected change over time and adjusting our responses 
accordingly.  
 
The general formulation of the care ethics guiding principles of practical moral 
reasoning is given here. In Chapter four, these are refined to apply specifically to 
sentencing decision-making and punishment delivery. These draw together the 
ideas expressed in the initial and ongoing review processes, described above, and 
echo the method of reasoning expounded earlier. 
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1. The past-regarding, information-gathering pair: when deciding 
how to respond to a need, we gather information about the 
personal and social context of the individual with the need. We 
learn about their narrative, and how this shapes the present, 
through:  
a) Respectful Listening: Care ethics expects the individual is 
best placed to understand their own needs (Sevenhuijsen 
1998, p.60; Engster 2007, p.31). 40  Respectfully hearing 
partial narratives, learning relevant personal and relational 
context, as the other considers relevant. 
b) Needs Identification: We identify how their needs fit 
together holistically in a personal context, and consider the 
adequacy of present needs-meeting attempts. Using the 
positive limits of care, we consider who is best placed to 
meet this need, and what we can do to facilitate this.  
 
2. The future-regarding, response-designing pair: these principles 
consider how needs might best be met first in isolation to 
provide a target for planning, and then holistically in the social 
context: 
a) Creative Consideration: What needs-meeting resources are 
open to the individual, and what other responsibilities do 
they have? In light of this, how does the individual prefer to 
be helped? This principle helps the care-receiver describe 
their ideal preferred response. This principle includes care-
givers’ reflections on their competence; is this kind of caring 
within our competence?  
b) Cumulative Fairness: Initial review identifies a preferable 
response to these needs in the broader social context, and 
                                                     
40
 Although I shall argue in Chapter 4, contra Sevenhuijsen an Engster, that while individuals 
experiences of their needs provide essential information, some individuals may need support in 
articulating needs, considering possible responses, and identifying preferences.  
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rebalances this according to cumulative considerations. This 
takes account of potential harms and the cumulative impact 
of previous prioritization losses. This principle provides an-
all-things-considered response, and where there are 
shortfalls or conflicts, prioritizes needs according to the 
negative limits of care.  
 
3. Present-focused, harm-avoiding pair: two present-focused 
principles, informed by past and future consideration:  
a) Care Delivery: The planned practical care delivery is 
provided, in a way that is conscious of avoiding, where 
possible, harm to others. 
b) Response Analysis: Keeping decisions under ongoing review, 
scrutinizing our actions for appropriateness.  
 
In Chapter one I asked how far existing theory provided guidance for punishment 
decision-making and delivery, which  
 
I. Allows conceptual space for practical caring work and 
identification of problematic, morally significant harms 
II. Facilitates inclusive, non-objectifying treatment as equals qua 
human beings for offenders  
 
In this chapter we have seen that care ethics has the potential to offer guidance for 
decision-making through the practical moral reasoning method offered by the 
perspective of care. That caring work deals regularly with conflict, and manages the 
tension between unacceptable and unavoidable harm, demonstrates that care 
ethics is able to recognize non-trivial harms, and caring practices. And in its richer, 
contextual understanding of persons, care ethics also offers a better informed 
opportunity to include others as equals and avoid exclusion and silencing. This 
shows that care ethics may offer one alternative means of conceptualizing 
punishment practices. How these can be applied as normative guidance for 
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punishment decision-making and delivery will be discussed in Chapter four. The 
next chapter examines the presence of care within punishment, strengthening the 
argument for why we might take a care perspective in relation to punishment. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
Caring practices in contemporary punishment delivery 
practices 
 
 
Chapter one considered existing penal theory and the guidance available to 
sentencers and practitioners for punishment decision-making and delivery. I 
suggested that caring practices may be present within existing punishment delivery 
practices, but argued these are obscured in penal philosophy by the harm-centred 
conceptualizations of punishment, upon which existing theory is built. Chapter two 
provided us with the conceptual anatomy of care ethics, which will be employed 
here to identify these caring practices as present in, and essential for, punishment 
delivery practices. I begin with a brief note on penal history, tracking the 
development of caring themes in policy and practice. I note and evidence some of 
the unintended harms of existing penal practices, which may be morally significant, 
yet to which we are desensitized. I then review of imprisonment practices, as 
central to our penal thought, community punishment and lastly restorative justice, 
the niche practices where caring is clearest.  
 
 
Penal history  
The approach advanced in this thesis is intended to have a wider relevance than 
simply for common law jurisdictions. However, the criminal justice system with 
which I am most familiar is that of England & Wales.41 Accordingly I draw many of 
my examples from that system. Here I sketch a little of the history of penal ideology 
and practice in England & Wales over roughly the last century, to understand the 
continuously evolving presence of care practices.  
                                                     
41
 I worked in the criminal justice voluntary sector in England & Wales for two years, as a 
Resettlement Helpline Information Officer for Nacro, the crime reduction charity.  
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Garland’s era of penal welfarism began in the 1890s. In 1895, the Gladstone 
Committee replaced the earlier prison regime philosophy (‘Hard labour, hard fare, 
and hard bed’) with improved prison conditions: better food, less solitary 
confinement and ‘deterrence and rehabilitation’ through ‘training and treatment’ 
(Hostettler 2009, p.244). It must however be noted that the standardized regime 
and solitary system Du Cane imposed on the prisons in England & Wales was a step 
forward from the unhygienic conditions in which prisoners had been held 
previously. Du Cane’s regime was intended to reform offenders by facilitating 
reflection and repentance, following the ‘Enlightenment penology of Cesare 
Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham’, which had represented ‘faith in scientific reason 
and the perfectibility of man’ (Garland 2003, p.40). Useful industrial labour began to 
replace hard labour (Hostettler 2009, p.245). Outside the prison, the Probation of 
Offenders Act 1907 gave statutory footing to police court missionaries, existing 
charitable offender support. The Act permitted courts in England & Wales to 
appoint probation officers to ‘advise assist and befriend’ released offenders 
(National Probation Directorate 2007, p.3). 
 
An ad hoc probation report practice on offenders’ backgrounds developed in the 
1920s, as ‘pleas for leniency’ (McNeill et al. 2010, p.473). It became mandatory for 
courts to appoint probation officers under the Criminal Justice Act 1925 (National 
Probation Directorate 2007, p.8). Probation reports developed through the 1930s, 
growing increasingly scientific in tone, fitting with the developing rehabilitative 
treatment ideology (Smith 1996, p.135). 1945 indicated another rise in 
rehabilitation ideology (that reformatory treatment can help offenders to stop 
offending), under conditions of social and economic optimism and trust in science 
and social work (Easton & Piper 2008, p.42). Probation services began providing 
prison aftercare and probation hostels were introduced under the Criminal Justice 
Act 1948 (National Probation Directorate 2007, p.10). The same act abolished penal 
servitude, hard labour and flogging (Howard League for Penal Reform 2011).  
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In the mid-1950s prison officers were encouraged ‘to become more involved in the 
lives of prisoners and to improve officer/inmate relationships’ (Edwards & Hurley 
2002, p.5). Probation reports received statutory footing in 1961 as ‘Social Inquiry 
Reports’ into offenders’ backgrounds, which later became pre-sentence reports. 
These reports included a variety of information about offenders’ ‘school, family, 
neighbourhood, finance, health, attitudes and relationships within the family, 
offence, employment and previous convictions; family and immediate social 
environment’ (Hardiker 1975, p.92). In 1963 the prison service was brought under 
the remit of the Home Office, with the stated purpose of ‘training and treatment of 
convicted prisoners … to encourage and assist them to lead a good and useful life’ 
(Flynn 1998, p.35), a long standing part of the prison rules. The 1950s and 1960s 
saw the height of penal welfarism (Garland 2003, p.34), with treatment 
practitioners given ‘discretionary’, ‘unaccountable’ powers, and who were viewed 
with social workers in a ‘benign, apolitical light’ (2003, p.36). These powers were 
eventually criticized as authoritarian (2003, p.182). The rehabilitative idea began to 
decline after the early 1960s, but social inquiry reports fitted the increasingly 
determinist ideology (Smith 1996, p.136). 1965 saw the death penalty abolished 
and suspended sentences introduced (Easton & Piper 2008, p.42), and in 1967 
parole supervision by probation officers was introduced (National Probation 
Directorate 2007, p.11).  
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1972 introduced community service (National Probation 
Directorate 2007, p.6). Following the Criminal Justice Act 1974, probation officers 
began supervising community sentences and suspended sentences (National 
Probation Directorate 2007, p.12). But Martinson’s influential 1974 paper 
concluded of rehabilitative attempts that ‘nothing works’ (1974), ushering in what 
Garland terms the politics of crime and control (Garland 2003, p.120). Rehabilitative 
optimism declined and in 1979 the May Committee investigating the prison service 
found that ‘the rhetoric of treatment and training had had its day and should be 
replaced’, with ‘positive custody’, including work, education and exercise, to keep 
prisoners occupied and healthy (Flynn 1998, p.37).  
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The 1980s saw a rising New Right focus on individual responsibility under less 
favourable economic conditions (Easton & Piper 2008, p.43), gradually replacing 
collectivist and welfarist approaches. Whereas criminal justice agencies had 
previously been given responsibilities, powers and budgets, they were constrained 
by centralized targets. Previous ambitions to attempt rehabilitation were lowered 
to merely punishing offenders according to pre-determined scales, diminishing the 
social, crime-reduction purpose of sentencing (Garland 2003, pp.120–1). A state-led 
rise in victim-focused strategies and victim inclusion during the 1980s followed the 
demise of the rehabilitative ideal (Armstrong & McAra 2006, pp.9–10). Meanwhile, 
the probation service pioneered treatment for intravenous drug users as a means to 
reduce offending (National Probation Directorate 2007, p.3).  
 
The Woolf Report, following high profile prison riots of 1990, proposed drastic 
reforms to the prison service intended to provide a sense of fairness to prisoners, 
leading to the Custody Care and Justice (1991) white paper. While not all proposals 
were adopted, one important change was the introduction of personal officers; 
prison officers with responsibility for individual prisoner’s wellbeing (Easton & Piper 
2008, p.299). Following the Criminal Justice Act 1991 pre-sentence reports, replaced 
social inquiry reports; compiled by probation officers to ‘assist’ sentencers in 
‘determining the most suitable method of dealing with [offenders]’ (Criminal Justice 
Act 2003, s158 1a). 1992 saw the first privately-run prison in England & Wales, and 
today there are 11 private sector prisons (HMPS 2011). In 1993, Home Secretary 
Michael Howard famously asserted ‘Prison Works’. The prison service became an 
agency of the government headed by Director General Derek Lewis, with private 
commercial experience, but no previous experience of prisons (Flynn 1998, p.41). 
This tunes with Garland’s culture of control, and Candace Kruttschnitt’s later 
observation that in the UK ‘the notion of treating prisoners humanely has been 
subsumed into an actuarial form of managerialism’ (2005, p.166). 
 
Psychology-led offending behaviour programmes were introduced in prisons and 
community punishment in the early 1990s (Palmer & Hollin 2006, p.6). High quality 
programmes are essential for success, but require adequate resources, and there 
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are problems for ensuring standardization across many individual practitioners 
(2006, p.10). Quality accreditation for offending behaviour programmes has been in 
place in varying formats since 1996 (2006, p.11), and is currently provided by the 
Correctional Services Accreditation Panel (Ministry of Justice 2012a). Programmes 
currently available range from community-based drink-impaired driver 
programmes, to sex offender treatment programmes (available both within prisons 
and the community) and include programmes around managing anger, tackling 
addiction problems, forming healthy relationships and boosting thinking skills. Some 
programmes have been specifically developed for women (HMPS 2012b). Home 
Detention Curfew or electronic tagging was established in 1999, often 
controversially provided by private sector contractors (BBC 2013).  
 
In 2000 national probation service objectives were introduced under the Criminal 
Justice and Court Services Act, and the previously regionally organized probation 
service became the National Probation Service under the National Probation 
Directorate in 2001 (National Probation Directorate 2007, p.14). Drug Treatment 
and testing orders were introduced under the Act, which also renamed orders: 
probation orders became community rehabilitation orders, and community service 
orders became community punishment orders (2007, p.14). The Criminal Justice Act 
2003 redefined the purposes of probation supervised community sentences as 
‘punishment of offenders; crime reduction; the reform and rehabilitation of 
offenders; the protection of the public and … reparation by offenders’ (Justice 
Committee 2011, p.15).  
 
2005 saw community service renamed ‘unpaid work’, and branded ‘community 
payback’. Community orders replaced community rehabilitation and community 
punishment orders. These and newly introduced suspended sentence orders 
allowed sentencers to combine flexibly a set of ‘requirements’ under the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, allowing sentencer’s to take account of offenders’ contextual 
information and tailor sentences to the circumstances of individuals’ (Mair 2011, 
p.225). The stronger community punishments were intended to offer an alternative 
to prison sentences of less than 12 months (Mair & Mills 2009, p.46). The National 
128 
 
Offender Management Service was introduced in 2004, and in 2008, the prison and 
probation services were merged under the National Offender Management service 
(Howard League for Penal Reform 2008, p.7). Moves have been made to open 
probation services to commercial tendering, despite concerns raised by the House 
of Commons Justice Committee (2011, p.37). This was justified by claiming 
charitable and private sector organizations, with the skills and experiences to 
deliver services more efficiently, would be able to compete for secure funding for 
their work (Ministry of Justice 2013, pp.16–7).  
 
Penal reality  
What we see here is an explicit move away from actively harmful practices, such as 
the early replacement of prison hard labour with ‘productive’ labour, the 1948 
ending of flogging and the 1965 abolition of the death penalty.42 This coincides with 
a rise in more supportive practices, as Garland’s penal welfarism recognizes: from 
early nineteenth-century concerns for hygiene and safety, the later introduction of 
training and treatment, efforts to improve relationships between prisoners and 
officers in the 1950s and concern for prisoners’ sense of ‘fairness’ in the 1990 Woolf 
Report (despite this being well into Garland’s era of crime and control). Harm 
avoidance is integral to Engster’s definition of care, relationship maintenance for 
Tronto’s definition, and fairness important for interactional justice and treatment as 
equals. Even the work, education and exercise proposed by the 1979 May 
committee displays concerns to develop individuals’ capabilities, and meet basic 
biological needs for health. Penal welfarism can be seen in the 1907 and 1925 
provision of probation support to offenders not sent to prison, the 1948 extension 
of support to ex-prisoners, and probation supervision of prisoners released on 
license after 1967. The era of crime and control, beginning for Garland in 1970 
(2003, p.168), is visible in the 1974 introduction of probation supervision for 
suspended prison sentence offenders, and the 1979 replacement of ‘treatment and 
                                                     
42
 These measures continue the trend that Foucault identifies, moving even further away from the 
physical punishment of the body (1979, p.11), despite England lagging behind in the abolition of 
public executions (1979, p.14), towards controlling the offender through the surveillance of prison 
staff and practitioners. The last public execution in England & Wales was in 1868, prior to but moving 
towards Garland’s penal welfarism, beginning in the 1890s. This marked the end of punishment as a 
public spectacle, applied to the body of the offender. 
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training’ within prisons with ‘positive custody’. Garland is right to emphasize the 
move away from penal welfarism and rehabilitative optimism and into a climate of 
risk management and control. Yet elements of caring work persist despite changes 
practice and policy.  
 
I have begun to highlight the presence of care in penal practices, which I will argue 
are necessary if obscured in current penal practice. I have thus far presupposed that 
penal practices often cause morally significant harms, unnoticed by practitioners, 
and unintended by the court. Before identifying the presence of care, I must first 
indicate the kinds of harm which raise concerns. Here I present two typical but 
fictional vignettes based on my own experience and supported by social research, 
and the harms presented elsewhere in the literature. It must be noted that, despite 
these examples, most prisoners are men. The minority of prisoners who are 
women43 suffer further harms since the system is designed largely by and for men 
(Kruttschnitt 2005, p.146).  
 
Jane is sentenced to seven months in prison. The separation from her family 
damages Jane’s mental health. In England & Wales, women prisoners are held on 
average 55 miles away from home. Women in custody are five times more likely to 
have ‘very poor physical, psychological, and social health’ (PRT 2012, p.31). In 2010, 
‘72% of male and 70% of female sentenced prisoners suffer[ed] from two or more 
mental health disorders’ (PRT 2010, p.7). Jane’s sentence means she no longer 
qualifies for housing benefit (Shelter 2013), losing her tenancy because she cannot 
pay the rent. The landlord clears and re-lets the property. ‘Around a third of 
prisoners lose their housing on imprisonment’ (Wilson 2012, p.10). Because Jane 
cannot work for the period she is in prison, Jane loses her part time job. On release, 
Jane is homeless, unemployed and has lost most of her possessions, including 
personal documents which would help prove her identity (passport, utility 
statements). This and her lack of address makes it harder for Jane to apply for 
benefits, housing, register with a doctor or open a bank account. Jane misuses 
                                                     
43
 Approximately 3,853 prisoners in England & Wales were women, in a total prison population of 
83,836 on 30 June 2013 (Berman & Dar 2013, pp.8– 9). 
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alcohol as a coping mechanism. ‘75% of all prisoners have a dual diagnosis (mental 
health problems combined with alcohol or drug misuse)’ (PRT 2011, p.54). Jane’s 
lifestyle becomes more chaotic, making her more vulnerable. The intention of the 
court was not to make Jane homeless and destitute, to harm Jane’s mental health, 
to make her vulnerable or to put barriers in the way of rebuilding a normal life. Only 
36% of people leaving prison go into education training or employment (PRT 2012, 
p.8). ‘Half of all prisoners do not have the skills required by 96% of jobs and only 
one in five are able to complete a job application form’ (PRT 2012, p.62). Many past 
offenders face financial exclusion (PRT 2012, p.64).  
 
Jade is convicted of benefit fraud. The court accepts that she was pressured to 
offend by an abusive ex-partner and orders a community punishment arranged 
around her job. Jade’s employer knows about the conviction, but is pleased with her 
work. However, local people hear about the financial and dishonest nature of her 
conviction and start to avoid the small shop where she works. Jade’s employer 
reluctantly dismisses her to try to save the business. Jade struggles to find 
alternative work and to make ends meet. ‘More than 60% of employers deliberately 
exclude [people with convictions] when recruiting’ (PRT 2012, p.60). The court did 
not intend Jade to lose her job. 
 
I was lucky enough to be on a wing for vulnerable prisoners. There 
wasn’t much fighting but there were plenty of … suicide attempts 
… the boys on my wing hurt themselves, not other people…. I felt 
divorced from myself in prison. I saw a boy who’d done stupid 
things and found himself in a dark place…. I knew who I wanted to 
be: someone with qualifications, who didn’t smoke, who ate 
better, who had better friends – ones that didn’t turn up in the 
middle of the night with decent drugs and bad ideas – and 
someone who had managed to make that seemingly magical 
transition from male to female. But I doubted I could become that 
person. My self-esteem was crushed, back then, crouching down 
at the bottom of society  
(Lees 2013, on life as a transgender inmate).  
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We were dismayed that the woman [prisoner] who had already 
been in the segregation unit for three years in 2010 was still there 
in 2013. Her cell was unkempt and squalid and she seldom left it … 
she still had too little to occupy her. Her prolonged location on the 
segregation unit amounted to cruel, inhumane and degrading 
treatment – and we use these words advisedly…. Much of this was 
outside the prison’s direct control and required a national strategy 
for meeting the needs of these very complex women – as exists in 
the male estate  
(HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 2013, p.5, HMP Bronzefield 
Unannounced Inspection Report). 
 
No amount of resources, however great, can enhance a convicted 
citizen’s chances for productive re-entry to a democratic society 
when that citizen has been confined in an institution too large to 
provide individual services, too geographically remote to provide 
vital life contacts, and too regimented to foster self-esteem. … If 
you were required to live in a cell with few facilities, little privacy, 
limited contact with other persons significant to you, limited 
access to employment, and a high degree of authoritarian 
regimentation, how might you fare upon re-entry into the broader 
and more competitive society, there to be greeted with the stigma 
of having been “away”  
(Wisconsin Council on Criminal Justice 1972, p.1)? 
 
Being released from prison proved more difficult for me than 
going in. Everything I’d lived for over the past 30 years had been 
taken away … prison was all that I knew. … I had power in there. I 
had a reputation, I was a somebody. And then … I’m on the street 
being treated like some arsehole. … I was full of heroin before 
nightfall, desperately trying to figure out a way of getting myself 
back into jail  
(Collins 1999, p.98). 
 
It used to be said … that offenders who have completed their 
sentence have paid their debt to society and are entitled to the 
same considerations and opportunities as anyone else … th[is] is 
no longer realistic, if it ever was. Convicted offenders carry the 
stigma of conviction with them … they are increasingly the object 
of suspicion and sometimes surveillance. Part of their dignity and 
status as a citizen is withdrawn from them  
(Faulkner 2001, p.150). 
 
 
The stories above show some of the ‘collateral damage’ encountered by offenders: 
self-harm and crushed confidence, addiction and institutionalization problems, 
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social skills adapted to meet the needs of a prison environment, not everyday life in 
the community. The above examples focus mainly on the experiences of prisoners, 
but the stigmatization and social exclusion faced by prisoners on release is, to a 
degree, encountered by all those with a criminal record. These harms in particular 
can extend long after a sentence has finished, and are not intended by the courts. 
These harms will give rise to greater needs in some individuals than others 
depending on their personal context, the resources upon which individuals are able 
to draw to overcome the effects of these harms. For example, an individual able to 
seek employment with family, or become self-employed, is less affected by the 
prejudice of employers against people with a criminal record. Where individuals 
have fewer such resources, these harms will have a greater impact, for example, on 
those who are already on the weaker side of power inequalities, on the lower side 
of socially constructed hierarchies, and with fewer socially acceptable conventional 
options (Heidensohn 1986, p.290). This is significant since the 2005 House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee Report on the rehabilitation of prisoners notes 
that offenders often come from ‘disadvantaged backgrounds’ (2005, p.15). 
 
Following Walker (2006, p.154), discussing restorative justice, I do not mean to 
claim that what is ‘really’ happening when prison officers maintain order is wholly 
described by care ethics. Rather, I mean to highlight that what appears to be 
important to maintaining order within a prison (supporting prisoners, maintaining 
relationships, communication and sensitivity to context), or delivering a community 
punishment effectively, may be understood as care. Insofar as these activities can 
be understood as care, they can be strengthened and potentially improved by 
recognizing them as caring practices and applying caring values. Indeed, stable and 
effective penal regimes are impossible without adequate caring practices and 
attitudes.  
 
Caring practices in imprisonment 
Prison is central to popular, political and academic theoretical penal thought 
(Worrall & Hoy 2005, p.xiii), and therefore a crucial example of punishment delivery 
practices which include obscured caring practices. Worrall & Hoy argue that we lack 
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the language to consider punishment without reference to prison (2005, p.xv), 
contributing to perceptions that non-custodial sentences cannot be real 
punishment (McIvor 1994, p.175). Imprisonment is the practice of curtailing a 
person’s liberty for the purposes of lawful criminal punishment. While caring 
concerns, such as the 1970s focus on rehabilitation have declined in policy 
significance, and while many harms result from imprisonment, we do not have to 
look too far into the ideals and implementation of imprisonment to find that caring 
aims and practical examples of care-giving remain. 
 
Ideals and care ethics values 
Discussing Californian prisons, Irwin & Owen observe that ‘the official purposes of 
imprisonment do not include harming prisoners’ (2005, p.94). The England & Wales 
Prison Service states its objectives as: 
 
To protect the public and provide what commissioners want to 
purchase by:  
 Holding prisoners securely  
 Reducing the risk of prisoners re-offending  
 Providing safe and well-ordered establishments in 
which we treat prisoners humanely, decently and 
lawfully. 
(HMPS 2012a) 
 
Kruttschnitt observes that the ‘emphasis on treating prisoners with humanity may 
be more than just rhetoric’ (2005, p.150) in England & Wales. While management 
may be moving in an actuarial management direction (2005, p.166), she argues 
prison officers stress the importance of experience and intuition (2005, p.167). In 
England & Wales ‘the purpose of the training and treatment of convicted prisoners 
shall be to encourage and assist them to lead a good and useful life’ (The Prison 
Rules 1999 SI 1999/728, r3). ‘Punishment’ or something akin to ‘harsh treatment’ 
are noticeably absent in the objectives and purpose of prison. This echoes the claim 
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of Sir Alexander Patterson, a prison commissioner from 1922-45, that offenders ‘are 
sent to prison as a punishment, not for punishment’ (Flynn 1998, p.33).  
 
The stated purpose implies supportive aims, reflected in the standard provision of 
education and training, and rehabilitative programmes. Engster lists development 
of basic capabilities as one end which caring practices should pursue (2007, p.76). 
Some training (especially vocational) is specific, other courses such as basic 
remedial education reflect Nussbaum’s basic capabilities (2000, pp.78–80), essential 
for any good life (2000, p.76). Prison rules direct ‘special attention’ to the 
maintenance of relationships between prisoners and their families, when in the 
interests of both parties (The Prison Rules 1999 SI 1999/728, r4). Relationships are 
central to the care ethics understanding and expectation of interdependent 
individuals.  
 
Prison Officer job description 
In early 2009, the HM Prison Service Prison Officer job description listed duties that 
might be described as ‘care work’: ‘taking care of prisoners and their property... 
rights and dignity; Providing appropriate care and support for prisoners at risk’ (HM 
Prison Service 2009). This has been revised and the word ‘care’ omitted, but officers 
are still required to ‘respect ... Prisoners, their property, rights and dignity’, to 
encourage prisoners ‘to deal with personal challenges’ and ensure ‘bullying, 
assaults, substance misuse and self harm’ are identified and dealt with ‘effectively’ 
(HMPS 2013). Tronto distinguishes between ends of caring and protection in police 
work: while crime prevention activities are supportive and address needs for 
residents to feel safe at home, protection activities are not caring because they 
presuppose the harmful intentions of a third party, rather than responding to need 
(1993, pp.104–5). Prison officers attempt to protect prisoners from assault, and 
protect the public. Yet the work supporting and encouraging prisoners may also 
include work which in Engster’s terms helps individuals to meet basic needs.  
 
Liebling, Price & Elliott’s ethnographic study of prison officers describes their work 
as ‘establishing order ... retaining or restoring relationships and ... keeping 
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communication flowing’ (1999, p.82). This focus on maintaining relationships and 
communicating is indicative of care practices, and gathering information through 
respectful and responsive interaction helps to facilitate other goals. Communication 
is fundamental to the awareness and responsivity values Tronto identifies as the 
first and fourth ethical elements of caring work, attentiveness to others’ needs, and 
responsiveness to their feedback on caring. We have also seen that it is a part of the 
prison officer’s role to take responsibility, Tronto’s third ethical element, for 
meeting at least some of prisoners’ needs, particularly in their roles as personal 
officers.  
 
Alison Liebling later argued that ‘staff–prisoner relationships matter’ (Liebling 2000, 
p.337; citing Home Office 1984), noting that on a prison wing in her study where the 
relationships between staff and prisoners was good, fewer formal controls were 
used and ‘staff used their verbal skills’ to achieve compliance. Although Liebling 
identifies this as a complex finding requiring additional research, she identifies a 
contrast with another ‘wing with poor staff–prisoner relationships and a high resort 
to formal sanctions [where] a major disturbance followed’ (Liebling 2000, p.337). 
Liebling observes that staff recognized as ‘role models’ by peers ‘were described as 
having ... sensitivity to the effects of their power; and a sensitivity to individuals and 
contexts’ (2000, p.346). Care relationships are necessarily imbalances of power: 
care-receivers depend on the support of care-givers. Sensitivity to one’s power in 
such context is important for appropriate caring work, demonstrating the reflexive 
practice Gregory identifies in caring as ‘self-awareness of our impact upon the 
situation’ (2011, p.66). Power imbalances make the open engagement attitude and 
responsiveness of the care-giver more important for both understanding needs and 
establishing trust between care-giver and care-receiver. The importance of 
relationships and sensitivity to individuals and context are both indicative of care 
practices, as we saw in Chapter two. Care-givers are necessarily in a position of 
power over care-receivers, and receiving the care-receiver’s response to our caring 
(Tronto’s fourth practical phase), helps to make us aware of the impact and 
adequacy of our actions.  
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Implementation and caring practice 
Prison life causes prisoners to lack opportunities to take responsibility for some 
personal needs: preparing food or washing clothes. The prison service meets 
prisoners’ basic food and laundry needs through industrial-scale provision. This 
could be interpreted as caring work, but not necessarily with the appropriate 
attitude. Mass provision inhibits the openness and engagement with the cared-for 
person, which helps care-givers to better understand needs and provide more 
responsive, better quality care. However it may be argued that, far from being care, 
this is a pragmatic, logistical response to basic human needs.  
 
Basic needs-meeting is not the only care present within prisons. Following the 1991 
Woolf Report, each prisoner is allocated a specific Personal Officer (Easton & Piper 
2008, p.299). Personal officers provide a first point of contact for prisoners, and are 
‘expected to help with anything from sentence planning to food requirements to 
bereavements’ (Justice Committee 2009, p.50). Where personal officers cannot 
themselves help directly, they may signpost prisoners on to other services. 
Interacting with prisoners respectfully and attending to prisoners’ needs while 
recognizing personal competence limits displays Tronto’s practical care-giving phase 
(1993, p.107), and competence value (1993, p.133). This is an idealist description of 
how this practice is expected to function. In practice, mistakes will be made, time 
and resources limited, and personal officers may not always live up to these 
expectations, reflecting the negative and operational limits of care. Yet this is part 
of prison officers’ duties (HMPS 2013).  
 
Other prison staff help prisoners with personal and emotional problems. Chaplaincy 
workers are available to all prisoners to discuss personal problems. Education, from 
basic literacy to vocational training and Open University programmes, is 
(theoretically) available (GOV.UK 2013, pt.6). Prisons in England & Wales provide 
the same healthcare as is provided in the wider community. In theory at least, 
prisoners can access support for addiction problems, mental health issues, and 
disability or learning difficulties (2013, pt.3). The efforts of staff are frustrated by 
insufficient resources, the impact of overcrowding and short-notice transfer of 
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prisoners, as well as the general difficulties of the prison environment.44 HM Chief 
Inspector of Prisons described ‘care for common mental health problems’ as 
‘underdeveloped’, and ‘uniformed officers’ training in mental health as 
‘inadequate’; while ‘patients with complex mental health needs had good access to 
mental health staff’ (HM Inspectorate of Prisons 2012, p.7). The National 
Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education and Association of College 
Lecturers research found that only one third of prison education managers regularly 
receive records following transfers (PRT 2011, p.64). The UK Drugs Policy 
Commission has observed ‘prison drug services frequently fall short of even 
minimum standards’ (2008, p.14). Yet these supportive services do work for some 
offenders. A study found 21% of offenders reported no qualifications on entering 
prison, yet 70% of this group said they had gained a qualification in prison (PRT 
2012, p.63). ‘[D]rug treatment programmes in prison, especially psycho-social 
programmes and therapeutic communities, were associated with a 26% reduction 
in criminal behaviour’ (PRT 2012, p.58).  
 
Prison regimes include further activities which could be understood as care. In 
addition to education, training and support for substance misuse, rehabilitative 
psychology-led offending behaviour programmes (Palmer & Hollin 2006, p.6) can 
form part of prisoners’ individual sentence plans, ranging from sex offender 
treatment programmes to anger management and cognitive skills (HMPS 2012b). 
Other supportive activities include prison job clubs, providing advice on job seeking 
and CV writing, and prison resettlement units offer support in finding 
accommodation and services for release. Unfortunately, demand often outstrips 
supply (PRT 2012, p.60). This support can, if prisoners are aware, be supplemented 
by contacting external organizations. Various voluntary sector organizations 
attempt to support offenders on release from prison with finding accommodation 
and work (eg, Nacro, St Giles Trust, Apex Trust).  
 
                                                     
44
 Prisoners must be escorted to medical appointments, education classes, work placements etc. 
Staff shortages, perhaps due to sickness or disturbances elsewhere in the prison, prevent prisoners’ 
attendance.  
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Peer-to-peer prisoner support is particularly significant. The prison service runs an 
‘insiders’ mentoring programme to help new prisoners learn the rules of each 
establishment (HM Inspectorate of Prisons 2012, p.26). Peer mentoring is arranged 
through the prison service and external organizations for prisoners addressing 
substance misuse issues (HM Inspectorate of Prisons 2012, p.60). In addition to 
prison-provided literacy programmes, the Shannon Trust trains prisoner volunteers 
with good literacy to provide one-to-one mentoring to prisoners with low literacy 
(Shannon Trust 2010). The St Giles Trust train prisoners to offer advice and support 
to others on securing accommodation for release (St Giles Trust n.d.). The 
Samaritans train and support prisoner volunteers to listen confidentially to others 
experiencing distress, despair or contemplating suicide, using the same guidelines 
as for their external volunteers. There are over 1,200 Listeners across prisons in 
England & Wales, who organize themselves so that there is always someone 
available to listen, usually in private, to a prisoner in distress (Samaritans 2013). 
Peer support helps to meet the needs of prisoners receiving one-to-one, face-to-
face support with issues they could not address alone: caring according to Bubeck’s 
strict definition (Bubeck 1995, p.129). These programmes also afford mentors the 
opportunity to provide care. If, as Noddings argues, caring is a learned behaviour 
(Noddings 2002, pp.24–6), this offers offenders an opportunity for prisoners to 
develop care-giving skills, perhaps for the first time (Jablecki 2005, p.32).  
 
Tronto’s caring ethical elements (awareness, responsibility, competence and 
responsivity) and practical phases (caring-about, caring-for, care-giving and care-
receiving) can be seen in the values and practices of imprisonment. By providing 
laundry, cooking and cleaning, prison authorities take responsibility for prisoners’ 
basic needs. To encourage and assist offenders requires responsive interaction with 
offenders, and implies gaining some awareness of prisoners needs. Competence in 
providing caring might be found in training staff, in prison service trained peer 
mentors, and in the recruitment of specialist staff, (teachers, drugs workers, 
chaplains, psychologists etc). Responsivity, as with other forms of punishment is 
harder to demonstrate in imprisonment, but might be found in the actions of peer 
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care-givers or personal officers, responding to the particular need or concern of 
their care-receiver.  
 
Tronto’s phases of practical caring can also be identified in prison life. Her first 
phase, ‘caring-about’, making efforts to become aware of and understand needs, 
can be seen in initial screening for mental health and addiction problems and ‘first 
night’ procedures paying extra attention to the needs of new prisoners. Tronto’s 
second phase, ‘caring-for’, or making arrangements for care might be found in the 
assignment of personal officers and their actions, interaction with prisoners on a 
day-to-day basis, and also in facilitating mentoring schemes to allow new prisoners 
to get to know the institution. The direct ‘care-giving’ of phase three can be found 
in many of the training and rehabilitative programmes from education offending 
behaviour programmes. Care-giving and ‘care-receiving’, Tronto’s final phase of 
practical caring, can be identified in peer support.  
 
The unpaid practical caring work of prisoner volunteers helps contribute to the 
purpose of prison, and to maintaining order. Shannon Trust mentors contribute 
towards raising literacy standards, ‘enabling’ prisoners’ chances of a ‘good and 
useful life’. Drug recovery peer mentors contribute to prison drug treatment 
services. Prison Listeners help to reduce suicide risks. Prisoners receiving support 
for drug problems, emotional problems, giving or receiving advice about housing, 
and helping fellow inmates to read are not causing disturbances or threatening the 
safety of other prisoners and staff. Prisoners receiving such care are prisoners 
whose capabilities to address their own needs are gradually strengthened, helping 
to equip them for a ‘good and useful’ life.  
 
Liebling & Arnold note Pilling’s 1992 observation that respect for prisoners is 
necessary for both healthy relationships and prison order (2004, p.207). Engster and 
Tronto highlight the importance of respect for caring practices. Providing 
appropriate respect to prisoners is important for treatment as equals and for 
interactional justice. Butler & Drake distinguish respect-as-consideration, and 
respect-as-esteem (2007, p.115), which Hulley et al. define as ‘recogniz[ing] human 
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rights’, and non-degrading treatment respectively (2012, p.5). Prisoners’ sense of 
self-worth is influenced by their treatment by officers, which is linked with Tyler’s 
work on interpersonal treatment as a component of interactional justice (Butler & 
Drake 2007, p.122; Hulley et al. 2012, p.5, p.6, p.17). Liebling argues respect and 
fairness are correlated with order and wellbeing, whereas ‘poor treatment leads to 
negative emotions … distressing and damaging for individuals’ (2011, p.534). 
 
Liebling recently returned to HMP Whitemoor to conduct, with colleagues, a further 
study of investigating prisoner–staff relationships following her earlier study 
(Liebling et al. 1999). The new report details that staff feel afraid (Straub et al. 2011, 
p.177), unsupported by management (2011, pp.179–80), and unsure of how to 
build and manage relationships with a changed cohort of prisoners (2011, p.176). As 
such, staff ‘had retreated into the basic custodial aspects of their role’ (2011, 
p.180). Trust and information exchange with prisoners had suffered (2011, p.160). 
Many offenders at Whitemoor are now serving longer or indefinite sentences, and 
include a sizeable Muslim minority. In combination with the reduction in staff 
confidence and a greater threat and fear of violence (2011, p.102), Liebling reports 
‘prisoners feeling more trapped, vulnerable and hopeless than they were’ (Liebling 
2011, p.536). Liebling candidly observes ‘[t]his research has troubled me more than 
any other study … because of the pain and distress experienced and the contrast 
with the same prison 12 years earlier’ (2011, p.532).  
 
These studies highlight the importance of respectful, responsive communication 
within a prison and the dangers that can arise when this is missing: basic needs for 
bodily security and freedom from fear are not met. The obscured caring practices, 
which do occur in prisons, may be stunted and poor examples of caring. Yet these 
are necessary to meet the prison service aims of holding offenders safely and 
securely, encouraging a good and useful life among prisoners, and providing basic 
respect for the human dignity of offenders.  
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Caring practices in community punishments  
 
Ideals and care ethics values 
The first ‘court missionaries’ of 1876 worked to support offenders with alcohol 
problems and in finding work (National Probation Directorate 2007, p.4). Treatment 
for substance misuse and supporting offenders in finding work is still part of 
community punishments. Probation officers were trained in a social work context 
(Nash 2011, p.473) until a separate Probation Diploma was introduced in 1997, 
after ‘the Government decided that social work was an inappropriate 
understanding … of the service’ (Justice Committee 2011, p.13). Gregory identifies 
this transition as away from a ‘social work’ understanding of probation and towards 
what Cavadino et al’s describe as ‘a ‘punitive managerialist’ mode’ (Gregory 2011, 
p.61; see also Cavadino et al. 1999, p.54; and Gregory 2010) of operation. The 
Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 replaced ‘advise, assist and befriend’ 
with ideals of enforcement, rehabilitation and public protection (Canton 2012, p.6). 
The role of probation officers has changed, particularly since the 2001 national 
structuring and 2008 merger with the prison service in the National Offender 
Management Service (Howard League for Penal Reform 2008, p.7). Probation 
officers as offender managers have been obliged to ‘become punishment-
orientated, law-enforcing officers’ (Nash 2011, pp.476–7). Yet a House of Commons 
Justice Committee Report of 2011 found that ‘staff continue to emphasize the 
original values of probation’ (Justice Committee 2011, p.13). 
 
Advising, assisting and befriending are sympathetic to caring values. These values 
imply some level of open engagement with recipients, particularly with supportive, 
enabling attitudes. The values of care ethics, as Tronto’s ethical elements of caring 
will help us identify, can be found in the ideals of probation. Tronto’s first and 
second ethical elements were awareness and responsibility (1993, pp.127–33). To 
either ‘advise, assist and befriend’ or ‘rehabilitate’ offenders, officers must have an 
awareness of offenders’ personal challenges. This must in part at least be gained 
through respectful and responsive interactions with offenders. Officers may also 
play a role in supporting offenders in taking responsibility for their offences. This 
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implies supportive, responsive interactions with offenders. Probation officers must 
take responsibility, perhaps shared with colleagues, such as psychologists and 
addiction workers, for helping provide support to the offender. Tronto’s third and 
fourth ethical elements were competence and responsiveness (1993, pp.133–6). 
Probation services aim to provide competent support for offenders through the 
training of officers and appointment of appropriately skilled staff (addiction 
workers, psychologists etc). Tronto’s final element is least clear in mainstream 
punishment delivery practices, yet we may find responsiveness in those cases 
where officers make time to hear offenders and to respond to their concerns.  
 
The quality of delivery of these aims varies in practice between officers, and is 
influenced by factors such as time and resources. While the practices of probation 
workers engaged in community punishment has changed, these still reflect caring 
practices. Even when acting as risk managers, this contributes to an end of reducing 
avoidable harm, following Engster’s aims of care (2007, p.76). There are then caring 
aims integrated into the aims of community punishment delivery practices, and 
caring practices which facilitate the delivery of punishment. To the extent that 
these caring values are present, the aims of community punishment delivery 
practices are better delivered where this caring is done well.  
 
Implementation and caring practice 
There are 35 Probation Trusts in England & Wales, funded by, and accountable to, 
the National Offender Management Service. The probation service produces pre-
sentence reports to assist sentencers. Gregory, a probation officer turned scholar, 
argues that under the pre-1997 social work understanding of probation, ‘an ethic of 
care underpinned practice’ (Gregory 2011, p.63). Drawing on her 2003 study of 
officers trained under the social work model, she argues the moral reasoning of 
care was employed by officers when preparing pre-sentence reports (2011, p.63). 
We will see in Chapter 4 that more recent, risk assessment based pre-sentence 
reports are criticised. The service supervises offenders subject to community and 
suspended sentences, and prisoners released on licence; and provides approved 
accommodation and running offending behaviour programmes. 
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Community orders, which replaced and consolidated previous orders, and 
Suspended Sentence Orders (SSOs below) (providing support and programmes for 
offenders with suspended prison sentences, expecting to reduce further offences 
and subsequent immediate custody), were introduced in 2005. While these orders 
resemble those they replaced, breach is more serious: breached suspended 
sentence orders are expected to result in immediate custody, and courts can no 
longer respond to community order breaches by taking no action (Mair et al. 2007, 
p.31). Orders can include an individually tailored selection from 12 potential 
requirements. 
 
1. Unpaid work (40–300 hours) 
2. Supervision (up to 36 months; 24 months maximum for 
SSO) 
3. Accredited programme (length to be expressed as the 
number of sessions; must be combined with a supervision 
requirement) 
4. Drug rehabilitation (6–36 months; 24 months maximum for 
SSO; offender’s consent is required) 
5. Alcohol treatment (6–36 months; 24 months maximum for 
SSO; offender’s consent is required) 
6. Mental health treatment (up to 36 months; 24 months 
maximum for SSO; offender’s consent is required) 
7. Residence (up to 36 months; 24 months maximum for SSO) 
8. Specified activity (up to 60 days) [may include restorative 
justice] 
9. Prohibited activity (up to 36 months; 24 months maximum 
for SSO) 
10. Exclusion (up to 24 months) 
11. Curfew (up to 6 months and for between 2–12 hours in any 
one day…) 
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12. Attendance centre (12–36 hours with a maximum of 3 
hours per attendance) 
(2007, p.11) 
  
The first eight requirements are intended as ‘rehabilitative’ (2007, p.14). Only 
stand-alone curfew orders do not require probation contact (2007, p.20). Most 
community orders include some contact with probation officers. This contact may 
be of varying duration and quality, but it provides some opportunity for officers to 
engage with offenders, important for building trust and developing relationships. 
There is also some evidence that probation officers do endeavour to build 
relationships with offenders in order to help manage them (HM Inspectorate of 
Probation 2013, p.17, p.49), a factor we saw earlier in the work of prison officers. 
Supervision by a probation officer, does not guarantee needs-meeting practical 
caring work with respect for offenders. But it provides an opportunity for 
responsive conditions for caring to develop. 
 
Where probation officers offer meaningful opportunities for dialogue, officers are in 
a position to find out about needs, and to make arrangements towards addressing 
these needs in discussion with the offender. Arrangements for needs-meeting might 
be seen in the variety of requirements, recognizing a diversity of needs and 
providing a means of meeting these, and in the sentencers selection of appropriate 
measures. This reflects Tronto’s first two practical phases of care ethics, caring-
about (noticing needs) and caring-for (making arrangements). Where probation 
officers or other specialist staff deliver programmes, or interact with offenders to 
deliver appropriate support, this reflects Tronto’s third phase of practical care-
giving. In cases where care is delivered well, and the officer is able to make time to 
hear offenders’ concerns and views on the support they receive, this reflects 
Tronto’s final care-receiving phase of practical caring.  
 
Care can be delivered in better and worse ways. In Chapter two we saw that caring 
has negative and operational limits. Yet better caring was argued to be provided 
when care-givers had an appropriate attitude, such as the ‘advise, assist, befriend’ 
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attitude held by some probation officers. This does not mean that all community 
punishment interactions are caring, or even deliver good care, but that there is the 
potential for caring work. Rehabilitative programmes, in the community or prison, 
work best when tailored to the individual needs of the offender, enabling the 
supportive elements to be delivered as good care. The aims of caring overlap with 
some of the aims of community punishment. Yet this work is not identified as 
caring: it is centrally defined as the delivery of rehabilitative services. Some work 
carried out by probation officers may represent practical caring, and to the extent 
that this understanding is helpful, the caring elements can be improved by 
recognizing them as care, and applying caring values and principles.  
 
Rehabilitative programmes may help meet basic needs, following Engster’s care 
aims. For example, health-related needs might be addressed through substance 
misuse and mental health programmes. Offending behaviour programmes, ranging 
from anger management to community treatment programmes for sex offenders 
might also be said to help the individual offender to build basic capabilities for 
functioning well in the social environment. While these may also be described 
following Hampton’s definition of ‘rehabilitation’, rendering offenders productive 
rather than parasitical (1998, p.39), this is achieved by benefitting the offender. In 
Scotland, where probation officers are still considered social workers, Robinson & 
McNeill found that officers understand themselves as benefiting the community 
through supporting individual offenders, and helping to address offender’s needs:  
 
It’s the [offender] who needs help at that point in time [who is 
most important to me].... I know in the long run it is helping the 
bigger, the wider community  
(Scottish Criminal Justice Social Worker interview comment, 
Robinson & McNeill 2004, p.290). 
 
You are assisting them not only in their own right but also to 
reduce the likelihood of them offending again. But arguably that's 
in their interest as well ... assisting the individual does assist 
society  
(Scottish Criminal Justice Social Worker interview comment, 
Robinson & McNeill 2004, p.291). 
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Caring perspectives are able to deal with conflict, and can offer us resources to help 
prioritize conflicting needs according to the particular context. Yet the opposite is 
also true: sometimes, needs converge, and by assisting one individual we can assist 
many others.  
 
Unpaid work requirements are noted as being potentially rehabilitative (Mair et al. 
2007, p.20). This has not always been intended, but this perspective has history. 
Writing about Scottish unpaid work in 1994, McIvor suggests that while not ‘an 
expressly rehabilitative sanction, there is nonetheless a widespread belief even 
among sentencers that it may in some instances be rehabilitative in effect’ (1994, 
p.176). She explains that this belief is held on the grounds that unpaid work may 
bring offenders into contact with others, with greater needs than themselves, 
providing fresh insights from a broader perspective on their own lives, problems 
and offending behaviour. Later evidence seemed to suggest that contact with 
beneficiaries helped offenders to broaden their perspective in this way (McIvor 
1998, pp.55–6). This opportunity for offenders to understand how their work helps 
others is reflected in an offender’s comment about an unpaid work requirement 
made through the North Liverpool Community Justice Centre in the late 2000s:  
 
We were on this estate painting these fences and these people 
said to the probation guy that some of the fences weren’t any 
good … and you thought why do they care about it but once it was 
done good they thanked us and you could see it was useful for 
them. 
(offender respondent 55 Mair & Millings 2011, p.78). 
 
Similar feelings were echoed by the Residents’ Association of The Westminster 
Estate in Kirkdale, North Liverpool, one of the estates benefiting from offenders’ 
unpaid work. Residents’ Association Chairman, Harry Mooney, observed that the 
unpaid work had demonstrated to residents that the offenders were not as bad as 
media portrayals, and were just ordinary people. Elaine Doolan, Residents’ 
Association Secretary, reported that residents were initially apprehensive, until they 
met and developed relationships with the offenders labouring on their estate. 
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These relationships sometimes outlasted the orders, with past offenders coming 
back to visit. Doolan noted the work helped to give offenders pride in their local 
area and themselves (Rt Rev Jones 2012, at 15:43 mins). 
 
Unpaid work may offer offenders opportunities to provide some kind of practical 
assistance to others. This allows offenders an opportunity to share responsibility for 
delivering something of benefit to others, and to begin considering the needs of 
others when going about their work. In this limited way, this might offer an 
opportunity to experience the attitude of care and to begin to engage in practical 
care. If caring is a learned behaviour (Noddings 2002, pp.24–6), then this may 
enable offenders to develop care-giving skills.  
 
The National Probation Service specific aims are: 
1. the protection of the public 
2. the reduction in reoffending; 
3. the proper punishment of offenders; 
4. ensuring offender awareness of the effects of crime on the 
victims of crime and the public; and 
5. the rehabilitation of offenders 
(The Offender Management Act 2007, s2 para. 4) 
 
These aims exhibit a tension present in other punishments, yet appearing most 
clearly in community punishment. On the one hand, there is a belief in reform, 
present in aims 2, 4 and 5 especially. On the other there is a clear expectation of 
recidivism, visible in particularly aim 1 and perhaps 3. Helping offenders to 
understand the impact of their offence might be understood as supporting 
offenders in enabling their desistance from offending. This might represent care-
giving, meeting needs for healthy relationships, or for living a life free from the 
harms of crime (for offenders, victims and communities). Aims 2, 4 and 5 might be 
interpreted as viewing offenders as individuals to be supported and encouraged, 
who can be enabled to desist from offending. However, aims 1 and 3 reflect 
Tronto’s end of protection, as identified in her police work example (responding to 
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harmful intentions rather than needs (1993, p.104)). Aim 1 in particular expects the 
future harmful conduct of offenders, taking steps to protect others from harm. 
Probation practices, particularly as ‘advise, assist and befriend’ are at once expected 
to address needs by successfully rehabilitating or reforming offenders, avoiding 
unacceptable harm; yet, most obvious in the probation officer’s role as offender 
manager, recidivism is anticipated as unavoidable. The Aggregate Report on 
Offender Management Inspection on probation identifies good practice examples 
showing both how officers engage individual offenders to support them away from 
offending (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2013, pp.33–4); and to identify offenders 
posing greater risks than previously thought, and to put in place or return to court 
for measures to manage the risk (2013, p.17, see especially Gloucestershire and 
Durham Tees Valley examples). 
 
This tension of risk management, where risk is understood as ‘an inescapable part 
of the human condition’ (Hudson 2003a, p.45) has some resonance with the tension 
identified in care ethics in Chapter two: harm is at once unacceptable, and 
unavoidable. The tension in care ethics is manageable: only primarily intended harm 
is identified as unacceptable; unavoidable harms are acknowledged and where 
possible addressed. But this tension cannot be eliminated. As Hudson observes of 
criminal justice, while ‘risks might not … be eliminated, they can be kept within 
reasonable levels, and can be reduced where they can be anticipated’ (2003a, p.46). 
Both caring and criminal justice risk management are practices which respond to 
the human condition: our interdependence and vulnerability.  
 
In Chapter two I noted the care ethics approach to managing this tension. Care 
ethics acknowledges that harms are both unacceptable when a primary intention, 
and yet unavoidable as side and unforeseen consequences: harm is at once 
unacceptable and accepted as unavoidable. Yet care ethics anticipates that we 
cannot ideally meet all needs all of the time, which I have made more explicit 
through my systematization of the limits of care. These limits, together with the 
values and practical moral reasoning approach of care ethics, suggest a response of 
reviewing our practices, both at the decision-making and delivery stage, when 
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caring is understood as an ongoing process. If we are concerned to care well (Kittay 
2002, p.259; Clement 1996, p.101), as an ongoing activity (Tronto 1993, p.103; 
Noddings 2002, p.103), then we are obliged to review our caring to monitor 
progress, to identify and address problems. Given the resemblance between these 
two tensions in punishment delivery practices and in caring practices, and the 
presence of caring practices within punishment, the self-scrutiny and mutual 
moderation resources of care, present in the cumulative fairness response design 
stage, and care delivery response analysis stage, may help us to address the tension 
within punishment.  
 
Carlen is correct to argue, as we saw in Chapter one, that rehabilitative support in 
mainstream criminal justice is at present not ideally and often poorly practiced. 
Because the validity of support for offenders is undermined by perceiving offenders 
as ‘less-deserving’, these practices are not framed as supportive or caring concepts, 
but identified as ‘rehabilitation’, ‘risk management’ or reform through training and 
treatment. As Carlen argues, offenders’ needs are often not well met by 
conceptualizing this as rehabilitation for offenders qua offenders. By recognizing 
both the necessity of supportive practices and identifying them as caring, we might 
be better placed to provide the ‘support from the state’ Carlen recommends for ‘all 
those – whether lawabiding or lawbreaking – whom [the state] has failed materially 
and culturally in terms of ensuring satisfaction of their minimum needs’ (2013, 
p.33). With Carlen, my concern is about improving support for offenders, not 
necessarily about rehabilitation as an end in itself. Providing practical caring where 
it is needed, both acknowledges and addresses need and provides a means to 
recognize the other as an equal, ‘equally worthy of our attention and 
responsiveness’ (Engster 2007, p.31). 
 
 
Caring practices in restorative justice  
In Chapter one I noted that I will consider face-to-face methods of restorative 
justice, as alternative punishments. While there is no ‘typical’ restorative justice 
process, (Shapland et al. 2011, p.114), most mediation and/or conference sessions 
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follow a similar structure. Facilitators welcome participants, ensuring each 
understands who the others are, and their role in the discussion. Victims and then 
offenders in turn, each recount the events leading up to, and of, the offence. 
Turning to the present, the facilitator asks the victim and then the offender to 
describe the subsequent impact on their lives and present feelings. After both 
victim and offender have spoken, other parties are invited to contribute. Finally, 
facilitators direct discussions towards the future, towards agreeing how to repair 
the harm of the offence. This offers an opportunity for making and accepting 
apologies (although not made in all cases). In most schemes, a written agreement is 
produced drawing on the discussion outcomes and participants’ wishes. This 
agreement is not legally binding (2011, pp.101–2). In many schemes, facilitators 
undertake to inform victims if and when the offender completes any agreed 
activity.  
 
Ideals and care ethics values 
Braithwaite proposes a set of standards for restorative justice, divided into three 
groups. Constraining standards, or minimum levels which must be achieved; 
maximizing standards which are ideal aims if not always fulfilled; and emergent 
standards, or practices which are becoming more widespread (Braithwaite 2002, 
pp.569–70). These values and aims are not hierarchical and allow flexibility in and 
between programmes. Resonances with care values can be seen. For example, 
Braithwaite’s constraining standards include empowerment, respectful listening, 
and equal concern (2002b, p.569). This reflects the respectful listening I drew from 
the values of care ethics in Chapter two, and the concern for treating offenders 
(intended in mainstream punishment) or all parties (in restorative justice) as equals. 
Braithwaite’s maximizing standards are aims of restoration, which broadly concord 
with Engster’s aims of care as meeting needs, developing capabilities and avoiding 
(or repairing) harm. These include restoration of relationships, communities, human 
dignity, freedom, compassion, and also speaks of restoring civic duties, developing 
human capabilities and preventing future injustice or harm (2002b, p.569). The 
emergent standards Braithwaite details are restorative justice specific, in that 
Braithwaite argued these were not values found elsewhere, such as United Nations 
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Human Rights documents. Braithwaite lists ‘remorse over injustice, apology, 
censure of the act, forgiveness of the person [and] mercy’ (2002b, p.570). These are 
aims, rather than necessary requirements. There is broad agreement in the 
literature that victims must not be expected to forgive (Duff 2001, p.114; Minow 
1998, p.14, p.17), nor offenders to apologize. Apology and forgiveness, Braithwaite 
stresses, are gifts which lose their meaning if required (2002b, p.570).  
 
Restorative justice practices value respectful discussion, negotiating and agreeing 
responses to offending where possible. Johnstone & Van Ness explain respectful 
discussion as an awareness of our own limited knowledge, an openness to others 
differences, treating others with dignity and worth and valuing their contributions 
(2007, p.19). It is possible to see the values and practices of care ethics, particularly 
the open, engaged attitude, reflected in restorative justice values. This has been 
noted by feminist scholars. Margaret Urban Walker observes an overlap between 
the practices and language of restorative justice and the moral perspective of caring 
(2006, p.146). The discussion of equality as relationally understood in the previous 
chapter was drawn from Llewellyn’s framing of restorative justice as a relational 
practice (Llewellyn 2012). Below, I offer a brief systematic account of where and 
how far caring practices can be found in restorative justice, and how important they 
are to this practice.  
 
Engster’s aims included avoiding unwanted and unnecessary harms. Whereas 
mainstream proceedings seek to respond to the offence proportionally to the harm 
caused, restorative practices seek to repair the harm through the response (Zehr & 
Mika 2003, p.43). This attempt to repair harm might be understood as helping to 
minimize harms, meeting basic needs for relationship repair, running parallel with 
Engster’s aims of care. We also saw Tronto’s ethical elements of caring included 
awareness, taking responsibility, competence and responsiveness (1993, pp.127–
36). To greater and lesser degrees, these are also present in restorative justice.  
 
Seeking awareness of the needs of others is displayed in the discursive aims of 
restorative justice. As we saw in the initial description of the usual structure of a 
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restorative encounter, both victims and offenders are invited to speak, but 
importantly, with each other. Restorative justice values dialogue and an important 
condition for dialogue is that participants listen to, and engage with, the other’s 
speech (Braithwaite 2002b, p.569). Without listening, dialogue becomes alternating 
monologues. The intended inclusive dialogue recognizes both that offenders and 
victims each have needs to be expressed and recognized, but attempts to permit 
this in a way that allows offenders and victims each to gain a better understanding 
of the other’s needs.  
 
Tronto’s second ethical element is taking responsibility. Restorative justice practices 
enable offenders to take responsibility for the harm caused and provide 
opportunity for apology (desirable but not required). Insofar as offenders 
themselves are encouraged to take responsibility for their acts and to respond 
constructively to their victims, offenders are encouraged to care. Restorative justice 
providers might be understood to take responsibility for providing facilities and 
opportunities for mediation.  
 
The third ethical element was competence (Tronto 1993, p.134). This is reflected in 
the use of trained facilitators, giving all participants the time to speak, and in 
helping participants to articulate their perspective in a way which can be 
understood by the other. This will be subject to individuals’ performances, and 
resources may permit only limited facilities. Sometimes volunteers and practitioners 
will be misinformed or make errors (Roche 2004, p.195). Yet this aspiration is in 
tune with the concern to provide for needs competently, and these limitations 
(practical negative and operational) are those I argue care ethics recognizes in 
Chapter two. Tronto’s final element was responsivity (1993, p.134), seen in the non-
compulsory enabling of apology and forgiveness exchange. We might identify 
responsiveness in part in the facilitator’s responses to the contributions of the 
participants: helping to encourage the nervous, and calm the angry etc.  
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Implementation and caring practices 
Although restorative justice is in theory a requirement available in community 
punishment, restorative practices within, and external to, mainstream criminal 
justice are limited niche practices, often restricted to geographic areas and small 
sets of offence type (eg Medows et al. 2010). That said, a recent Ministry of Justice 
Restorative justice action plan stressed an ‘increased use’ of restorative justice, 
since 85% of victims found the experience helpful, and reoffending rates reduced by 
14% (Ministry of Justice 2012b, p.1).  
 
Tronto’s four practical phases, caring-about, caring-for, care-giving and care-
receiving, are clearly visible in restorative justice practice (1993, pp.106–8). Tronto’s 
caring-about represents acknowledging the needs of those around us, even where 
this requires effort on our part. This is illustrated in restorative justice activities, 
inviting offenders and victims to participate in restorative practices, acknowledging 
their needs. Caring-for is seen in arranging the training and hiring of facilitators, and 
providing resources. Care-giving is most clearly present on the facilitator’s part, 
where offender and victim are helped towards mutual understanding, and towards 
agreeing an outcome satisfactory to both parties. Care-giving and receiving by the 
parties themselves is seen where exchanges of apology and forgiveness occur. Care-
receiving, might also be illustrated in the practices of the facilitator responding to 
the participants and progressing the conference accordingly. Better still, would be 
the practice of facilitators undertaking to keep victims informed about offenders’ 
progress in keeping to the agreements. As with the discussion of community 
punishments and imprisonment above, the ideals and ideal implementation seen 
here is not always achieved in practice. Negative practical and operational limits to 
restorative justice are discussed further in Chapters six and seven. This final 
responsiveness phase is least well applied in mainstream punishment practice.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered a little of penal history, illustrating the presence of care 
in the ideals and implementations of punishment against a backdrop of changing 
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ideologies. I have also explored the discussion of care ethics in relation to 
punishment, particularly restorative justice practices. I have argued that, contrary 
to expectations generated by harm-centred conceptions of punishment, parts of the 
ideals and practices of present punishment delivery practices, including restorative 
justice, community punishment and imprisonment, may be understood as caring 
practices. Further, the functioning of these practices as caring is necessary for these 
punishment delivery practices to work as we expect: restorative justice participants 
must listen and become aware of the other’s perspective and needs in connection 
with the offence. Probation officers must take account of individual offender’s 
circumstances to provide appropriate support (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2013, 
p.17, pp.33-4). Open engagement with offenders also helps probation officers to 
identify and manage risks for the benefit of offenders and others. Prisons provide 
some ‘treatment and training’ through peer and personal officer support, which can 
in turn make contributions towards the safe and ordered running of a prison. 
Listener volunteers help to support others who may harm themselves or others. 
Orderly and safe prisons are not possible without some degree of caring practice. 
Perhaps fines may be excluded, but even these are administrated in England & 
Wales by taking account of the individual’s resources, and seek to minimize harms 
of avoidable financial hardship by allowing payment by instalments. Caring practices 
are necessary for contemporary punishment delivery practices.  
 
It is easy to miss caring practices when we focus on punishment defined partly in 
terms of harm. But were these practices to disappear, we would certainly notice 
their absence, as Libelling’s revisit to HMP Whitemoor shows (Straub et al. 2011). 
These practices may not be considered ‘caring’ by those engaged in them. Yet I have 
shown it is possible to view them in this way. We saw in Chapter two the idealized 
components for good care, the conceptual anatomy of care. Employing care 
principles when designing and implementing these practices will help to strengthen 
these practices. In the implementation of the punishment delivery practices 
examined, the care provided is not ideal. The responsiveness element and 
understanding of care ethics as an ongoing process, rather than a discrete event, is 
often either limited or missing.  
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While punishment delivery practices display many core features of the anatomy of 
care ethics, since these practices are not intended as care or necessarily enacted 
with the attitude of care, they may not be as ‘good’ care as they might be. Because 
the approach to practical moral reasoning of care ethics is not employed, it is 
possible if not likely that these caring practices will be inefficient: missing and 
misinterpreting needs, failing to meet them as well as they might have been met or 
to engage respectfully with offenders and provide interactional justice. The penal 
theories examined in Chapter one offered little guidance for practitioners delivering 
punishment or about their interactions with offenders during the process, despite 
implying the value of understanding the offenders’ personal context. But we have 
seen here that at least some elements of punishment delivery practices could be 
achieved, and potentially improved upon, by employing caring aims and values to 
accompany the unrecognized caring practices. By choosing to understand these 
practices as care practices and by following caring principles, our ability to provide 
good care is strengthened. We benefit from awareness and responsivity to others’ 
needs and from reflexive initial and ongoing review practices, highlighting our own 
limits and how these might be addressed, that the care ethics perspective enables. 
In Chapter two, I provided a general statement offering one account of the practical 
moral reasoning method of care ethics. This chapter has considered the importance 
of care for punishment delivery, and the interactions between offenders and 
punishment practitioners. In Chapter four I consider how the principles and 
priorities of care ethics can complement and enhance mainstream criminal justice 
practices of information-gathering punishment decision-making, and how these 
principles might be applied to such settings. 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
Information-gathering and treatment as equals in 
punishment decision-making 
 
 
This chapter begins by considering how punishment decision-making is informed. 
Chapter one argued that both retributive and consequentialist penal theories 
implicitly require offenders’ personal contextual information. Here I argue that 
mainstream criminal justice practices also value offenders’ personal contextual 
information, but fail to gather this sufficiently. Restrictions on offenders’ 
opportunities for speech risks at least partly silencing, excluding and objectifying 
offenders. Further, the classical liberal informed practices and protections for 
offenders, designed to respect the offender’s equal rights, fail to provide the 
interactional justice necessary for procedural justice and may further exclude 
offenders. The potential for exclusion, silencing and objectification are more 
troubling when the central place harm then takes in most definitions of 
punishment, distorts our recognition of harm. 
  
While I propose punishing with care, there is more to punishment than caring for 
offenders. I note that the care ethics concern to avoid unnecessary harm could 
ground the censure of criminal acts as unnecessarily harmful. In considering how to 
punish with care I revise the principles derived from care ethics in Chapter two; to 
help guide sentencers, and later practitioners, in punishment decision-making and 
delivery. This provides instrumentally useful details, and a means of recognizing 
offenders’ expertise in their own lived experience. The care ethics principles 
prioritize respectful engagement with others, offering a means of providing 
interactional justice. I consider why we should punish with care. I offer a principled 
argument, which can be fleshed out from either a liberal or care theory perspective, 
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supplemented by political and pragmatic arguments, in favour of responding to 
offenders: 
 
1. Without intentional, primary purpose harm; 
2. With care. 
 
I consider some important limits and concerns about these principles. I identify the 
differences between the state’s duty to care for citizens in general and offenders in 
particular, and balancing needs-meeting between offenders and victims, before 
arguing that we should punish all offenders with care. I then address concerns and 
proportionality. I shall argue that rather than abandoning the principle, it still 
applies in a revised form which takes account of offenders’ context in assessing 
punishment seriousness. Chapter six proposes a practice to gather offender’s 
contextual information, as they choose and view as important, through dialogue. 
While listening respectfully is a core theme, I note here some important limits on  
gathering offender’s context. However, including offenders’ contexts makes 
offenders vulnerable to state intrusion and bias, and I offer a brief indication of how 
this might be addressed, before noting a tension between care and the compulsory 
nature of punishment. I finish with a note on the needs of victims.  
 
 
The purpose of criminal trials 
Lai distinguishes three aims for adversarial criminal trials. Firstly, a ‘search for the 
truth’ (2010, p.245), determining whether an offence occurred and whether the 
defendant has a lawful defence. Secondly, ‘to bring criminals to justice’ (2010, 
p.255), engaging in ‘moral dialogue with the accused’ (2010, p.249). Finally, to 
ensure appropriate and legitimate law enforcement (2010, p.247). Each requires 
information-gathering and assessing facts. These details however focus on the 
social context of the alleged events. Information about the defendant is only 
relevant insofar as it either illuminates the offence circumstances, or indicates a 
lawful defence.  
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Drawing on Duff’s concerns for the inclusion of offenders as (citizen) members of 
the normative community, Lai reinterprets the purpose of criminal trials ‘to do 
political justice to accused persons, according them their dues as human beings and 
citizens’ (Lai 2010, p.255). Lai identifies the value of treating even the worst 
offenders as equals according to the demands of justice. We bring ‘notorious war 
criminals before a criminal tribunal, even though it is far simpler just to shoot them 
in the street’ (Lai 2010, p.255) not because we doubt guilt, but because we value 
the rule of law and procedural justice. Lai stresses: 
 
A person, in virtue of being a person, deserves to be treated with 
dignity…. A liberal trial is one that adequately respects the accused 
as a rational and autonomous moral being, and as the bearer of 
basic political rights  
(Lai 2010, p.255). 
 
Duff et al argue trials are a communicative process, calling defendants ‘to answer’ 
(Duff et al. 2007, p.2) for wrongs, suggesting dialogue between the defendant and 
the court. However, Brownlee critiques Duff’s dialogue as overly scripted, allowing 
defendants few options (Brownlee 2011, pp.59–61). As Lai reminds us, criminal 
trials in Western liberal democracies are built on the classical liberal principles of 
respecting the defendant as rational and political equals. However, I will argue that 
mainstream processes do not always achieve these aims. Potential for 
misunderstanding in court, and restrictions on what, how and when defendants are 
permitted to communicate, unintentionally risk excluding, silencing and objectifying 
offenders. Classical liberal informed protections in mainstream practices, which 
both ‘do not force [defendants] to participate at the trial and, at the same time, 
give that person the cherished right to do so’ (Lai 2010, p.255), entitle citizens to 
‘distance themselves normatively from prosecution’ (Duff et al. 2007, p.204). They 
also fail to engage with defendants and compound these problems: mainstream 
practices cannot guarantee, and risk failing to supply, interactional justice, the 
‘missing link’ in procedural justice (Tyler & Bies 1990, p.88).  
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Contextual information in mainstream criminal justice  
Contextual information is already instrumentally valued in mainstream criminal 
justice practices. Attention to the unique details of each case prompt  Daly’s claim 
that criminal justice already speaks with a situated, ‘feminine’ voice45 (Daly 1989, 
p.2). However, there are two kinds of relevant contextual information: offence 
context and offenders’ personal and social context. Offence context is the focus of 
mainstream trials. Offenders’ personal context is not gathered in the same way, 
reflecting a concern that offenders should only be tried in relation to the present 
alleged offence.  
 
Contemporary mainstream criminal justice practices in England & Wales are not the 
only example of core criminal justice practices valuing contextual information. 
English legal history offers some interesting insights. Until the seventeenth century, 
felony trials afforded defendants ‘the opportunity to speak in person to the charges 
and the evidence adduced against him’ (Langbein 2003, p.2). Representation was 
forbidden, for fear of interference ‘with the court’s ability to have the accused serve 
as an informational resource’ (2003, p.2). If guilty, then defendants necessarily 
knew more about the offence than any other present. Defendants were therefore 
used to access information about the offence and themselves. As late as the mid-
eighteenth century, defendants were encouraged to contest trials, since their 
defence speech provided context. A Surrey assize judge of 1751 complained of 
feeling obliged to hang an offender who admitted guilt, as the defendant’s silence 
‘shut out’ information which might have suggested alternative punishments (2003, 
p.61). I do not intend that defendants should be so ‘used’, only to highlight that the 
instrumental value of contextual information, heard directly from offenders, has 
long been recognized. This example demonstrates the possibility for contextual 
information to be gathered in objectifying ways (an ‘informational resource’). I shall 
seek to preserve the first insight, but to reduce the risk of objectification.  
 
                                                     
45
 Daly rejects any gendered claims regarding care ethics, but argues that this relational approach 
requires further research (Daly 1989, p.13). 
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Contextual information is also instrumentally valued in the civil law practices of 
contemporary French courts. ‘Almost the first thing that happens’, Field reports, ‘is 
that the President constructs a picture of the defendant’s life and character by 
questioning the defendant’, asking ‘defendants to tell their story themselves’ (2006, 
p.526). The official dossier, containing detailed background interviews, is used as a 
second-choice means of accessing and understanding the defendant’s personal 
context, if hearing their storytelling is not possible (2006, p.527). Character 
evidence about defendants is usually taken first, to provide personal context 
through which to understand the offence and offender (2006, p.530). French 
practices have been described as judging defendants ‘on the facts but through the 
personality’ (2006, p.524), implicitly differentiating between facts about offender 
and offence. 
 
We cannot draw direct practical lessons from the French experience due to 
procedural differences, which might explain the different information-gathering. 
French courts must retire with sufficient information to determine guilt and 
sentence (Field 2006, p.533); whereas English jury trials only determine guilt (2006, 
p.525). This reflects the English principle of trying the offender purely in relation to 
the alleged offence (2006, p.524). The French examination of defendants’ character 
and context is much broader. 
 
Contextual information was identified in Chapter one as implicitly relevant for both 
retributive and consequentialist penal theories. Given that punishments affect 
different individuals differently, we must understand something of offenders’ 
contextual background in order to determine either a proportionate punishment; or 
reach a consequentialist target, given the individual offender’s starting position. 
Sentencers could be given a more adequate opportunity to hear and access 
contextual information directly from offenders, without radically altering the 
principles of trial in England & Wales, by providing post-conviction, pre-sentence 
dialogue. This could also benefit sentencers and offenders in the vast majority of 
uncontested trials. This echoes the French preference for hearing directly from 
offenders. An illustrative, discussion-priming proposal is provided in Chapter six. In 
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the next sections, I discuss the gathering of information and the problems which 
can arise in mainstream practice. 
 
The instrumental benefit for sentencers of contextual information is only a 
contributory reason for preferring dialogue. Including offenders is separately 
valuable as a means of providing treatment as equals. Engagement with offenders is 
not automatically respectful, but allows this possibility.  
 
 
Telling tales: the communicative value of storytelling 
Bennett & Feldman identify everyday storytelling and story-hearing as key 
communicative practices in American courtroom processes, and note that 
‘storytelling in legal judgement’ (Bennett & Feldman 1981, p.3) is also used in 
England & Wales. It is essential that all courtroom actors (ie, judge, jurors, defence, 
prosecutor, witnesses) (Bennett & Feldman 1981, p.ix) share an understanding of 
storytelling construction and social action, to understand the story in the way the 
teller intends. How plausible a narrative is depends on how the listener interprets 
the information: When hearing narration of a defendant’s alibi, listeners must also 
understand the teller’s signals about how this information should be interpreted, 
and why the information should be interpreted in this way.  
 
Bennett & Feldman recognize understandings of storytelling are culturally and 
socially informed. As Young observes, the norms of speech are privileged norms, 
particularly those used in court. These norms may restrict what we are able to hear 
(Young 2000, p.72). Members of different groups may interpret stories differently, 
introducing bias into the courtroom through social differences, not necessarily as 
intended prejudice (1981, p.170). These biases cannot be overcome, since ‘the 
whole inventory of divergent social understandings … would be impossible to 
document’ (1981, p.181). The authors conclude that the ‘most important 
contribution of the storytelling perspective is that it explains how legal judgements 
work and, at the same time, shows how justice fails’ (1981, p.182). They argue that 
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stories are used to convey a variety of contextual information, but acknowledge 
that ultimately some stories will be misheard. 
 
Yet Bennett & Feldman emphasize that storytelling devices are misunderstood, 
rather than incomprehensible. We share enough meanings to be able to 
communicate acceptably well46 across social cleavages in everyday life, and the 
authors specify the role of ‘everyday’ storytelling (Bennett & Feldman 1981, p.ix, 
p.7). As we saw in Chapter one, our personal narratives, our total personal and 
social contextual detail, are at least partly socially and culturally constructed 
(Sherwin 1998, pp.34–5).  
 
While different social and cultural groups attach different meanings to narrative 
devices, this does not prevent us from being active listeners. Since we are aware 
that while ideas overlap, their apparent meanings may not be fully shared, we can 
actively seek to better understand the other. Active listening skills are used to 
enhance understanding (Cournoyer 2011, pp.194–6). After attending to the 
narration, the listener paraphrases and reflects: eg ‘you have told me that ….’ in 
order to check meanings. This can be extended to test out the listener’s 
interpretation, eg ‘it sounds as though … have I understood?’ This allows 
clarification of meaning without blame for misunderstandings. This treats the 
speaker inclusively, allowing them to highlight misunderstandings and the harms 
that have, or may, result. At the end of the clarification process, while we may still 
not understand exactly as the other intends, we have made good-faith efforts, 
respecting their self-knowledge. This might be useful to sentencers in gathering and 
clarifying contextual information from and about offenders through pre-sentence 
dialogue.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
46
 Not perfectly, and this is not to deny that some misunderstandings, including important ones, will 
persist.  
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Mediated (mis)understandings  
Contextual information about offenders is communicated to sentencers in 
mainstream criminal justice processes in ways which restrict the information 
sentencers receive. Information presented in court during trial is subject to legal 
restrictions, to prevent bias against the defendant. Information about offenders’ 
personal contexts, still subject to rules of relevance, is also presented to sentencers 
post-conviction. I shall discuss information raised during trial, before turning to 
pleas in mitigation and pre-sentence reports.  
 
During trial 
Information is presented in court, by the prosecution, and then by the defence, who 
each call witnesses. Witnesses, including defendants where they choose, may only 
respond to practitioner’s questions. This allows lawyers to draw out details, crafting 
a particular narrative arc. The good defence lawyer will draw out the narrative 
which produces the most convincing case for their client. Information about the 
social context of offences will be raised, but the personal and social context of the 
offender is relevant only insofar as it helps to build the case.  
 
Firstly, information presented in court is subject to the law of evidence, ‘formal 
procedural limits’ restricting what information may be admitted and ‘perceived as 
relevant’ (Bennett & Feldman 1981, p.xi). These restrictions are essential for a fair 
trial under common law adversarial traditions, and I do not challenge these. Yet this 
additionally restricts the information available to help sentencers understand the 
offender as a concrete person at later stages.  
 
Secondly, witnesses’ narration in court is shaped by legal professionals, not by 
witnesses themselves. Bennett & Feldman argue that lawyers use various devices to 
‘engineer’ the delivery of evidence (1981, p.124). Bibas notes of the American 
criminal justice system: ‘[d]efendants stay silent, letting their lawyers do the talking 
for them’ (2012, p.xvi). While defendants (and other witnesses) may give evidence, 
their speech may be skilfully directed by legal practitioners. The speech is 
interpreted by the court, where its relevance will be determined.  
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Bennett & Feldman note that lawyers direction of evidence requires the co-
operation of witnesses (1981, p.124), but stories are nonetheless purposefully 
crafted by someone other than the apparent speaker. Duff argues this should count 
as defendant’s dialogue with the court, since legal representatives should assist in 
telling their client’s narrative (Duff et al. 2007, p.212). Narratives might be 
structured to the defendant’s legal advantage. Yet this prevents sentencers hearing, 
and offenders from telling, parts of the offender’s narrative, which offenders 
identify as important. For most defendants, the vast majority of ‘their’ courtroom 
narrative will be mediated through legal representatives. If they choose to give 
evidence, their storytelling is directed by and mediated through lawyers’ questions. 
We should not presume that because some contextual details are raised in a 
restricted and carefully shaped way, that offenders’ stories have been told to their 
satisfaction, or that sentencers have a sufficient understanding. During trial, 
offenders’ speech is restricted and mediated.  
 
Post-conviction 
Whether offenders plead guilty or are convicted, information is still raised orally 
through pleas in mitigation. Here the prosecution state the facts of the case, and 
defence lawyers provide pleas in mitigation for their client. Again, the information 
presented is crafted by legal professionals and may be incomplete (Ashworth 2010, 
p.377). Ashworth reports that crown court judges place a higher value on pleas in 
mitigation than pre-sentence reports, given that the report may have been 
prepared well in advance (2010, p.379) and is therefore less ‘up-to-date’ (2010, 
p.381).  
 
Pre-sentence reports in England & Wales are prepared by probation officers after 
interviewing the offender. Reports ‘assist’ sentencers in ‘determining the most 
suitable method of dealing with [offenders]’ (Criminal Justice Act 2003 s158 1a). 
However, sentencers may choose to proceed without reports, or to ignore the 
report. These reports recognize the value of the contextual information they are 
intended, among other things, to convey, but at the same time devalue the 
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information by allowing for it to be discarded. Similar reports exist in other 
jurisdictions. The Social Inquiry Reports, from which pre-sentence reports were 
developed, contained much personal and social contextual information about 
offenders. Yet, pre-sentence reports contain decreasing amounts of contextual 
information and increasingly focus on risk assessments (Hudson 1996, p.156; Field 
2006, p.537; Nash 2011, p.479). 
 
In England & Wales, the reports follow a national standard template, focusing on 
providing a balanced and accurate account, the ‘risk of serious harm’ and any 
information from the victim. Much of the risk assessment process is conducted 
through a computerized system (OASys), meaning reports can be produced quickly 
should conviction follow a not guilty plea (Ashworth 2010, p.379). There have been 
criticisms of the varying quality of reports (Ashworth 2010, p.378), and Cyrus Tata 
and Ashworth separately suggest that sentencers place little emphasis on the 
content, particularly detail about the offender’s context (Ashworth 2010, p.380; 
Tata 2010, p.245). Yet Tata also notes Scottish sentencers were critical of reports 
that lacked sufficient personal context and focused on offending (2010, p.245).  
 
Tata’s study of the Scottish equivalent of pre-sentence reports found that how 
reports were used ‘differ[ed] markedly from what report writers strive to 
communicate and how policy and practice literatures have supposed judicial 
sentencers read reports’ (2010, p.256). Tata suggests that ‘one of the key roles 
which reports play is … easing the concerns of legal professionals that defendants 
may not have been treated with sufficient care and dignity’ (2010, p.256). The 
‘[r]eports facilitate a display of humanity, which is essential if legal professional 
discomfort about the abruptness of the process is to be eased’ (2010, p.257). 
 
Both pre-sentence reports and pleas in mitigation provide the sentencer second-
hand information. Practitioners determine which parts of offenders’ contexts are 
relevant and how these are most usefully communicated. Sentencers reappraise 
this mediated information. This saves sentencers time but denies offenders the 
chance to convey their stories for themselves. At the post-conviction pre-sentence 
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stage, offenders are silenced. Some details the offender considered important, and 
any meaning the offender gives to this information may be lost; like meaning in a 
game of Chinese Whispers.  
 
 
Tell it to the judge?  
 
Silencing and exclusion 
Because offenders’ speech may be compromised during trial, and silenced during 
sentencing, they can neither tell their personal story to appear as a concrete other, 
nor help identify and correct misunderstandings. Such misunderstandings may 
obscure potential harms which would otherwise have been foreseeable, making 
avoiding unnecessary harm difficult. Pleas in mitigation and pre-sentence reports 
might convey this information, but we risk two problems. Firstly this allows a 
second occasion for Bennett & Feldman’s misunderstood storytelling by the 
sentencer, even if the practitioner understands and communicates correctly. 
Secondly, this devalues the offender’s self-knowledge and lived experience of their 
own position, treating them as passive and excluding them from speaking with the 
decision-maker. Excluding and silencing the offender misses an opportunity to 
provide interactional justice.  
 
Hudson observes that while victims may feel ‘excluded from the proceedings, the 
offender is excluded by the proceedings’ (Hudson 2003b, p.179; original emphasis). 
If victims lack voice, defendants’ speech is limited. Except when in the witness box, 
offenders are largely ‘spoken of’ between legal practitioners, excluded as neither 
speaker nor audience. Crucially, convicted offenders have no right to speak with the 
sentencer at post-conviction, to offer or clarify information about themselves. This 
applies to offenders who admit guilt as well as those who contest the charges. 
Those in positions of relative power decide what is to be done with offenders. 
Reduced to a problem to be addressed, offenders become the object not subject of 
punishment.  
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The ‘usual suspect’ definitions of punishment desensitize us to morally significant 
harms that we ought to acknowledge and address. Because we are at risk of 
misunderstanding narratives, it becomes more important that offenders are able to 
highlight such possibilities at sentencing. Lyotard identifies situations when the 
other is prevented from speaking about the harms we cause them as wrongs of 
silencing (Lyotard 1993, p.144). When offenders are silenced from highlighting 
these harms, we treat them as passive or inert. Our lack of concern implies that 
morally significant harms are acceptable, failing to provide treatment as equals. This 
silencing and excluding prevents offenders from identifying potential harms, and 
risk at least partial objectification, to which I now turn.  
 
Objectification 
When sentences are decided and punishment delivered, offenders are silenced. 
Offenders’ experiences or feelings need not be taken into account: mainstream 
theory views this contextual information as an optional extra. When processes and 
decisions are not explained to offenders (informational justice), when feelings and 
emotional responses are not explored respectfully (interpersonal justice), we treat 
offenders as inert. We treat offenders more as part of the set of objective facts 
before the court, and less as intimately involved concrete persons. In some cases, as 
this offender’s report of their experience in an English Magistrates’ court illustrates, 
some offenders may experience mainstream sentencing as something which 
happens passively to them: 
 
I know [nothing] of what’s happening, sometimes I don’t even 
speak and like they’ve done it all and I’m on my way and still don’t 
know what’s happened  
(offender respondent 36, Mair & Millings 2011, p.78). 
 
Although offenders are punished for their offences and are not interchangeable in 
this sense, the sentencer’s perspective is a stream of cases. Sentencers sentence 
the present defendant for the present case. If understood as part of an 
administrative flow of punishment decision-making events, offenders may come to 
appear interchangeable. Bibas describes the ‘mechanization’ of the American 
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criminal justice process, employing swift, ‘cookie-cutter plea bargains’ (2012, p.xx). 
‘Criminal justice’, he argues, ‘used to be individualized, moral, transparent, and 
participatory but has become impersonal, amoral, hidden, and insulated from the 
people’ (2012, p.xvii). 
 
Martha Nussbaum lists seven features involved in treating a person as an object, 
arguing that objectification was present if one or more of the features could be 
found. Three of these reflect the possible treatment of offenders described above. 
These included ‘denial of subjectivity’: treatment ‘as something whose experiences 
and feelings (if any) need not be taken into account; passive treatment or 
‘inertness’: treatment ‘as lacking in agency’; and ‘fungibility’: treatment ‘as 
interchangeable’ (Nussbaum 1995, p.257; original emphasis). Failing to recognize 
the presence of non-trivial morally problematic harms, and thus failing to respond 
to them, may also suggest inertness and denial of subjectivity. Langton identifies 
three further features, including ‘silencing’, or treating others as though they are 
unable to speak (Langton 2009, pp.228–9).  
 
Lina Papadaki further clarifies the concept of objectification. She argues that 
Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin each offer conceptualizations of 
objectification that are too narrow. Here objectification treats other persons as 
tools, sacrificing their humanity in Kant’s terms, transforming them indefinitely into 
an object (Papadaki 2010, p.18). These authors imply that objectification always 
permanently and intentionally harms another’s humanity (2010, p.34). Nussbaum’s 
conception is broader. Following Nussbaum, Papadaki argues that not all 
objectification necessarily harms an individual’s humanity in Kant’s permanent 
sense. Objectification may rather ignore or improperly acknowledge the other’s 
humanity. Further, while objectification may be deliberate (knowing both that 
objectification will result and that this is wrong); Papadaki acknowledges 
objectification may be accidental. For example, following faulty beliefs about the 
nature of women, some men take steps to paternalistically ‘protect’ women. 
Despite altruistic motivation, objectifying outcomes result. Papadaki offers the 
example of a woman locked in a room by a (male) friend, since he knows both that 
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she plans a dangerous ice-climbing trip and is unskilled (2010, p.34). Papadaki 
distinguishes four types of objectification:  
 
 Harms victim’s humanity Ignores victim’s humanity 
Deliberate 
Reductive Intentional 
Objectification 
Non-reductive Intentional 
Objectification 
Unintended 
Reductive Unintentional 
Objectification 
Non-reductive Unintentional 
Objectification 
 
The objectification risked in punishment decision-making and delivery is of the non-
reductive, unintended kind:  
 
Non-reductive objectification is unintentional when the objectifier 
(A) does not intend to deny the objectified individual’s (B’s) 
humanity, and yet A denies B’s humanity in the sense of 
ignoring/not properly acknowledging B’s humanity  
(Papadaki 2010, p.33) 
 
Post-conviction, the offender is silenced and cannot speak to correct or clarify 
information. For Langton, silencing is a marker of objectification (2009, pp.228–9). 
Even where the silencing is incomplete, and some satisfactory communication 
occurs, this denies subjectivity, treating offenders as passive or inert, which are 
markers of objectification for Nussbaum (1995, p.257). An additional risk of 
objectification is present: where sentencers are unaware of and therefore unable to 
prevent otherwise avoidable harms, it is implied the offender may be acceptably so 
harmed, treating them as less than equal. For Duff, community perpetrated 
injustice is a problem of itself, but the state’s failure to acknowledge and address 
these contributes to denying the offender’s equal citizenship (2010, p.139). 
Restricting offenders’ speech contributes to sentencers’ lack of awareness of harms 
to which we are already desensitized. An example may help here. 
 
Recalling Jane’s story from the vignettes in Chapter three, Jane is sentenced to 
seven months in prison, losing her entitlement to housing benefit. Jane can no 
longer pay the rent. Jane’s potential inability to pay rent may not be relevant to the 
circumstances of the offence, or to a plea in mitigation. This contributes to the 
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silencing and exclusion which at least partly objectifies offenders like Jane in the 
first instance. Jane is homeless on release, a morally significant harm. Failing to 
respond to this harm, through ignorance or desensitization to harm, is the second 
example of objectification. If the sentencer were aware of the likelihood of this 
morally significant ‘collateral damage’ harm, steps could be taken to prevent this. 
For example, the sentencer could consider whether a strong community 
punishment might be more appropriate than the short prison sentence (community 
orders were strengthened in 2005 to avoid short prison sentences (Mair & Mills 
2009, p.46)).  
 
Housing advice is available to Jane during punishment delivery, recognizing that 
some prisoners have housing needs. However not all prisoners know how to access 
this support and demand for this help often outstrips availability, particularly in 
larger prisons (PRT 2012, p.60). Prison advice services are under-resourced to meet 
these needs adequately. This is poor caring, and a poor use of resources for meeting 
housing needs, holistically considered. Prison resources could be focused on 
offenders entering prison homeless if Jane kept her home. 
 
Returning to the decision-making stage, suppose a seven month prison sentence is 
‘known’ to be ‘correct’. Here it is a regrettable, unavoidable consequence that Jane 
loses her home. This may follow from reasoning according to the negative limits of 
care: Jane’s housing need regrettably cannot be met with current resources. Care 
ethics counsels that we should respond to Jane respectfully, acknowledging needs. 
When this harm and the associated housing needs are not acknowledged as a 
significant harm against Jane, we suggest this harm is acceptable. We suggest that 
Jane is less than equal, risking objectification.  
 
This unavoidable harm is remedied insofar as possible by housing advice in prison. 
Even in this case47 current practices may still objectify Jane, should the sentencer, 
as the state’s agent and community representative, fail to acknowledge the state’s 
                                                     
47
 I have suggested there are reasons to think this an inefficient use of resources 
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responsibility for the unavoidable ‘collateral damage’ harm. Ignoring this harm 
confirms the unintended objectifying message that harms against Jane are 
acceptable; improperly acknowledging Jane’s status as an equal and her 
entitlement to interactional justice. The prison housing adviser’s help is too little 
too late, they are not always state agents in the same way as sentencers. If the state 
ignores the harm, implying that the morally significant harm Jane experiences is 
acceptable, this treats Jane as a passive subject of punishment, whose 
understanding and feelings are unimportant, objectifying Jane on Nussbaum’s 
account (1995, p.257).  
 
This second example carries less weight than the first example, where an alternative 
sentence might have been explored. There will perhaps be some occasions of this 
second type where partial objectification does not occur, because the unavoidable 
harm is properly acknowledged by the state, and only meagre efforts to address the 
harm are possible. Nor do I suggest that the first example will happen all or even 
most of the time. Yet the risk remains unnoticed in present practice. The silencing, 
exclusion, and desensitization to harms of mainstream practices do not help to 
reduce this risk.  
 
 
Practical problems rooted in theory  
In punishment decision-making and delivery, we do not normally intend to objectify 
offenders. On the contrary, liberal values inform practices endeavouring to provide 
respect, protection from bias and interference, through non-interference. My 
concern is not that full objectification necessarily occurs in all cases. Rather, 
mainstream practices avoidably risk at least partly excluding, silencing and 
objectifying offenders. By applying the same procedural rules about when and how 
offenders may speak, we seek to provide procedural justice. Given the objectifying 
history of English legal practices it is not surprising that the foundations for the 
mainstream adversarial trials,48 which evolved during the same period as classical 
                                                     
48
 Hostettler identifies the origins of the Adversarial Trial in the Trials and Treason Act of 1696 
(Hostettler 2006, p.30), around the time that Liberal ideas were also developing, with the publication 
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liberal principles of neutrality and non-interference, prioritize minimal or non-
engagement. Offenders’ entitlement ‘to remain passive’ (Duff et al. 2007, p.203) 
minimize state intrusion, thus providing respect for generalized, necessarily equally 
dignified/rational, individuals. 
 
This conceptualization of respect influences our practices. Chapter two saw that 
from relational perspectives such as care ethics, dignity is a property of 
relationships: dignified treatment conveys respect. To understand what counts as 
dignified treatment, we require personal context: ‘knowledge and concern for their 
needs and aims’ (Llewellyn 2012, p.94).  Chapter one notes fair procedures are only 
part of treating others as equals. If dignity is a relational property, displaying 
respect through dignified interpersonal treatment, then we provide neither dignity 
nor respect by declining to interact. 49  Care ethics offers a framework for 
engagement. Interpersonal treatment of others conveying respect for their status 
as fellow human beings (Bottoms & Tankebe 2012, p.121)  provides interactional 
justice, ‘missing link in procedural justice’ (Tyler & Bies 1990, p.88).  
 
Because the sentencer’s post-conviction focus is on indications of mitigation or 
aggravation, there is a risk that insufficient personal contextual detail will be 
gathered about offenders to avoid easily preventable harms, as we saw in revisiting 
Jane’s story above. In some cases sufficient information will be conveyed, enabling 
action to prevent avoidable harms: sentencers aware of Jane’s vulnerability to 
homelessness may be able to prevent this harm. In these cases, morally significant 
harms do not arise, are not ignored and objectification is avoided. This is more by 
good luck than good judgement and the risk of unacknowledged and unaddressed 
harms remains. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
of John Locke’s ‘Two Treaties’ in 1695 - where it reportedly made ‘a great noise’ in Oxford and 
attracted the attention of Some Whigs (Hoppit 2000, p.195), who played a role in the development 
of the Trials and Treason Act (Hostettler 2006, p.30) – with Locke’s text rising to prominence shortly 
afterwards in 1703 (Hoppit 2000, p.195).  
49 Non-interference and silence can be respectful, but only in the context of wider relationships, 
which usually entail expectations that prior interaction will be resumed.  
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Present practices lack the information-gathering priority, restricting their ability to 
reduce this risk. The classical liberal prioritization of non-interference misses the 
awareness value and practice that Tronto identifies in care ethics. This fails the 
moral obligation to identify and acknowledge the needs of others (1993, p.127), and 
misses otherwise avoidable harms. When these harms are missed, offenders are at 
least partly objectified in that the state ignores or fails to properly acknowledge the 
moral significance of the harm against them, diminishing their humanity and dignity 
(Papadaki 2010, p.33): their status as equals qua persons. A critic might object that 
the moral obligation to identify and acknowledge the needs of others is a care 
ethics value and not necessarily a principle of liberalism. Yet objectification is 
inconsistent with liberal principles.  
 
Without the care ethics priority of situational and contextual information, and the 
direction to gather this through respectful open engagement, we are less likely to 
identify missing information as a problem, or to engage with offenders as a means 
of providing treatment as equals. Bennett & Feldman identify a propensity to 
misunderstand storytelling in court, which may apply both during trial and pleas in 
mitigation. I have argued that offenders risk being partly silenced and excluded 
through the mediated storytelling of practitioners, and through their silencing at 
the post-conviction punishment decision-making stage. Our ability to gather the 
personal contextual information of offenders respectfully, sufficiently and cogently 
is jeopardized when we combine the risks of misunderstanding with silencing and 
exclusion. Given our desensitization to morally significant harms, this increases our 
risk of failing to acknowledge or address these harms, and thus at minimum partly 
objectifying the offender. Taken together, these produce a toxic environment, 
where the risks of morally significant harm are increased, and our chances of 
avoiding or acknowledging and addressing the harm diminished, risking further 
objectification.  
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Developing theory: how to punish with care 
Above I argued that mainstream practices have limited abilities to gather offenders’ 
personal context and to provide interactional justice and treatment as equals. How 
can these problems be reduced? Care ethics approaches help to identify potential 
harms, given the information-gathering priority following from a richer 
understanding of concern and respect. This better enables us to acknowledge and 
either avoid or address harms; or to communicate respect by explaining why we 
cannot address individuals’ needs. The respectful mode of engagement care ethics 
implies also helps to deliver interactional justice. Thus far we have considered 
whether it might be possible and helpful to approach punishment decision-making 
and delivery from the perspective of care ethics. The desirability of doing so is 
implied by these factors: 
 
1. Harm-centred definitions of punishment desensitize us to 
harm, making harms more difficult to identify; 
2. Failure to acknowledge morally significant harms risks 
objectification; 
3. Silencing and excluding offenders risks further objectification; 
4. Necessary caring practices are obscured in punishment; 
5. A resonance between the tensions identified in care in Chapter 
two, and punishment in Chapter three; where in both cases 
harm is unacceptable and yet anticipated. 
 
Punishment is more than caring and meeting needs. A care ethics approach does 
not mean that we cannot disapprove of, or censure, criminal conduct. Crime causes 
harm, thus frustrating the ends of care. This grounds disapproval of criminal 
conduct and supports general and particular deterrence from a care ethics 
perspective. Disapproval is communicated by the social democratic identification of 
behaviours as criminal, and by the censure of criminal acts through compulsory, 
public punishments (conviction details are publicly available information). While 
criminal acts may be censured to communicate disapproval and deterrence, care 
ethics aims to meet needs and avoid unwanted harm (Engster 2007, p.28), 
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prompting a constructive response to offenders. This resonates with Braithwaite & 
Pettit's republican disapproval of crimes (1990, p.88), and reintegration of offenders 
and victims.  
 
Following a procedural-only definition of state criminal punishment, the guidelines 
below allow needs, capabilities and other caring concerns such as minimizing harms 
to play a greater role in punishment decision-making and delivery. This does not 
alter the likelihood that such revised practices will cause unintended, unforeseen 
and sometimes unavoidable harms. Care ethics aims to avoid harms, but recognizes 
negative and operational limits restrict which harms we can avoid. Tronto's integrity 
of care (1993, p.136) suggests we should recognize both those harms that we can 
address and those which we cannot. The self-scrutiny and supportive mutual 
moderation present in the initial and ongoing review stages below helps to identify 
and avoid potential harms; and to acknowledge and address unavoidable and 
initially unforeseen harms. While this is still subject to human error, I will argue in 
later chapters that this informal review can help to supplement, inform and target 
formal review practices. Here I revise the principles derived in Chapter two to apply 
specifically to the case of punishment decision-making and delivery. 
 
Care ethics principles for punishment decision-making and delivery 
It is my thesis that the principles drawn from care ethics can provide a framework 
for punishment decision-making and delivery, which  
 
I. Allows conceptual space for practical caring work and 
identification of problematic, morally significant harms 
II. Facilitates inclusive, non-objectifying treatment as equals qua 
human beings for offenders 
 
A theme of respectful dialogue runs through the principles, reflecting the openness 
and engagement attitudes, and awareness and responsivity found in care ethics. 
Engagement creates space for interactional justice, the inclusive, non-objectifying 
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treatment of offenders as equals. Below I revise the principles derived from care 
ethics for application to punishment, revisiting each pair of principles in turn.  
 
1. The past-regarding, information-gathering pair: learning about 
the past offence, and the present situation of parties:  
a) Respectful Listening: listening respectfully to offenders’ 
personal context (part narratives), details which they 
identify as relevant. 
b) Needs Identification: drawing on offenders’ personal and 
social context, those parts of their narrative that offenders’ 
identify as most relevant, offenders and sentencers (or 
practitioners) identify together the offender’s needs 
associated with the offence. 
 
These principles support sentencers/practitioners in understanding information 
about the offender, which otherwise may be unclear or incomplete. Exploring 
offenders’ context through respectful dialogue allows us to gather information 
about offenders in relation to their offence, and to understand their needs as part 
of a distribution of needs across the social context after the crime. Engster’s claim 
that we are all ‘capable of understanding and expressing’ (2007, p.31) our needs, 
echoes Sevenhuijsen’s earlier claim that ‘people themselves (can) have knowledge 
about their own subjectivity’ (1998, p.60). This recognizes individuals’ self-
knowledge and reflects the care ethics concern for particular personal and social 
context and respectful engagement. 
 
Yet not all persons will be able to articulate needs skilfully, given the privileged 
norms of speech (Young 2000, p.72). In some cases we may need to add ‘how can 
we help you to identify what you need?’ or ‘how can we help you explore and 
consider the social disadvantage which you appear to encounter?’ to the questions 
Engster’s argues are motivated by caring (see Chapter two p.88 Engster 2007, p.31). 
Support may be needed to help offenders consider and express needs, and to assist 
sentencers in interpreting the offender accurately. Listening respectfully allows the 
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provision of interactional justice, communicating that while the state punishes 
offenders for their offences, offenders still deserve treatment as equals. 
 
Acknowledging a problem is a first step to addressing it. Together, sentencers and 
offenders identify offenders’ needs associated with the offence. I specify 
‘associated needs’, since the needs may pre-date or indirectly relate to the offence. 
The easy example is acquisitive crime funding pre-existing addictions (where 
addiction support might be considered). Alternatively we might consider the credit 
card fraudster whose conviction worsens their ability to pay off other debt (where 
advice on negotiating with creditors might help); or the financial director barred 
from future employment of the kind for which they are skilled following misconduct 
(where retraining opportunities might help).  
 
How and when it is appropriate for punishment responses to address offenders’ 
needs? This reflects the positive limits of care. Sometimes, criminal justice agencies 
are best-placed to support offenders: we saw in Chapter two an unskilled passing 
stranger rescues Singer’s drowning child, as the only party able to provide timely 
care.50 These principles are past-regarding and retributive in that they respond to 
offenders according to moral principles, recognizing offenders’ status as equals.  
 
2. The future-regarding, response-designing pair: considering 
what can be done to improve the future for the affected 
parties:  
a) Creative Consideration: considering the available needs-
meeting resources, and creatively considering how the 
offender’s needs might be met. This includes sentencer’s 
(or practitioner’s) reflection on their competence. 
b) Cumulative Fairness: initial review balances individual 
preferences identified in creative consideration with the 
                                                     
50
 Nothing here should be taken as rationalizing imprisonment for the offender’s own good, in the 
hope of medical, mental health or addiction treatment (Corston 2007, p.9). These services must be 
made available to community-sentenced offenders, and should include residential treatment by 
agreement. 
178 
 
wider social context, considering the distribution of needs, 
resources and previous prioritization losses holistically for 
distributive fairness.  
 
The second pair of principles begins to design the sentence response to the 
offending. This chimes with Duff’s proposal for occasional ‘negotiated sentences’ 
(2001, pp.158–63). Sentencers and offenders together begin by considering 
creatively what ideally might meet needs most effectively. Given offenders’ 
expertise in their own positions, their views on what may be successful for them are 
valuable (although we may suggest their views are biased, overly optimistic, 
practically unachievable etc). As a part of considering which response is preferred, 
sentencers should also consider the non-care aspects of punishment (eg censure, 
deterrence) in light of the offender’s personal and social context. Sentencers should 
also consider their competence to provide (or arrange) supportive sentence 
elements. This is a part of the sentencer’s (or practitioner’s) reflexive consideration 
of the effect of their power in context, acknowledging the potential for the 
sentencer (or practitioner) to cause harm. This may mean revising preferences to 
reflect non-care aspects, or considering how the offender might be supported 
through their sentence to access support for their need outside of the criminal 
justice system.  
 
Where resources are limited, we may need to prioritize needs, as detailed in 
Chapter two. While we identify effectively which needs will be un-met or poorly 
met, we still treat the other as an equal because we consider their needs on the 
same terms as those of others: in personal and social context. The creative 
consideration principle begins to overlap with the cumulative fairness principle, 
considering these responses holistically, taking account of the needs of victims and 
the community. Sentencers should avoid frustrating external attempts to meet 
victims’ needs. 
 
The cumulative fairness principle draws offenders’ needs into holistic consideration 
with social context, relative to other needs of victims and communities. Where can 
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harms be avoided, needs met and capabilities strengthened? Should selected 
responses be rebalanced in the light of previous prioritization losses, changes in 
relationships and responsibilities-to-resources ratios? These principles are 
consequentialist, and aim to improve future outcomes for victims, offenders and 
the community.  
 
3. The present-focused, harm-avoiding pair: informed by past 
and future consideration:  
a) Punishing With Care: responding to offences by censuring 
acts and where possible providing needs-meeting without 
causing harms, including stigmatizing and objectifying 
either offenders or victims’ 
b) Response Analysis: keeping our decisions under ongoing 
review. 
 
These principles are present-focused and see punishment being delivered with care. 
This means avoiding objectifying offenders and avoiding aggravating existing needs 
of offenders and victims, whatever else is ordered. Care ethics deals regularly with 
conflict, providing tools for managing conflicting needs. Prioritization helps to 
manage negative limits, self-scrutiny and mutual-moderation also addresses 
negative and operational limits. I shall have more to say on these limits below.  
Finally, response analysis involves practitioners listening to offenders throughout 
their sentence, reviewing and monitoring for fit between the sentence and 
offenders’ changing needs and developing capabilities. This reflective, ongoing 
review helps identify problems, enabling correction where needs are not met as 
expected, unintended harms arise, or different needs are discovered. These 
informal review practices can act as supplements to formal review practices, such 
as probationers returned to court for a variation of their order, responding either to 
good progress or breach. These post-sentence principles focus on supporting the 
offender in the present. 
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Developing theory: why punish with care? 
While I have argued that caring practices are present in punishment delivery, some 
readers may be concerned that it is inappropriate to respond to offenders either 
without primarily intending harm, or with caring. I offer three arguments, 
principled, political and pragmatic, for responding to offenders: 
 
1. Without intentional, primary purpose harm; 
2. With care. 
 
A principled argument can be fleshed out with either a liberal or care ethics 
approach. However care ethics approaches can, by prioritizing personal and social 
context information-gathering through respectful engagement, help to avoid the 
silencing and exclusion risked by liberal practices through providing space for 
interactional justice. Supplementary political and pragmatic arguments are offered. 
I begin with harm avoidance, taking the arguments in the above order, before 
working backwards through the supplementary arguments, showing why we might 
prefer to respond to offenders following care ethics, even if we still believe that 
intentionally harming offenders in punishment is acceptable.  
 
If we must treat human beings as equally worthy of our care (Kittay 1999, p.69; 
Engster 2007, p.31), then when we punish, our treatment of offenders must respect 
these parameters whatever else it does. Since the aims of care ethics include 
avoiding unwanted harm, it follows that we should avoid intentionally causing 
avoidable harms. We ought not to avoidably objectify or intentionally harm 
offenders. Engster’s other aims of caring are meeting basic needs and developing 
capabilities (2007, p.76), additionally suggesting a supportive response.  
 
A similar principled argument against harm can also be made from a liberal 
perspective, since deliberately harming another fails to treat human beings as 
‘dignified beings of equal moral worth’ (Nussbaum 2000, p.79). Here we provide 
respectful treatment to acknowledge the dignity of the (presumed) rational 
individual. Causing harm intentionally fails to respect the rationality/dignity of the 
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generalized other. Liberal arguments overlap with care ethics, and the two 
perspectives are not inconsistent, but there are practical reasons for preferring the 
care ethics approach. As Llewellyn notes, liberal and relational understandings of 
concern, respect and dignity are not incompatible, but the practice-focused care 
ethics perspective provides guidance for action. As we saw in Chapter two, 
relational theories ‘offer a deeper and richer sense of these aspirations and a better 
means of achieving them’ (2012, p.95). Relational theories prioritize information-
gathering to deliver dignified treatment, informed by personal context. 
 
For those not persuaded that offenders ought not to be intentionally harmed, and 
ought to be treated inclusively and supportively, there are supplementary 
arguments for both avoiding intentional harm and responding to offenders with 
care. These political and pragmatic supplementary arguments do not necessarily 
rely on accepting that offenders: 
 
1. Have an as equal status qua persons; 
2. Ought not to be harmed; 
3. Deserve our caring. 
 
The political argument for avoiding harms applies to citizens, since Dworkin’s equal 
concern and respect is a duty of the state regarding citizens. This is pertinent for 
state criminal punishment as a state interaction with individuals. Political theorists 
of many persuasions argue that part of the purpose of the state is to protect 
citizens from harms caused by others (Nozick 1974, p.27; Hobbes 1996, p.189), 
through state instituted rule of law (Rawls 1973, p.241). It is prima facie 
counterproductive for the state to intentionally harm citizens it ought to protect. 
Brooks argues that ‘[p]rotecting … the well being of citizens need not require that 
we protect and promote the well being of each citizen at all times’ (2012, p.154). 
Not protecting offenders’ wellbeing may be consistent with the end of protecting 
citizens en masse; deliberately (or recklessly) causing unnecessary, avoidable harm 
is a different case.  
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While treatment as equals allows differential treatment, differential treatment 
deliberately causing avoidable harm to some individuals is inconsistent with equal 
concern and respect.51 The state must avoid intentionally harming some citizens 
with the end of protecting others if it is to show equal concern and respect. If some 
citizens are unavoidably harmed as a part of protecting others, the state ought 
further to acknowledge unintended and unforeseen harms and their impact on 
those the state exists to protect. Such harms should be addressed, where the 
negative limits of care allow.  
 
Finally, there is a pragmatic, instrumental argument, covering citizen and non-
citizen community members. The majority of offenders return to the community at 
some stage (Mushlin 2004, p.407),52 expected to establish ‘good and useful lives’ 
(The Prison Rules 1999 SI 1999/728, r3) as socially and ‘economically productive’ 
(Hampton 1998, p.39) members of society. This requires that offenders are 
equipped to meet their own needs and to contribute to social co-operation as 
employees, family and community members. By harming an individual, we can only 
deplete their available resources for meeting their own needs, the needs of others 
and engaging in social co-operation. Harming offenders compromises their ability to 
be socially and economically productive. Hence we should avoid harm. 
 
There are pragmatic reasons for responding with care instead of harm. Helping to 
address harms associated with the offence 53  and supporting offenders in 
developing their basic capabilities, reflects Engster’s aims of caring (2007, p.76). 
Building capabilities better equips offenders for potential social co-operation. This 
does not guarantee offenders will be fully able or inclined towards social co-
operation post sentence; but at least it does not guarantee the reduction or 
                                                     
51
 Commitment to the state protection of citizens precludes the argument that equal concern and 
respect is provided through treating everyone in ways which deliberately or recklessly cause 
avoidable harm. 
52
 Until recently there were a very small number of prisoners in England & Wales who would never 
be released. The position of offenders subject to indeterminate sentences has clouded this issue. The 
uncertainty is both a practical and theoretical problem, and harms these offenders and their 
families.  
53
 Which might include facilitating restorative practices between offenders and victims, and enabling 
offenders to take responsibility. 
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destruction of offenders’ available resources to be good and useful citizens, 
meeting their own needs and potentially those of others. Even if we believe 
offenders may or should be intentionally harmed, there are pragmatic reasons of 
social and economic efficiency for both refraining from harm and punishing with 
care.  
 
Treating offenders as equals is also important for democratic politics. As observed, 
most offenders return to the community where they are expected to participate on 
equal terms. The offender requires necessary resources, but also requires that the 
community allows them to develop a social role as an equal member. By treating 
offenders inclusively and supportively in punishment decision-making and delivery, 
the state can communicate offenders’ status as political equals.  
 
Benefits 
In Chapter six, I shall sketch a proposal for replacing pre-sentence reports with pre-
sentence dialogue. Listening respectfully to narratives provides instrumentally 
valuable information to sentencers, both in terms of designing punishment (this 
may indicate offenders’ criminogenic needs or need for moral education) and in 
terms of designing supportive caring measures (such as developing low skills, 
providing employment advice). 54  This provides more effective information-
gathering. Respectful listening is further intrinsically valuable, since this is a means 
providing the treatment as equals and interactional justice that Tyler argues 
procedural justice demands (Tyler 2003, p.286). This treats offenders as equal, 
concrete others, rather than objects.  
 
Instrumentally seeking efficient information-gathering does not necessarily imply 
the intrinsic benefits, but both provide reasons for respectful listening. As Kay 
Pranis notes (2002, p.30), and Braithwaite echoes (2002, p.564), listening can be 
empowering for those who have been excluded. ‘To have a voice is to be human. To 
have something to say is to be a person. But speaking depends on listening and 
                                                     
54
 That these may overlap with criminogenic needs, particularly in the case of mental health and 
addiction needs, strengthens my argument that some caring is necessary within punishment. 
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being heard’ (Gilligan 1993, p.xvi). Listening is then particularly important for 
recognizing the offender’s status as equal. Acknowledging what we cannot address, 
and being able to explain the negative limits that prevent us, also demonstrate 
listening and recognition of others as equals. We should not underestimate the 
importance of listening for the communication of respect, as this prisoner’s 
comment suggests: 
 
Although the answer was not what I wanted, I did speak to [the 
Governor] and she showed me respect. She spoke to me as a 
normal person … she listened and considered what I had to say 
and went out of her way to explain (Prisoner, Risley in Liebling & 
Arnold 2004, p.209). 
 
By employing the attitude of openness and engagement of care ethics, running 
through the principles above, our chances of listening respectfully increase over 
that available through prioritizing liberal non-interference. However, these practices 
of listening and providing needs meeting are subject to some limits, to which I now 
turn.  
 
 
Limits and Concerns 
 
Caring for citizens and offenders? 
Above we saw Brooks note that attending to citizens’ wellbeing need not require 
promoting and protecting the wellbeing ‘of each citizen at all times’ (2012, p.154). 
What are the similarities and differences between state duties of care owed to 
citizens and to offenders? In Chapter 2 I articulated the positive limits of care, 
arguing these help to identify and limit our responsibilities. These were: 
 our association with  the other, in the context of their other relationships;  
 the gravity of the other’s need (seriousness and urgency) in the context of 
other needs around us; and  
 our suitability to meet needs (including but not limited to specialized or 
scarce skills or resources).  
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States have a relevant association with their citizens and citizens owe duties to the 
state: eg paying taxes, abiding by laws, following regulations. Following from this 
relationship, states owe citizens duties too. This can be seen in the political theory, 
noted earlier, conceptualizing the state’s purpose as including protecting citizens 
from harms and fostering the collective good. Held argues that the existence of 
states presumes citizen connectedness: fellow citizens are not the perfect strangers 
that contractual and rational choice theory suggest, but rather identify with one 
another (2006, pp.128–9). This resonates with Duff’s expectations of shared values 
within the political community (2007, p.46), which includes offenders. Interpreting 
this from a care ethics perspective, this relationship with citizens suggests state 
responsibilities to help citizens to meet basic needs and avoid preventable harms, 
as Engster identifies (2007, pp.75–6).  
 
States are additionally well suited to deliver some forms of care to citizens, some of 
which find expression in the civil law. Local Authorities in England & Wales have a 
general duty ‘to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area 
who are in need’ (the Children Act 1989 section 17 1a). Family law disputes, about 
the upbringing of children or the administration of their property, are informed by 
the ‘welfare principle’ under the same Act, which requires that ‘the child’s welfare 
shall be the court’s paramount concern’ (s1(1)). Under the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 the court may be asked to decide where a vulnerable adult should live 
according to their best interests (Herring 2013, p.298). In these examples, the 
courts act to protect the interests of individuals deemed unable to protect 
themselves.  
 
States have the necessary resources and organizational capacity to co-ordinate 
responses to these needs, and to enforce standards in care-delivery. Care ethics 
concern is not ‘one individual’s interest versus another’s but about the well-being of 
the relation between them’ (Held 2006, p.129) and the ‘intermingling’ of interests 
between related individuals (Herring 2013, pp.59–60). While individualized 
approaches do not always account for these intrinsic as well as instrumental value 
186 
 
of relationships, Engster identifies enforcement of adequate care standards as a 
specific state responsibility (2007, p.102). 
 
These civil law duties of care exist towards all vulnerable people, not just vulnerable 
citizens. The European Convention on Human Rights also applies to all persons 
within the jurisdiction of contracting states, regardless of the individual’s legal right 
to be present (Emmerson et al. 2007, p.1). For example, states are particularly well 
suited to protecting citizens and others against violations of criminal law. Emmerson 
et al explain that the European Court of Human Rights has identified positive 
obligations on states to protect individuals as potential victims of crime. In X and Y v 
Netherlands, the Court identifies a positive state duty to protect individuals by 
establishing and enforcing ‘an adequate system of law to deter and punish 
individuals guilty of violating the Convention rights of others’ ((1985) 8 E.H.R.R. 235, 
see Emmerson et al. 2007, p.92). Osman v. United Kingdom specifies protection of 
Article 2’s ‘right to life by putting in place effective criminal law provision’ ((2000) 
29 E.H.R.R 245, see Emmerson et al. 2007, p.91).   
 
Conceptualizing this from a care ethics perspective, the state’s monopoly on the use 
of legitimate force is a special resource for law enforcement. In addition to the 
state-citizen relationship, which Held argues is necessary for, and presumed by, 
rights (2006, p.137), this further implies the state is best-placed to meet citizens’ 
needs for basic rights protection, which helps to meet basic needs and avoid 
preventable harms. The local state is also best-placed to enforce non-citizens 
human rights, given the gravity of non-citizens’ human rights claims. In Chapter two 
we saw Singer’s untrained passing stranger rescuing the drowning child, protecting 
her right to life. For non-citizens, the local state is not analogous to an untrained 
passing stranger. While relationships are weaker, the state has the resources 
necessary to meet this need. Ignoring such high-gravity needs of non-citizens in our 
midst would be a ‘moral evil’ (Tronto 1993, p.123).  
 
There are similarities between state duties of care towards both citizens and non-
citizens. Likewise, there are similarities between state duties of care towards 
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offenders and non-offending others. Offenders are also protected under the 
positive duty to provide ‘effective criminal law provision’, since many offenders are 
also crime victims (Sherman & Strang 2007, p.12). Yet delivery of Convention rights 
protection may differ for offenders. Genders & Player identify that ‘prison 
authorities owe prisoners both a positive duty to safeguard their lives, as well as a 
negative duty to refrain from practices that put their lives at risk’ (2013, pp.10–1). 
Emmerson et al note, drawing on Thompson and Venables v. News Group 
Newspapers and Others ([2001] Fam 340) and Maxine Carr v. News Group 
Newspapers and Others ([2005] EWHC 971 (QB)), a positive obligation on domestic 
courts to grant identity protecting injunctions to offenders convicted of high profile 
offences, who would otherwise likely face life-threatening attacks (2007, p.93).   
 
Another example of differentiated state care responses towards offenders is found 
in attempts to recognize the distinct requirements of women prisoners. The state 
has a responsibility to provide care, given the citizenship (or proximate) relationship 
with offenders, the suitability of the state’s resources to meet needs, and additional 
positive duties to eliminate discrimination and promote gender equality under the 
Equality Act 2006.55 Discussing the provision of ‘distinct response to the particular 
needs of women [offenders]’ (Social Exclusion Unit 2002, p.142), in light of their 
social exclusion needs,56 Loraine Gelsthorpe & Carol Hedderman observe that 
demand ‘is too small, and the complexity of women’s needs is too great, to make 
this an area for easy or quick profits’ (2012, p.387). This can be expected to deter 
private sector providers, necessitating public services to meet basic needs.  
 
Again, the state appears best-placed to provide support, this time through the 
criminal justice system. This is not to say that the criminal justice system is 
                                                     
55
 The British Government Equalities office was established in 2007 to lead ‘the development of a 
more integrated approach on equality across Government’ including criminal justice (Government 
Equalities Office 2008, p.9), to help deliver these gender equality duties. I focus on applying care 
ethics values to guide the consideration and meeting of offender’s needs, as important for the 
state’s treatment of offenders as equals. However this creative approach demonstrates how needs 
might be even more effectively met through a more holistic approach, which a broader public 
employment of care ethics would support (Tronto 1993, pp.174–80; Engster 2007, p.74; Held 2006, 
pp.134, 136). 
56
 eg ‘high levels of mental and physical illness, poverty, [and] debt’ (Hedderman 2010, p.489). 
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necessarily the best way for needs to be met,57 but rather that when individuals are 
already caught up in the criminal justice system, providing timely access to support 
through the criminal justice system may be more efficient (Hedderman 2010, 
p.489). The Together Women ‘community-based intervention’ (Jolliffe et al. 2011, 
p.1), beginning in 2006-7, attempted to provide such timely, holistic support, 
although difficulties were encountered in demonstrating this.58  
 
How are state care obligations towards non-offenders and offending citizen or non-
citizen community member, subject to sentencing and punishment, different? I 
have identified above similarities between these responsibilities of care, but there is 
a difference: offenders are vulnerable to sentencers and punishment practitioners. 
This is not simply with respect to receiving procedurally fair lawful punishments, 
where I have argued that trivial, unavoidable harms are likely to occur and should 
not trouble us too much. Offenders are also vulnerable with respect to the 
unintended, unnoticed ‘collateral damage’ harms. These may cause morally 
significant harm, and which may continue to have damaging effects long after their 
sentence has ended. This vulnerability is increased when there is a risk offenders 
                                                     
57
 The Women’s Offending Reduction Programme, established in 2002, was ‘developed to deliver a 
cross-government response, drawing together strands of work and best practice from across 
departments (Home Office 2004). Baroness Corston echoed the importance of cross-departmental 
working, proposing a ‘Champion for Women’ body to co-ordinate inter-departmental working on 
women in the criminal justice system (2007, p.37). The government responded positively but 
selectively to the Corston Report, appointing a Ministerial Champion for Women (Ministry of Justice 
2007, p.7). This holistic response to women offender’s needs, understanding individuals as concrete 
persons, facilitates the responsive, respectful listening and engaging practices I have proposed. Yet 
Player reports obstacles to the success of the project: ideological, in terms of reconfiguring women’s 
welfare needs as risks, which will be considered here on p.204; and practical: lacking sufficient, 
stable funding, and counter-incentives for some agencies to work jointly with the criminal justice 
systems (2013, pp.9–11). 
58 The project aimed to establish and disseminate best practice in adequately supporting women 
offenders’ in the community, through individual needs assessment and voluntary agreement (Jolliffe 
et al. 2011, p.1). We should note, however, that access to support through the project was freely 
available to local women, mixing offenders and non-offenders (Jolliffe et al. 2011, pp.23, 28). ‘[I]t 
was regarded as essential that service users should be involved in the design and review’ of support 
plans, rather than being ‘passive service recipients’ (Hedderman et al. 2011, p.5). Because the five 
pilot projects were designed to meet local needs, it has been hard to draw conclusions across the 
pilot locations in terms of reducing re-offending, and the official evaluation criticised inconsistent 
and incomplete data collection (Jolliffe et al. 2011, pp.25–6). Of more concern, given the holistic, 
inclusive approach involving women in planning and agreeing their own support, the evaluation does 
‘not include an up-to-date assessment of the service users’ perspective’ (Hedderman et al. 2011, 
p.5).  
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will be silenced, excluded and misunderstood, as I have illustrated in the earlier part 
of this chapter. From a care ethics perspective, the state has an opportunity and, 
given the causal relationship between state punishment and collateral damage 
harms, a responsibility, to attempt to minimize avoidable harms where possible.  
 
Both the similarities and differences between the state’s duties to care for citizens 
and noncitizens, offenders and non-offenders, can be understood through a 
principle of protecting the vulnerable: protecting citizens vulnerable to offenders, 
and offenders vulnerable to vengeance, in order to secure basic rights. The state 
owes the offender a duty of care because the offender is vulnerable to the decisions 
of the vastly more powerful state. A principle of protecting the vulnerable (cf 
Goodin 1985) can explain the different content of duties towards citizens in general 
and offenders. For offenders, this echoes the ‘equality of arms’ principle, which 
acknowledges and addresses the vastly weaker resources of the private individual 
when charged with a criminal offence by the might of the state. This is one of the 
central notions of a fair trial (Ashworth 2002, p.34). Both Engster and Tove 
Pettersen use protection of the vulnerable to mark out the limits of caring, which 
will be useful to us later in the chapter.  
 
Protecting the vulnerable: conflicting needs 
Sherman & Strang emphasise that victims and offenders are not ‘fundamentally 
different kinds of people’ with fundamentally different needs. They remind us of 
our interdependence, and that many individuals are both offenders and victims 
(2007, p.12). While not always noted, it is a mistake to presume offenders’ and 
victims’ needs necessarily conflict. However, on some occasions victims’ and 
offenders’ needs will inevitably conflict directly.  
 
Care ethics writings often discuss the balancing of needs, reflecting the 
particularistic, context-sensitive approach and avoiding context-insensitive rules. 
Chapter two noted Slote (2001, p.90) and Clement (1996, pp.95–6) each employ 
‘balancing’. However the concept of balancing raises concerns in a criminal justice 
setting. Offenders’ basic rights cannot simply be exchanged in the balance for other 
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valuable ends, such as public protection or victim satisfaction (Hudson 2003b, 
p.187; Ashworth 2010, p.237; 2002, pp.64–74). How may we respond to conflicting 
needs? 
 
One reason for choosing care ethics approaches is that care decision-making often 
responds to conflict through attention to contextual details (Tronto 1993, pp.136–
41). I offered my own approach to balancing in the negative limits of care, 
articulated in Chapter two as shortfalls in time, resources and information, 
conflicting needs and human error, which limit our ability to meet all needs in full, 
and demand prioritization of needs-meeting. Awareness of these limits prompts the 
reflexive review mechanisms of care, as integral to prioritization decisions. Firstly, 
we consider whether caring responsibilities towards some individuals have 
previously failed. For example, the failure of civil law duties to safeguard children’s 
welfare is a failure of care on the part of the state. We should ‘be collectively ready 
to be called to account’ for unintended, past harms against the offender (Duff 2007, 
p.193), which may strengthen a responsibility to offer support. Secondly, 
responsibilities-to-resources ratios of the offender and others (particularly those 
with caring responsibilities either towards, shared with, or owed by, the offender) 
may be relevant. Finally, the review mechanisms of care offer ongoing reflection on 
our decisions to identify mistakes and other problems. These elements remind us 
that individual personal and social contextual information is necessary for care 
ethics decision-making.  
 
What else should guide our decision when offenders’ and victims’ needs conflict? I 
cannot develop a full answer here, but I shall indicate some potential approaches.  
‘Without justice’, Herring observes, ‘an ethic of care might be seen to support 
harmful or manipulative activities’ (2013, p.67). We saw in the operational limits of 
care, that poor caring risks infantilization and parochialism. How can we ensure that 
our caring decisions are not abusive and objectifying, but are also just? I have 
argued that care and justice perspectives are compatible but, following Clement, 
that we should avoid assimilation, which loses the valuable, distinct insights of at 
least one perspective (1996, p.5). Earlier I noted that the different content of duties 
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of care towards citizens in general and offenders in particular might be understood 
as a principle of protecting the vulnerable. This principle may also provide some 
guidance for managing conflict between victims’ and offenders’ needs, prioritizing 
the needs of those most unable to help themselves.  
 
For Robert Goodin, what is significant about our duties to others ‘is that others are 
depending on us. They are particularly vulnerable to our actions and choices’ (1985, 
p.11). Goodin argues that our special duties to close friends and family are not 
‘special’ instances of general duties (1985, p.11) but our neighbours ‘in space and 
time’ (1985, p.121) such as friends and family (ie those with whom we are 
interdependent and relationally connected) are more likely to be vulnerable to our 
choices and actions. Goodin argues that ‘economically, you could drive a very hard 
bargain indeed with someone who is utterly dependent upon you. Morally it would 
be utterly outrageous to do so’ (1985, p.38). Economic exploitation is not the only 
problematic case for Goodin. He considers a skater who recklessly ignores warning 
signs and falls through thin ice. Once the skater is beyond self-help, Goodin argues 
they become especially vulnerable to the actions of bystanders. ‘[T]o suggest … 
others should (or even that they may) stand idly by and watch people reap the 
bitter fruits of their own improvidence is surely absurd’ (1985, p.129). Goodin’s 
argument is individualistic rather than relational. Yet Engster makes a similar 
argument with respect to an imprudent skater: ‘If an ice skater recklessly skates on 
to thin ice and falls into the water, he or she still deserves … our care’ (Engster 
2007, p.64).59 
 
                                                     
59
 Goodin distinguishes between the imprudent skater, who does not deserve to be harmed 
(although their recklessness should be discouraged), and ‘evil people whose wickedness deserves to 
be punished’ (1985, p.133). Although it is far from clear Goodin would reason as I do, we do not 
punish offenders for their wicked personalities but the criminality of their acts. Some criminal 
offences are also moral wrongs, explaining why wicked conduct may be an aggravating factor in 
some cases. Some offenders may be considered like the reckless skater, whose’ poor choices and 
bad decisions lead to their present predicament. Many offenders encounter personal and social 
circumstances which limit their options and skew their choices. Following Engster, I take the view 
that while states may censure criminal acts we must still treat offenders as equal persons, who are in 
the first instance equally deserving of our care. 
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In Chapter 2 we saw that Gilligan’s highest stage of moral care recognized the equal 
importance of one’s own needs: the exhausted carer meets neither their own nor 
others’ needs. Pettersen argues that Gilligan’s mature care requires that we do not 
heap all our efforts into caring for one individual at the expense of either others or 
ourselves (Pettersen 2008, pp.135–9). Engster also notes the importance of self-
care and care for others (2007, p.56), suggesting this limit protects care-givers from 
exploitation (2007, p.64). We cannot be expected to provide care for a particular 
individual when this disrupts responsibilities to care for a more vulnerable60 third 
party, or for ourselves (2007, p.62).  
 
Limiting care provision to protect the vulnerable provides a principle for resolving 
conflicts. This principle allows us, following Hudson, to recognize the moral ‘force of 
the argument for prioritizing victim’s rights’, as the already wronged party, without 
establishing an absolute rule (2003b, p.187). Victim’s basic rights must be 
protected, but Hudson argues, drawing on Dworkin, offender’s basic rights are the 
same category of good and worthy of protection (2003b, p.187). An absolute rule 
does not allow us to respect this whereas a contextually-sensitive approach focused 
on protecting the most vulnerable party allows prioritization of victims’ needs in 
many, but not all, cases. For example, where an offender committing common 
assault has suffered years of abuse from their victim, the victim is not so clearly the 
most vulnerable party.  
 
Tronto argues that caring reasoning and work requires ‘a democratic social order’ 
(1993, p.163). In bringing care values to democratic politics we should avoid 
simplistic ‘competition among needs’, seeking rather ‘a commitment on the part of 
society to address all the needs that are most urgent’ (Tronto 2013, p.153). To avoid 
pitting ‘needs against one another’, Tronto emphasises that ‘a discourse of rights 
becomes vital’ (2013, p.153). Basic rights, such as Ashworth’s understanding of 
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 I cannot offer a detailed definition of vulnerable in the space available, but this should be 
understood as identifying individuals with relatively higher-gravity needs, who are also less able than 
others to help themselves. Everyone in a burning building has an urgent and serious need to reach 
safety. While we might try to help as many people as possible, our efforts under this principle should 
be targeted towards people with mobility needs, who are more vulnerable to the danger posed by 
the fire than those who are able to evacuate themselves.  
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human rights,61 can help us to identify high-gravity needs62 that must be met when 
balancing conflicting needs. This approach follows Held (2006, pp.66–68, 132, 134–
7), Pettersen (2008, p.99), Tronto (1993, pp.163–7; 2013, pp.26, 153) and Herring 
(2013, pp.273–82), highlighting the continuing importance of mainstream 
approaches.  
 
Paralleling the conflict between the needs of different parties, Ashworth notes that 
there are inevitably ‘clashes between individual [human] rights and public interest’. 
Like the conflicting needs of victims and offenders, both are goods that are 
valuable. Ashworth argues that ‘the structure of the [European] Convention [on 
Human Rights] provides for distinct methods of resolving those conflicts, by means 
of concepts that have some flexibility and also a solid core’ (2002, p.54).  
 
Where  offenders’ and victims’ needs conflict, the care ethics approach can provide 
the flexibility to respond to contextual nuances, and basic rights (either human 
rights or citizenship rights) provide Ashworth’s  ‘solid core’ or the ‘floor’ (Held 2006, 
p.71) beneath which we must not sink. While Held previously advocated the rights 
as a moral floor approach, building care ethics on top; she now argues ‘caring 
relationships should form the wider moral framework into which justice should be 
fitted’ (Held 2006, p.71). The approach proposed here begins with care reasoning, 
tempered by basic rights. Recognizing basic rights helps prioritize caring between 
conflicting needs, securing the care ethics aim of avoiding preventable harm. While 
acknowledging Held’s core observation that there can be no justice without 
practical caring work (Held 2006, p.17), Herring notes ‘[t]o be blunt, we could not 
survive in a society which was not just’ (2013, p.67). The conflicting basic human 
rights63 of more vulnerable others, then, must limit the caring in our response to 
                                                     
61
 Ashworth argues that, while he employs the term ‘human rights’, to reflect the language of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the term ‘“human” could be replaced by another adjective 
such as “fundamental”, “basic” or even “constitutional”’ (2002, p.3) 
62
 which are both serious, understood in terms of the harm threatened, and urgent, in the positive 
limits of care I sketched in Chapter two 
63
 There is a similarity between this conceptual deployment and that of autonomy. Susan Sherwin 
reports how she revised her understanding of autonomy as largely unhelpful to women in 
healthcare, when South American Colleagues noted the rhetorical power of the concept in securing 
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offenders. This meets Tronto’s concern for society to address the most urgent 
needs, rather than viewing needs as simply competing demands (2013, p.153), 
noted above.  
 
Why punish every offender with care? 
The principles derived from care will be more successful with some types of 
offender than others. Not all offenders are ready, willing or able to discuss their 
needs, or wish to accept help. While I recognize that not all offenders can be 
helped, the community, through criminal justice state agents, has a responsibility to 
attempt to provide care to offenders as best-placed under the positive limits of care 
to provide care. Consider the following example. Mandy, Candy, Brandy and Sandy 
each commit similar common assaults, but respond in different ways:  
 
 Accepts conduct as wrongful 
Does not accept conduct 
wrongful 
Regrets the 
offence 
Mandy Candy 
Does not regret 
offence 
Sandy Brandy 
 
Mandy assaults her friend after they had both been drinking. Mandy accepts her 
conduct was wrongful. She regrets the offence and asks for help managing her 
drinking. Candy assaults her adult daughter, chastising her since in Candy’s 
judgement, her daughter’s conduct brought dishonour on the family. Candy does 
not accept her conduct was wrong, arguing that the cultural honour code her 
community follows condones her action. The sentencer and probation worker 
engage with Candy and explain why the law sees assault as wrong. Candy isn’t 
completely convinced, but her involvement with the criminal justice services is not 
well-regarded by her community. She begins to regret the offence and the effects of 
her punishment on her family and relationships. After Brandy assaults a stranger, it 
becomes apparent that Brandy has a mental health condition. Brandy could not at 
the time of her offence understand that her conduct was wrongful. Brandy is 
                                                                                                                                                      
women’s rights (2012, pp.13–5). In both cases we find a politically useful concept that can coherently 
be employed to achieve care ethics ends. 
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removed from the criminal justice system and cared for as a mental health patient. 
Sandy also assaults a stranger. Sandy accepts her conduct was wrong, but does not 
regret the offence and says she will do it again. All attempts to reason with Sandy 
fail. 
 
Offenders might respond in one of four ways, as illustrated above. The care ethics 
principles allow us to take account of the individual’s needs, attempt to supply 
appropriate support and consider the likely impact of particular sentences on 
offenders’ in context in order to avoid further harm. Offenders like Mandy, who 
acknowledge problems and are ready to address them, are likely to benefit most 
from these principles.  
 
Offenders like Brandy with serious mental health problems ought not to be 
punished for their conduct. Responding by considering personal context and needs 
helps us to identify offenders like Brandy. Offenders who have less serious mental 
health conditions must have their problems accounted for. Both identifying which 
offenders should be excused on mental health grounds and how to treat them are 
complex issues. There is a broad literature on this topic, as there is on how to 
respond to unexcused offenders with mental health problems (Eastman & Peay 
1999; Peay 2010; Loughnan 2012). Although there is not space to detail a response, 
care and need-focused responses are likely to be beneficial for these offenders, as 
the literature indicates (Genders & Player 1995; Smartt 2001; Shuker & Sullivan 
2010; Ward & Salmon 2011; Pickard 2011). 
 
Offenders like Candy are potential success stories. Candy begins to understand the 
majority perspective, even if she rejects it. Candy is persuaded instrumentally to 
avoid repeat offences. As with Hampton’s moral education and Duff’s transparent 
rational persuasion our obligation is to attempt to persuade offenders, while 
respecting their position as equals. Success is not expected in all cases, leaving room 
for Candy’s autonomy. Care ethics then, is not the only perspective to propose a 
particular mode of response to offenders as morally appropriate while 
acknowledging full success is impossible. This approach provides interactional 
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justice to Candy, treating her inclusively as an equal without objectification or 
stigmatization.  
 
Until we engage with an offender, we cannot know which example offenders are 
most like. On first encounter, we cannot tell Sandy, who is unreceptive, from Candy, 
who is somewhat responsive to our arguments. Crucially we cannot identify Brandy, 
who needs support. Offenders like Sandy are a problem for the principles I advance. 
All attempts to persuade Sandy that she should avoid such conduct in future fail. 
Sandy just likes assaulting people. But we cannot know our attempts to persuade 
will fail in advance. We must attempt to engage the offender,64 as we cannot know 
offenders will reoffend until we can evidence this with a further conviction. 
Ultimately, some offenders will be like Sandy and our efforts to persuade or support 
them will fail repeatedly. Such risks cannot be eliminated, only managed.65 This 
does not change Sandy’s status qua person who deserves interactional justice. 
Therefore, whatever our treatment of Sandy, it must be within the limits of what is 
appropriate for human beings, including treatment as equals. Further, Sandy’s 
conduct cannot change our responsibilities to treat other offenders as equals.  
 
Proportionality and seriousness 
Some readers may be concerned that proportionality is lost if we include offenders’ 
personal and social contextual details. While classical proportionality may be 
disrupted, the intuition can still be followed. Proportionality is the intuition that 
more serious offences deserve more serious punishment than less serious cases. 
Conceptually related horizontal equality, that like offences ought to be punished 
alike, corresponds with Dworkin’s ‘special case’ of treatment as equals: equal 
treatment, appropriate when all other things are equal (2000, p.227).  
 
                                                     
64
 Anstiss et al.’s study supports the view that some approaches to sentence delivery in prisons 
(motivational interviewing) may succeed in engaging offenders, enabling them to choose desistance, 
even where offenders expected no change in their own offending (2011). 
65
 This thesis does not discuss in detail whether or how care ethics might be applied for the purpose 
of risk management in these cases, but this might be an interesting case for the expansion of the 
care ethics approach in future research. 
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Offence seriousness is classically conceptualized as the amount of harm caused or 
intended by the offender, in the light of their culpability (Ashworth 2000, p.240). 
Ashworth notes that ranking offence seriousness measured by harm is complex and 
controversial: ‘No easy formula presents itself’, however, ‘progress can be made by 
separating threats to the person from threats to property, immediate attacks from 
remote harms, and more culpable from less culpable wrongs’ (2002, p.111). This 
allows for the detail of individual cases to be included in the final measure of 
offence seriousness. Deliberate harm to persons is generally more serious than 
accidental harm to property: yet we can recognize that my deliberately slapping you 
is less serious than my accidentally burning down your home. Punishment 
‘seriousness’ is measured by the harm expected to be caused to offenders. 
Following mainstream principles of non-interference and difference-blindness, 
intended to protect offenders from intrusion and bias, this anticipated harm 
measure necessarily considers a generalized, abstract offender.  
 
Classical punishment seriousness measures describe generalized anticipated harms 
and cannot describe the likely harm particular offenders may and do encounter. 
Judging offenders’ guilt according to a generalized ‘reasonable person’ standard is 
necessary and appropriate. Offences cannot be excused or mitigated by the 
offender’s unreasonable beliefs, assumptions or other discriminatory perspectives:  
consider hate speech offences where offenders unreasonably contextualize their 
conduct as unproblematic or desirable, or the adult subjecting a young girl to 
female genital mutilation believing that this is in the child’s best interests. Yet 
generalized measurement oversimplifies punishment seriousness. Without an 
understanding of the likely impact of a punishment on particular offenders, the 
accuracy of proportionally linking an offence with a punishment is limited. 
Insufficient knowledge about offenders as concrete others risks objectifying 
offenders, causing preventable harms through ignorance, and failing to respond to 
offenders’ needs 
 
I argued above that mainstream practices provide sentencers with insufficient detail 
about offenders’ personal and social contexts. We saw that some contextual detail 
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about offenders’ backgrounds (eg in some cases addiction or abuse) is valued, but 
this is relevant only insofar as it describes the offence seriousness, suggesting 
aggravation (voluntary intoxication) or mitigation (self-defence, provocation). 
Despite practical difficulties in measuring and linking offence and punishment 
seriousness, present sentencing guidelines roughly link levels of offence seriousness 
with a proportionally deserved punishment in practice. 
 
My concerns resonate with Carlen’s concern: 'women who commit crimes for 
reasons that are readily comprehensible to men will receive proportionate 
penalties’, that is, in my terms, generalized, classically proportionate penalties, 
‘although these penalties will take no account of the circumstances that they face 
specifically as women' (Carlen 2013, p.36). Present practices only consider the 
impact on particular offenders in special circumstances: eg the court may consider 
the effect of a prison sentence on an offender in poor health. Yet arguments are 
often made that such offenders ought not to escape proportionate punishment 
(Pertierra 1995; Porcella 2007), rather than considering punishment as 
proportionate for both the offence and offender.  
 
Following Benhabib (1986, p.414), identifying truly ‘alike’ cases requires personal 
and social contextual information about concrete offenders: ‘more knowledge 
rather than less contributes to a more rational and informed judgment’ (1986, 
p.417). Blanca Ruiz echoes this observation, noting that ‘detail particularity renders 
every moral situation unique and in need of an equally unique response’ (Ruiz 2005, 
p.788). Including offender’s personal and social context acknowledges potential 
‘collateral damage’ harms that credibly threaten particular offenders: in the earlier 
example, Jane lost her entitlement to housing benefit, contributing to losing her 
home. Other examples include offenders’ avoidably losing jobs, or damage to their 
relationships. Without individual context, proportionality and horizontal equality 
are impossible: ‘it is impossible to treat individuals fairly if they are treated as 
abstractions’ (Hannah-Moffat 2009, p.215).  
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I apply a revised form of proportionality, employing a measure of punishment 
seriousness which includes the likely impact on the particular offender in light of 
their personal and social context. This follows the classical proportionality intuition 
that offence and punishment seriousness should match. With classical 
proportionality this includes a measurement of harm caused and anticipated 
respectively. Departing from classical proportionality, the measurement of 
punishment seriousness is supplemented with offenders’ context. This approach 
acknowledges the complexity of punishment seriousness, reflecting the 
acknowledged complexity of offence seriousness.  
 
The classical, generalized proportionality calculation provides a beginning point to 
inform the revised punishment seriousness measure used to inform proportional 
punishment. The classical, generalized proportional punishment may also be 
employed as a maximum punishment, to which I return on p.205. While classical 
proportionality is often intended in academic discussion and applied in practice by 
the courts, the approach I follow, that offenders’ context should inform punishment 
seriousness measures, has resonance with recent scholarship challenging 
contemporary proportionality use (Torti 2013; Sheketoff 2010). For my purposes, 
proportional punishment is instrumentally useful, in providing a beginning point to 
include offenders’ context, potentially suggesting a maximum punishment, and 
providing two separate ranked scales of generalized offence and punishment 
seriousness, which I argue below are useful to us in practice. More relevantly, 
including offenders’ context necessary for this revised proportional punishment 
further facilitates the identification and consideration of needs, treating offenders 
as equals.  
 
I have argued against defining punishment normatively in terms of harm, which 
restricts our thought to the conceptual space defined by harm, and removed harm 
from the definition of punishment to avoid normalizing harm simpliciter. There are 
nonetheless benefits to including classical punishment seriousness, measured as 
generalized harm, as a starting point for describing actual punishment seriousness. 
This acknowledges the reality that most punishments cause harms, but that there is 
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(or ought to be) more to punishment than harm. When we recognize classical 
punishment seriousness assessments as an incomplete generalization, this has two 
further benefits. Firstly, we can acknowledge that more information is needed to 
describe anticipated punishment harms, informing seriousness in particular cases. 
This prompts the inclusion of offenders’ context, as discussed above.66 Secondly, we 
can identify actual punishment harms as variable, potentially causing morally 
significant ‘collateral damage’ harms. The classical, generalized ranking of 
punishments, from more to less serious, can then provide an instrumentally useful 
means of identifying alternative punishments expected to cause less harm in 
general. This follows the proportionality intuition, matching actual offence 
seriousness and actual expected punishment seriousness (revised proportionality), 
and is consistent with care ethics aims to minimize preventable harms.  
 
When offenders’ contextual information identifies no risks of significant harm, or 
needs which might be supported through particular punishments, these revised, 
particularistic measurements of seriousness might coincide with classical 
proportionality. Sometimes, revised proportionality will depart from classically 
proportional punishment.  An offender’s context may suggest that the classically 
proportionate punishments risks greater levels of particular harm than anticipated 
on the generalized consideration. Again, in Jane’s case, considering contextual 
information indicates that Jane will very likely lose her home if imprisoned. The 
classical ranking of punishments identifies punishments generally expected to cause 
less harm. These may then be considered for likely particular harm, helping 
sentencers avoid preventable ‘collateral damage’ harms.  
 
The proportionality intuition is still followed. Revised proportionality supplements 
the classical generalized assessment with particular likely effects of punishment for 
concrete offenders. Proportionate punishment is still possible, but includes 
contextual detail about offenders’ personal and social context and not a 
                                                     
66
 Although I lack space for discussion here, I do not intend to exclude the possibility that other 
information might be included in assessing punishment seriousness. For example, the potential 
interference with offender’s agency, or level of censure expressed. Much more normative research 
would be required to consider whether these or other factors are appropriate.  
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generalization linked with complex offence seriousness. Horizontal equality still 
applies, although in fewer cases since measurement of when all other things are 
equal is more complex.  Following Sevenhuijsen, care ethics approaches expect that 
this situated, concrete personal and social circumstance information ‘is exactly what 
will raise the quality of judgement’ (1998, p.60). Separately, the scale of offence 
harms might also be used to reflect on likely needs and potential support for 
victims. I shall have more to say on victims’ needs in due course. 
 
The normative limits of care ethics principles 
Listening respectfully is core to the principles I propose for providing interactional 
justice and treatment as equals. Listening directly to offenders acknowledges the 
intrinsic value of offenders’ self-knowledge. Acknowledging the offender’s moral 
perspective is important for treatment as equals. Listening does not mean we 
sentence offenders relative to their beliefs. Listening respectfully and taking 
offender’s context seriously during punishment decision-making and delivery 
requires that we critically engage where we believe offenders are mistaken. 
Sentencing is not the place to engage offenders in moral debate. Moral judgements 
are not objective and cannot be measured. What can be, and is measured in 
criminal cases, is that certain acts are legal wrongs prohibited under the criminal 
law.67 Yet understanding the offender’s position instrumentally helps sentencers 
avoid preventable harms, meet needs through building capabilities, and identify 
appropriate punishment measures to challenge offender values and actions 
inconsistent with the basic rights of others. Following the limits detailed below, 
offenders who fail to treat others as equals, deny responsibilities and, in some 
cases, lie, may be treated as choosing not to engage constructively in the alternative 
pre-sentence dialogue I shall sketch in Chapter six. Written reports may provide a 
second-best substitute. 
 
                                                     
67
 I am not able to discuss a full theory of criminalization, or justification for punishment practices, 
here since this is beyond the scope of this thesis. Tentatively, given the aims of care ethics to ‘avoid 
harm and relieve unnecessary or unwanted suffering’ (Engster 2007, p.28), care ethics may justify 
criminal punishment along the lines employed by harm principle justification. This, however, 
requires much further consideration.  
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These limits accept that not all personal and social contextual detail is ‘good’. In 
some cases this may help identify risks. I have in mind a practice example described 
in HM Inspectorate of Probation Aggregate Report 2009–2012, where a probation 
officer built a relationship with her client, who eventually disclosed more fully the 
nature of his offending. The nature of the offenders’ community supervision was 
modified to manage more effectively the different risk that the client potentially 
posed (2013, p.17). I shall say more about the risk of interpreting offenders’ needs 
only as risks in the next section. However, managing cases sensitively to provide 
individuals with more appropriate support, rather than ‘additional’ punishment, 
helps to avoid harm can be supported from the perspective of care.  
 
The offender’s speech fails to treat others as equals 
That all persons deserve equal concern and respect is fundamental to both care 
ethics (Gilligan 1982, p.149; Koggel 1998, p.184) and liberalism (Dworkin 2000, 
p.227; Koggel 1998, p.46). While we should listen respectfully and engage in the 
first instance, sentencers need not take account of persistent unreasonable views 
ignoring the principles under which we seek to treat offenders as equals. For 
example, persons charged with assaulting a family member may sincerely view their 
offence as justified to preserve family honour. While this view may reflect cultural 
backgrounds and sincere, deeply held beliefs, this objectifies the victim and denies 
their basic rights. Another example is the conduct of a rapist objectifying their 
victim by considering their consent unimportant, or ‘contextualizing their 
misrecognition of the woman's "no" as "yes" within the cultural context of 
prevailing ideas about women's sexuality’ (Lacey 1998, p.202). This contextual 
information is not ‘good’ in itself, but punishment delivery may be designed to 
engage offenders, explaining why their actions are inconsistent with treating others 
as equals.  
 
The offender's speech minimizes responsibility 
This limit is based in the integrity of care (1993, p.136). Taking a relational, care 
ethics approach expects individuals to recognize their connections and 
responsibilities. This limit becomes apparent when offenders minimize their 
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responsibilities to others. For example, neglect or abuse of a position of trust: 
consider care assistants who neglect or steal from clients. Alternatively, this limit 
might arise where offenders trivialize their responsibility or the harm they caused. 
For example, some sexual offenders suggest their actions were less harmful given 
their victim’s (blameless) conduct, or focus on their own position: internal guilt, 
custodial experience and future prospects (Miller 2011, pp.91–6, pp.181-2). 
 
The offender demonstrably and maliciously grossly misleads 
Sometimes offenders will lie. I am cautious about including this as grounds for 
refusing to listen to offenders. My experience of helping others to understand 
criminal records information was peppered with problems caused by honest 
mistakes68 and good-faith responses based on misinformation,69 interpreted by 
others as malicious deceit. This is supported by Bennett & Feldman’s observations 
of the potential for misunderstanding in storytelling. By providing opportunity for 
private dialogue, after conviction, with the purpose of understanding offenders’ 
context to avoid preventable harm, offenders should have nothing to lose by being 
truthful, encouraging constructive dialogue. However, some offenders may feel 
there is something to be gained by lying. While the possibilities of genuine 
misunderstandings should be explored, deliberate and gross lying may be read as 
the offender’s unwillingness to participate in constructive dialogue.  
 
Protecting Offenders: interpreting context 
Garland notes a ‘new and urgent emphasis upon the need for security, the 
containment of danger, the identification and management of any kind of risk’ in 
penal policy (2003, p.12). This emphasis is relentless in a political climate which sees 
politicians vying to take ‘firm action’ against crime, which may jeopardise offenders’ 
human rights (Ashworth 2002, p.109). Elaine Player argues that the actuarial 
approach to risk management, which has dominated the last decade of penal policy, 
is less accurate when applied to minority groups, since it has been developed with 
                                                     
68
 Believing an offence ‘spent’ once the sentence is completed, but the rehabilitation period 
specified under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 has not elapsed. 
69
 Erroneous information from police officers, lawyers and magistrates. 
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reference to majority offender populations. The risk management approach leaves 
questionable space for the impact of gender differences (2007, p.413).  
 
By engaging with offenders’ personal and social contextual information, we risk 
information about offenders’ needs being used only to infer public risk, and risk 
subjecting offenders to prejudice. Troublingly, within the Canadian prison system, 
women offenders’ ‘self-injurious behavior has become more overly identified as 
behavior that is "difficult to manage," ... undifferentiated from assaultive behavior 
directed at others that requires some form of "behavioural management”’ (Hannah-
Moffat 2006, p.188), a consideration for security classification, a poor choice for 
which offenders are blamed, rather than a cause for concern about offenders’ 
welfare. Mainstream criminal justice practices provide some protection against 
these risks through classical liberal principles of neutrality and non-interference, 
which avoid intrusion and prejudice by treating the offender as abstracted and 
generalized (Benhabib 1986, p.414). Yet, the focus on neutrality does not facilitate 
the gathering of information about the real personal and social context necessary 
for providing concrete individuals with treatment as equals. Kelly Hannah-Moffat 
emphasizes that reducing offenders ‘to a series of risk categories and calculations’, 
treats offenders as abstract ‘members of statistical distributions’ (2006, p.185). 
Viewing offenders purely or mainly as a source of risk reduces them to an inert, 
inactive objects, again risking objectification on Nussbaum’s account (1995, p.257). 
 
How can we protect offenders from interpretations of information disclosed about 
their needs as sources of risk? ‘[P]rotecting the public has become the dominant 
theme of penal policy’ (Garland 2003, p.12), increasing the risk of objectification in 
the ‘risk society’ (Hudson 2003a, pp.43–3). When sentencers apply contextual 
information, assessments of relevance will draw on the broader political values of 
the society. However these norms are not necessarily benign. What principles 
should protect offenders and guide sentencers and practitioner’s interpretation of 
offenders’ personal and social context? These problems resonate with addressing 
conflicting needs considered earlier. Again, I cannot provide a full answer here, 
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although I indicate some avenues for managing the risks of prejudiced and risk-only 
interpretations of context.  
 
Care ethics guides us to engage responsively and respectfully with the other, which 
interpreting offenders merely as risk sources clearly fails to do. The reflexive and 
reflective review practices of care ethics prompt us to analyse our own caring and 
the caring of others for effectiveness and appropriateness. However, I accept both 
that in practice some practitioners will not follow guidelines, and that those who do 
will make mistakes. We cannot expect full answers to these problems from care 
ethics alone, since it is not a ‘total account of morality’ (Tronto 1993, p.126) or a 
complete political theory (2007, p.5). But care ethics can help us to identify and 
choose between other useful principles. What other protections can we offer to 
offenders? 
 
Firstly, I suggested above that classical proportional punishment might be useful to 
us in limiting our treatment of offenders. Present practices provide a means, albeit 
approximate and necessarily somewhat self-referential (Ashworth 2000, p.241) (as 
a ‘common feature of human affairs and policy-making’ (2000, p.242)), of ranking 
and equating seriousness of offence with seriousness of punishment deserved. 
Classical proportionality may be used to articulate maximum penalties. In a 
discussion of the future of fundamental rights, Ashworth proposes adding ‘the right 
not to be subjected to disproportionate punishment’ (2002, p.133). While we can 
allow that personal and social contextual information should be used to inform 
proportionate sentencing, from the perspective of care ethics it is acceptable to use 
individual context to avoid preventable harms. It is not acceptable to use the 
information in ways which will clearly cause preventable harm, such as increasing 
the punishment beyond the proportional maximum. This echoes a principle, since 
repealed, expressed in the Criminal Justice Act 1991, as Wasik and Taylor explain in 
discussing the custody threshold expressed in terms of the seriousness of the 
offence in section 1(2) of the Act:  
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The Act … requires the sentencer to have regard to mitigating and 
aggravating factors which impinge upon the seriousness and 
permits the sentencer to take account of any other mitigating (but 
not aggravating) factor. It follows from this that factors which are 
not associated with offence seriousness may operate to save the 
offender from custody, but pulling him back for the threshold, but 
can never provide the impetus for custody if the offence is not 
itself serious enough to justify it.  
(Wasik & Taylor 1994, p.17) 
 
Secondly, I noted that basic or human rights can help to address conflicts between 
victims and offenders. Offenders’ human rights can play a similar role in protecting 
the offender from the risk of being viewed as only a source of risk, avoiding over 
punishment. The offender’s non-derogable human rights ‘must be upheld in all 
circumstances’ (Ashworth 2002, p.75). Under the European Convention, these are: 
 
the right to life (Article 2), the right not to be subjected to torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3), the right not to be 
subjected to forced labour (Article 4.1), and the right not to be 
subjected to retrospective criminal laws or penalties (Article 7). 
(2002, p.75) 
 
This provides Held’s ‘floor’, offering some protection whatever risk is indicated. 
Under the European convention some human rights are ‘qualified rights’: Articles 8-
11 (respect for private life, freedom of thought and religion, of expression and of 
assembly and association) (Ashworth 2002, p.76). These cannot be ignored, 
although they may be abridged on public interest grounds, where ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ or ‘for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ 
(Ashworth 2002, p.77). But between non-derogable and qualified rights, Ashworth 
identifies ‘strong rights’: the rights to liberty and security of the person (Article 5) 
and the right to a fair trial (Article 6), requiring stronger grounds than the qualified 
rights before they can be abridged. ‘Strong rights’ cannot be overridden by ‘a simple 
argument that public safety would be enhanced if the right were curtailed’ (2002, 
p.76).  
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Ashworth draws on Doorson v. Netherlands ((1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 330), where the 
Court held that the ‘credible and specific dangers’ posed to witnesses’ Article 5 
rights, detracted ‘from the defendant’s right to confrontation under Article 6(3)(3d)’ 
(Ashworth 2002, pp.77–8). In other words, the Strasbourg Court held that strong 
rights of the defendant may be abridged only as far as necessary to protect the 
strong rights of the more vulnerable party. The Court also required counterbalances 
for the resulting ‘handicap’ faced by the defence (2002, p.78), recognizing and 
addressing the defendant’s increased vulnerability, and demonstrating the 
possibility of creative approaches to minimizing unavoidable harms. 
 
Thirdly, I suggested above that a principle of protecting the vulnerable might help 
address conflicts between victims’ and offenders’ needs. The principle might 
similarly help protect offenders from bias and state intrusion when information 
about offenders’ needs is treated as risk information, to which offenders are 
vulnerable. From the perspective of care ethics, serious and immediate risk to 
particular others cannot be ignored, as is seen in the ‘credible and specific dangers’ 
posed to witnesses in Doorson v. Netherlands above.  
 
Coercion and care 
Ideally care should be provided responsively, respecting offender’s decisions about 
when and how far to engage with sentencers, and what information about their 
personal and social backgrounds to share with sentencers and practitioners. This 
should include offender’s choices whether to consent to receiving a particular form 
of care. Chapter six will argue, drawing on Roche (2004, pp.47, 216–9) and Winick 
(2003, pp.183, 187), that conditions for consent can be strengthened. Roche argues 
that transparency, accountability, advice and information about the options 
available, and credible exit options without penalties can help to allow offenders’ 
informed and voluntary choices in restorative justice settings. Winick argues 
successful therapeutic interventions are more likely when offenders understand 
measures as their autonomous choices. Chapter seven also discusses the 
management of coercion. However, disclosure of personal detail appears, and is 
intended, to lead to a less ‘serious’ punishment, measured by harmfulness. This will 
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likely influence choices to disclose, making protections for offenders against 
prejudice and the misuse of information, noted above, more important. While we 
can provide conditions that foster and respect individual choice, we cannot avoid 
coercion completely, as the criminal law is coercive. 
 
Compelled care cannot be an ideal form of caring practice, since we compromise 
our responsiveness to the person receiving care. However, I still intend to include 
these kinds of responses within my proposal for care ethics guided punishment. 
While this is not good care, it still requires the labour associated with care. The 
offender may prefer not to engage in a programme, although their attendance is 
compelled. While the sentencer may have been rightly unresponsive to the 
offender’s preferences, given the necessity of a compelled, public punishment; the 
practitioner may nonetheless strive to respectfully and responsively engage the 
offender. Recognizing this practice as care firstly acknowledges the value of these 
caring-work practices. Secondly, we can judge our efforts by care standards. Our 
caring in these cases will inevitably fall short of the ideal but this should prompt 
reflection, on individual cases and broader procedures and practices, to consider 
how care delivery might be improved and the responsiveness of the care provided 
strengthened, on both individual and best-practice levels.  
 
Victims’ needs 
Punishment is the official state response to offending directed to offenders. We 
cannot necessarily expect victims’ needs to be adequately met by the punishment 
of offenders. Ideally, offenders should contribute to meeting victims’ needs, but 
where offenders are unable or unwilling, the community must take responsibility. 
Following the positive limits of caring described in Chapter two, the community is 
best-placed to provide support, having an appropriate association with victims and 
suitable resources. Similarly to Singer’s drowning child, the community must 
respond in light of the community’s relationship with the victim, and where victims’ 
needs are of such gravity that we cannot ignore them.  
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Suppose, during a heated academic debate, Agatha vents her frustration by 
snatching up Beatrice’s reading glasses, deliberately breaking them and cutting her 
fingers in the process. Agatha needs stitches in her hand. The medical treatment 
she receives does not repair the broken glasses. We should no more expect the 
criminal justice response to Agatha for minor criminal damage to repair Beatrice’s 
shock, betrayal of trust, or fear of the violence displayed by her colleague. The 
community response to Agatha should censure her behaviour: it is harmful and 
wrong to go about deliberately breaking other peoples’ reading glasses. This causes 
victims personal distress and is not conducive to social efficiency. 
  
The response to Agatha might also explore the way she deals with frustrations, with 
a view to helping her build capabilities to respond in more positive ways, both to 
avoiding repeat offences and help Agatha avoid personal injury. Victims have been 
excluded from mainstream criminal proceedings, although improvements have 
been made (Armstrong & McAra 2006, p.9; Garland 2001). It is important that 
Beatrice is included in our collective, criminal justice response to Agatha, and that 
both Beatrice and Agatha are treated as equal concrete persons. It is important that 
the community takes steps to repair the harm experienced by Beatrice: to reassure 
her and re-establish her equal status, rejecting Agatha’s implicitly insulting 
evaluation (Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, p.91; Murphy 2011, p.29), perhaps to assist 
with the practical burdens of spectacle repair.  
 
Punishment is a response to offenders for their offences, not a response to victims. 
By attempting to address both victims’ and offenders’ needs with punishment 
measures, directed only towards offenders, we may risk masking needs and 
meeting neither. Further, it may be inappropriate to include victim needs-meeting 
within the state response to the offender, which censures the act as harmful. It may 
even be unhelpful to victims to insist that punishment is an appropriate setting for 
victim needs-meeting. Consider a traumatized victim who does not wish to see or 
speak about the offender. Even informing this victim of the offender’s punishment 
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response might cause harm.70 Expecting this victim to draw satisfaction from this, or 
to consider some reported act of the offender as an indirect form of ‘making good’, 
is unrealistic. But sentencers can be aware of the kinds of things that might be done 
to help Beatrice, and avoid frustrating attempts to support victims. Sentencers 
might facilitate restorative justice, where this is the express wish of both parties, or 
order compensation payment as a part of the offender’s punishment response. But 
this should be a small part of community support for victims.  
 
Although not my present focus, the care ethics approach would endorse practices 
of respectfully and responsively gathering information directly from victims, similar 
to the practices of pre-sentence dialogue I shall propose for offenders, with one 
important difference. For offenders, dialogue is to be preferred but optional. Where 
offenders prefer, existing pre-sentence reports will be used to gather contextual 
detail about the offender’s personal and social context. Social context information-
gathering from victims must only be done with the victims’ consent, in their 
preferred format.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that mainstream trials do not provide the dialogue and 
information-gathering opportunities that we expect. Due to procedural limits, 
mediated communication, potential for misunderstanding, and the desensitization 
to morally significant harms of harm-centred conceptualizations of punishment, 
mainstream practices risk silencing, excluding offenders and partly objectifying 
offenders. I have considered how we may punish with care, developing the 
principles drawn from care ethics to expand opportunities for gathering offenders’ 
personal context information, in ways which respect offenders as equals, providing 
interactional justice. I have considered why we should punish with care, offering 
arguments from care and liberal perspectives, and supplementary political and 
pragmatic arguments. I have argued that this approach should be taken in all cases, 
                                                     
70
 Perhaps the offender participates in constructing a hospital garden (Thames Valley Police & 
Thames Valley Probation Service 2010) 
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since all offenders deserve non-objectifying treatment as equals, notwithstanding 
that some offenders will reoffend. I have noted the main benefits and addressed 
key limits of the principles. The next chapter considers how the principles I propose 
build on the existing theories of Duff and Braithwaite & Pettit. 
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Chapter Five 
 
 
How do the care ethics principles for punishment build 
on and develop existing scholarship? 
 
 
Chapter one identified the following problems in existing penal theory, which at 
least to some extent: 
 
1. Has a skewed understanding of harm and is desensitized to, 
and therefore less able to identify, morally significant harms;  
2. Thus fails to recognize non-harm practices, especially care;  
3. Offers only restricted guidance for the reasoning processes 
used in punishment decision-making and delivery, resulting 
from an impoverished understanding of punishment; and  
4. Produces restricted guidelines that compromise our ability to 
treat offenders as equals. 
 
Chapter two introduced my understanding and application of care ethics, from 
which I drew a generic set of decision-making principles. Chapter three investigated 
the presence and essential role of care practices in present punishment practices. 
Chapter four discussed the way information is gathered by sentencers, during trial 
and post-conviction, and argued that when this practice is informed by the classical 
liberal provision of respect through non-interference, this further risks objectifying 
offenders. I presented three arguments for applying care to the case of punishment; 
principled, political and pragmatic, and discussed what the principles developed 
from Chapter two might mean for punishment and addressed core concerns. Here I 
discuss how these principles are compatible with, and advance, existing theory.  
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The first part of this chapter shows how care ethics meshes with and develops 
existing theory, of Duff, and Braithwaite & Pettit. The principles derived from care in 
Chapter four are both compatible with the theory of these authors, and help 
strengthen and extend their work. The second part shows how the principles drawn 
from care ethics fit three psychological models for the treatment and rehabilitation 
of offenders. These are peripheral to the present research; yet there are resounding 
harmonies between each model, and the anatomy and ontological expectations of 
care ethics. These merit mention since they demonstrate the cross-disciplinary 
applicability and compatibility of the approach advanced here, strengthening the 
argument in favour of the principles developed from care ethics as normative 
guidance for punishment.  
 
Remaining with a treatment perspective, I briefly examine practices of blame. 
Hanna Pickard imaginatively separates the act of holding individual agents 
responsible, which she terms ‘detached blame’ (2011, p.219), from the destructive 
emotional elements that the disapproving of norm-breaching conduct is thought to 
entail (‘affective blame’ (2011, p.210)). Care ethics perspectives have no difficulty in 
censuring criminal conduct, since this gives rise to needs and causes avoidable 
harms, contrary to Engster’s aims of caring. The potentially damaging stigmatization 
of full affective blame is, however, counter-productive to the caring aims of building 
capabilities and avoiding harm. Care ethics encourages us to respond to wrongs in a 
constructive manner. Lacey & Pickard indicate compelling ‘instrumental, moral and 
political reasons’ for exporting this model of blame into the criminal justice arena 
(2013, p.28). This supports the same practical ends as care theory: repairing and 
avoiding harm, through supporting individuals (needs-meeting). Lacey & Pickard 
argue for employing ‘detached blame’ within criminal justice. If Lacey & Pickard are 
right to argue for this move to detached blame in criminal justice, the approach I 
offer is one way in which this could be achieved, given the clear resonances 
between the principles developed in Chapter four and Pickard’s detached blame.  
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The care approach and existing penal theory 
 
Common concerns 
There are significant similarities between the approach advanced here, and the 
work of Duff, and Braithwaite & Pettit. Yet there are differences in how far these 
similarities extend. These similarities include:  
 
Common aims: 
1. Treating offenders inclusively, recognizing their equal status; 
2. Repairing harm and restoring damaged relationships, ideally by 
offenders; 
3. Some (potential for) concern for victims’ restoration. 
 
Common methods: 
1. Valuing of contextual information; 
2. A prima facie expectation of dialogue, which implies 
interaction. 
 
For Duff, as for the care ethics approach described here, responses to offending are 
guided by what is morally appropriate. Duff highlights the particular relevance of 
social exclusion, highlighting the relevance of social context information-gathering. 
For Braithwaite & Pettit there is some correspondence between their parsimony 
principle and the concern of the care ethics approach advanced here to make 
efficient, effective use of scarce needs-meeting resources. I have included concern 
for victims’ restoration, although this is stronger in the existing theory. My 
approach is focused on the punishment of offenders, which I have argued cannot 
necessarily meet victims’ needs. But I have explicitly indicated a concern to avoid 
causing victims any further harm, and to avoid frustrating external attempts to 
meet victims' needs. The inclusion of victims is a very relevant concern for the 
socially holistic, relational practices and values of care theory, and while the 
restoration of victims is outside the scope of my present work, this is a clear avenue 
for future expansion of the application of care theory to criminal justice practices. 
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Duff, and Braithwaite & Pettit both discuss the treatment of victims in greater 
detail, hence I note this only as a potential overlap with a future development of 
the approach I offer.  
 
 
Care and Duff’s penal theory  
 
Shared aims 
Chapter one introduced Duff’s retributive, communitarian informed penal theory, 
with its focus on the treatment of offenders as members of the normative 
community; and the implications for penal legitimacy where offenders have been 
systematically excluded from the benefits of society. Duff’s concern for the 
relevance of political community membership evidences the shared aims of treating 
offenders as equals, and involving offenders in repairing harm, and especially for 
Duff, restoring victims. The shared civic voice (Duff 2007, p.46) includes offenders 
(2007, p.192; 2001, p.113) and victims (2001, p.114) as equals. The public, secular 
penance (2001, p.131) expected of offenders demonstrates the ideal of offender 
provided repair and reconciliation. Duff views trial and punishment as dialogue 
(1996, p.82), advocating transparent rational persuasion of offenders (2001, p.177). 
Duff adopts inclusive aims and discursive methods as intrinsically morally 
appropriate responses to offenders (2001, p.89), similarly suggested by care ethics 
principles.  
 
Shared methods  
Duff’s concern for contextual information-gathering is evidenced in his attention to 
social exclusion. Duff describes several variants of exclusion: from political voice, 
material goods, normative community membership and linguistic exclusion from 
democratic debate (2001, pp.75–6). He distinguishes between ‘only 'social 
disadvantage'’ and ‘serious, persisting and systematic injustice’ (2001, p.183). 
Systematic injustices across Duff’s categories amount to ‘persistent … unrecognized 
or uncorrected failure to treat [offenders] … as members’ (2001, p.196). In order to 
know whether an individual has suffered such systematic exclusion, implicitly we 
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must attend to their social context to identify how their treatment differs from 
others.  
 
For Duff, contextual information is primarily relevant for the community’s 
legitimacy in calling the offender to account. For the care ethics approach, 
contextual information provides essential situational detail, without which our 
responses to offending are impoverished. Including contextual information also 
provides the evidence base necessary for treating offenders as equals, and a means 
of providing interactional justice. Duff’s focus is ‘systematic’ exclusion which may 
threaten penal legitimacy71 (2001, p.183). However, social exclusion may be less 
systematically far-reaching, or less than the causal responsibility of the whole 
community. Duff acknowledges lesser exclusions are important, noting that courts 
might recognize ‘social disadvantage’ (2007, p.191; 2001, p.183, p.200). Yet the 
community may bear some responsibility for addressing needs relating to such 
exclusion, even if it is not causally responsible for the harm.  
 
Consider a child who grows up abused by their guardians. The community is not 
causally responsible for these harms. Yet where needs go unmet by those who 
ought to take responsibility, the needs-meeting responsibility falls to the wider 
community. Following the positive limits of care, the child’s guardians have the 
most appropriate association (a close familial relationship) to provide care to the 
child. The gravity of the child’s needs is such that these ought not to be ignored by 
others able to meet the need. Our weaker association as fellow community 
members begins to imply responsibilities towards the child, as we saw in the case of 
Singer’s drowning child. If the community has been blind to the child’s plight, failing 
to address the child’s need for a minimally non-abusive home life, the community 
has also failed in its needs-meeting responsibility, although not responsible for 
causing the harms. The community’s failure may be caused by the operational limits 
of care: the child’s needs are masked, falsely appearing to have been met by the 
abusive adults.  
                                                     
71
 This also demonstrates this importance of considering information about exclusion holistically and 
cumulatively if we are to identify lesser social exclusion and systematic injustice.  
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The adult the child becomes is not ‘systematically’ excluded in Duff’s terms: the 
adult may vote and participate in democratic debate; and may share the values and 
civic language of the wider society. From the care perspective however, such past 
harms are relevant. When we understand care as an ongoing process, this past 
failure in needs-meeting is relevant from the point of view of the cumulative 
fairness principle of the approach advanced here: the individual has unfairly ‘lost 
out’ or been harmed by our previous caring distribution choices, relevant for 
considering the current distribution of caring resources (time, resources, facilities 
etc).  
 
Duff recognizes these ‘less broad than systematic’ social exclusions and asks how 
we can address harms resulting from past lesser social exclusions; yet at the same 
time respond to the offence and resultant new harms? Duff suggests ‘more 
nuanced legal procedures and post-conviction processes’, drawing on restorative 
justice methods, might indicate a way forward (2007, p.193). But Duff focuses on 
systematic injustices which threaten the legitimacy of punishment, on harms which 
threaten the offenders’ status qua citizen. He acknowledges but does not discuss 
lesser social exclusion in detail (2007, p.193), focusing his work on the case of 
systematic exclusion. Duff’s project spotlights significant systematic injustices that 
deny the citizen their status as an equal community member. My focus is those less-
than-systematic exclusions that are nonetheless relevant for responding to 
offenders as a concrete person, avoiding preventable harm and providing treatment 
as equals. The guiding principles proposed in Chapter four allow us to identify and 
take account of personal and social contextual details in our response to offending. 
Since Duff has not developed a response to these lesser social exclusions, the care 
ethics approach I propose provides one, coherent and compatible, way of extending 
his theory.  
 
One possible explanation for these lesser exclusions appearing of less relevance to 
Duff might be found in his expectations of individuals, particularly individual 
offenders. Duff’s theory has communitarian roots, recognizing the important role of 
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the community in the individual’s understanding of the criminal law, the 
community’s obligations of minimal social inclusion, and the offender’s civic 
relationships with the state and fellow citizens (2010a, p.302). Other relationships, 
and the interdependencies these involve, are less visible since Duff argues precisely 
for a liberal political community, ‘fostering individual autonomy and freedom’ 
(2001, p.47).  
 
The ontological expectations from the care ethics perspective conceptualizes 
persons as connected through interdependence, implying personal limitations. 
There are times, then, when we depend on the assistance of others, or they rely on 
our care. The liberal independent understanding does not allow for the constraints 
of personal needs and caring responsibilities towards others (Kittay 1999, p.89). The 
impact of lesser social exclusions will be very similar across generalized, ex-
hypothesi similar individuals. The impact of lesser social exclusions on concrete 
individuals in their particular personal and social context will be very different, in 
some cases causing morally significant harms. Duff’s position may not necessarily 
prevent us from detecting these different impacts on individuals, but it does not 
help us to do so. Koggel argues that liberal conceptions of individuals ‘do not take 
[relational] aspects to be relevant to an account of what it is to be a person to treat 
a person with equal concern and respect’ (1998, p.128).  
 
Were Duff to adopt a care theory or relational conception of persons rather than 
the liberal conception, these ‘relational aspects’, our particular personal and social 
context, could inform our understanding of the different impact on differently 
situated individuals. For example, on Duff’s account it is not systematic exclusion to 
be excluded from the labour market, but not excluded from formal education, 
political rights etc. But this exclusion might have more relevance in some 
circumstances. For example if the unemployed person is ‘young and poor, and 
comes from minorities’ (Heidensohn & Silvestri 2012, p.361). In this case, the 
amount of exclusion this individual encounters increases, given the individual’s 
membership of disadvantaged groups, as these socially constructed differences 
interact. It is not necessarily clear whether this would always count for Duff’s 
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systematic exclusion. The approach I offer allows a holistic consideration of the 
individual, interpreting their personal and social contextual details or situation, 
allowing consideration of whether the exclusion is morally significant.  
 
Shared methods  
Duff views trial and sentence as the beginning of dialogue which helps offenders 
acknowledge their wrongs and seeks reconciliation through repentance (2001, 
p.177). Dialogue is a core part of Duff’s concern, yet the care ethics guided 
approach drawing on the practical moral reasoning methods of care ethics allows us 
greater opportunities to provide discussion. In Chapter one I noted Brownlee’s 
concern that the offender’s part in the dialogue during punishment is heavily 
scripted: we stipulate offenders’ punishment and the terms of their carrying it out. 
Punishment ‘dialogue’ is not particularly discursive, despite Duff’s rich 
understanding of communication (Brownlee 2011, p.57). We normally expect 
‘dialogue’ to involve: 
 
1. Reciprocal mutual recognition as speakers and 
listeners; 
2. Sustained rather than minimal interaction; 
3. Aiming towards common understanding; 
4. Equal rights to participation; 
5. Willing participation.  
(Brownlee 2011, pp.57–8 paraphrased)  
 
Brownlee discusses punishment only, whereas Duff considers trial and punishment 
as communicative, potentially discursive practices, as the offender wishes. Chapter 
four raised concerns about offenders’ ability to participate in equal dialogue during 
trial.  
 
Duff perceives the trial as normatively communicative; however I argued in Chapter 
four that trials do not always meet this expectation pp.161-66. Even where 
offenders participate in mediated dialogue, they are still partly excluded as their 
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speech is crafted and given meaning by others, as argued in Chapter 4. This 
communicates information between defendant and court, but not necessarily with 
the sustained, willing, reciprocal engagement that is implied by ‘dialogue’. Duff’s 
trial dialogue is likely to be mediated and potentially non-participatory (Duff et al. 
2007, p.204), and does not reflect the rich understanding of dialogue Brownlee 
argues is usually intended. Hence her complaint that sentencing is too scripted and 
restricted to represent dialogue as she describes.  
 
The care perspective implies exactly the kind of ongoing dialogue Brownlee 
describes: both parties engage in dialogue recognizing the other as a speaker and 
listener, as for example care-givers receive care-receivers’ responses to the care 
provided. This engagement with the other implies discussion and response, in order 
to refine the care we provide. Since care is an ongoing process, we can expect 
sustained interaction as needs are meet and capabilities developed. We will see 
that some of the practices examined in Chapters six and seven employ repeat 
sessions with the original sentencer precisely to offer this otherwise unavailable 
sustained dialogue. These practices and the pre-sentence dialogue I have proposed 
for discussion expect that both parties attempt to reach mutual understanding, 
using pre-sentence dialogue to help sentencers understand the offenders’ personal 
context as they perceive it as relevant. This treats the offender as an equal knower, 
with relevant expertise in their own position to bring to the discussion. Willing 
participation is also anticipated, but provision to respect the choice of some 
offenders not to participate will be offered.  
 
Understanding offenders’ personal contexts is important if we are concerned to 
provide proportionate punishment. Accessing this information through respectful 
dialogue offers a means of both respecting the offenders’ lived experience, and 
providing interactional justice. The care ethics guidance proposed here allows 
greater scope for dialogue than Duff’s existing theory, and might be employed as 
one way of extending or strengthening Duff’s existing work. As noted in Chapter 
one, care ethics principles may offer the 'more nuanced legal procedures’, post-
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conviction processes’, and ‘room for genuine recognition and discussion of such 
injustices’ (Duff 2007, p.193) that Duff notes but does not develop. 
 
Brownlee raises another concern: the state’s condemnation of offenders diminishes 
their status and disrupts the conditions of equality necessary for dialogue. She 
argues that ‘a condemned party no longer has the standing to engage in an equally 
empowered, rational and reciprocal exchange’ (Brownlee 2011, pp.62–3). In part, 
Brownlee accepts this may be mitigated if we regard the act (rather than offender) 
as censured (a weaker term). Yet even when censure applies to an act, the actor is 
still the subject of punishment. Brownlee argues that neither of these responses are 
available to Duff (Brownlee 2011, p.63), since he speaks explicitly of condemning 
offenders. There are a number of possible responses to the apparent status-change 
problem for offenders whose acts are censured. 
 
Firstly Pickard’s detached blame, discussed later, might be employed allowing 
censure without status-reducing stigmatization. This holds persons accountable, 
acknowledging agency and responsibility, and imposing consequences for 
misconduct. Yet detached blame permits us to avoid the negative, stigmatizing and 
alienating consequences, which can result from full, affective blame. Avoiding these 
negative effects reduces or avoids damage to the other’s equal ability to participate 
in discussion. 
 
Secondly, while Brownlee argues condemnation is normally used in the strong 
denunciatory, damning and stigmatizing sense (2011, p.63), it is not so clear this is 
what Duff intends. Duff describes punishment, blame and even condemnation in an 
enabling sense, explaining blame and punishment need not deliver stigmatization. 
Duff argues ‘our condemnation or blame must … allow and assist’ offenders, to 
‘enable or help him to repair his relationships with his victim and with the 
community’ (1996, p.82). In Duff’s influential 2001 book, ‘condemnation’ is not 
indexed, whereas ‘censure’ has several entries. In Chapter one I highlighted a 
journey in Duff’s writings away from ‘pain’ as a primary purpose of punishment 
towards an unavoidable side-consequence, and his discussion of condemnation may 
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reflect a similar journey. The permanent exclusion sense of condemnation Brownlee 
suggests sits uncomfortably with Duff’s concern to treat offenders as community 
members, who remain community members. Consequently there does not seem to 
be sufficient evidence to conclude that Duff intends full condemnation in the sense 
of Brownlee’s permanent exclusion, given Duff’s focus on repair and reconciliation 
between community members. 
 
However, Brownlee’s complaint refers to the equal conditions of participation, 
stipulated as her fourth expectation of dialogue. The offenders’ opportunity to 
speak ends when their guilt is determined, save for the following of the punishment 
script. This is the problem I identified in detail in Chapter four; to an extent during 
trials, and particularly at punishment decision-making and delivery stages, offenders 
are at least partly silenced, excluded and objectified. This is the problem the 
principles advanced in this thesis seek to address, creating opportunities for 
offenders to be heard by beginning with respectful listening. When offenders are 
punished, how can we interact with them so that we continue to treat them as 
equals, and provide interactional justice? Duff seeks to advance an inclusive, 
communicative, dialogue based, theory of punishment. The approach I propose may 
provide a stronger account, resisting Brownlee’s status-change and scripting 
criticisms of Duff’s approach, by providing greater opportunities for dialogue. 
 
While Duff’s theory is envisaged as a dialogue, Brownlee argues that only limited 
discussion is possible. Care principles may help to strengthen Duff’s theory: by 
explicitly prioritizing respectful, responsive dialogue, providing a means to treating 
offenders as equals. The care ethics approach explicitly encourages information-
gathering through respectful listening. Following the principle of need identification, 
open, engaged and responsive discussion helps to identify needs, and put these in 
the offender’s personal context, along with the social context of the offence. 
Because these are explicit aims, it is easier to identify practices which fall short: we 
have language with which to express the problem. Creative consideration discusses 
how we might take needs into account in our responses to offenders. The 
cumulative fairness and response analysis principles explicitly recommend active 
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review of our practice to help identify anticipated mistakes. While Duff’s theory 
displays concern for personal contextual information, treating offenders as equals 
and discursive methods, he limits his work to systematic exclusion and penal 
legitimacy. Finally, Duff’s retributive theory represents a morally intrinsically 
appropriate way of responding to offenders. The care ethics approach and the 
principles derived from this also respond in a morally principled way, intrinsically 
appropriate to human beings.  
 
 
Care and Braithwaite & Pettit’s penal theory 
 
Shared aims 
The shared aims (treatment as equals, offender’s repairing harm and restoring 
victims) are also clear in Braithwaite & Pettit’s work. The equal importance of 
involving victim and offender can be seen in their concern to reintegrate both 
victims and offenders into the community (Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, pp.91–2). This 
reflects their republican requirement of equal dominion: less-than-equal treatment 
of individuals has a damaging impact on equal dominion. Braithwaite & Pettit are 
also explicit about their preference for restoration to come from offenders for 
dominion-repairing reasons. Where offenders cannot or will not make restoration 
to victims, needs-meeting responsibility shifts to the community (1990, p.91), as I 
have also suggested in Chapter four p.208. 
 
Shared method – information-gathering 
Braithwaite & Pettit offer a revised consequentialist, civic republican theory of 
criminal justice, which includes punishment decision-making and delivery, targeted 
on maximizing republican dominion. Their approach is compatible with the care 
ethics approach I propose, but they are concerned with social contextual 
information-gathering only implicitly. The authors argue for strengthened 
practitioner discretion to proceed informally (the on-the-ground decisions of police 
officers, prosecutors and judges). Braithwaite & Pettit argue that discretion and 
parsimony should lead us to prosecute only those cases necessary for securing 
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compliance with the law (1990, p.198). This suggests that individual practitioners 
are regarded as best placed to determine what is parsimoniously appropriate in 
each case, implying that social context at minimum must be relevant. Across 
Braithwaite & Pettit’s relatively short but broad writings, their concern for 
individual understandings of context remains implicit. Offender’s personal context 
may be relevant to Braithwaite & Pettit. Since this represents some departure from 
mainstream processes, we might expect a more explicit indication if this was part of 
their intention. Some superficial personal context, which overlaps with social 
context, is suggested as relevant. Braithwaite & Pettit suggest a police officer might 
respond to a drunk wielding a broken bottle by either arrest, or by confiscating the 
bottle and sending the drunk home. Presumably, the practitioner’s discretion will 
include an assessment of how violent the drunk appears (Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, 
p.111).  
 
Despite Braithwaite & Pettit’s holistic approach and concern for holistic practitioner 
discretion, and implicitly social contextual information, this does not necessarily 
suggest a holistic or personal contextual approach to understanding offenders. The 
civic republican approach identifies a concept of liberty distinct from classical 
liberalism, and understands this holistically in the sense that differences in 
dominion reduce liberty for everyone. To maximize liberty, the restrictions and 
potential restrictions on each person must be the same (Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, 
pp.62–3). However, as the authors argue, civic republicanism is a branch of liberal 
theory. This is reflected in their understanding of individuals.  
 
While the civic republican liberty approach is socially holistic in the sense that 
liberty is only achieved through equal dominion for all, we retain the default liberal 
understanding of individuals as generalized, self-sufficient and equally independent. 
As we saw in the discussion of practical moral reasoning in Chapter two, while 
classical liberal perspectives may include contextual details, for the classical liberal 
perspective this is a separate, second stage in our reasoning. The self-sufficient 
default presumption hampers the consideration of the concrete constraints of 
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personal needs and caring responsibilities towards others (Kittay 1999, p.89), or the 
limits to our personal capabilities that interdependence and vulnerability suggests.  
 
We cannot expect our personal context not to affect our political capacity to engage 
as citizens. As we saw earlier, carers and dependants are not free to engage in social 
co-operation as citizens in Rawls’ sense (Kittay 1999, p.92). It is not that Braithwaite 
& Pettit’s position necessarily cannot consider concrete others, rather they adopt a 
position that considers some social context, but does not equally prioritize concrete 
personal context. Carers and dependents must make claims to have their needs 
considered, rather than beginning from a position where interdependence is 
anticipated. As we saw Llewellyn argue in Chapter two relational perspectives, such 
as the reading of care ethics I advance, offer ‘a deeper and richer sense of [concern 
and respect] aspirations and a better means of achieving them than liberalism’ 
(2012, p.95). 
 
Both Braithwaite & Pettit’s practitioner discretion and the creative consideration 
principle reflect openness to a variety of possibilities. Yet the care ethics principles 
prioritize direct interaction as a preferred means of information-gathering, and the 
equal relevance of personal as well as social context. More responses are available 
for Braithwaite & Pettit’s broader theory, since their approach encompasses 
decisions to charge and to prosecute as well as sentencing and punishment. 
Braithwaite & Pettit’s case for discretion and concern for holistic consideration are 
in harmony, as distinct from in unison, with the care principle of cumulative fairness 
and with the review processes implied by care, at least insofar as the social context, 
and the holistic consideration of needs. The principles developed in the last chapter 
begin by considering, creatively, and broadly, the available responses (with 
whatever the care-giver and care-receiver can imagine together) and contract down 
to consider what is possible, preferable and achievable. The cumulative fairness 
principle, drawing offenders’ needs into balance with other relevant needs, makes 
explicit Braithwaite & Pettit’s intention that preferred responses should be 
considered holistically, with respect to the needs of the community.  
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Shared methods  
Dialogue is compatible with Braithwaite & Pettit’s holistic approach. They describe a 
holistic and implicitly context sensitive approach, suggesting ‘the criminal justice 
process should … be a communicative process … engag[ing] defendants in moral 
discourse’ (Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, p.128). This requires at least minimal fact-
finding interaction, and is compatible with the principle and practice of respectful 
listening. The practices of listening and attempts to include resonate with 
Braithwaite’s role in developing restorative justice, both within criminal justice and 
other areas, such as industrial regulation compliance (Braithwaite 1985; 2000; 
2002a; 2002b; 2003). Dialogue and the implied contextual information-gathering 
are in harmony with Braithwaite & Pettit’s master principle of maximizing 
republican dominion, since this recognizes the status of individuals as equals, and 
could be considered more explicitly.  
 
In Chapter one I noted von Hirsch & Ashworth’s concerns about over-punishment 
between proportional desert and Braithwaite & Pettit’s maximum penalty, and loss 
of horizontal equality. The oversight and accountability provided through 
Braithwaite & Pettit’s power-checking principle might go some way to correct these 
concerns by allowing appeals against inappropriate sentences. However, 
Braithwaite & Pettit expect informal measures will enable the minimizing of formal 
measures, going so far as to claim ‘there will be less power to be checked’ (1990, 
p.138). Informal measures are still exercises of power as state responses to 
offending, therefore requiring avenues of accountability for republicans.  
 
Informal measures, including the socializing of citizens to understand the 
shamefulness of crime (1990, p.89), are not necessarily benign. Consider 
socialization practices which induce people to understand the ‘shamefulness’ of a 
particular skin colour or social background. Institutional checks do not work well for 
assessing these extra-legal responses, or the informal discretionary actions of 
practitioners which Braithwaite & Pettit emphasize (1990, p.87, pp.101-2, p.111). 
There are fewer protections for the community should a police officer 
inappropriately decide to proceed informally, leaving an offender to the potentially 
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over-zealous shaming of their community; or responding with a warning when 
stronger action is warranted.  
 
Informal (socialization) and formalized reintegrative shaming can be a powerful tool 
for reintegrating offenders and mending harms (Braithwaite 1989). Yet Braithwaite 
& Pettit acknowledge that shaming is difficult to manage, and has a cultural 
component not necessarily present in Western societies (Japanese practices being a 
core example of reintegrative shaming (Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, p.122; Masters & 
Smith 1998, p.17)). Shaming can easily become stigmatizing, and this becomes more 
concerning without the checks and balances that civic republicans ought to 
demand. 
 
This is a fundamental problem for republican theory, a perspective which demands 
effective, equally accessible procedural institutional mechanisms of review for 
powers used by the state to secure citizens’ individual liberty. The ‘master principle’ 
(Pettit & Braithwaite 1993, p.319) of parsimony, and dominion-promoting target 
might guide individual state agents towards these goals. Even assuming state agents 
always act in diligent accordance with these goals, there is no provision for 
identifying and correcting human error. This is insufficient power-checking for a 
republican account. 
 
The creative consideration principle contains an element of assessing one’s own 
competence to deliver the appropriate care. While merely considering our own 
competence cannot deliver competent responses of itself, this could provide an 
alternative avenue of appeal, which in turn may help temper over-punishment risks 
for Braithwaite & Pettit. Sentencers might be called to explain their assessments of 
their competence, or decisions not to seek expert advice, which may allow concrete 
ground for the appeal of less formal responses. This expands the principle of open 
justice, obliging sentencers to explain their reasoning publicly (Roche 2004, p.47).72  
 
                                                     
72
 This will be particularly relevant for problem-solving justice practices, which can also lack checks 
and balances, as discussed in Chapter six. 
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The self-scrutiny and mutual moderation review processes found in the cumulative 
fairness and response analysis principles, are an integral part of caring well, and 
offer an informal reflection on practice precisely to spot inappropriate actions such 
as over-punishment. Cumulative fairness includes a rebalancing element, reviewing 
our ceteris paribus preferred decision. This is part of the initial review stage, and 
should allow sentencers to reflect on their decisions to double-check social context 
appropriateness before application. Separately punishing with care, as including 
elements of caring practices, includes an aim to minimize harms, including 
stigmatization or over-punishment.  
 
Response analysis ongoing review processes are not procedural checks, but urge 
self-scrutiny and supportive mutual monitoring, to meet an aim of providing good 
care. This acknowledges and responds to the negative practical and operational 
performance limits, acknowledging that what we may do is limited by shortfall, 
conflicting requirements and mistakes; and that how we may do this is subject to 
poor application. This allows potential for over-punishment to be spotted, and 
could inform (providing details of the concern) and target (suggesting cases for 
review) formal review practices to help address this.  
 
Ongoing review practices present in the response analysis principle, checks that our 
beliefs about what was most appropriate at sentencing were, in fact, reasonably 
accurate during delivery. Review processes help to supply richer, informally 
available information to help identify where institutional checks should be applied, 
and to inform these processes. Braithwaite & Pettit prefer informal measures, 
including the suggestion above that a police officer might respond to an aggressive 
drunk by disarming and sending them home, rather than arrest (1990, p.111). They 
also suggest police officers should respond to ‘most detected offences with 
warnings and persuasive overtures’, since, ‘moralizing social control in general 
works better than punitive control’ (1990, p.171).  
 
Communities might have some access to formal power-checking for the 
inappropriate use of formal warnings, such as police cautions and conditional 
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cautions. As noted above, it is difficult to provide oversight for the appropriate use 
of informal warnings, but self-scrutiny will at least encourage police officers to 
reflect on the appropriateness of their conduct. Where officers work in pairs, some 
mutual moderation may be available from colleagues. Community mutual 
moderation might allow the raising of some dissenting voices, offering offenders 
some (albeit scant) protection from the informal ‘moralizing social control’ (1990, 
p.171) which is not necessarily benign, as noted above. Self-scrutiny and mutual 
moderation may help target Braithwaite & Pettit’s formal republican power-
checking most efficiently, and provide some informal oversight (which nonetheless 
implies action) for informal measures. 
 
Care ethics aims to avoid harm, meet needs and develop capabilities. The principles 
I have developed to help guide punishment practitioners seeks to identify needs, 
understand these in personal and social context, and respond to needs as part of a 
socially holistic understanding of needs within an offenders’ punishment. These 
principles may help strengthen Braithwaite & Pettit’s position against over-
punishment charges, by providing some informal power-checking of informal 
measures. Self-scrutiny expects sentencers and punishment practitioners to reflect 
on the adequacy of their practices. The absence of such reflection is an automatic 
cause for concern in itself. Mutual moderation also provides an expected 
framework of mutual support to raise problems about shortcomings.  
 
Further, under the expectations of care ethics, these may be framed as collective 
learning opportunities. Shortcomings arising from expected and unavoidable 
personal limits need not be understood as accusations of personal failing; although 
mutual moderation will also help detect malicious malfeasance. While this may not 
wholly address the problems of lack of oversight and risked over-punishment, this 
at least acknowledges that not all practitioners will act ideally, and that those who 
attempt adherence to principles may still make mistakes. This is some progress on 
Braithwaite & Pettit’s expectation that practitioners will intentionally and 
successfully strive to prioritize dominion through parsimonious use of formal 
powers.  
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Von Hirsch & Ashworth further challenge Braithwaite & Pettit’s attempt to 
‘separate blame from the quantum of sentence’ (von Hirsch & Ashworth 1992, 
p.92). They object that we cannot possibly ‘keep punishment as presently 
constituted with its blaming implications … and still separate the blame from the 
severity of the sanction’ (1992, p.95), since hard treatment is intimately linked with 
censure in punishment as ‘presently constituted’. I have argued that understandings 
of punishment built on a framework partly defined by harm are limited, obscuring 
the presence of caring. Part of von Hirsch & Ashworth’s critique may be explained 
through this restricted harm-centred understanding of punishment: they simply 
cannot imagine a punishment not framed as hard treatment, despite the potential 
for morally significant harm. Braithwaite & Pettit’s attempt to disconnect 
reprobative, reintegrative shaming (Braithwaite 1989) from ‘severity of sanction’ 
(von Hirsch & Ashworth 1992, p.86) may be supported by Pickard’s subsequent 
developments of a conception of blame, sharing similarities with Braithwaite’s 
reintegrative shaming. As we shall see at the end of this chapter, Pickard argues 
that we can ‘detach’ holding individuals responsible from applying negative 
consequence for unacceptable behaviour, from the damaging, stigmatizing, 
‘negative reactions and emotions’ (2011, p.219) often associated with blame.  
 
Neither I nor Braithwaite & Pettit abandon desert completely. For Braithwaite & 
Pettit, while not all offenders need be punished, they intend that only offenders 
known to be criminally responsible are punished. Von Hirsch & Ashworth emphasize 
that the desert theory they defend relates to sentencing (1992, p.84, p.98), and 
claim only to discuss sentencing aspects of Braithwaite & Pettit’s much broader 
theory. Since sentencing applies to those already identified as liable, this addresses 
only Hart’s amount of punishment question. Yet von Hirsch & Ashworth are right to 
caution that ‘knowing’ an offender to be criminally liable, and avoiding over-
punishment, are both difficult for the informal responses, and the community’s 
‘moralizing social control’ (1990, p.171), which Braithwaite & Pettit favour.  
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If liability is not what von Hirsch & Ashworth intend, what else might be intended 
meant by desert? Desert is a proportionate amount of punishment, reflecting the 
offender’s culpability and the harmfulness of their conduct (von Hirsch & Ashworth 
1992, p.88). Horizontal equality then provides for similar penalties for similar 
offenders. Braithwaite & Pettit reject proportionality as unachievable, given the 
differences between offenders’ experiences of punishment, branding horizontal 
equality as ‘silliness’ (1990, p.127). In Chapter four I argued that classical, 
generalized proportionality might be used as a beginning point for a revised 
approach to proportionality, including offenders’ context and treating generalized 
punishment expectations and specific offence similarity as one among many 
contextually understood pieces of the jigsaw. The principled recognition of 
individuals’ contexts, treating offenders as equals, explains differences in 
sentencing between similar offences, and other apparent instances of horizontal 
inequality. These differences are not arbitrary or unprincipled, and reflect 
differences between offenders as concrete individuals, rather than as generalized 
‘offenders’.  
 
 
What do we learn about the care principles? 
 
The care perspective takes a more relational approach to recognizing offenders and 
victims, and to seeking to repair harm, than either Braithwaite & Pettit or Duff. Care 
theory seeks to repair harm and (re)build relationships via identifying and 
addressing needs associated with the offence. These needs are considered 
holistically in the social context, suggested by the interdependent conceptualization 
of individuals. Braithwaite & Pettit’s approach is holistic, and Duff’s approach 
considers the role of community and its responsibility for wrongs, but both operate 
with an independent, self-sufficient individual agent in mind, rather than 
interdependent, vulnerable or limited individuals. Duff is concerned about 
systematic social exclusion (2001, pp.75–6), and the further harm of ignoring the 
impact of this first harm (2010b, p.139). The moment of discussing the offender’s 
crime may be the time to discuss community-perpetrated wrongs against the 
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offender, as part of the relevant social, and the offender’s personal, context. Duff 
hints towards this but does not discuss it. The supportive practices of problem-
solving courts may be one way in which we can act to recognize the impact of 
earlier harms, and holistically consider how these needs might be included, given 
the social context.  
 
Braithwaite & Pettit seek for offenders to restore their victims, and like Duff to 
recognize offenders’ equal status as citizens. However the approach proposed here 
takes a broader view of which needs may be relevant: contextually understood 
needs associated with, rather than causally linked to, the offence. Punishment 
responses specifically aim to avoid unnecessary, preventable harms by avoiding 
creating or aggravating needs, including victims’ needs, through the response 
provided. Associated needs may include needs prior to the offence, where the 
offence either aggravates the need73 or reduces the individual’s ability for self-
care.74 For offenders, this may include needs which contribute to offending. At the 
punishment delivery stage under the principle punishing with care, we work to 
actively avoid causing of new harms, to ether victim or offender, through the review 
processes under the response analysis principle.  
 
Shared criticisms?  
If Duff’s dialogue is not especially discursive as Brownlee contends, are the 
principles in Chapter four equally vulnerable to this criticism? The principles derived 
from the care approach specifically aim to foster dialogue, expecting offenders to 
make an unscripted communication, which must be attended to. That is to say, we 
listen respectfully and engage, in the first instance, with offenders; subject to the 
normative limits of respectful listening, as specified in Chapter four. This applies the 
same procedure, but leaves room for offenders’ responses to diverge and for 
                                                     
73
 Victims previously afraid to go out alone after dark are afraid to go out alone at all; offenders who 
previously had difficulty finding work now must disclose a criminal record, further reducing their 
chances of employment.  
74
 A victim who had previously struggled to make ends meet is less able to meet their family’s needs 
after paying for repairs to a broken window; an offender who previously struggled to manage an 
addiction problem may be less able to do so in a prison environment where some illegal drugs may 
be more readily available. 
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discussion to engage with the specific contextual detail. Sentencers’ hold 
responsibility for sentencing, but sentencers’ and offenders’ contributions in 
particular are individually valued rather than pre-determined.  
 
Both Duff’s approach and the approach I advance, allow offenders to decline to 
participate, for different underlying reasons. For Duff, this reflects liberal principles 
(Duff et al. 2007, p.204). From the care perspective, this responds to a potential 
care-receiver’s indication that they prefer not to receive support at this time (we 
lose an opportunity to include individually supportive measures, offenders do not 
go unpunished). Both respect offenders’ autonomy. Since it is partly my concern to 
contribute to real-world policy debate, the contribution that care principles might 
make here is detailed in Chapter six as a proposal for pre-sentence dialogue. The 
principles I offer would extend the opportunities for the dialogue Duff seeks, which 
are not as great as he suggests. While trials may provide fact-finding information-
gathering opportunities, contra Duff and with Brownlee, I do not consider trial as 
dialogue, given the mediation and procedural restrictions on speech, as discussed in 
Chapter four. 
 
I have argued that Braithwaite & Pettit’s theory has weaknesses in the provision of 
oversight for informal responses to offending employed as a formal response by 
state agents. I have illustrated how the principles I have developed can help to 
address this. While these measures are by no means equal to the procedural 
protections of formal processes, they are an advance on what Braithwaite & Pettit 
offer. The flexibility of the principles I advance for punishment decision-making and 
delivery allows for a principled application of knowledge about personal and social 
context, needs, responsibilities and resources in sentencing. This will be complex 
but it is not arbitrary, following the detailed set of principles I have proposed, in line 
with the aims and conceptual anatomy of care ethics. Yet von Hirsch & Ashworth’s 
concerns point to potential limitation for my approach. If, outside of this thesis, the 
care ethics principles were addressed to the question of who should be liable for 
prosecution; the flexibility (which is a great strength in producing roughly 
proportional, horizontally equal and future-regarding punishments) gives rise to an 
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uncertainty problem: how could we be sure about what conduct, in which context, 
leaves us liable to criminal prosecution?  
 
I do not have a fully worked out care perspective position on liability since this is 
beyond my scope. My initial expectation is that care ethics would see all known 
offenders proceeded against, in order to identify cases where needs-meeting 
support is necessary, and to identify and offer appropriate support. Punishment 
responses to offenders, however, might look very different, particularly for minor 
offences, since I have rejected the necessity of harm. Noddings suggests ‘an ethic of 
caring is likely to be stricter in its judgement, but more supportive and corrective in 
following up its judgement than ethics otherwise grounded’ (2003, p.93). This 
tentative suggestion is open to charges of net widening, requiring further 
theoretical work. Since the question of who is criminally liable is also bound up with 
the question of what is criminalized, any future theoretical work on liability will also 
need to engage with a theory of criminalization. As speculated in note 67 in Chapter 
four (p.201), a theory of criminalization might be developed from a harm principle 
justification.  
 
 
Care and three psychological models 
Three competing psychological models dispute the most effective methods of 
discouraging recidivism, which have informed the design and assessment of 
offending behaviour programmes (Polaschek 2012; Birgden 2002; Ward et al. 2007; 
Brayford et al. 2010). While this psychological approach is peripheral to my 
research, there are strong resonances, with the care-guided approach presented in 
this thesis. Here I highlight the focus on relationships, meeting needs and building 
capabilities these approaches share, and counsel for the design of psychological 
offending behaviour programmes. The oldest is the risk-need-responsivity model, 
proposed by Andrews, Bonta and Hodge (1990). Its principles are: 
 
1. High risk of recidivism offenders are prioritized and services 
and therapies are provided to reduce recidivism risk. Offence 
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type and other offender needs are less relevant (Andrews & 
Bonta 2010, p.47); 
2. Criminogenic needs functionally related to the offender’s 
recidivism risk are prioritized (2010, p.48). This does not 
prevent other (personal, social, medical, economic etc) needs 
from being considered (2010, p.35); 
3. Responsivity tailors the means of service delivery to offenders’ 
criminogenic needs, learning style and abilities (2010, p.49). 
 
While support for non-criminogenic needs is not ruled out, there no requirement to 
consider them at all under this approach. ‘Only “manageable” [criminogenic] 
problems are targeted for intervention … resolved through behavioral or lifestyle 
changes … structural barriers conveniently disappear’ (Hannah-Moffat 2006, p.189). 
These ‘intervenable needs’ are defined in terms of resource availability, ‘structural 
arrangements for intervention … [and] statistical knowledge’ of variables associated 
with reduced recidivism (2006, p.187). However this model was developed through 
‘statistical analyses of aggregate male correctional population data’ (Hannah-Moffat 
2009, p.211), with little consideration of the appropriateness of this model for other 
groups. Hannah-Moffat reports that most studies had focused on ‘validating’ the 
existing criteria for minority groups (2009, p.213), rather than considering afresh 
what approach might best acknowledge and account for gender and other 
intersecting differences (2009, p.216). The risk-need-responsivity model is only 
minimally compatible with a care-based understanding of punishment. The 
approach is alert to and responds to some needs, albeit considered hierarchically 
and according to practitioners’ assessment of criminogenic need rather than 
individuals’ identification of needs and priorities; and values respectful relationships 
between practitioners and offenders as instrumental to rehabilitative success 
(Bonta & Andrews 2010, p.19, pp.22-23).  
 
This first model has been criticized, since it perceives offenders as ‘bearers of risk’ 
(Ward 2006, p.112), rather than as concrete individuals, keen to live fulfilling lives 
(2006, p.113). Tony Ward argues we can both promote this good and manage risk 
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by considering offenders as socially enmeshed individuals, with criminogenic needs 
in addition to the ordinary needs and life-goals of non-offenders (2006, p.114). The 
second model I shall consider, the good lives model Ward offers, is a strength-based 
paradigm aiming to build offenders’ strengths, responsive to their aspirations and 
interests, providing offenders ‘with the internal and external resources to live 
rewarding and offence-free lives’ (Ward 2010, p.41). The good lives model is 
‘founded on the ethical concept of human dignity and human rights’ (2010, p.42). 
Hence it becomes ‘ethically obligatory’ recognize offenders as equals (2010, p.42). 
The risk-need-responsivity model addresses the top-down defined criminogenic 
needs of offenders posing the greatest risk of recidivism. Whereas, for the good 
lives model, risk reduction for all offenders is part of offering ‘a more fulfilling … less 
harmful’ life (2010, p.61), through developing the ‘skills values, attitudes and 
resources necessary’ (Ward 2006, p.115). The good lives model values needs-
meeting, capability building and harm avoiding, as well as treating offenders as 
equals.  
 
Ward & Salmon have linked Engster’s reading of care theory with sex offender 
treatment (2011). The authors identify the attentive responsive and respectful 
engagement with the offender, and the empowering of offenders through building 
and strengthening basic skills necessary ‘to function independently when released’ 
(2011, p.408) as echoing Engster’s aims of care. ‘Caring clinicians’ seek to avoid pain 
and suffering, and display genuine interest and concern for offender well-being 
(2011, p.410). Both the risk-need-responsivity model and good lives model responds 
to offenders’ ‘learning style [and] motivation’ (2011, p.409). But the good lives 
model aims to ‘meet offender’s needs, strengthen and maintain capabilities’ (2011, 
p.410) more broadly. The authors claim ‘strength-based approaches like the good 
lives model … will help align practice with caring norms’ (2011, p.408). 
 
Both models meet needs to reduce the risk of reoffending. Yet the good lives model 
presumes most offenders will choose to move away from offending given adequate 
opportunity, and empowers offenders towards this end. This may not be true of all 
offenders, but represents the ideal case. Despite differences, both models value 
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relationship quality (Andrews & Bonta 2010, p.23; Ward 2010, p.61) (as does the 
desistance paradigm discussed below (Maruna & LeBel 2010, p.81)). For the risk-
need-responsivity model, relationships are primarily valued instrumentally. The 
good lives model (and desistance model) sees intrinsic value in offenders’ 
relationships, taking a broader view on the needs that might be prioritized, and 
hence the practices of needs-meeting that might be appropriate. The good lives 
model prioritizes needs-meeting, helping offenders to develop capabilities to live 
fulfilling and law-abiding lives.  
 
By contrast, the desistance paradigm, supports offenders because they have chosen 
or may choose to desist from offending. The model understands desistance as an 
individual offender-led process, when a (marginal) preference for desisting from 
offending coincides with an opportunity for doing so, within the context of 
supportive professional and social relationships (Maruna & LeBel 2010, pp.80–1; 
McNeill 2012, p.9). While McNeill et al. report there is relatively little research on 
exactly how probation facilitates desistance (2012, p.7), practitioners can play an 
important role in building relationships which ‘foster and promote desistance’ 
(2012, p.7), by taking an interest in offenders as individuals, developing their 
strengths and addressing needs (2012, p.10). This individualized, empowering and 
contextual treatment reflects Engster’s aims of meeting needs and developing 
capabilities, and displays core themes of care anatomy: open, responsive 
engagement with care-receivers. Efforts to understand offenders’ personal and 
social contexts and needs holistically, and to empower offenders to meet these 
needs as they choose, reflect the respectful listening and need-identifying guiding 
principles derived from care theory. As Engster notes, responsiveness and respect 
‘directs us to ask the question: what can I do to help you, or even better, what 
would help you to be able better to meet your [own] needs?’ rather than merely 
‘thrusting goods at individuals’ (2007, p.31). 
 
Desistance is a ‘difficult and complex process … likely to involve lapses and relapses’ 
(McNeill et al. 2012, p.8). Yet more than practitioners’ support is needed to 
maintain this new identity. Maruna & LeBel report previous research indicating 
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individuals’ chances of successfully changing their lives improve when those around 
the individual believe they will succeed (2010, p.75). In order for past offenders to 
assume a new non-offending identity, this must be accepted by others (Maruna & 
LeBel 2010, p.76; McNeill et al. 2012, p.10). If offenders’ efforts are ‘blocked … by 
the practical effects of a criminal record’ or ‘the refusal of the community to accept 
that someone has changed, then desistance may be quickly derailed’ (McNeill et al. 
2012, p.10). Preventing such social blocking of the offenders’ attempts to build a 
new identity is difficult under present conditions, given the harms our interactions 
with offenders can cause and give rise to, as illustrated in Chapter three. Desistance 
processes are offender-led, yet require the engagement of friends and family, 
community and the state (2012, p.2). While desistance is something which only 
offenders can do for themselves, there is a clear harmony between care theory 
approaches and the desistance paradigm; between building capabilities and 
empowering offenders’ choices to assume a non-offending social identity (2012, 
p.9).  
 
The desistance paradigm, attempting to meet needs, build capabilities and avoid 
harms, respects offenders’ choices about their own process of desistance, providing 
a striking reflection of Engster’s aims of care. The recognition and valuing of the role 
relationships play, in informing and influencing the individual’s personal and social 
context, also resonates strongly with care ethics. Further investigation of these 
resonances between care theory and the desistance model in particular might prove 
a fruitful direction for future research, although here I only note these apparent 
resonances. Yet ‘the concept of desistance has now reached such a level of 
acceptance that specific and practical methods are being founded on its principles’ 
(Herzog-Evans 2011, p.29). This provides a practical indication that the guiding 
principles drawn from care ethics may have some acceptance in punishment-
delivery, and may perhaps be usefully employed at punishment decision-making 
stages. We should note that, from the perspective of minority groups such as 
women offenders, desistance processes and their significance are presently poorly 
understood (Hedderman et al. 2011, p.6).  
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Overcoming or avoiding stigmatization is crucial to the desistence model, and 
desirable for the good lives model. Pickard’s development of a conception of blame 
able to avoid stigmatizing, ‘negative reactions and emotions’ (2011, p.219) might 
accommodate both Duff’s censure of offenders, which I also propose; and 
Braithwaite & Pettit’s separation of blame from sentence level, explaining why von 
Hirsch & Ashworth claim that desert is ‘discarded’. Pickard’s insight on blame is 
prompted by developments in the psychological treatment of psychiatric patients 
(2011, p.210), although Lacey & Pickard have argued for extending this model to 
criminal justice practices (Lacey & Pickard 2013). I turn now to a brief discussion of 
blame.  
 
 
Care, punishment and blame 
I have argued that, since avoiding harms is one of the aims of care, care theory 
guided principles will be able to censure criminal acts because they are likely to 
cause avoidable harm. Yet there may be a tension between the use of blame, which 
censure suggests, and avoiding harm, since stigmatization is often associated with 
blame and also causes harm. There have been several philosophical accounts of 
blame.  
 
For Strawson, blame is a natural reaction: an attitude we hold towards a particular 
other regarding the nature of their acts and its expression (1962, pp.4–6), within 
the context of personal relationships (1962, p.10). Our attitudes may be modified if 
we learn that the behaviour we react to can be excused or justified. For Strawson, 
reactive attitudes cannot be separated from our expression of holding accountable. 
Stigmatization is unavoidable in some cases of blame.  
 
For Sher, blame is a past-focused desire that an agent should not have acted as they 
did, coupled with feelings of frustration or resentment (2006, p.93). While 
expressing blame might be the venting of negative emotions towards an offender, 
or the actioning of negative intuitions, this need not be the case. We need not, Sher 
argues, desire or even feel it appropriate that negative actions should be expressed 
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in all cases of blame (2006, p.88). In this development, stigmatization, which may 
result from the expression of such negative emotions, is again unavoidable in some 
cases where blame is expressed.  
 
Scanlon describes blame in composite form. For Scanlon, blame is our moral 
judgement about the meaning of another’s action, which indicates something about 
the agent; coupled with our decision to hold an attitude towards the agent 
reflecting our judgement (2008, p.211). This may or may not constitute a change in 
attitude towards the other, depending on whether the conduct confirms or 
challenges our previous interpretations of the other and their actions. For Scanlon, 
blame is our chosen response, following from our judgement about another’s acts. 
Stigmatization may result (or be perpetuated) from our judgements and chosen 
attitudes when these express blame.  
 
Stigmatization is a distinct possibility on these accounts of blame. But these need 
not be in conflict with care approaches, as some similarities exist: blaming is a 
relational practice for Strawson, an emotive response for Sher (albeit one which 
need not necessarily be expressed towards the object of our blame) and a choice 
based on our judgements of others’ acts for Scanlon, which may be contextually 
informed. Pickard innovatively uncouples the elements of ‘holding responsible’ and 
‘expressing negative attitudes’ in her exploration of ‘detached blame’ (2011, p.219). 
Pickard argues that these destructive, ‘negative reactions and emotions’ (2011, 
p.219) associated with what she terms ‘affective blame’ (2011, p.210) are not 
necessary to the practice of holding a person responsible, even when negative 
consequences for the behaviour are imposed. Holding accountable separately from 
‘negative reactions and emotions’ (2011, p.219) she terms ‘detached blame’ (2011, 
p.219). If the harm-causing aspects of blaming can be avoided, this will be 
important for care perspectives which aim to avoid unnecessary harm.  
 
Pickard’s insight is to show that emotive responses like the negative emotions 
associated with blame may be irrational, like fearing spiders known to be harmless 
(2011, p.219). Despite this potential for irrationality, we feel entitled to the negative 
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reactions towards the other, in light of their wrongful behaviour (2011, p.219). 
Negative attitudes, which when expressed may be stigmatizing, are linked with full 
‘affective’ blame (2011, p.218) through a ‘defeasible and resistible but nonetheless 
genuine … feeling of freedom to express blame’ (2011, p.219). Our sense of 
entitlement to hold these attitudes is not a rational judgement, but rather an 
emotive, potentially irrational reaction relative to the other’s wrong (2011, p.219). 
The negative emotions associated with full affective blame are understandable, but 
separable.  
 
Full, affective blame (Pickard 2011; Lacey & Pickard 2013, p.1) is contrary to the 
ends of psychological – and, by extension, penal – treatment. Treatment 
presupposes patient agency: patients can exercise choice and control, and learn to 
change maladaptive behaviours (Pickard 2011, p.213; Lacey & Pickard 2013, p.4). 
Pickard’s description of blame without the damaging effects resonates with 
Braithwaite’s reintegrative shaming, as identified in Lacey & Pickard’s article (2013, 
p.21). The challenge for practitioners is to hold individuals responsible through 
‘detached blame’ (2011, p.219), or blame without the counter-productive and 
separable negativity.  
 
If full blame is unhelpful, Pickard proposes that clinicians can avoid affective blame 
through empathy with patients. By gaining personal contextual information through 
hearing patient narratives (fuller details of personal and social context), it can 
become possible to understand a patient’s maladaptive responses (2011, pp.219–
20). Gaining an understanding of the patient as a concrete person allows clinicians 
to understand more clearly why a patient might have acted as they did, without 
excusing wrongful conduct. This facilitates the ‘holding individuals responsible’ 
element of blaming, perhaps with negative consequences; but without the 
damaging stigmatization of full blame. Information-gathering thought respectful 
listening allows for the identification of patient needs in context. This treats 
patients inclusively and allows therapists to see patients as concrete persons, rather 
than treating their disorder in isolation.  
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There are clear resonances between Pickard’s narrative and empathy means of 
achieving detached blame, and the respectful listening and need identification 
principles I have proposed following a care ethics perspective. In a similar way, I 
suggest that sentencers and punishment practitioners ought to treat offenders as 
equals through understanding offenders as concrete persons, responding to them 
as individuals, and valuing their expertise in their own lived experience. Pickard 
explains that supporting a patient in exploring their personal history can help both 
clinician and patient to better understand the patient’s individual context, and the 
factors that have shaped their character and development of problematic 
responses. The creative consideration principle I propose will see sentencers and 
offenders consider potential responses together, echoing Pickard’s clinician-and-
patient joint investigation of the patient’s history, to develop responses (2011, 
p.220). This in turn can provide a starting point for therapists, to help individual 
patients develop alternative coping mechanisms and essential skills for living well in 
society (2011, p.220). This echoes both the good lives model and desistance 
approaches discussed above: seeking to equip offenders with skills for living well, in 
Pickard’s case by employing detached blame, and empowering offenders to develop 
internal resources for themselves and skills for desistance.  
 
There is a distinction between disapproving or censuring a harmful criminal act, and 
applying the same ‘negative reactions and emotions’ (Pickard 2011, p.219) of 
blame, to the offender. In both Braithwaite’s and Pickard’s work, the destructive 
consequences of ‘negative reactions and emotions’ (2011, p.219) are not necessary 
for holding offenders responsible. Matravers describes censure as ‘moral criticism’ 
(2011, p.69). We may offer moral criticism for an act, but it does not necessarily 
follow that we must similarly criticize and stigmatize the offender. For Braithwaite, 
disintegrative shame only further alienates offenders (1980, p.68, pp.101-4; 2002a, 
pp.81–4). Pickard’s constructive form of blame, and Lacey & Pickard’s exportation 
to criminal justice, chimes with Bennett’s criticism of current criminal blame 
practices. Bennett argues blame in response to criminal acts is a proportionate 
‘severing of relations’ or diminishing of offenders’ civic status. This distances 
offenders from the community (Bennett 2008, p.148), and is unhelpful for 
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punishment ends of reform, rehabilitation, restoration or even particular 
deterrence. Stigmatization is contrary to the principled treatment of persons as 
equals (Dworkin 1977, p.227). 
 
Pickard’s conception of responsibility without the negative effects of blame 
originates from a therapeutic, caring, approach. Pickard advocates exploring 
narratives and needs. Lacey & Pickard argue that there are ‘instrumental, moral and 
political reasons’ (Lacey & Pickard 2013, p.28), for exporting Pickard’s conception of 
blame into the criminal justice process: the moral relevance of society’s obligations 
towards offenders, such as offenders’ needs resulting from community-perpetrated 
harms (for example Duff’s systematic social exclusion); the political good of 
democratic inclusion of fellow community members (especially citizens, for example 
Braithwaite & Pettit’s republican reintegration and Duff’s normative community 
membership); the instrumental end of reducing risk through facilitating offender 
reform and offender-led desistance through empowering offenders. These reasons 
take similar paths to the principled, political and pragmatic arguments advanced 
against harm and in favour of care-guided responses to punishment in Chapter four. 
Above we saw similarities between the guiding principles derived from care, and 
the approach proposed by Pickard to enable detached blame. Employing care ethics 
principles may be a way to allow conceptual space for, and to foster the use of, 
detached blame within criminal justice, as Lacey & Pickard suggest (2013, p.28). 
Detached blame is an excellent example of responding to another for wrongful 
conduct, in such a way as to avoid further harms. The principles advanced in this 
thesis help to gather the contextual information necessary for Pickard’s empathy, 
provide for initial and ongoing review, encourage offender engagement in 
sentencing decision-making processes and also seek to balance offenders’ needs 
with community needs.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the similarities between the principles developed from 
the perspective of care in the previous chapter and some existing penal theory, and 
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where the care ethics approach might strengthen and extend existing theory. I have 
identified a similar methodological concern for contextual information and 
discursive method in the work of Duff. This contextual and discursive method is 
compatible with, although less prominent in, Braithwaite & Pettit’s theory. The 
principles derived from care provide space for the broader consideration of past 
harms against offenders, and offer an opportunity to extend Duff’s theory, 
notwithstanding that Duff’s focus remains the legitimacy of punishment. For 
Braithwaite & Pettit’s theory, the dialogue-based method appears compatible, 
offering concern for nuanced description with similar intent. 
 
Care ethics is not a ‘total account of morality’ (Tronto 1993, p.126), and is 
necessarily situated within a wider political theory. While I cannot elaborate a full 
political theory here, it is worth noting that this is consistent with the reading of 
care ethics I have employed. Engster sites care at ‘the heart of justice’, arguing that 
care ethics represents ‘only a minimal set of moral and political principles’ 
regardless of how we ‘choose to organize private or public lives’. For Engster, care 
theory is potentially compatible with ‘liberalism, libertarianism, communitarianism, 
and natural law theory – or other religious or cultural values’ (2007, p.5), and is 
necessary since in all societies humans will need care. For my own part, I would 
restrict the set of practices and principles to those compatible with any broadly 
social democratic approach.  
 
The care-guided approach advanced here is not a complete theory of punishment. I 
do not, and care ethics perhaps cannot, consider who should be liable for 
punishment. I have specifically considered interaction with, and quality of 
treatment of, offenders during the decision-making and delivery of punishment. 
This is not to say that victims’ experiences and needs are not important: on the 
contrary, respectful listening to the particular narratives of victims will help 
strengthen sentencers’ understandings of the social context of an offence and 
victims’ associated needs.  
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The earlier parts of this thesis considered whether it would be possible and helpful 
to consider punishment from the perspective of care ethics. I argued in Chapter four 
that this was possible and desirable. In this chapter I have shown the harmonies 
between the principles I propose and existing theory, and considered the 
possibilities for my proposals to extend existing theories. I have also noted 
harmonies with psychological approaches to offender management and the 
principles I propose. In the remaining chapters I consider how the framework I 
offer, for guiding punishment decision-making and deliver according to care ethics 
to strengthen the treatment of offenders as equals, might fare in practice and 
consider the changes we might see. I use the natural experiment of some existing 
bottom-up punishment practices to provide a part-test of the principles I propose.  
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Chapter Six 
 
 
Punishing with care: informing punishment decision-
making 
 
 
Chapter four identified principles derived from the ethics of care to guide 
sentencing decision-making and delivery. There are several bottom-up practices of 
responding to criminal offending which, while not explicitly following care ethics 
values, have values and practices partly in harmony with, and moving parallel to, 
the principles I propose. This allows some insight into how the principles I propose 
might fare in practice. The next two chapters examine elements of these practices 
with a view to testing these principles. To the extent that these practices harmonize 
with the principles proposed, the strengths, weaknesses and limitations of these 
principles can be illuminated. In this chapter, mainstream practices will also be 
compared. 
 
Sentencing defines the nature and content of punishment: put simply, different 
options are available to prison and probation officers when planning a sentence. 
This chapter focuses on the ways in which bottom-up criminal justice practices 
inform punishment decision-making. Chapter six largely considers the first two pairs 
of principles, covering information-gathering and response design: 
 
1. The past-regarding, information-gathering pair:  
a) Respectful Listening; 
b) Needs Identification. 
 
2. The future-regarding, response-designing pair:  
a) Creative Consideration; 
b) Cumulative Fairness. 
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The final pair of principles applies mostly to punishment delivery and review, 
considered in relation to bottom-up approaches in Chapter seven: 
 
3. Present-focused, harm-avoiding pair:  
a) Punishing With Care; 
b) Response Analysis. 
 
Restorative justice was introduced briefly in Chapter three, noting the link identified 
between this practice and care ethics (Walker 2006). Conferencing will be 
considered in Chapter seven as a formal punishment practice. Here I consider the 
practice of circle sentencing, a restorative practice specifically aimed at gathering 
contextual information to inform punishment decision-making. Next I introduce the 
perspectives of therapeutic jurisprudence and community justice, which 
contributed to the development of problem-solving courts, bringing to problem-
solving practice of their attendant strengths and flaws, to differing degrees.  
 
This chapter will focus on initial decisions to admit to drug court programmes, and 
the sentencing stage of problem-solving courts. Chapter seven will consider the 
regular review meetings, which are integral to these practices. This distinction is 
blurred in practice since the same problem-solving techniques are used at the initial 
practice-informing stage and the sentence or programme delivery; whereas 
restorative justice processes aim to gather information and propose a response to 
harm through a one-off in-depth discussion. The issue is further clouded since 
American drug courts are often convened under bail laws, operating outside of 
usual trial or plea bargaining procedures, and ‘under the radar’ of due process 
(Miller 2012 at 23–4 mins). Partly this represents an administrative division of 
labour between Chapters six and seven, given these overlaps. Exploring the values 
associated with problem-solving courts is more difficult than for restorative justice, 
since problem-solving courts lack an underlying theory. Yet there are key practical 
similarities between diverse projects, which give some insight.  
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Restorative justice information-gathering 
Restorative justice is a broad church (Ashworth 2003, p.164) encompassing a variety 
of practices.75 In this thesis I have used the term to refer to face-to-face methods 
which bring offender and victim in to direct contact by consent to discuss the 
offence and its consequences, and designing a way forward. Sherman & Strang’s 
meta-analysis identifies face-to-face restorative justice conferencing and court-
ordered restitution as ‘best practice’ (2007, p.24), suggested by the existing 
research. These practices seek healing, repairing relationships and restoring victims 
through allowing victim and offender to meet, engage in dialogue and reach an 
agreement (McCold 2004, p.15). This chapter discusses the information-gathering 
techniques of restorative justice, as used to inform and conduct sentence decision-
making. Chapter seven considers delivery of court-ordered conferencing as an 
alternative form of punishment.  
 
Conferencing is sometimes used as an information-gathering and decision-making 
tool in mainstream sentencing, for example in New Zealand (Daly 2005, p.164). 
Conferencing is not usually used in this way in England & Wales (Easton & Piper 
2008, pp.191–8).76 However restorative conferencing might be used externally to 
mainstream processes, at a pre-trial or pre-sentence stage, and these reparative 
agreements may be reported to the sentencer (detailing the quality of offenders’ 
participation and noting victims’ sentencing preferences, rather than 
recommending a sentence). Sentencers may disregard such reports. But 
occasionally, where restorative practices have run alongside, but separately from, 
mainstream practices, restorative justice outcome agreement elements have been 
ordered in England & Wales sentencing (Shapland et al. 2011, pp.17–20, p.98). 
Since these practices were not intended to inform punishment decision-making, I 
do not include these practices here. 
                                                     
75
 Restorative justice may be used as an umbrella term (Miller 2011, pp.10–1) for grass-roots 
responses. Over time this has included ‘community corrections, informal justice, community service, 
alternative sentencing, community mediation [and] victim offender reconciliation’ (Zehr & Mika 
2003, p.40). 
76
 In youth justice in England & Wales, conferencing may be used in issuing a young person with a 
warning or reprimand. Though similar to adult police cautions (although informed consent is not 
required (Easton & Piper 2008, p.265)), these are not court orders. 
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Restorative practices are used in some jurisdictions explicitly as information-
gathering and decision-making mechanisms, aiming to deliver a sentencing 
proposal. One clear example is the practice of sentencing circles, used for example 
in Canada and Australia. I focus on the Canadian example since it is a relatively well-
established practice, explicitly focused on informing a court-ordered response, and 
consider chiefly this one example so as to think more about the principles and 
motivations underlying the practice, rather than becoming embroiled in procedural 
differences between jurisdictions.  
 
Circle sentencing 
Canadian circle sentencing began in First Nations Communities, following a concern 
to include aboriginal law and values (McNamara 2000, p.2). Canadian Appellate 
Courts now also use circle sentencing in non-aboriginal settings (Stephens 2007, 
p.25 at footnote 18). Practices vary as circles reflect the values of the participant’s 
community. In the Canadian example, circle sentencing takes place after a fact-
finding mainstream trial. Circles aim towards healing and restoring community 
harmony, and are similar to restorative conferencing, in that all relevant parties 
(including victims, offenders and their supporters, community members, elders or 
non-political leaders, police representatives, defence and prosecution lawyers, and 
the sentencer) may participate on an equal basis in face-to-face discussions. Each 
participant has an opportunity to speak in turn, ask questions and contribute to 
building a restorative reparation agreement (Rexroad 2006, p.241). Following R v. 
Joseyounon (1996), Canadian case law guidelines describe when First Nations circle 
sentencing is appropriate, focusing on voluntary participation, particularly victims’ 
consent; and the willingness of the court to consider a nonconventional sentence. 
This final aspect of the case law guidelines implies that sentencers ought to give 
serious consideration to implementing the circle agreement, although their primary 
obligation remains imposing a ‘fit’ sentence (Cunneen 2007, p.124). But do parties 
have equal voices in practice? 
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Criticisms 
Equal-voiced participation cannot be presumed given participants’ unequal social 
standing in the community. Women occupy a subordinate social role in some 
Canadian First Nations communities. When circle sentencing responds to domestic 
violence, women victims may be intimidated by their victimization and may lack the 
social standing to be heard as equals (Goel 2000, pp.324–8). Cameron addresses a 
lack of empirical research on the ‘gendered power imbalances between the survivor 
and the abuser, cultural and economic factors … exacerbate[ing] the subordination 
of women, and administrative shortcomings’ (Cameron 2006, p.482) threatening 
victims’ safety in dealing with domestic violence. Her 2006 study concludes that the 
judicially convened sentencing circles examined in her study ‘fail to meet the needs 
of survivors of intimate violence in many instances’ (2006, p.483), by perpetuating 
oppression and repeating the harm of exclusion. The problem of ongoing 
discrimination and re-victimization is echoed across the circle sentencing literature 
(McNamara 2000, p.4), and into the literature concerning restorative justice 
processes as part of a sentence.  
 
Separately, circles may focus too heavily on the concerns of offenders and restoring 
harmony between offender and community, producing unduly lenient sentences 
(Rexroad 2006, p.418; Cameron 2006, p.313). This fails to respond appropriately to 
offending, and may fail to avoid harm and to meet associated needs in line with the 
aims of care. One potential response to victim discrimination and inadequate 
punishments is also the site of another concern: the sentencer’s role in final 
sentencing and concerns about proportionality. Canadian sentencers may reject 
circle recommendations to impose a ‘fit’ sentence. A sentencer following circle 
agreements may be criticized for imposing an unduly lenient punishment or 
perpetuating the victim’s oppression. In departing from agreements, sentencers 
might be criticized for devaluing the circle. However, this offers sentencers an 
opportunity to avoid further harm to victims. 
 
Where sentencers do not alter circle-derived punishments, sentences may be 
viewed as disproportionate since offenders committing similar offences could, with 
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different circles, receive quite different punishments. While this is true, this is not 
necessarily disproportionate. I argued in Chapters one and four that taking full 
account of personal as well as social contextual detail regarding offenders and 
offences is required for truly proportionate sentencing. This provides a more 
nuanced approach to proportionality which admits another variable: how alike 
individual offenders are, as distinct from similarities between offences. Chapter one 
argued that this more nuanced approach is implicit in both retributive and 
consequentialist penal reasoning. The circle allows access to offenders’ personal 
contexts, to be understood in relation to the offence and victim. This broader 
account of proportionality and horizontal punishment expects more variation 
between punishments for similar offences in the light of differences between 
offenders.  
 
Equally, sentencers’ power to overrule circle outcomes could provide a safeguard 
against oppression, offering some formal oversight to a more informal process. 
Where sentencers do adjust circle recommendations, this need not disregard the 
agreement altogether. Sentencers’ oversight roles and responsibilities for a ‘fit’ 
sentence may help to temper instances of circle over-punishment, protecting 
offenders, and under-punishment, protecting victims in this case. Roche similarly 
suggests that judges might provide procedural oversight to restorative justice 
conferences (2004, pp.216–9). Transparency about sentencers’ intentions might 
improve legitimacy, accountability and confidence in their intentions. Were 
sentencers to articulate their reasons for adhering to, or departing from, circle 
agreements, this might clarify sentencers’ respect for both the circle’s value and the 
equal status of the parties. Similarly, Roche highlights decision-makers knowing 
they will (or may) be called to explain and justify their decisions in many democratic 
practices (2004, p.3), as a means of improving the quality of decision-making. The 
sentencer’s role is balancing the concerns of the circle, the treatment of offenders 
and victims as equals, and the delivery of appropriate censure for the offence. This 
will not be easy, but is not so different from sentencers’ current role in mainstream 
criminal justice: to impose an appropriate, proportional sentence, given the facts of 
the case and guidelines circumscribing potential punishments.  
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Further, different circles are differently convened to reflect local values. This has 
the benefit of taking better account of the social context in which the offence 
occurred, increasing the nuances considered proportionally, but does risk the 
unquestioning perpetuation of oppressive values. Mainstream laws that have 
ceased to reflect majority moral beliefs, derive some procedural, democratic and 
popular legitimacy from their discussion, enactment, enforcement and openness to 
revision (consider the decriminalization of same-sex relationships). A means 
external to the circle for the community to periodically discuss and review the 
values applied in the circle might help to strengthen the approach.  
 
While circle sentencing seems an imperfect, unreliable method for ensuring victims 
and offenders are heard as equals and their needs considered; the restorative 
justice approach of circle sentencing may still do a better job than mainstream 
criminal justice. Circle sentencing practices ‘may have more room for some of the 
needs of some women to be met’ (Cameron 2006, p.510). We cannot expect 
changes in criminal justice practices alone to alter wider social perceptions and 
institutions that expect and perpetuate oppression (2006, p.510). The capacity of 
restorative justice practices to help to identify and meet needs of both offenders 
and victims, in a balanced way that does not contribute to the difficulties already 
faced, does not seem to be fully realized. Yet restorative justice makes important 
steps forward in recognizing the individuals harmed and aiming to treat them 
equally.  
 
Circle sentencing methods are reasonably in line with the principles I propose, and 
go further, explicitly considering how the needs of communities and victims may be 
actively met. In particular, there is a similarity between the likelihood of different 
sentences for similar offences, because we take account of more information about 
the individual offender. However, since circle procedures differ between 
communities, the approach I propose should allow less variance from different 
procedures, since I seek a modest modification to mainstream practice. The equal 
standing within the circle may be undermined by participants’ unequal standing in 
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the community. If social prejudice prevents circles from hearing victim’, or 
offenders, equally in the discussing, circle sentencing may risk masking these needs. 
I have suggested that existing forms of sentencer responsibility for a ‘fit’ sentence 
might, rather than posing another problem, become a means of providing some 
oversight for the treatment as equals of all parties in the circle. Sentencers might 
act to prevent over- or under-punishment, which may result from the exclusion of 
some participants. Greater transparency explaining sentencers’ departures from 
circle agreements might help to improve confidence in sentencers’ provision of 
oversight and respect for the circle’s value. 
 
The healing and harmony motivation of circle sentencing in response to the harm 
caused resonate with the aims of care: meeting needs and avoiding harms through 
(re)building relationships. Sharing power and opportunities to speak suggests the 
process is equipped to treat victims, community members, families and offenders 
as equals. Respectful listening is a means of empowering the disempowered (Koggel 
1998, p.53; Pranis 2002, p.30; Braithwaite 2002b, p.564) and providing interactional 
justice, avoiding at least in theory the exclusion, silencing and objectification risked 
in mainstream practices in England & Wales in Chapter four. The subjects of 
restorative circle sentencing are the persons involved (McCold 2004, p.18, p.20). 
The primary concern is restoring social harmony, which may come at the victim’s 
expense, if circles perpetuate discrimination. The equal discussions of the circle and 
negotiated agreement, is one source of information for sentencing decision-making. 
Power is claimed to be shared equally by the participants in their contributions to 
the circle agreement. Yet sentencers hold ultimate authority and responsibility to 
impose a ‘fit’ sentence, overruling agreements if necessary.  
 
Fit with care principles 
In Chapter four I proposed principles developed from care ethics, to help guide 
sentencers’ consideration when sentencing. How well do circle sentencing practices 
measure up with these principles? Information is gathered through respectful 
listening, hearing each participant on an equal basis in theory. In line with the 
principles I propose, this allows for hearing from offenders themselves about their 
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personal context: those parts of offenders’ narrative which they deem relevant to 
the offence and their present position. Each piece of personal contextual 
information should be considered holistically: recognized as linked and taken 
together to help describe a concrete person, and not considered as isolated details. 
This allows needs-identification for offenders. Collectively agreeing an appropriate 
resolution resembles the responsibility taking and sharing, awareness and 
responsiveness values of care ethics (Tronto 1993, pp.126–37). This shared 
responsibility approach suggests that a balanced needs-meeting and burden-sharing 
response might be a possible outcome. This follows the second pair of principles, 
creative consideration of responses, and cumulative fairness, balancing the needs of 
offenders (and in this case, victims) with other values determined by the broader 
political morality, according to available resources.  
 
Going beyond the principles I propose, this supplements social contextual 
information found at trial and provides information about community and victims’ 
needs. I propose the creative consideration of needs-meeting possibilities, 
envisaging this being primarily between sentencer and offender in mainstream 
criminal justice scenarios (detailed at the end of this chapter). But in the circle 
sentencing case, many more participants are able to contribute to the caring-for 
practices of identifying potential responses to needs. This information will be useful 
at the cumulative fairness stage, where the principles I propose seek to balance 
responses to offenders’ needs with the needs of others, given the available 
resources and personal and social context of the offender and offence. Going 
beyond the proposals I offer, circle sentencing theoretically allows consideration of 
how needs can be met for victims. 
 
 
Problem-solving justice  
If restorative justice is a variety of overlapping and related practices under an 
umbrella heading; then therapeutic jurisprudence and community justice are 
conceptually distinct approaches to similar overlapping and related practices in 
problem-solving courts, albeit focusing on different elements. Because therapeutic 
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jurisprudence and community justice approaches overlap in problem-solving courts, 
it is important to consider how each perspective contributes to problem-solving 
practices. Once all three have been explored, I will reflect on the fit between these 
practices and the principles I propose. 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence practices 
Therapeutic jurisprudence describes a practice of intensive, judge-led supportive 
progress assessment for particular groups of offenders. The first problem-solving 
courts were drug courts, employing a therapeutic jurisprudence ideal: the belief 
that judicial interventions can and should have a therapeutic effect (Schma 2000, 
p.6). The first drug court opened in Dade county Florida in 1989, propagating a 
wave of ‘problem-solving’ courts (Berman & Feinblatt 2001, p.126). These early 
courts operated with a model closer to the 12 step programme associated with the 
Alcoholics Anonymous practices, than a traditional courtroom (Miller 2012, at 06 
mins). Specialist problem-solving courts for various issues (for example, mental 
health, domestic violence) have since spread to each of the American states, and to 
many other countries (Berman 2009, p.2). Other therapeutic courts followed, for 
example mental health courts. However, here I shall focus on the drug court 
example. 
 
Drug courts are judge-led initiatives, responding to problems through trial and 
error, in search of what works for individuals (Nolan 2001, p.42). In America, where 
the practice is more established than in England & Wales, drug courts work with 
‘clients’ on a voluntary basis, as a diversion from criminal prosecution. Winick 
recommends problem-solving judges should employ motivational interviewing (a 
psychological technique requiring engaging with the offender, drawing out their 
problems and helping them to see possible solutions as achievable options, and 
their associated benefits). Winick argues that where drug court participants 
experience problem-solving measures, including decisions to participate in drug 
court programmes, as their own choices, this improves offenders’ chances of 
success (2003, p.183, p.187).  
 
256 
 
American drug courts often operate largely outside of the traditional channels of 
judicial influence (trial and plea bargaining) operating instead through pre-trial 
provisions as extended diversion under bail processes. This is noteworthy, since the 
due process protections of American law, such as rights to representation apply to 
trial and not to bail hearings, or the alternative post-sentence probation model, 
where representation is a privilege. While American drug court participants do not 
have these protections, they are subjected to onerous and long-term conditions of 
bail, which is where US drug court programmes usually operates (Miller 2012, at 
20–26 mins). By comparison, Scottish drug courts operate as post-sentence 
probation supervision with judicial involvement (2012, at 24 mins). It is further 
worth emphasizing that, unlike England & Wales, probation supervision in Scotland 
is undertaken by Criminal Justice Social Workers, still trained in a social work setting 
(Halliday et al. 2009, p.412).  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence values 
Drug-courts are a judge-led response to the ‘revolving door’ of re-offending (Hora et 
al. 1998, p.523), resulting from the ineffectiveness of mainstream approaches in 
dealing successfully with offenders’ underlying problems. Given this supportive, 
needs-meeting aim, Christine Saum & Alison Gray describe the practice as ‘care 
perspective’ informed (2008, p.115), and Judge William Schma links therapeutic 
jurisprudence to the ethic of care, with potential to deliver desirable societal 
benefits obscured by mainstream justice (2000, p.6). However, the process rests on 
the power and discretion of the judge, responsible for overseeing and directing the 
treatment process, and who may make orders rewarding success or disciplining 
failure.  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence views legal and judicial actions as not only with the 
potential to be therapeutic or to order therapeutic interventions, but as therapeutic 
of themselves (Miller 2009, pp.422–3). This, says Miller, is a problem. While 
problem-solving drug courts are constructed to draw in specialist expertise to 
benefit the decision-making judge, sentencers are not therapeutic experts (2009, 
p.445). How effective is it for sentencers to make therapeutic decisions? Do judges 
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with the best of therapeutic intentions risk doing more harm than good through 
lack of appropriate knowledge? Where drug courts operate outside of the usual due 
process channels, can offenders receive proper protections? In either case, should 
offenders be subjected to drug courts at all? These questions will be taken up 
presently.  
 
The motivation of therapeutic interventions is a belief that criminal justice 
interventions both can and should have a therapeutic effect (Schma 2000, p.6). 
Therapeutic approaches aim to tackle underlying problems and difficulties 
associated with a chaotic lifestyle, to stop re-offending through building offenders’ 
capabilities in the community as active citizens. The subject of therapeutic 
jurisprudence processes is claimed to be the offender, with concern directly for 
offenders’ individual problems, but community benefits are anticipated. This 
supportive, individual-focused, needs-meeting approach appears to share the 
responsive, other-focused openness and engagement features of care. The 
therapeutic jurisprudence ideal sees judges building agreements with participants, 
who choose to engage. Judges draw on information from the offender and expert 
advice from clinicians and support workers external to criminal justice, who are 
specialists in dealing with a particular kind of problem (eg addiction to a specific 
substance). The claimed locus of power is the offender themselves, with the 
offender’s ‘ownership’ of the treatment process, identified as important for their 
success (Winick 2003, p.183). Although it is ultimately sentencers who control 
orders, McIvor also reports the efforts of Scottish Sheriffs to have immediate 
offender input when drug court orders are made (2009, p.38). 
 
Community justice practices 
Community courts, specializing in addressing quality-of-life crimes and community 
justice (hereafter community justice) concerns, followed drug courts. The first 
problem-solving community court opened in New York’s Midtown district in 1993, 
followed in 2000 by the Red Hook Community Justice Center in another New York 
neighbourhood (Malkin 2009, p.150). The Center brings criminal justice and 
community services together on the same site. Strang describes this community 
258 
 
justice strategy as a largely American phenomenon (2004, p.75). Yet in late 2004 a 
problem-solving community justice pilot project began operating in North Liverpool 
(Mair & Millings 2011, p.7). Problem-solving, community-centred courts can also be 
found in Australia (Victoria NJC 2013). Community justice aims to empower local 
people to address local problems, including offending. Focusing on high-crime 
localities for greatest impact, community justice draws together concerns about 
crime and social justice problems that foster crime. These social problems form the 
‘flip side’ of criminal justice (Clear et al. 2011, p.3). The needs-meeting element of 
problem-solving justice is often combined with a community sentence. Community 
justice approaches seek comprehensive changes proactively, through: repairing and 
improving public spaces (often as part of a community sentence); empowering local 
people through peer-support, job-creation and supervision for children; problem-
solving rather than apportioning blame; and decentralizing priority setting to 
enforce national laws according to local concerns (2011, pp.20–3). 
 
Community justice practices follow the values of community policing (engaging 
communities, building trust and co-operation with local people) and are structured 
to allow informal discussion. ‘Sentences are not “imposed” by a judge remote to the 
circumstances of the case; rather, the penalty is determined in interaction with 
those who were affected by the case, including the offender’ (Clear et al. 2011, 
p.65). Specialist courts, overlapping with therapeutic jurisprudence (eg domestic 
violence courts), may engage with community justice strategies. Community justice 
seeks problem-solving solutions, aiming to ‘dispose of cases on a local level and … 
provide the care needed to address the complex problems faced by low-level 
offenders’ (2011, p.73). Community justice values context-specific responses to 
offending, although prioritizing local social contexts over offenders’ personal 
contexts. Community justice values the repairing and restoring of community 
relationships, building community capabilities and meeting community needs. This 
perspective recognizes that building the capabilities of offenders and helping to 
meet offender needs, is instrumentally useful in meeting these community goals. 
Hence there is an instrumental overlap with the concerns of care ethics.  
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Community justice values 
Resonating with Braithwaite’s reintegrative shaming work (1989; 2002a), informal 
social controls are identified as key to public safety, and social capital is 
strengthened through joint working with local residents, businesses and public 
services. Community justice recognizes the importance of place (the safety of the 
geographical location of the community). In high-crime areas, local people often 
prioritize tackling ‘quality-of-life’ crimes (Nolan 2009, p.12), offences which make 
everyday life threatening (street drug dealing, soliciting, etc).  
 
Yet the flexibility offered by decentralized priority setting might raise practical co-
ordination problems between areas, and consistent application of the law. 
Localization may also disadvantage minorities, since those best able to articulate 
their concerns at public engagement fora are often the already powerful 
(Mansbridge 1983, pp.132–5). One way this concern has been addressed is through 
increasing and diversifying the outreach work of American courts and police 
departments, to reach a broader spread of the community and hear the concerns of 
the marginalized. This requires time, effort and resources to build relationships and 
does not guarantee success, but acknowledges and attempts to address the 
problem.  
 
Community justice benefits from the wider information available from engaging 
with offenders as concrete persons. Yet there is concern that the informality of 
community courts does not afford offenders proper due process protections. The 
social environment improvement values of community justice may offer some 
protection to offenders, but this cannot protect against poor practice. A system of 
appeals might help, yet it is difficult to appeal on procedural grounds when 
procedures are unclear, and defendants have ‘chosen’ not to have their guilt 
determined by trial (Clear et al. 2011, p.67). 
 
While community justice practices claim to empower communities, Malkin argues 
that discretionary powers of community court judges rather enhance judges’ power 
within the local community (2009, p.154). Although there is some guidance 
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available for American jurisdictions seeking to set up community justice projects, 
this could be improved (Clear et al. 2011, p.76). Community-court projects have a 
poor reputation for adequate data collection (Sherman & Strang 2007, p.25; Strang 
2004, p.76), which would help evidence best practice (Clear et al. 2011, p.756) and 
provide guidance. It is further difficult to compare data collected across different 
community justice schemes, since each project reflects the unique circumstances of 
the community it serves.77 It is not clear whether the use of problem-solving 
methods actually reduces reoffending, coincides with other factors or simply 
relocates problem behaviours (Malkin 2009, p.147). There are concerns about net-
widening (2009, p.150), and resource efficiency given the resources required to 
intensively support offenders (Boldt 2009). 
 
The motivation of community justice projects is the empowerment of local people 
in high crime areas to address local problems. The offender and their personal 
problems are the subject of community justice, following an expectation that this 
will help meet concerns to empower communities, and achieve the goal of 
improved public safety. The sources of information that inform sentencing decisions 
include the ‘affected parties’ (victim and offender) and may include contextual 
information. In America, defendants may be questioned in some cases by 
community members, such as citizen jurors in youth community courts (Mullins 
2009), while judges (rather than the parties) steer the process. Power is viewed as 
held by local people, whose concerns inform local law enforcement priorities, 
although sentencers ultimately determine punishments.  
 
Problem-solving courts 
Problem-solving court practices developed from therapeutic jurisprudence and 
community justice, addressing the offender’s current needs for their own, and the 
community’s, long-term benefit. Similarly to community justice, sentencers engage 
informally during the trial proceedings about the offence. After the trial (and before 
sentencing) there may be a separate problem-solving meeting, similar to drug 
                                                     
77
 Restorative justice conferences reflect the unique situation of the participants, and better progress 
has been made in evaluating these schemes (Strang 2004, p.77). 
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courts. Sentencers engage with offenders to understand and explore underlying 
problems from offenders’ perspectives (Nolan 2001, p.40; Miller & Johnson 2009, 
p.9). Problem-solving courts are evolutionary in nature. Supporters and critics agree 
there is no founding theory on which these practices are built (Berman 2009, p.3; 
Strang 2004, p.76), and since no two projects will be quite the same, no single 
exemplar exists (Miller & Johnson 2009, p.44). Yet problem-solving practices share 
five key aspects: 
1. Collaboration; 
2. Information sharing; 
3. Individually tailored sentences; 
4. Outcomes; 
5. Accountability. 
 (see particularly Miller & Johnson 2009, pp.123–4; Berman 2009, pp.2–3; also 
Nolan 2009, pp.10–11; and Wolf 2007, p.4 who includes community engagement).  
 
The first three apply particularly to problem-solving as an information-gathering, 
sentence-informing mechanism, which address the primary concern of problem-
solving sentencing, according to the offender’s needs.  
 
Problem-solving requires strong relationships. Collaboration, is required between 
criminal justice system agencies (police, court staff and probation workers) and 
partner organizations (local social services, mental health services and voluntary 
sector support organizations). Building relationships between agencies in advance 
facilitates co-working and provides access to a ‘voice of experience’ in problem-
solving meetings, and contributes to developing and delivering problem-solving. 
 
Information sharing is essential. In addition to partner agencies sharing knowledge, 
offenders are encouraged to share personal information and are treated as ‘expert’ 
in their personal experience of their problem. This gives a richer understanding of 
the problem, providing the problem-solving meeting (often including the offender, 
sentencer, prosecution and defence teams, probation workers and voluntary and 
statutory support agencies) more information to help identify the most appropriate 
response. This facilitates individualized, tailored sentences.  
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Problem-solving court sentencer involvement has therapeutic and community 
focused roots, (McIvor 2010, p.217) and is primarily concerned with offender needs. 
Results matter in problem-solving courts since successful outcomes (where 
offenders’ feel fairly treated, and community quality-of-life is raised), are more 
important than the volume or speed of cases processed (Berman 2010, p.10). 
Collecting outcome data can help identify what works locally, identifying strengths 
and monitoring weakness.78 Unfortunately, the impact of punishment responses is 
difficult to measure, and consistent data collection remains a problem for these 
community courts (Malkin 2009, p.154; Mair & Millings 2011, pp.62–4). 
Accountability is raised: offenders are accountable to both probation services and 
sentencers for their progress at review meetings. Sentencers are accountable to the 
community for following community-identified priorities through helping offenders 
to move away from offending towards stable, good lives (Ward 2010); or by 
choosing desistance (McNeill et al. 2012).  
 
Problem-solving courts use sentencer-led progress reviews: the problem-solving 
does not stop after the initial problem-understanding, information-gathering 
session that feeds into decision-making. Problem-solving courts, as practised at the 
New York projects and the North Liverpool Community Justice Centre, are criminal 
justice responses, with problem-solving operating often as part of the community 
sentence. Key features enabling the community justice centre approach include:79 
                                                     
78 The first year problem-solving outcomes at the North Liverpool Community Justice Centre found 
reoffending rates were ‘not statistically significantly different’. However, offenders dealt with 
through community justice projects were significantly more likely to breach sentence conditions 
than a mainstream group (Jolliffe & Farrington 2009, p.3). Owing to greater use of extended review 
powers under sections 178 and 191 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and intensive unpaid work 
orders (full-time rather than part-time), this may partly reflect increased breached detection rather 
than an increase in breaches (Jolliffe & Farrington 2009, p.4). Increased breaches and technical 
violations were also observed in American intensive supervision programmes (Petersilia et al. 1993).  
Popovic reports problem-solving courts as therapeutic although not ‘time efficient’ (Popovic 2006, 
p.75) since individual hearings are generally longer. This resonates strongly with Tronto’s 
observation that caring does not benefit from being temporally ‘compressed’ (2003, p.123). 
However, one of the few achievements the North Liverpool Community Justice Centre has evidenced 
with statistical data, is the reduced length of time from first hearing to sentence. In 2007 at the 
North Liverpool Community Justice Centre this was 26 days, compared with a 147 day national 
average (McKenna 2007, p.73).  
79
 See Mair & Millings 2011 Chapter one for a more detailed discussion. 
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1. Same-site location of criminal justice and partner agencies; 
2. Problem-solving approaches; 
3. Extensive use of extended review powers; 
4. Single resident judge dealing with all cases and reviews; 
5. Community engagement work to understand local problems 
and priorities. 
 
Initial problem-solving sessions feed into sentence decision-making. Follow-up 
review sessions are considered in Chapter seven. 
 
The motivation of problem-solving courts is to address offenders underlying 
problems for their own wellbeing and to promote community quality-of-life. The 
subject of problem-solving courts is the offender, and its primary concerns are the 
offender’s problems following an expectation of improvements to community 
quality-of-life. Victim wellbeing is less important than preventing reoffending and 
improving community quality-of-life. This risks side-lining victims’ interests. 
Information is gathered during an initial problem-solving meeting, from the 
offender themselves, about their personal context and problems, and from experts 
experienced in addressing similar problems (ongoing review hearings will be 
considered in Chapter seven). This breadth of information is one of the strengths 
associated with problem-solving courts. Power is understood to be shared between 
the offender and sentencer. Although sentencers hold the final responsibility and 
authority, they endeavour to build consensus with offenders. There is some 
resonance here with Duff’s occasional negotiated sentences (2001, pp.158–63). 
 
 
Criticisms 
Therapeutic jurisprudence and community justice are both employed in problem-
solving courts. Eric Miller describes drug courts as problem-solving courts 
employing community justice (2012). Miller uses the term ‘holistic’, rather than 
therapeutic jurisprudence (reflecting therapeutic attention to offenders’ needs) or 
restorative justice (reflecting community restoration concerns), to reflect the 
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drawing together of criminal justice and partner professional agencies (and thus, 
bringing together the expertise of specific-problems solving, eg drug treatment in 
the case of drug courts, with concerns for both offender and community (2012, at 
28 mins). 
 
For problem-solving justice Miller identifies two pairs of concerns. The lack of due 
process protections, particularly for the particularly for the American examples of 
drug courts as ‘bail courts’. If we value the informalities of these practices, as 
encouraging open engagement, do these provide appropriate protections for 
offenders? This is closely bound up with a second concern Miller raises; the lack of 
clarity in criminal justice policy, particularly in the American context; because drug 
courts are judge-led and ad hoc, there is a lack of clarity about the policy intention 
intention (Miller 2012, at 33–4 mins). Miller argues that American drug courts offer 
a means of supervising and supporting drug addicted offenders in the community 
rather than imprisoning them, an alternative punishment; whereas most American 
drug courts are diversionary, albeit a lengthy and onerous process, since a criminal 
record may be avoided with good progress (Miller 2012, at 29 mins).  
 
These due process and policy concerns will be discussed further below, as 
particularly in relation to the American context, these concerns resonate with 
considerations of admission to drug courts, as close as diversionary drug courts get 
to punishment decision-making (the therapeutic support is a court-ordered 
diversion, albeit long and onerous, rather than court-ordered punishment). Another 
related pair of concerns are those of coercion (coerced participation and problem-
solving court disclosure) and confidentiality (protecting information about 
offenders). Lack of appeal against either admission to, or decisions during, a drug 
court programme is a serious concern in the light of coercion. These concerns, in 
England & Wales and in Scotland, relate more strongly to the delivery of a problem-
solving court order (whether diversionary as in some American cases, or a response 
to offending as in the Scottish case) and will be discussed in Chapter seven. Because 
of the nature of problem-solving courts, these concerns overlap the processes of 
punishment decision-making and delivery.  
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Due process protections and competence 
Problem-solving courts sentencers behave more like a ‘caring but authoritarian 
guardian’ than an ‘impartial arbitrator’ (Payne 2005, p.74), with other informalities 
intended to make court sessions less intimidating. This aims to increase offender 
engagement in problem-solving. But can offenders receive proper advocacy 
(Berman & Feinblatt 2001, p.134) or does this treat offenders as ‘second class 
citizens’ (Popovic 2006, p.66)? American diversionary drug courts do not provide as 
full access to review processes as mainstream courts, concerning in the light of 
offenders’ questionably ‘voluntary’ participation (2006, p.66).  
 
Berman quotes problem-solving Judge Cindy Lederman, raising concerns about the 
character of would-be problem-solving judges. She observes that, American 
problem-solving judges have ‘a tremendous ability to harm people’, since they 
become ‘involved’ with offenders’ lives and family circumstances. Judge Lederman 
implies mainstream judges, who simply preside, determine guilt and sentence, risk 
less harm (Berman 2000, p.82). Yet mainstream sentencing also has potentially 
harmful effects on offenders and families. Chief Justice Blatz of the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota suggests that problem-solving judges do not act alone; problem-
solving courts allow voices to be raised against potentially harmful decisions 
(Berman 2000, p.84). Problem-solving sentencers draw on expert advice from 
partner organizations (2000, p.82) the offender’s contextual information and 
defence lawyers’ scrutiny (2000, p.84), to a greater degree than for mainstream 
processes. But it is right to raise concerns about due process protections, 
particularly when many problem-solving sentencers are not trained in the use of the 
psychological techniques they employ in the courtroom,80 or in the detail of 
appropriate problem-solving methods depending on the client’s needs. Two 
responses are available to strengthen this position.  
 
                                                     
80
 Winick suggests that problem-solving sentencers should adopt ‘motivational interviewing’ 
techniques (2003, p.187). 
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Training sentencers as public servants 
Firstly, we could insist that problem-solving judges become appropriately trained, 
gaining rudimentary specialist knowledge of the particular need their court serves 
to address, and skilled in engaging and motivating vulnerable offenders 
appropriately within the court. Bean asks ‘what … of an overly enthusiastic judge, a 
sadistic judge, or an incompetent judge’ (2002, p.248)? Consistently incompetent 
sentencers must either accept retraining or be removed from post. Training is 
already provided to sentencers: the Judicial College (previously the Judicial Studies 
Board) (Judicial Office 2012) ensures that sentencers in England & Wales are 
informed about changes to the law and sentencing guidelines; the Federal Judicial 
Center has a similar role in America. Training could be expanded to cover problem-
solving and engagement techniques. Where problem-solving justice occurs within 
mainstream community sentences, the formal appeals process is available. 
Problem-solving courts’ regular review sessions, discussed in the next chapter, 
potentially expose offenders to further unfairness; but equally allow for 
misunderstandings to be identified and corrected.  
 
Further, sentencers are public officials carrying out public duties. As public servants, 
sentencers are asked to measure cases impartially, without consulting their private 
biases. Their role as public servants is to provide an appropriate punishment 
response on behalf of the community. Civil servants are expected to leave personal 
political beliefs at home. We might expect ‘overly enthusiastic’ (Bean 2002, p.248) 
problem-solving judges to leave personal biases on a peg by the door, and simply to 
apply the law appropriately, in light of the personal and social context information 
about the offence and offender. Failure to do so is not just a case of a judge with 
questionable personal prejudices: it is a case of being either unable or unwilling to 
do the job. Appeals are already made against procedural irregularities. It is not so 
far-fetched to consider appeal on the grounds that sentencers acted according to 
prejudice rather than law.  
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Collaboration for informal oversight 
Secondly, structuring in informal review according to the principles drawn from care 
ethics may go some way to meeting due process concerns about access to appeal 
and oversight, particularly for courts since operating as diversions from mainstream 
criminal justice or effective as pre-trial measures. I have suggested a concern to 
provide good caring as an ongoing activity, bound together with the integrity of care 
as Tronto suggests, point to a practice of self-scrutiny. We continuously monitor our 
own caring for aspects that might be improved, for accuracy of caring as intended, 
for mistakes and unforeseen problems.  
 
Self-scrutiny begins with the first pair of principles, encouraging continuous critical 
reflection as the driver continues to check mirrors while travelling. This runs 
through the care principles with the open, engagement of the attitude of care, and 
is the responsive part of our engagement, paired with our awareness of or listening 
to the other. I have indicated key stages of review in the care ethics principles, the 
initial review at the cumulative fairness stage, where we consider the socially 
holistic appropriateness of the best response for the individual; and ongoing review 
as a part of the response analysis stage, understanding caring as an ongoing 
practice. I have drawn a parallel between self-scrutiny and a driver checking their 
mirrors to make sure their actions are and remain safe. The good driver continues 
to check mirrors throughout their journey and responds accordingly. Because these 
review practices are internal to good caring, the absence of self-scrutiny is itself a 
cause for concern. We should be just as concerned about our caring practice if we 
omit self-scrutiny (part of a caring attitude), as the babysitter who forgets to feed 
the baby should be concerned about their practical caring. 
 
At the creative consideration stage we consider our own competence to provide the 
emerging care preference. While high-gravity needs in non-ideal circumstances 
(such as life-threatening emergencies), will sometimes call upon us to care beyond 
our competence. Where acting beyond our competence is avoidable (ie the gravity 
of the need allows for more suitable help to be sought), we ought not to do so, 
since this risks incompetent care. Partly addressing Miller’s concern about 
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therapeutic fitness, the sentencer in a drug court ought to ask themselves: ‘can I 
provide appropriate ‘therapy’ for this offender; what else is needed?’ Appeal 
processes could be established around sentencers’ assessment of their 
competence, and decisions whether to seek and follow advice, in the same way 
sentencers are already called upon to explain other aspects of their reasoning, 
building on accountability and the principles of open justice (Roche 2004, p.47). 
 
Because caring practices often require a sharing of responsibility, our reflection 
must also have a collaborative element; mutual moderation monitors the caring of 
others in the same way we monitor our own. Both these practices are implied in, 
and are internal to practices of caring, and are implied in both Engster’s and 
Tronto’s descriptions of caring as a value set, attitude and practice. Further, these 
practices occur under care perspective ontological expectations of persons: we 
expect all persons to be interdependent. This interdependence suggests that there 
will be some occasions where we rely on the help of others, a limit beyond which 
we need support. Normalization of need is a core part of care ethics. Given that we 
encounter these limits as persons, there is no reason to presume these limits apply 
only to our biological basic needs. What we are able to do individually informs the 
contributions we are able to make to collaborative social endeavours. Once again, 
these personal limits are expected by virtue of our interdependence.  
 
We find a division of labour within the criminal justice system between the different 
practitioners in the courtroom, each relying on the legal expertise and case-specific 
knowledge of the others in order to progress the case. When we presume liberal 
self-sufficiency, we assume each has effective mastery of the skills and knowledge 
necessary for participating, as self-sufficient individuals. Because on the liberal 
ontological expectations of generalized others with necessarily equal 
rationality/dignity and presumed self-sufficiency, to suggest that another is in error 
is at least potentially insulting. Either we imply the other could or would not use 
their rational capacity, or has a deficiency of knowledge. Both run counter to the 
expected rational self-sufficiency, suggesting a personal failing. Because we seek not 
to slight the powerful, or because we wish to hide our own errors, this motivates 
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covering up and the denying of mistakes. Consider a junior nurse, who is the regular 
care-giver for a particular patient. Tronto notes that due to this specific contextual 
knowledge, the nurse’s view about the best treatment for this patient may conflict 
with the senior consultant’s view (1993, p.109). If the nurse raises the concern, the 
consultant may perceive this as a challenge to their hierarchical and technical 
authority, rather than as an attempt to improve patient care through discussing 
nuances and conflicting needs. Based on this opposed-individuals, adversarial 
account, junior nurses may need to learn not to challenge consultants if they wish 
to keep their job.  
 
If instead we begin by following the principles of care ethics, this requires that we 
recognize our own limits and those of others as normal and expected. The purpose 
of recognizing limits is to provide support and not to stigmatize. As I argued in 
Chapter 2, care ethics implies that following the principles of caring, we undertake 
to self-scrutinize our actions for adequacy, and to provide similar, supportive, 
mutual moderation for others. When we know that the participants, for example in 
the courtroom, are following the principles of care, we also know that others will 
perform this mutual moderation task for us; not to find fault, although deliberate 
misconduct can also be identified this way, but to support us. This allows problems 
to be identified outside of the oppositional, individual fault that model that liberal 
expectations inadvertently imply.  
 
Senior consultants may be more willing to listen when the nurse’s concerns can be 
understood as part of a collaborative attempt to address patient preferences as well 
as medical need. This conceptual shift to collaboration provides the nurse with a 
justification for voicing concern. Given the deeply embedded adversarial nature of 
mainstream Anglo–American and Commonwealth courtrooms, the adversarial 
model may be a more likely default option than the collaborative model, even in 
courts aspiring to proceed differently.  
 
Care ethics does not preclude identifying individual faults. But it provides an 
alternative way of understanding the problems that arise either through 
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misunderstanding, misapplication of practice, mistakes and unforeseen harms: the 
negative and operational limits of caring. Care ethics allows problems to be 
considered collaboratively, sharing responsibility with others for using limited 
resources most effectively and efficiently. When all participants share these 
expectations of supportive mutual moderation and self-scrutiny, this provides 
legitimacy for participants (even those with less power) to address the more 
powerful, suggesting mistakes might have been made. The best present criminal 
justice example of this is found in the regular review practices of problem-solving 
courts, where it is expected that diligent defence lawyers will identify the judge’s 
mistakes, chiming with Chief Justice Blatz’ expectation (Berman 2000, p.84). Yet 
these practices are limited. Because they do not proceed explicitly under care ethics 
guidelines, there is more room for such an intervention to be negatively 
interpreted, rather than as a collaborative act to support and improve the caring 
response devised by the court and sanctioned by the sentencer. Under present 
practices, particularly practitioner participants may see themselves in oppositional, 
adversarial roles. In American diversionary drug courts, since charges may be 
dropped for compliance, defence lawyers have an incentive to ‘play along’ rather 
than necessarily challenge. From the care perspective, we work together towards 
the shared goal of identifying problems to allow needs-meeting, capability building 
and harm avoidance. This is taken up in Chapter seven, with the regular review 
practices of problem-solving courts.  
 
These review practices do not of themselves address problems, but they imply that 
further action should be taken to remedy the problem, insofar as possible. These 
practices do allow the identification of problems for discussion: was the offender’s 
context properly understood? Will the proposed therapeutic intervention be 
appropriate? Has the offender been treated as an equal? Have the offender’s 
needs, responsibilities and resources/capabilities been considered? 81  Were 
mistakes made applying the law? Was the appropriate procedure followed? 
                                                     
81
 Even if not grounds for mitigation, they may still inform what kind of sentence might help meet 
the offender’s needs and build capabilities, the most obvious being an offence unrelated to the 
offender’s alcoholism, disposed of with a community order including an alcohol support 
requirement. 
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Whether a mainstream courtroom, or a problem-solving review hearing, each 
participant will bring their own skills and knowledge, to contribute to identifying 
problems.  
 
The problems identified, and possibilities for addressing them, can then feed into 
either problem-solving review or, where available, formal institutional oversight 
practices. The informal practices can provide information about where problems 
exist, which problems are more urgent or complex, and propose responses. This 
informal review might for instance provide information about an instance where a 
sentencer’s assessment of their competence appears flawed, or where a sentencer 
should be called on to explain other aspects of their reasoning. Where informal 
review identifies sufficient cause for concern, this might help to identify which cases 
should be subject to review, or assist in providing information about concerns for 
appeal. Finally, a side benefit of explicitly adopting the principles developed from 
care ethics may help to improve policy clarity, which Miller complains is particularly 
lacking in American drug courts, by openly acknowledging that we seek to provide 
community-based caring work (needs-meeting support, capability building for 
healthy living and harm avoidance), which is nonetheless a punishment response to 
an offender.  
 
 
Fit with care ethics principles 
Each of the problem-solving practices discussed focuses holistically (in Miller’s 
terms) on the offender and community together. The literature suggests a subtle 
difference between therapeutic jurisprudence and community justice: community 
justice tends primarily to address community needs, potentially through the 
instrumental route of addressing offender needs; whereas therapeutic 
jurisprudence tends primarily to address offender needs, anticipating instrumental 
community benefits. Yet despite variance in focus, each includes offenders as 
subjects, and seeks their contribution in understanding needs and designing 
responses. This inclusive treatment as equals reflects my core concern in this thesis 
and echoes the responsiveness of care, the aim to include the care-receiver, in this 
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case the offender, in determining the nature of our responses. There is resonance 
here with the past-regarding respectful listening and needs identification principles, 
both of which seek care-receiver (offender) input into information-gathering and 
need identification. When done respectfully, this provides a means of providing 
interactional justice.  
 
By bringing in others with expertise, this helps to broaden the creative 
consideration of available responses. Implicitly, this allows both a broad 
consideration of how a particular need might be met, and provides for sentencers 
concerned about their technical competence to make such decisions with access to 
expert support. As identified above, the care ethics expectations and guidelines 
allow sentencers to receive advice in support of the caring elements of the decision-
making as collaboration. The care ethics principles make explicit this expectation, of 
reflecting on our own competence, and seeking assistance as necessary.  
 
Problem-solving courts seek to involve offenders immediately in this information-
gathering for initial review process, reflecting some of the concerns of the 
cumulative fairness principle. By taking account of the offender’s position, we may 
be able to acknowledge where instances of re-balancing are appropriate, following 
previous prioritization losses. Concerns for community restoration may also help to 
balance the offender’s needs, in their social context, with the distribution of needs 
in the wider community. Again, the inclusion of victims and their needs are not 
actively considered. This also resonates with the principles I have developed from 
care ethics for punishment, since I have argued it is unrealistic to expect victims’ 
needs to be adequately addressed through our response to offenders. This is not to 
deny the importance of victims’ needs, only to suggest that these ought to be given 
proper consideration in their own right, outside of sentencers’ considerations of the 
nature of the offender’s punishment.  
 
Miller argues that supporting addicted offenders in the community rather than 
imprisoning them is a justifiable criminal justice policy aim. Yet American drug 
courts are defined as diversionary. One benefit the care ethics principles can offer is 
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an opportunity to be more honest about the necessity of support for offenders’ 
needs in the criminal justice response. By acknowledging the existing and proper 
role of care in punishment, and approaching caring as such and aiming to care well, 
we have an opportunity to provide open and engaged, better-quality caring.  
 
 
Comparing mainstream decision-making practices 
Chapter four discussed the limitations of mainstream criminal justice processes in 
gathering contextual information about offenders. Mainstream practices prevent 
offenders from sharing information through expressing their personal and social 
context by telling their own stories, as they see and understand the details. In 
recent years, mainstream victim inclusion has improved. Victim liaison staff help to 
keep victims informed of legal processes. The needs-meeting that exists for victims 
is partly through restorative means, which will be discussed in Chapter seven. 
Mainstream sentencing may seeks to avoid further harm through deterrent effects 
and offender rehabilitation, which can involve meeting needs. Yet mainstream 
decision-making considers needs as defined by the justice system, rather than 
individual offenders. Mainstream practices provide due process protections, but 
limit information-gathering, thereby reducing the capability of sentencers to be 
aware of offender narratives around both needs and potential further harms.  
 
The motivation of mainstream information-gathering practices is offender 
punishment and rehabilitation, and offenders are the sole subject. The concern of 
mainstream practice may be to the offenders’ benefit, the community’s benefit, or 
a combination of both. But often the practical question this produces is how to 
allocate offenders into existing programmes, rather than designing rehabilitation 
based on offender needs. A 2002 UK Social Exclusion Unit report notes that 
sentence-planning allocated prisoners to available programmes rather than what 
they needed (2002, p.40), and ‘rationed’ access rather than informing the 
development of programmes to ensure access for all needing support (2002, p.43). 
These approaches fail to meet needs responsively. Some progress on operational 
difficulties has been made since 2002. The report noted the lack of suitable IT 
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systems and problems transferring paper records (2002, p.41). An IT system was 
introduced across the prison and probation services in England & Wales in 2003, 
although this brought its own difficulties (Mair et al. 2006). 
 
While mainstream rehabilitative efforts may intend benefiting the community and 
offender, either insufficient attention is paid to individual offenders’ needs in 
context, or this information is not or cannot be acted upon for the environmental or 
operational reasons discussed in Chapter 7. It makes a difference that we consider 
the offender’s needs as an equal human being who is also harmed by the offence. 
This is possible in mainstream sentencing, but not procedurally necessary, whereas 
for restorative justice and in problem-solving courts, repairing harms and meeting 
offender needs is an explicit fundamental principle, if not always realized. In 
restorative justice and problem-solving courts, offenders’ needs are seen as 
essential information. In mainstream processes these needs are regarded as 
optional additional information, sometimes helpful, as illustrated in the ability of 
sentencers to disregard pre-sentence reports.  
 
The mainstream information source includes information raised at trial and in the 
written or verbal pre-sentence reports made by probation workers. I have raised a 
concern that this information is mediated to sentencers by probation workers, and 
that sentencers draw their own conclusions without further input from the 
offender, who is silenced at this stage. The literature also documents concerns 
around the level of personal contextual information included about offenders 
(Hudson 1996, p.156; Field 2006, p.537; Nash 2011, p.479), the value placed on 
reports by sentencers (Ashworth 2010, p.380; Tata 2010, p.245), who may choose 
not to request or to disregard a report, and the risk that the information in 
prepared in advance reports is out of date (Ashworth 2010, p.381). While this may 
not be as inclusive in practice as the supporters of restorative justice approaches 
claim, the importance and inclusion of these views is explicitly recognized. Presently 
I shall sketch a proposal allowing sentencers to hear offenders directly, and for 
supporting offenders in articulating their personal situation to sentencers, drawing 
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on the principles of care ethics and the insights of bottom-up approaches to 
criminal justice.  
 
The restorative justice model uses a decision-making process of discussion and 
agreement between all the interested parties. Restorative justice and problem-
solving courts practices, and pre-sentence reports, may include expert advice. 
Bottom-up sentencers may consider and reject circle agreements, expert and 
offender views in problem-solving courts and pre-sentence report 
recommendations. But there is an important difference between mainstream 
sentencers narrowly following or dismissing received expert advice, and a problem-
solving court approach, which allows sentencers to engage directly with experts and 
offenders and discuss recommendations over a period of time. Sole power is held 
transparently by mainstream sentencers. With mainstream decision-making, 
contextual information and expert perspectives tend to be valued implicitly and 
instrumentally, making consideration of how and when to include these more 
difficult. Restorative justice and problem-solving courts tend to make these 
concerns more explicit and provide practices designed to uncover them. 
 
Sentencers ultimately hold authority for sentencing. This is less transparent in 
bottom-up approaches, since information-gathering and interpreting powers are 
shared with other parties. Yet even approaches focusing on mutually agreed 
outcomes between the parties, such as restorative circle sentencing, ultimately hold 
sentencers responsible for the fitness of the sentence passed. Firstly, this provides 
clarity about where challenges to decision-making should be directed. Secondly, 
public officials make sentencing decisions as representatives of the state. The 
community, through the state representative, responds to the offence in a way that 
offers appropriate, proportional censure. It is legally and symbolically important 
that this communication should come through a sentencer with appropriate 
authority, and not from another person. This follows both the usual and my 
procedural definition of punishment; there is no administrative reason why state 
agents could not be restorative conference facilitators. This might however conflict 
with the neutral facilitation principles of restorative justice. In some cases police 
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officers act as facilitators. Such practices are criticized as threatening facilitator 
neutrality and process accountability (Roche 2004, p.19, p.223).  
 
Restorative justice and problem-solving courts make steps forward from 
mainstream sentencing, since there is greater opportunity to include victims and 
offenders as equals. The moral reasoning approach of care could enhance this by 
explicitly mandating holistic attentiveness and openness to both sets of needs or 
problems, as interconnected issues for interdependent parties. Mainstream 
punishments seek to balance harms caused by the offender with harms meted out 
to the offender, which can both cause harm and fail to meet needs. The balancing 
of needs-meeting was introduced in Chapter 2 as implicit in care ethics. This 
balances harms associated with the offence, with the available needs-meeting 
resources for offender, victim and community. Restorative justice and problem-
solving courts endeavour to appropriately respect individuals and seek to match 
needs to needs-meeting, whereas care allows us to balance needs-meeting and 
harm avoidance according to the individual situations and experiences of the 
parties involved. For bottom-up processes sentencers are involved in practices that 
explicitly seek to avoid further harms and meet needs. Sentencer involvement 
provides a better chance to develop a fuller understanding of the information, than 
a sentencer receiving a pre-sentence. 
 
 
What do we learn about the principles?  
What does this tell us about the principles proposed by care? We have seen that 
the decision-making and informing stages of restorative circle sentencing are 
reasonably aligned with the first two pairs of principles proposed in chapter four:  
 
1. The information-gathering pair:  
a) Respectful Listening; 
b) Needs Identification. 
 
2. The response-designing pair:  
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a) Creative Consideration; 
b) Cumulative Fairness. 
 
We have also seen some concerns about restorative circle sentencing: that equal 
treatment within the circle may not provide treatment as equals in the light of 
social inequalities. There is also concern that victims’ needs may be ignored or 
unduly light sentences agreed to meet a primary concern for community harmony, 
or that sentencers may disregard circle agreements. I suggest above, following 
Roche, that these concerns might be partly addressed by improvements in 
accountability and transparency: by allowing for sentencers to be challenged to 
explain decisions to move away from circle agreements, allowing sentencers to 
protect victims and provide appropriate sentencing. This follows the self-scrutiny 
practices of review that I have argued are implicitly internal to care practices, and 
are covered in the cumulative fairness (and response analysis) principles proposed 
in Chapter two and four. 
 
As we saw in Chapter two, the expectations care ethics around information-
gathering, encouraging the most complete information collection available (in the 
light of negative limitations) and to respond in a timely manner. This furthers the 
ends of caring competently (Tronto 1993, p.133). Respectful listening, a specific 
means of information-gathering reflecting the open engagement attitude of care, 
allows us to treat offenders as equals, and supply interactional justice. The 
principles in Chapter four indicate contextual information-gathering through 
respectful listening. Care ethics provides not just a way of valuing contextual 
information and respectful means of access, but a procedural direction that we seek 
this information and incorporate this into decision-making in the creative 
consideration principle. However care ethics and the principles I have derived 
expects that negative and operational limits will frustrate what we are able to do. 
Care ethics responds with review processes, made explicit in Chapter two, intended 
to minimize harms and maximize good practical caring work. Review processes are 
present in the cumulative fairness (and response analysis) principles. Initial and 
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ongoing review does not offer failsafe protection, but is in line with restorative 
justice and problem-solving court aims, and may help strengthen these practices. 
 
Making explicit the review processes (identified in the cumulative fairness and 
response analysis principles) raises the profile of self-scrutiny and supportive 
mutual-moderation practices. In Chapter two I argued that these practices are 
internally implicit in care ethics, which expect competent caring work to be 
practiced with integrity. Because these are internal requirements of ‘good’ practical 
caring work, it is a problem of both principle and practice if these review elements 
are missed or poorly applied. Existing bottom-up practices seem to lack explicit 
review of caring practices qua caring. Ultimately, all review practices, explicit and 
implicit, formal and informal, are restricted by human error. 
 
I have discussed the practices of community justice, therapeutic jurisprudence and 
problem-solving courts together as overlapping and related practices. We have seen 
that the discursive practices used to explore needs and to consider responses are 
reasonably in tune with the respectful listening and needs identification principles 
advanced in this thesis. Across all three there is a concern that victim’s needs may 
be side-lined in attempts to address offenders’ needs. This is a problem for 
practices that claim to include victims. Victims’ needs are not well covered by the 
care ethics informed approach I have developed. However, I have argued that 
punishment responses are directed to offenders, and are therefore not necessarily 
sufficient or appropriate for meeting victims’ needs. While it is preferable to have 
offender input to needs-meeting for victims, since offenders bear some 
responsibility for the harms caused, victims’ needs should also be acknowledged 
and addressed by communities, external to the practice of punishing offenders in 
response to their offence. Further, sentencers should avoid aggravating victims’ 
needs, frustrating external needs-meeting for victims, and where appropriate and 
possible facilitate the offender’s role in needs-meeting for victims. As Braithwaite 
argues, offenders’ apology and victims’ forgiveness are both gifts that lose their 
meaning if required (2002b, p.570).  
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The principles of creative consideration and the initial review of cumulative fairness 
are also echoed. Problem-solving court practices discuss potential responses to 
offending with offenders and involve systematic review procedures, which resonate 
with the review present in responses analysis and will be considered in Chapter 
seven. There are concerns about problem-solving courts as an informal process, 
including due process, lack of consistent application and effective oversight. There 
are further concerns about coercion, which will be explored in greater detail in 
Chapter seven. I have suggested that the principles I propose may help to make the 
implicit, caring intentions of these practices more explicit. This may help to provide 
clarity about the aims of the practice, and empower participants to work together.  
 
We have seen that these bottom-up alternative means of responding to offenders 
are reasonably well in line with the first two pairs of principles, covering the 
information-gathering and response-designing phases of responding to offenders. 
These practices are not free from problems, however, I have suggested ways in 
which the care principles might help to address these weaknesses, in line with 
inclusive, problem-solving principles. Yet it is important to note that the principles 
derived from care cannot provide a failsafe way of preventing these problems. I 
have suggested that care principles provide a way of encouraging sentencer 
reflection on competence, and of reviewing the available options through self-
scrutiny and supportive mutual-moderation, to help identify unforeseen harms.  
 
The principles I propose make initial and ongoing review explicit. These are internal 
to the practice of good caring, as checking mirrors and responding accordingly, is to 
good driving. Failure to perform a competence consideration in the self-scrutiny 
practices of initial and ongoing review is a failure of good caring practices, just as 
failure to check mirrors is a failure of good driving practices. This review is part of 
the care-giver’s or driver’s practice, not an external practice to caring or driving, as 
the appeal process is external to the practice of sentencing. The formal review and 
appeal processes in mainstream criminal justice are external to the practices of 
punishment decision-making and delivery, and more closely resemble the oversight 
of a traffic police officer observing the drivers’ procedures.  
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A failure to check mirrors should cause the driver to be concerned about their 
competence to practice. Likewise, a failure of review in care practices is cause for 
concern in itself. Mainstream review processes have fewer such triggers. Like the 
traffic officer, there is no cause for concern if they happen to be looking one way 
rather than another. The information gathered through the informal, internal 
mechanisms of self-scrutiny and mutual moderation could be used to inform and 
target mainstream procedural review processes; in the driving analogy, helping the 
traffic officer know where to look.  
 
The mainstream alternative to these bottom-up practices, and the principles I have 
drawn from care ethics, similarly cannot guarantee a perfectly reliable system, since 
all criminal justice responses are created and employed by fallible human beings. 
Mainstream sentencing information-gathering and response-design is not free from 
error, but its strength is that it has a formalized process which enables challenge on 
procedural grounds. The weakness of mainstream processes is that they also 
formalize non-interference and equal treatment, which as we saw in restorative 
circle sentencing, does not always deliver inclusive treatment as equals. This 
excludes and silences offenders, depriving sentencers of hearing directly from 
offenders themselves and restricting sentencers’ understanding of offenders’ 
contexts. Including the principles of care in mainstream responses would make 
criminal responses more complex and nuanced, but this would also allow for 
greater proportionality, taking account of both offence and offender.  
 
Mainstream processes allow formal procedural review. This process can be 
strengthened through the initial and ongoing review stages of the principles 
developed in Chapter Four. These review practices may help to provide information 
about limits and shortcomings for these processes, and to help direct where they 
might be most productively applied. No system designed and delivered by human 
beings can be infallible, but applying care ethics guidance within the mainstream 
may help to strengthen existing review mechanisms while also providing 
opportunities to treat offenders as equals and deliver interactional justice.  
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Treatment as equals 
How far then do these separate practices of information-gathering succeed in 
including offenders as equals? Certainly this is an objective of all practices, including 
mainstream practices, but I have argued that this is not as always as well achieved 
as we might hope. Circle sentencing restorative justice practices provide equal 
treatment, allowing each person a chance to speak, often by using a talking piece 
passed around the circle. But social inequalities outside the circle may still affect the 
ability of participants to speak when called upon. Community justice, therapeutic 
jurisprudence and problem-solving sentences each attempt to include the 
offender’s voice, including motivational interviewing techniques. But to an extent, 
how far this is possible depends on the personal traits (and training) of the 
sentencer. While personal traits and ‘charisma’ are not transferrable, learnable 
skills, the attitude of care, that of open engagement, may go some way to help 
replicate this quality. In Chapter seven, we will also see that all practices draw on 
the designing in of diversity in the hope of increasing the chance of challenges to 
mistakes and poor practice. The processes employed by mainstream practices to 
gather information were discussed in Chapter four, and I have argued may serve to 
exclude, silence and objectify offenders, despite seeking to respect the offender’s 
equal dignity through non-interference. From the perspective of care ethics, there is 
still no guarantee that individuals will be treated as equals, since all practices are 
vulnerable to human error. The care ethics principles focus on respectful listening 
when gathering information through open and engaged dialogue. This specifically 
respectful attitude and approach allows an opportunity for treatment as equals and 
interactional justice. The initial review practices direct self-scrutiny and mutual 
moderation (available in bottom-up practices) providing some checking that these 
principles are followed. These internal informal review practices increase the 
chances of early identification of failures of treatment as equals over formal review 
processes, since the informal processes are internal to the punishment decision-
making practice, and can help to avoid exclusion and silencing. The key points of 
each of the approaches considered here, and their ability to treat offenders as 
equals, is summarized in a table overleaf.   
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Key comparisons 
 Motivation 
 
Subject Concern Information source Power Treatment as 
equal? 
Restorative 
justice 
(circle 
sentencing) 
Responding to 
harm caused 
 
Persons involved: 
victims & offenders, 
their supporters 
(communities of 
care), community 
leaders in circle 
sentencing 
 
Restoring social 
harmony 
Equal discussions of 
the circle and 
negotiated agreement 
Shared equally by circle 
participants, yet 
sentencer has authority 
and responsibility to 
impose ‘fit’ sentence  
 
As equal 
treatment within 
circle, 
undermined by 
unequal social 
status 
Community 
justice 
Empowermen
t of local 
people to 
address local 
problems 
Offender and 
her/his personal 
problems 
Empowering 
communities to 
achieve public safety 
Affected parties: victim 
& offender, may 
include contextual 
detail 
Held by local people, 
whose concerns direct 
policy priorities, yet 
sentencers still steer the 
process and ultimately 
determine punishment 
 
Attempted, 
although 
unequal social 
status may 
undermine 
inclusion 
Therapeutic 
jurisprudence 
Court 
processes can 
and should 
have a 
therapeutic 
effect 
Offender The problems 
underlying her/his 
offending behaviour – 
secondary goal of 
community benefit 
 
Offender (expert in 
personal difficulty, eg 
addiction); external 
specialist (addiction 
treatment clinician) 
Offender ‘ownership’ of 
treatment process. 
Sentencers aims for 
negotiated agreement, 
but has ultimate 
authority 
Inclusion 
attempted, but 
need not be 
respectful (see 
Miethe et al. 
2000, pp.536–7) 
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 Motivation 
 
Subject Concern Information Source Power Treatment as 
equal? 
Problem-
solving courts 
Address 
offenders 
underlying 
problems for 
their own well-
being, while 
promoting 
community 
quality-of-life 
 
Offender The offender’s 
underling 
problems 
(considered 
holistically), with 
expected 
improvement to 
community 
quality-of-life 
Offender, variety of 
external specialists, 
criminal justice staff 
Shared by offender and 
sentencer, who 
endeavours to build 
consensus, although 
sentencers hold ultimate 
authority 
Attempted but is 
somewhat 
dependent on 
personality of 
sentencer 
Access to 
mainstream 
rehabilitative  
provision 
 
Offender 
punishment and 
rehabilitation 
Offender May be the 
offenders’ benefit, 
the community’s 
benefit, or a 
combination. 
 
information raised at trial, 
pre-sentence reports 
Held transparently by 
sentencers 
Not guaranteed, 
silencing and 
objectification 
risked 
Care ethics 
principles 
Meeting basic 
needs, building 
capabilities, 
avoiding 
unnecessary 
harm 
respectfully and 
responsively; 
where meeting 
needs will likely 
include repairing 
harm 
Offender, 
understood in 
the personal and 
social context 
(those parts of 
the offender’s 
narrative which 
they deem 
important). 
Meeting basic 
needs, building 
capabilities, 
avoiding 
unnecessary 
harm, repairing 
harms 
Offender initially, we take 
seriously people’s stories 
about what they need to 
live well (Sevenhuijsen 
1998, p.60).  
Support with needs-
meeting and capabilities 
building sought from 
specially skilled 
practitioners where 
possible 
Care-givers are 
necessarily in a position 
of power over care-
receivers, as sentencers 
and practitioners are 
over offenders. Good 
care-givers do not abuse 
their power, and are 
sensitive to the effects of 
power, as Liebling 
observes the best prison 
officers are (2000, p.346) 
Focus on 
respectful 
listening helps to 
encourage 
treatment as 
equals 
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Decision-making proposal: pre-sentence dialogue 
This proposal endeavours to bring the individual-focused ‘problem-understanding’, 
information-gathering element of circle sentencing and problem-solving justice into 
the mainstream criminal process, and is intended as a starting point for policy 
debate. Pre-sentence dialogue in place of pre-sentence reports would allow 
sentencers an opportunity to hear offenders’ personal context through listening to 
offenders’ narrative first-hand once guilt has been admitted or determined. This 
maintains due process protections of current trials. While problem-solving courts 
with regular reviews might be considered a gold-standard, regular review is neither 
economically achievable nor necessary for all offenders: the North Liverpool 
Community Justice Centre does not use in-depth problem-solving review to inform 
all sentencing. 
 
Pre-sentence dialogue would allow sentencers to spend time (perhaps limited to 
two hours) talking with offenders who choose to participate. We must acknowledge 
that not all offenders will be willing to co-operate, or ready to accept and address 
personal problems. To be credible, pre-sentence dialogue must be voluntary, with 
pre-sentence reports available as a fall-back option, providing contextual 
information about offenders who prefer not to engage. While we must 
communicate that offenders’ engagement is welcomed and encouraged, and offer 
information about how to seek help later, decisions not to participate must be 
respected. Pre-sentence dialogue has three benefits: sentencers access 
instrumentally useful information about offenders directly and so can seek 
clarification. Hearing the parts of their narrative that offenders’ consider relevant 
and important provides a means to recognize the intrinsic value of the offenders’ 
lived experience of their own position. When done respectfully this provides 
interactional justice and treatment as equals.  
 
Such dialogue with offenders will be easier within a trusting environment. 
Relationships are ideal for building trust, and much of the best quality care is 
provided within the context of long-term relationships. Relationships are unlikely to 
develop in a one-off session with a sentencer. Trust can be developed in other 
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ways. At the North Liverpool Community Justice Centre, the courtroom is a light and 
less formal space. The dock is positioned next to the bench, and when standing, 
defendants of average height were at eye level with the seated judge.82 Mair & 
Millings note that this was commented upon by many of their respondents, and ‘led 
offenders to feel less threatened and more involved in the process’ (Mair & Millings 
2011, p.77). Environmental changes can help to foster trust and become more 
important in the absence of relationships. A private, informal setting may help make 
an offender comfortable exploring personal problems within a small group, rather 
than in an extended problem-solving meeting or in open court.  
 
Building trust is only part of the sentencer’s role. Secondly, the sentencer must be 
able to interpret offenders’ verbal and non-verbal communication, especially where 
the offender lacks confidence or is unable to articulate themselves clearly. Training 
must be provided to help sentencers to engage with, and understand, offenders, 
and to help them to build this information into their sentencing decisions. This 
might include specific training in motivational interviewing techniques, active 
listening skills and basic counselling skills to help encourage and support the 
offender in exploring their situation. While the sentencer tries to persuade the 
offender to engage and consider problems in relation to their own goals, this is 
done through rational argument. 
 
The fair, efficient and non-confrontational conduct of staff at problem-solving 
community courts like the North Liverpool Community Justice Centre (Mair & 
Millings 2011, p.77) contributed to encouraging offenders to engage. Offenders 
must be allowed time and space to speak, and made to feel that their views are 
valued and their engagement important and welcome. Although offenders will be 
bound by the eventual sentence passed and are not in control of its content, Winick 
also stresses the importance of the offender’s choice to engage in problem-solving 
to their ultimate success (2003, p.183, p.187). This will take sentencers time, but 
may offer a time-saving over the total time for preparing and reading pre-sentence 
                                                     
82
 Personal observation from an informal visit made to the North Liverpool Community Justice Centre 
in 2011. 
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reports; not to mention potential for saving future court time, if we can more 
accurately help offenders avoid further offending. This is a big ‘if’, but this 
aspiration is included in all punishments with deterrent or reformative elements. As 
Benhabib observes, ‘more knowledge rather than less contributes to a more 
rational and informed judgment’ (1986, p.417). 
 
The act of listening can be empowering of itself (Koggel 1998, p.53; Pranis 2002, 
p.30; Braithwaite 2002b, p.564). Simply making time to speak with the offender and 
explain processes (providing ‘informational justice’ (Kumar et al. 2009, p.147)), or 
listening to what offenders have to say and engaging with rather than disregarding 
offenders’ contributions (the ‘quality of treatment’ (Bottoms & Tankebe 2012, 
p.121) component of interactional justice) can go some way towards providing an 
atmosphere in which an offender might feel more comfortable in discussing their 
personal lives. This respectful treatment and process explanation is the minimal 
interactional justice necessary for treatment as equals. As Tyler notes, quality of 
treatment is important for procedural justice (Tyler 2003, p.300). The value to 
offenders can be seen in these North Liverpool Community Justice Centre offender 
observations:  
 
‘They pay more attention and they seem interested in what you 
say, even the bizzies83 here treat you with respect’  
(offender respondent 28, Mair & Millings 2011, p.77).  
 
 
‘[I]t’s all explained and I know what's gone on … I’ve learned 
something today and had my say’  
(offender respondent 36, Mair & Millings 2011, p.78). 
 
 
‘They take time here ... you can calm down and work through it’ 
(offender respondent 39, Mair & Millings 2011, p.78).  
 
                                                     
83
 As a native of Merseyside, I understand this to be a local term for the police. Mair & Millings 
confirm the permanent presence of police teams at the Centre as part of the co-location of Criminal 
Justice Agencies (2011, p.8).  
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Similar experiences are reflected in offenders’ comments from McIvor’s study of 
Scottish drug courts: 
 
‘[Y]ou can talk to [the sentencer] the way you speak to anybody ... 
you can tell him if things are not working out’  
(2009, p.41). 
 
‘[The Sheriff will] listen to your point of view ... He looks through 
the addiction ... and sees the person’  
(2009, p.41) . 
 
‘I’m getting treated now like a human being and an equal’  
(2009, p.43). 
 
As a separate side benefit, there is reason to believe compliance with sentences 
might be strengthened when individuals feel they have been treated as equals. As 
Tyler observes, and his broader research is accepted to have shown (Bottoms & 
Tankebe 2012, p.169): ‘[i]n the context of particular encounters with police officers 
and judges, people are more likely to consent and cooperate if they feel that they 
have been fairly treated’ (Tyler 2003, p.286).  
 
Following restorative practices, offenders might be permitted to choose a personal 
supporter: a friend or family member, an existing support worker, even a court-
appointed social or probation worker where support is preferred but the offender is 
unable to suggest a suitable person. Offenders must be permitted to speak for 
themselves, subject to normative limits identified in Chapter four pp.201-3, unless 
their express wish is to correct the story-telling of another (perhaps where ill health 
prevents offenders from speaking for sustained periods). Selected supporters who 
cannot be expected to act supportively (eg known abusers or manipulators of the 
offender; drug dealers; abusive partners) or are potentially legally inappropriate (eg 
co-defendants) may be rejected. Where there are mental health or addiction 
concerns, a treatment practitioner should be available to the offender (eg 
Community Psychiatric Nurse, Mental Health Advocate, or other key worker). This 
individual should provide any necessary care or support during the discussion and 
be able to offer an ‘expert’ knowledgeable view of the offender’s condition. Where 
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the practitioner is known to the offender, they may also be able to help with 
information about how the condition affects the offender as an individual, where 
the offender chooses to disclose this information. Legal advisers should also be 
present, to ensure their client is empowered to express their own narrative, and to 
protect their interests since, just as during a trial, what their clients say has a direct 
impact on the client’s future (Nash 2011, p.476). 
 
Support and encouragement can facilitate discussion, active listening (reflecting 
others’ speech to check understandings) can help both to allow the other to feel 
included, and support the offender in articulating their personal context, including 
needs. Since criminal behaviours cause harm they should, following Engster’s aims 
of care, be deterred. All punishments will carry some deterrent value in that they 
are imposed. Punishment is more than just caring. But by listening to the offender’s 
personal context, the sentencer is able to provide a more accurate, individually 
tailored punishment. This can provide both censure for the offence since harm-
causing behaviours should be deterred, which is nonetheless sensitive to the 
offender’s existing needs. This acknowledges the role of caring in punishment 
practices, helps to meet needs and build capabilities for the offender, potentially to 
the benefit of the community, and may help to avoid further harms both to the 
offender and others.  
 
 
Conclusion 
I have outlined above the how the principles drawn from care might help structure 
interactions between sentencers and offenders in order to include the offender as 
an equal. These same principles, and similar practices, might also be followed on a 
smaller scale during punishment delivery. Reflecting on concerns such as building 
trust, and encouraging offenders’ speech and engagement through sensitivity to 
practitioners’ power, might also help keep trust and information flowing (Straub et 
al. 2011, pp.iv–v), as necessary for safe and effective punishment practices. As 
Liebling observes, ‘role model’ prison officers are sensitive to the effects of their 
power (2000, p.346). Bearing these concerns in mind could also help to avoid 
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causing harm to the offender during their punishment through unintentionally 
silencing them. I turn now to consider bottom-up practices of punishment-delivery. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
 
Punishing with care: punishment in practice 
 
 
Chapter six focused on sentencing decision-making in bottom-up approaches of 
restorative justice and problem-solving courts. This chapter considers sentence 
delivery for these approaches and the fit with the principles derived from the values 
and moral reasoning approach of care ethics. The strengths and weaknesses of 
these practices, considered in view of the similarities and differences between 
these practices and the principles I propose, will give an indication of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the principles developed from care ethics. Chapter six primarily 
considered the first two pairs in relation to punishment decision-making, the final 
pair will be more important in this chapter: 
 
1. The information-gathering pair:  
a) Respectful Listening; 
b) Needs Identification. 
 
2. The response-designing pair:  
a) Creative Consideration; 
b) Cumulative Fairness. 
 
3. Present-focused, harm-avoiding pair:  
a) Punishing With Care; 
b) Response Analysis. 
 
However, concerns around information-gathering, and personal and social holistic 
consideration of responses (sentences) design will still be relevant, given the 
blurred distinction in problem-solving practices between the initial problem review 
and ongoing review as part of punishment delivery. 
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Restorative justice sentences 
Chapter six considered the practice of circle sentencing, as one example of face-to-
face restorative justice practices used as information-gathering mechanisms to 
inform sentencing. Circle sentencing practices use restorative principles and 
discussion to inform a sentence which is ordered by the court and, once confirmed 
by the sentencer, is legally binding. We saw that these practices parallel the 
concerns of care ethics in theory, even going further in some cases. Yet sometimes 
they fall short in practice and may mask some needs, failing to realize their promise. 
Here I discuss restorative justice conferencing, where this is ordered by a court, 
following a mainstream trial as part of sentence.  
 
Restorative justice conferencing was introduced in Chapter 3 (pp.149-50). To briefly 
recap, facilitators ask victims and then offenders in turn to recount events leading 
up to, and of, the offence. Victims then offenders each describe the subsequent 
impact on their lives. After both victim and offender have spoken, other parties are 
invited to contribute. Finally, facilitators direct discussions towards agreeing how to 
repair the harm. The offender’s participation in the restorative conference is 
required as a part of their sentence, for example, the ‘specified activity’ 
requirement of community orders in England & Wales may include restorative 
justice practices. Restorative justice activities, such as conferencing, may be ordered 
by sentencers, requiring the offender to take part in the activity as part of their 
sentence. One example is the ‘specified activity’ requirement of community orders. 
Agreements produced during restorative conferences are not usually legally binding 
of themselves (Shapland et al. 2011, pp.101–2) but offer opportunities for 
voluntarily making and accepting apologies (although not in all cases). 
 
Restorative justice conferencing aims to provide offenders and victims with equal 
chances to speak, to explain feelings, discuss facts and contribute to an agreement. 
Hudson notes the ‘openness’ of restorative justice conferencing to ‘story telling’ 
(Hudson 2003b, p.192), providing an opportunity to allow offenders and victims to 
narrate their contexts, for themselves, expressing feelings, problems and needs. 
This provides an opportunity to understand the offence and the harms and 
292 
 
associated needs for offenders and victims, through personal context, by attending 
to sections of individuals’ narratives. This is important since victims are often 
reported as seeking an opportunity to tell their story or to be heard (Miller 2011, 
pp.160–3; Shapland et al. 2011, pp.100–2). Story telling allows individuals to 
emphasize particular details, and explain the effects of the past on their present 
lives. This also allows victims to encounter offenders as concrete persons, not 
simply as threatening: ‘restorative justice helps people to see the offender not 
necessarily as a nasty person’ (2011, p.106, p.111).  
 
When restorative justice works well, it can provide opportunities for victims to find 
closure (Sherman & Strang 2007, p.64; Ministry of Justice 2012b, p.1). Shapland et 
al. report that closure may also be achieved for offenders (2011, pp.164–5), and cite 
Jo-Anne Wemmers & Katie Cyr as suggesting that allowing victims and offenders to 
meet and talk, has therapeutic potential of itself (2005, p.531). Sherman & Strang 
report that ‘in many tests, offenders who receive restorative justice commit fewer 
repeat crimes’ compared to mainstream responses, and in ‘no large-sample test has 
restorative justice increased repeat offending’ (2007, p.88). These findings echo the 
analysis of Shapland et al. (2011, p.170). The smaller costs associated with reduced 
reoffending offset the cost of conferencing, making the process value for money 
(2011, p.170); while reducing repeat offending at least as well, if not better, than 
more expensive short prison sentences (Sherman & Strang 2007, p.88). Victims 
reported benefits including reduced post-traumatic stress symptoms and decreased 
desire for revenge (Shapland et al. 2011, pp.170–1). Yet there is a danger that 
restorative justice becomes a ‘tick-box’ exercise (Sherman & Strang 2007, p.21)., 
and seeking reconciliation by any means may come at the victim’s expense, as we 
saw for circle sentencing. 
 
Restorative justice targets the restoring of victims and the repair of harm. Avoiding 
aggravating harm, or causing further harms, is implied as counter-productive to 
restorative ends. While restorative justice can deliver in part on the first principles 
of identifying needs through respectful listening, this is weakened when parties’ 
voices are unequal in practice, resulting in exclusion, coercion or oppression. There 
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are no guarantees of full exploration of offender and victim needs or avoiding 
subordinating the interests of one party. There are no consequences should 
offenders fail to keep the agreement. While offenders must usually accept guilt and 
responsibility for harm, they are not required to apologize. The potential benefits 
are not necessarily realized: a 1993 study of youth justice conferencing in New 
Zealand found that as many as 25% of victims reported feeling worse as a result of 
the conference. The same study, however, found 59% of victims felt better, and 
other studies have found much higher satisfaction rates among victims and 
offenders (Maxwell & Morris 1993, pp.118–9).  
 
Satisfaction is difficult to measure and interpret since this deals subjectively with 
how well personal expectations are met (Shapland et al. 2011, p.29). Comparisons 
between restorative justice and mainstream responses to cases disputed in court 
are problematic since court processes include a fact-finding element (Daly 2005, 
p.167). Victim dissatisfaction may be caused by un-met expectations, 
communication problems, or by offenders’ refusal to apologize. Providing 
participants with information about what to expect during and after conferences 
can both improve satisfaction and informed consent (Maxwell & Morris 1993, 
p.118, p.121; Shapland et al. 2011, p.140). Facilitators may undertake to keep 
victims informed of offenders’ efforts, although Shapland et al. report 
communication failures in practice. This decreases victim satisfaction, by implying 
that offenders reneged on agreements (2011, p.29). 
 
Criticism 
The previous chapter showed that restorative justice practices do not always fully 
realize their potential to acknowledge and address the needs of victims and 
offenders in sentencing decision-making. Despite restorative justice facilitator-
provided procedural fairness, allowing each party to speak, the parties are not 
necessarily heard on the same terms. Similar concerns mentioned in the literature 
are re-victimization and the side-lining of victims’ concerns in restorative 
conferencing and mediation. Hudson raises the opposite complaint that in our 
concern to protect victims’ interests, as the already wronged party, we risk treating 
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the offender’s rights as nothing (2003b, p.187). For this reason Hudson argues 
restorative justice should abandon any claims of ‘even-handedness … to victims and 
offenders, it should define itself more clearly as victim-centred reparative justice’ 
(2003b, p.187). Both are concerns that the poor application of restorative justice 
ideals may result in exclusion or coercion. This fails to treat offenders (and victims) 
as equals, and may cause additional harms.  
 
Hudson criticizes the balancing of victims’ rights with respect for offenders as too 
vague, arguing this fails to keep the rights and interests of the parties in balance. 
The prioritization of concrete contextual information in care ethics might help 
improve on the vagueness Hudson criticizes. The classical liberal perspective 
communicates respect for rationality/dignity for the generalized other through non-
interference. Contrastingly, care ethics and relational perspectives offer dignified 
treatment, based on an understanding of respect which acknowledges connection 
and prioritizes concrete contextual information about the other. To have equal 
concern and respect for the other suggests taking an interest in those relationally 
connected with us and their wellbeing, an insight Llewellyn attributes to care 
theorists and communitarians. ‘Once we recognize that selves are relational’, 
Llewellyn argues, ‘it becomes clear that to respect [others] requires some 
knowledge and concern for their needs and aims’ (2012, p.94). This permits 
considering each offender and victim in their personal and social context. A 
contextual focus allows us to recognize the force of the argument for prioritizing 
victims’ rights, without having to accept this as always appropriate, thereby 
diminishing offenders’ rights. In Chapter four I further noted the roll a principles of 
protecting the vulnerable might play in balancing victim and offender needs when 
they conflict. 
 
Braithwaite & Strang argue oppression issues, such as coercion, or silencing and 
exclusion of weaker parties, are best addressed by designing diversity into 
restorative conferences,84 through the inclusion of many different participants and 
                                                     
84
 Similar to the information-gathering practices of sentencing circles, since they include a variety of 
participants, each of whom have an opportunity to speak. 
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perspectives. This, they argue, increases the chances that one participant will 
challenge the discrimination of another, by asking to hear the excluded voice 
(Braithwaite & Strang 2000, p.205), thus enabling equal participation. Since this 
cannot be guaranteed, facilitators should step in as a last resort (2002, p.566), 
echoing Chief Justice Blatz’ related expectation that voices will be raised against 
poor decisions in problem-solving courts. Bruce Winick also argues that processes 
can be structured to minimize problems of offender coercion in problem-solving 
courts, both seen in Chapter six.  
 
What is needed to shore up Braithwaite & Strang’s hoped-for protection through 
designing diversity in to conferences is a way of explicitly monitoring whether 
oppression and exclusion have been avoided, and a commitment to addressing 
problems detected, where possible. The internal review processes (initial and 
ongoing) in the principles drawn from care ethics may, however, help to strengthen 
this practice. Care ethics cannot offer a failsafe method. But because the approach 
explicitly acknowledges the potential for problems, it can take steps to acknowledge 
and address unavoidable harms. The initial and ongoing review processes present in 
the cumulative fairness and response analysis principles may help to strengthen 
restorative justice practice by making explicit review ideals. Explicit expectations of 
self-scrutiny and supportive mutual moderation could assist participants in 
providing respectful, non-discriminatory listening.  
 
For example, restorative justice participants could be encouraged to actively reflect 
on and self-scrutinize their own participation, to consider their contributions in the 
holistic context of the conference and to help identify misunderstandings between 
participants. Participants could provide mutual moderation by actively reflecting on 
the contributions of others. This could help identify negative limits (shortfalls, 
conflict) to be actively prioritized so that all participants are conscious of the 
implications of their agreement; and allows reflection on, and identification of, 
operational limits (potential harms to victims, risks of infantilizing offenders). This 
might help to constructively identify potential problems, such as the further 
exclusion and oppression of victims. This care ethics practice makes Braithwaite & 
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Strang’s expectations that diversity will provide challenges to discrimination explicit 
to participants, and offers a structure for engaging in the practice, rather than 
relying on individuals to independently and spontaneously identify and challenge 
the oppression of others. Under the expectations of care ethics, participants are 
more clearly working towards a shared goal, and negotiating complexity 
collaboratively, rather than in adversarial opposition. I return to this in 
consideration of the fit of bottom-up practices with care ethics principles below.  
 
Another way of reducing operational concerns of exclusion and coercion is through 
external oversight. Shapland et al. identify the need to develop mechanisms for 
after-the-fact regulation and accountability of restorative justice (2011, p.185). 
Roche argues that accountability and transparency can be strengthened in 
restorative justice. Roche argues that restorative processes derive some informal 
deliberative accountability (2004, p.80) from discursive practices. Drawing on 
Phillips’ argument that democratic outcomes can derive legitimacy procedurally 
(1998, p.164), Roche argues that informal deliberative accountability provides some 
legitimacy for restorative practices (2004, p.44). Roche is keenly aware that 
restorative justice practices are not always ideal, and argues deliberative 
accountability can be further strengthened by requiring facilitators to give account 
regarding the deliberative reasoning of the restorative justice conference. A 
formally or informally enforced requirement to provide explanation (rather than 
practitioners’ discretion) reduces chances of convenient ‘arbitrary’ explanations, 
and recognizes the importance of this transparency to fairness. Roche proposes 
further that judges with sufficient knowledge of restorative justice practices could 
provide procedural review of restorative justice meetings, to identify defective 
decision-making processes (2004, pp.218–9). This could improve the capacity of 
restorative justice to provide a balanced response to offending, in which the parties 
have a protected equal voice, and know what to expect: in short, to help restorative 
justice realize the potential of its own ideals.  
 
The purpose of restorative justice conferences is healing and restoration primarily 
for victims, but where possible includes offenders and communities. This is notably 
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different to circle sentencing where community harmony was the priority. A 
method, of open, engaged dialogue in conferences and mediation allows (but 
cannot guarantee) respectful listening. A state agent may be required to listen 
respectfully, at least in the first instance, to an offender’s storytelling; but their 
direct victim cannot be so required. There is little opportunity for review once 
conference agreements have been made: there is no opportunity for further 
discussion, or to amend the agreement.85 Restorative justice has the potential to 
see offenders and victims alike as concrete persons, to respect them as equals 
rather than risk excluding, silencing and objectification. Restorative justice practices 
potentially allow needs associated with the offence to be recognized for both 
victims and offenders, and to lay the ground for needs-meeting. This helps to treat 
offenders as equals.  
 
Needs and possible responses are identified in restorative justice conferences 
through respectful listening to the other, and engaging responsively with them. 
Designing the ‘outcome agreement’ together allows the parties to share 
responsibility for identifying needs and planning together about what should be 
done to see that these needs are met. This parallels Tronto’s first two phases of 
practical care (alertness to needs, and taking steps to see that these will be 
addressed). This responsibility-sharing approach has similarities with the second 
response-design pair of principles drawn from care ethics: to creatively consider a 
cumulatively fair response, given the resources available, other needs and 
responsibilities. This is informed by the resources and relationships of the parties, 
and the distributive values emphasized by the particular political morality. One core 
difference is that whereas the principles I propose focused on responding to 
offenders in the context of mainstream sentencing, restorative justice claims to take 
the needs of victims and offenders together holistically in the social context. While 
this is broader than the principles I propose, concern for victims is endorsed by the 
responsibility-sharing values of the conceptual anatomy of care ethics.  
                                                     
85
 Nothing prevents the design of restorative process to include review, but this may undermine the 
value of a ‘fixed’ agreement in providing reassurance and stability for both parties. This concern may 
not be particularly worrying, since agreements are not usually binding.  
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Care ethics may be able to help acknowledge and address the limits of restorative 
justice practices, through their built-in informal, implicit review processes. Initial 
and ongoing review processes might, as explicit guidelines for practice under the 
principle of cumulative fairness, encourage participants to speak out against 
oppression. There are clear benefits for formal accountability processes and 
external regulation, and the informal review processes offered by care ethics’ initial 
and ongoing review might provide information for, and help target, formal 
processes.  
 
 
Problem-solving sentences 
This section examines the nature and typical content of problem-solving sentences, 
as they are delivered in the community. I offer a brief note about the delivery of 
therapeutic programmes in American drug courts, since this is the foundation on 
which problem-solving criminal sentences are built. These appear most often in 
community courts to address ‘quality-of-life’ offending (graffiti, street-corner drug 
dealing and soliciting) (Clear et al. 2011, p.99), grounded in community justice 
principles of improving public safety.  
 
Drug court programmes 
American diversionary drug courts usually provide programmes as part of an 
extended pre-trial bail process. American judges set out individualized treatment 
programmes to address the offender’s needs, considering advice from experts, 
criminal justice staff and the offender’s wishes. Unlike mainstream trial 
proceedings, sentencers engage directly, with offenders rather than defence agents 
(McIvor 2009, p.38), to motivate and encourage ‘clients’ towards a stable, drug-free 
life. On the ‘bail’ model, the charges may be dropped at any time before the court 
enters judgement, in response to the offender’s good progress. An alternative 
practice is the post-sentence model, for example that found in Scotland where, 
following a short period on bail for assessment, offenders are sentenced to Drug 
Treatment and Testing Orders, (retained in Scotland for use in Drug Courts, in 
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parallel with the Drug Treatment Requirements made under Community 
Punishment Orders in mainstream proceedings), linked with treatment services, 
and provided with monthly judicial review (McIvor 2009, p.32).  
 
Both models potentially permit respectful listening, collaborative needs-
identification and creative consideration in analysing response effectiveness. 
Participants attend regular review sessions with the judge, held informally in the 
courtroom. Clients participate in a variety of treatment from 12-step programmes 
(eg Alcoholics or Narcotics Anonymous) to acupuncture, are submitted to regular 
drugs testing (Nolan 2001, p.40), may be required to find work or complete their 
education, and complete written ‘homework’ tasks (Payne 2005, p.75). American 
drug court programmes usually last at least a year. When things go well, restrictions 
on participants are gradually reduced. Praise and prizes are provided for small-step 
successes (from courtroom applause, to graduation T shirts). Yet reprimands are 
made for failure to meet requirements (including verbal ‘dressing down’ to revoke 
of earned privileges, or short prison sentences as a last resort) (Nolan 2001, p.40; 
2009, p.14). When things go badly on the diversionary model, offenders drop out of 
the programme and may be prosecuted for their original offence.  
 
Drug courts have found support across the political spectrum (Nolan 2001, pp.53–4, 
p.59) since, despite their therapeutic, rehabilitative aims, they are often rigorous 
and not ‘soft options’ (2001, p.51). Some offenders find the greater involvement of 
problem-solving court sentencers’ in punishment delivery encouraging and 
supportive in comparison to mainstream alternatives (McIvor 2009, p.43). Others 
find this amounts to invasive individual surveillance (Payne 2005, p.74 & p.75 
respectively; Mair & Millings 2011, p.77 (both cases)). One Australian drug court 
participant required to share a personal diary in court told researchers that he 
simply made it up (Payne 2005, p.75).  
 
A study of a Las Vegas drug court’s ability to provide Braithwaite's ‘reintegrative 
shaming’ suggested that the practice (in that particular court) was instead 
stigmatizing and degrading (Miethe et al. 2000, pp.536–7). Without due process 
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protections this potential is even more concerning. The lack of due process 
protections and appeals processes for drug court programmes on the bail model 
raises serious concerns over the coercion of offenders subject to drug court 
proceedings. The ‘voluntariness’ of participation is dubious, since the alternative is a 
standard criminal justice response, usually perceived as retributively ‘harder’. Drug 
court schemes are criticized for ‘cherry picking’ low-risk participants to raise success 
rates and failing to deal, as originally intended, with the complex and chaotic needs 
of offenders who cause greater social problems (Boldt 2009, p.12). 
 
Community court sentences 
In community courts, problem-solving sentencing is part of a criminal justice 
response, rather than a diversionary process. As we saw in Chapter six, the initial 
problem-solving meeting feeds into the sentencer’s decision-making, allowing 
expert advice, practitioners’ experience and offenders perspectives to inform the 
problem-solving element of the sentence. Similarly to Scottish drug courts’ post-
trial practices, problem-solving sentences use regular sentence review sessions, 
allowing the original sentencer to oversee and fine-tune the problem-solving. The 
purpose of the reviews is to provide the offender with supportive encouragement in 
addressing their own needs in small stages, rather than expecting offenders with 
long-standing problems to fully address these immediately.86 Through problem-
solving meetings, offenders are additionally held accountable to sentencers for 
their efforts to address problems (noted in Chapter six as part of the distinguishing 
features of problem-solving courts). Outcome success rates of problem-solving 
sentences provide accountability between the sentencer and the community.  
 
Chapter six considered concerns around due process protections for offenders, 
particularly since drug court reviews do not operate under the protections provided 
in mainstream trials, since these reviews are pre-trial or post-sentence measures. I 
suggested that the care ethics approach might help by providing informal review 
                                                     
86
 This checking and rechecking of the appropriateness of the problem-solving element to the 
offender’s needs is indicative of the responsiveness identified in the conceptual anatomy of care, 
and included in the work of Tronto (1993, p.134) and Engster (2007, p.31). 
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practices of self-scrutiny and the mutual moderation of all those involved. This can 
supplement and strengthen, but cannot replace, formal procedural protections. I 
also considered concerns around the competence of sentencers, who may lack 
appropriate extra–legal training and expertise, in providing responses expected to 
be therapeutic. Again, the care ethics principles require care-givers, and in this case, 
sentencers, to consider their own competence to provide care. This might allow an 
element of formal appeal, challenging a sentencer’s assessment of competence to 
provide particular therapeutic interventions.  
 
These concerns of due process protections and extra-legal competence also apply at 
the delivery stage of therapeutic jurisprudence and problem-solving court processes 
due to the pre- or post-trial nature of the practices. External oversight is provided 
for punishment delivery, performed by probation or prison officers, by the Prison 
and Probation Ombudsman. Similar external oversight for problem-solving 
sentencers could allow an avenue of complaint for problem-solving courts, 
strengthening the protections available to the offender. This might be especially 
beneficial for practices with fewer due process protections. Where problem-solving 
occurs within the context of a community order, oversight and avenues for 
grievance are available through the Prison and Probation Ombudsman. Yet where 
sentencers, in addition to probation officers, direct the application of the sentence, 
perhaps additional oversight is required for sentencers exercising this role, 
paralleling the Ombudsman’s oversight of probation officers. The existence of a 
clear route for grievances helps to establish clear boundaries of acceptability, and 
provides a remedy for poor practices.  
 
Problem-solving sentences  
Problem-solving sentences target concerns to improve community quality of life 
through problem-solving for individual offenders. However, addressing the needs of 
offenders may exclude the concerns and needs of the victim and the community. 
The purpose of problem-solving sentences is to address individual offender’s 
problems, anticipating benefits for the wider community through reduced 
reoffending. This is delivered through a problem-solving method, designed at an 
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initial problem-solving meeting as part of the sentence decision-making process, 
allowing the sentencer, criminal justice experts, community experts, treatment 
experts and offenders to explore together the offender’s problems and devise an 
individualized, constructive solution. Regular review allows sentencers to check 
offenders’ adherences to Community Order conditions, and to oversee and amend 
the problem-solving aspects to ensure needs are met. Power appears to be shared 
between the sentencer, practitioners, experts and the offender, and sentencers 
work towards consensus. Problem-solving review hearings check offender 
compliance and the effectiveness of problem-solving agreements. This allows non-
compliance to be addressed sooner and holds the offender accountable for 
completing their court-ordered response to their criminal offending. This also 
allows the fine-tuning of the sentence by the sentencer (who has more power to 
vary requirements than probation officers) to effectively meet needs, strengthening 
and developing offenders’ capabilities. However, concerns are raised regarding 
coercion to which I now turn. 
 
 
Criticisms  
There are concerns common to both the decision-making and delivery phases of 
these bottom-up practices: coercion and confidentiality. Potential for coercion casts 
a shadow over restorative justice and problem-solving sentences, therapeutic 
jurisprudence in particular. There are, however, two forms of problem coercion: 
coerced offender participation (in circle, conference or problem-solving sessions), 
and coerced disclosure of personal details. This second problem is greater for 
problem-solving courts due to repeat review sessions. It may be hard to see why 
coerced participation should cause a problem since the criminal law is coercive. As 
noted in Chapter four, the law does not recommend or advise: it compels. Bottom-
up practices in this respect are no more coercive than mainstream practices, yet 
bottom-up practices claim offender participation is voluntary.  
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Coerced participation 
One problem for coerced participation is that it is difficult to communicate 
‘voluntariness’ within a compulsory criminal justice setting. Clear, viable exit 
opportunities are necessary to demonstrate voluntary participation. Roche argues 
that offenders’ decisions not to participate in restorative justice, or where 
restorative justice breaks down, should not be held against offenders in later 
sentencing. To do so stacks restorative justice in the victims’ favour, rather than 
reflecting the needs of both parties (Roche 2004, pp.85–6). Voluntary participation 
treats offenders as equals, capable of making their own decisions about their lives. 
This avoids treating offenders passively, or as though their views count for nothing, 
which risks objectification.  
 
Although bottom-up approaches are often not experienced as ‘soft’ options (Nolan 
2001, p.51) by participating in restorative justice, therapeutic jurisprudence and 
problem-solving courts, the offender usually receives a less serious penalty, when 
measured according to harm anticipated, as classically understood. Offenders may 
be influenced, even subconsciously, by this consideration, making it difficult to 
eliminate all potential coercion. Voluntary participation might first be strengthened 
through information and transparency: providing comprehensive, easily accessible, 
information regarding what the practice involves, and the options and powers 
offenders have; and permitting offenders legal advice and a period for reflection. 
This supports transparency and informed choice, making coercion easier to identify 
and challenge, and echoes Roche’s call for greater accountability and transparency 
in restorative justice.  
 
The second coercion problem, coerced disclosure of personal information, is 
particularly an issue in problem-solving review meetings. While disclosure is 
voluntary, when the best advice and support is clearly only available through 
disclosure, this must have a coercive effect. Offenders are exposed to greater 
potential coercion or bias from sentencers, due to the ongoing review practices in 
problem-solving courts. Yet this may equally facilitate relationship-building, 
supporting offenders and allowing for the acknowledgement and addressing of 
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mistakes. There are two related problems here: firstly, the offender may feel 
coerced into disclosing personal details; secondly, problem-solving partner agencies 
may be tempted to share offenders’ personal details inappropriately. This second 
confidentiality problem will be put aside while I address coerced participation.  
 
Coerced disclosure 
Offenders will be encouraged to engage in in bottom-up practices: legal 
representatives may advise disclosure to be in the offender’s best interest, and the 
sentencer will also encourage offender engagement to facilitate support provision. 
We expect here Duff’s transparent rational persuasion (2001, p.177), recognizing 
the offender’s option to choose not to listen (Hampton 1984, p.232). Providing 
sentencers and legal advisers are able to persuade and advise without crossing a 
fine line into pressured coercion, problem coercion can be avoided. This is a self-
scrutinizing task, but not so far removed from the work already done by legal 
advisers whose clients decline to follow part of their advice. 
 
Winick recommends motivational interviewing (2003, p.181), echoing the 
structuring of processes so as to minimize problem coercion, seen in Braithwaite & 
Strang’s view of restorative conferencing (2000, p.205). Motivational interviewing 
resonates with the desistance and good lives psychological models of offender 
treatment. These models identify reductions in reoffending as arising from 
offenders’ decisions and preferences. Supporting offenders in constructing a new 
law-abiding identity and addressing personal problems are key for reducing 
reoffending. Most offenders reach a stage where desistance becomes an attractive 
option (Maruna & LeBel 2010). Despite the coercive environment of therapeutic 
jurisprudence, Winick argues sentencers should understand themselves as building 
consensus rather than coercing (2003, p.181), and that offenders’ chances of 
success are increased when they perceive decisions as their own choices (2003, 
p.183, p.187). If coercion can be removed where offenders can be rationally 
persuaded to co-operate, how are we to respond to offenders preferring non-
engagement? Basic rights protection, as noted in Chapter four, for example through 
legal advice and reasonable exit options, must be available. 
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Compromised confidentiality 
Returning to confidentiality, this is a particular problem for problem-solving courts 
and therapeutic jurisprudence (especially for diversionary projects outside of 
mainstream criminal justice due process protections). Collaborating justice agencies 
and partner organizations may seek to share information about an individual 
inappropriately, a problem encountered by the North Liverpool Community Justice 
Centre staff (Mair & Millings 2011, p.45). While this may be altruistically motivated 
to better provide support, this is problematic as it ignores offenders’ wishes, 
treating offenders passively and risking objectification. Some protection for 
confidentiality is provided through the Data Protection Act 1998 in England & 
Wales, requiring an individual’s consent to the sharing of information about 
themselves, and purposes for which the information is used. Confidentiality might 
be strengthened in problem-solving courts through agreeing confidentiality policies 
across partnership agencies collaborating within a problem-solving project.  
 
Social context 
A further concern, as we saw in Chapter five in relation to risk-need-responsivity 
approaches to offender treatment, is that the in-depth consideration of personal 
problems shifts our focus away from structural and social factors. Eric Miller raises 
concerns that drug courts’ attention to individual needs may obscure contributory 
social factors (eg race, class, gender and economic status (2009, p.449)). Where 
social exclusion has blocked opportunities and caused harm this may unfairly heap 
responsibility for the challenges offenders’ face onto their shoulders, ignoring 
community responsibilities. Mainstream, classical liberal, individual-focused 
approaches risk ignoring this relational and social information. Relational and care 
ethics approaches suffer less from this problem, as these approaches anticipate 
interdependent individuals and prioritize gathering personal and social contextual 
information to better understand this interdependency. The needs-meeting and 
capability-building we offer will be impoverished if we ignore these social 
contextual factors. The principles derived from care theory emphasize that it is 
imperative to understand how an individual’s personal and social context fit into 
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social and cultural realities. Operational failures to consider social context will in at 
least some cases be identified by the ongoing review processes made explicit in the 
final response analysis principle.  
 
 
Fit with care principles 
Problem solving and restorative justice practices fit reasonably well with the 
principles proposed here. Problem-solving courts use regular review hearings, 
either post-sentence or as part of an extended diversion or bail proceedings, to 
explicitly monitor changing situations as needs are met and capabilities developed 
incrementally. This reflects the response analysis principle. Problem-solving courts 
aim to punish with care, by supporting offenders in meeting their own needs and 
strengthening their capabilities. However, bottom-up practices lack formal 
oversight mechanisms, and need a way of monitoring whether their own principles 
are followed and produce the expected effect. 
 
Attempts to avoid harm through punishing with care and the ongoing review of care 
ethics, present in the response analysis stage, both aim to prevent avoidable harms. 
This allows acknowledging and addressing, where possible, harms arising as 
unforeseen ‘collateral damage’. Transparency might be strengthened through the 
review processes of self-scrutiny, and mutual moderation under the cumulative 
fairness and the response analysis principles. Transparency, self-scrutiny and mutual 
moderation can all contribute to identifying coercion and confidentiality problems. 
The benefit of the explicitly supportive care-informed principles is that this can 
empower weaker parties to raise concerns to the sentencer by securing them an 
opportunity to speak, and sentencers (and practitioners) a responsibility to listen. 
These informal measures could help to provide information for formal review 
(detailing concerns about coercion), and help direct efficient use of formal review 
processes (identifying cases where coercion appears a problem). By using the 
principles derived from care to shape ongoing day-to-day punishment-delivery 
decision-making, this may help to provide equal respect for offenders.  
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We saw earlier that designing diversity into restorative conferences aims to reduce 
the chances of oppression in restorative justice (Braithwaite & Strang 2000, p.205). 
This provides shades of the self-scrutiny and mutual moderation I have argued care 
ethics counsels. Yet restorative conference participants are ordinary members of 
the public, and not necessarily aware of their role in review. Care ethics principles 
could help to make this role explicit. Braithwaite & Strang’s oppression challenging 
practices rely firstly on participants’ spontaneous, perhaps passive, identification of 
a problem, mistake or discrimination, rather than active scrutiny of proceedings. 
Secondly, the participants must choose to raise their concerns in order for them to 
be considered by the conference. Some participants may consider that 
discrimination has occurred, but consider this too minor to raise, or feel that the 
excluded view is in any case not worth hearing, perpetuating rather than 
challenging the discrimination. A shared expectation of self-scrutiny and mutual 
moderation, coupled with the protection of basic rights and a principle of protecting 
the vulnerable, as seen in Chapter four, may help to correct this.  
 
For Braithwaite & Strang, the conscious scrutiny of the restorative justice facilitator 
is a last resort. Their ideal response is that participants’ desire to hear others will 
defeat discrimination indirectly. The restorative justice facilitator is to an extent 
external to the participant’s discussion, and from this external neutral position 
resolves to guard against discrimination. But the facilitator is only one person. From 
the care perspective, each participant is responsible for self-scrutiny, to question 
whether their own participation is aware, respectful and responsive to others. 
Mutual moderation from others supports our self-scrutiny: when mutual 
moderation causes one participant to identify the deliberate or accidental exclusion 
or discrimination of another, self-scrutiny will call on them to raise this to the group, 
since ‘the absence of attentiveness [to others’ needs] is a moral failing’ (Tronto 
1993, p.126). 
 
Problem-solving court practices in theory also provide ‘ongoing review’ space for 
practitioners to highlight difficulties (Chief Justice Blatz, reported in Berman 2000, 
p.84) and to help identify concerns about problem coercion in therapeutic 
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jurisprudence and problem-solving courts (Winick 2003, p.181). While participants 
(lawyers, judges, experts and offenders) have the expertise to identify practical 
differences, their problem-solving role may conflict with their courtroom role. 
Consider the defence lawyer who knows the offender will have difficulty with a 
requirement, but knows that raising this difficulty (with the client’s consent) 
weakens an argument they have made; or the medical expert who knows a 
particular response is unlikely to succeed with patients like the offender, but cannot 
offer a better alternative.  
 
The problem of conflicting needs is reduced when practitioners apply care ethics. 
Care ethics acknowledges both practical and individual limitations, and further 
recognizes that accounting for these leads to the best care provision for individuals 
and more efficient use of needs-meeting resources holistically considered across 
the social distribution of needs. Returning to the example of the lawyer, who knows 
that raising a difficulty for the offender with a requirement weakens an argument 
they have made. Both apparently conflicting details may be valued from the 
perspective of care ethics. If we aim to care well then we provide better care by 
pooling our knowledge, with the care-receiver’s consent, and sharing responsibility 
with others suited to help. Because review practices are internal to good care, 
raising both sides of such a paradox furthers, rather than conflicts with, the ends of 
caring well. Although conflicts of individual practitioner aims may still be possible, 
they may be less problematic. 
 
Acknowledging and addressing problems when they do occur can also be 
strengthened through the informal initial and ongoing review internal to good 
caring. Because we expect individuals to have personal limits, and expect negative 
and operational limits to our caring practice, care ethics offers internal review 
mechanisms. Self-scrutiny and mutual moderation are parts of the decision-making 
and delivery process for caring; not an external or separate activity. Through 
review, continuing checking of contexts, needs, resources and responsibilities in the 
light of punishment decisions and practices helps identify when things do not go as 
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expected. By continuing to listen, we reduce the harm of exclusion, and increase the 
chances of problems being aired.  
 
The initial stage of review occurs in the cumulative fairness principle of the 
response-design stage (pre-sentence or pre-decision), and ongoing review in 
response analysis principles of the harm-avoiding stage (the regular review of 
problem-solving sentence delivery). Initial review will be most useful for one-off 
restorative conferences, whereas ongoing review can help to strengthen the 
repeated review practices of problem-solving courts. Both offer potential to inform 
and target mainstream formal oversight. Review practices help to identify 
problems, either to avoid or to acknowledge and address harm.  
 
 
What do we learn about the principles? 
We saw above that the care ethics principles can help to provide some informal 
oversight to bottom-up practices, yet no oversight, whether formal or informal, 
external or internal, can offer complete protection. The initial and ongoing review 
implied by care ethics will not always succeed in identifying problems. And while I 
have argued that review implies appropriate action, the negative and operational 
limits of care mean that problems will not always be adequately identified or 
addressed. Adding self-scrutiny and mutual moderation to existing bottom-up 
punishment practices strengthens protections for offenders. I argued in Chapter 
four that basic rights, desert as a maximum punishment, and a concern to protect 
the vulnerable may also help protect offenders from intrusion and prejudice. These 
approaches may similarly help here, offering some protection against coercion. This 
reinforces that we still need the formal processes of the court and for sentence 
delivery oversight, for procedural justice, yet we must still expect errors and 
unavoidable harms as no system is infallible.  
 
While care ethics ongoing review practices are not failsafe protection, these are 
internal to the practice of good caring. Our (albeit imperfect) chances of identifying 
the problem of poor practice are improved when the failure is of a recognized, 
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necessary part of the practice, rather than a separate additional practice. When we 
are explicitly guided by the principles I derived from care ethics, failure to carry out 
ongoing review implies a failure to conduct the practice properly. The practitioner 
following care ethics principles is a poor practitioner, as the driver who fails to 
check mirrors is a poor driver. The separate formal institutional protections found in 
mainstream criminal justice are valuable. Part of what makes them valuable is their 
separation from, and independence of, the practices of punishment decision-
making and delivery. Yet what is less clear is that cases not subject to full formal 
appeal and review practices are appropriately passed over, and that poor decisions 
are not left unidentified. While both practices are limited by human error and 
liability to poor implementation, this is where care ethics principles can help to 
strengthen mainstream institutional protections, by helping to gather information 
to suggest which cases require full formal oversight.  
 
 
Treatment as equals 
Restorative justice conferences are one-off incidents, and do not have a continuous 
process of punishment delivery. As equal participants in conferences, offenders are 
in theory treated as equals, although there are risks this may break down in 
practice. This may be due to social status external to the conference. Further, 
through understandable concern for the victim’s rights and wellbeing, we risk 
devaluing the offender’s rights; I have suggested that the care ethics principles may 
help to strengthen the practice of designing in diversity to address discrimination 
problems. Offenders are routinely included in discussion in the delivery of problem-
solving court sentences. This engagement is not necessarily respectful. However, by 
following the principles derived from care, which specify respectful open 
engagement, we can help to provide the conditions necessary for interactional 
justice, and treatment as equals. From the perspective of care, dialogue focused on 
respectful listening is encouraged. Key comparisons between these bottom-up 
punishment delivery methods considered above are summarized overleaf. 
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Key comparisons 
 
 
 Purpose Method Review Treatment as equals? 
Restorative 
justice 
 
Healing and restoration, 
primarily for victims, but 
including communities and 
offenders if possible. 
 
Dialogue: in circles, 
conferences and mediation, 
emphasis on understanding 
the other to reach agreement. 
Few review practices available in practice, 
potential for much more to be done to 
strengthen accountability (Roche 2004, p.229). 
  
One-off conference, no 
ongoing interaction 
during punishment 
delivery. 
Problem-
solving 
sentence or 
therapeutic 
programme 
Address individual 
offender’s problems, in the 
expectation of community 
benefit. 
Dialogue: problem-solving 
meeting allows offender to 
explain problems and discuss 
solutions with experts and the 
sentencer, emphasis on 
problem identification. 
Regular review hearings discuss the progress 
made in addressing the offender’s problems 
and consider whether changes to needs-
meeting are necessary. Particularly in America, 
the involvement of sentencers means the 
original order can be amended if necessary 
 
Inclusion attempted, 
but need not be 
respectful (Miethe et al. 
2000, pp.536–7), 
somewhat dependent 
on personality of 
sentencer. 
Care ethics 
principles 
 
Meeting basic needs, 
building capabilities, 
avoiding unnecessary 
harm; respectfully and 
responsively. 
Dialogue: open engagement, 
emphasis on listening, 
responsiveness to needs and 
to feedback from the other. 
Internal practices of informal review (self-
scrutiny & mutual moderation) support formal 
review and oversight where formal review is 
present. 
Respectful listening 
focus strengthened by 
ongoing responsiveness 
to offender and 
informal review. 
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Conclusion  
As with all practices performed by humans, criminal justice is subject to human 
error. The care perspective is well-suited to supplement mainstream justice, since it 
explicitly acknowledges these limits. The care perspective principles also provide 
ongoing review practices, internal to the delivery practices, which specify self-
scrutiny and mutual moderation. This will not acknowledge and address all 
problems, but it can help to strengthen formal review processes. Further limits to 
these principles, such as the protection of basic rights and vulnerable parties 
discussed in Chapter four, give us some guidance for resolving the practical 
difficulties of coercion, intrusion and bias which the greater consideration of 
contextual destails risks. We have seen that the bottom-up alternative approaches 
to criminal justice follow the principles of care ethics reasonably well already, 
although they struggle to offer the formal oversight of mainstream trials. 
Mainstream trials, by contrast, are well positioned to engage with the more 
formalized limits, particularly the protection of basic rights, which I suggested in 
Chapter four might help to address conflicting needs and protect offenders from 
intrusion and bias. 
 
Were the principles I propose, drawn from care ethics, to be brought into 
mainstream practices, this could help to bring the context-recognizing benefits of 
bottom-up approaches, which help to provide treatment as equals and interactional 
justice to offenders, into mainstream practices. Care ethics values also bring 
concerns to meet needs and avoid preventable harms. Mainstream practices 
provide the formal oversight which bottom-up approaches lack. While the care 
ethics principles can provide inclusive context sensitivity and informal review 
practices to mainstream practices; mainstream practices provides an environment 
which supports the additional necessary limits caring practices: basic rights 
protection, and a concern to protect the vulnerable. Given that mainstream 
practices also include unacknowledged care practices, we can conclude that 
mainstream practices and care ethics principles complement one another, 
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strengthening the argument for including care ethics principles in mainstream 
practices.  
 314 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
I began from the widely accepted position in liberal theory that persons should be 
treated as equals. How should we treat, and interact with, convicted offenders 
during punishment decision-making and delivery, in order to treat offenders as 
equals? Punishment practices cause unacknowledged, unintended ‘collateral 
damage’ harms, and include many examples of caring work. Yet we acknowledge 
neither the full extent of the harms which punishment risks, nor the caring practice 
which punishment entails.  
 
Why do we neither acknowledge the full extent of ‘collateral damage’ harms nor 
the caring work in punishment practices? I have suggested that one contributing 
factor to this oversight is present in most leading definitions of punishment. The use 
of an ambiguous, harm-like element as one defining feature of punishment, and the 
only substantive content defining feature, distorts our perception by elevating and 
normalizing harm. This forms a vicious circle, both desensitizing us to harms and 
obscuring caring practices. We expect harms and fail to question whether ‘collateral 
damage’ harm represents appropriate treatment for offenders as equal persons. 
While trivial harms are not concerning, some harms are non-trivial and may be 
morally problematic. When we ignore, thereby failing to respond to, morally 
significant ‘collateral damage’ harms, we treat offenders as inert and passive, 
objectifying them as an item that may be acceptably harmed. A procedural-only 
definition of punishment allows normative reflection on what treatment is 
appropriate for offenders qua persons. 
 
Retributive and consequentialist penal theories say little on how we should treat 
and interact with convicted offenders. This is not surprising since the focus of these 
theories has often been the justification of punishment. I have argued that both 
approaches implicitly require contextual information to understand the unique 
situation of the offender in order to determine punishment, either proportionally or 
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to reach specific end goals. However, neither approach offers explicit guidance 
about how this might be obtained.  
 
Mainstream procedures aim to protect offenders from intrusion and bias, but risk 
part objectification. While objectification may not happen in all cases, this casual 
regard for the offender’s personhood is inconsistent with treatment as equals. 
Dworkin told us that treatment as equals is the provision of equal concern and 
respect (2000, p.227), which implies accounting for concrete information about 
individuals’ contexts. Because the treatment this provides is rightly context specific, 
I have proposed interactional justice as a practice that would help us to identify 
cases of appropriate information-gathering and treatment as equals.  
 
Caring practices as I have described them are learned behaviours, and continuous 
processes rather than discrete acts. The anatomy of care ethics, which helps to 
identify the presence of caring in punishment practices, contains a moral injunction 
to become aware of needs (Tronto 1993, p.127, p.129) and where possible, subject 
to the negative limits of care, to respond to needs (1993, pp.136–7). We expect all 
persons to have individual limits and needs, and that our needs-meeting will be 
restricted by shortfalls and need conflicts. Hence, care ethics recognizes that non-
ideal needs-meeting and caring will occur. I have suggested that the processes of 
initial and ongoing review are internal to the practices of good caring in response to 
these recognized limits. I have offered a systematic presentation of these limits, 
positive, negative and operational, which together with the injunction to care well, 
directs a response to the un-met or poorly met needs of which we become aware 
through review practices.  
 
The care ethics perspective I have argued for in this thesis has several key 
differences to the classical liberal perspectives that have informed the development 
of the criminal justice processes in England & Wales, which has informed 
approaches to criminal law in other jurisdictions. These differences include a 
difference in practical moral reasoning; while classical liberal approaches apply an 
abstract, generalized form of reasoning, care ethics practical moral reasoning 
 316 
 
prioritizes concrete contextual detail, preferably directly gathered from the 
individuals involved. These methods of reasoning are informed by differing 
ontological expectations about individuals: whereas the classical liberal approach 
understands individuals as most often independent, self-sufficient and autonomous; 
care ethics anticipate interdependent, variably vulnerable individuals. Care ethics 
approaches have the effect of normalizing expectations of individual personal limits 
and needs, in turn normalizing the acceptance of, offering of or request for, 
support. These expectations, and associated mode of moral reasoning, suggest a 
contextual or relationally informed interpretation of concern, respect and dignity.  
 
Contextual information, gathered preferably through engagement with the other 
where possible, is prioritized under care ethics approaches, but not from classical 
liberal perspectives. I have shown that contextual information is valued in 
mainstream criminal justice practices and aims; however I have argued that the 
classical liberal informed practices are not well disposed to collect this information. 
Trials, where they are contested, limit offenders’ speech. But post-conviction pre-
sentence practices silence and exclude offenders. Under conditions desensitizing us 
to harm, this further compounds the risks of misunderstanding offenders, missing 
personal and social contextual detail that could facilitate harm avoidance, and 
reduce risks of offender objectification.  
 
Care ethics is able to acknowledge both caring practices and harms and is therefore 
not as immediately likely to obscure caring or ignore harms, compared with present 
punishment theory. I have argued that, in significant ways, the principles that 
inform the care ethics mode of moral reasoning can be applied to punishment 
decision-making and delivery. Care ethics prioritizes the personal and social 
contextual detail which mainstream practices already value. I have offered a 
formulation of these principles designed to guide sentencers and punishment 
practitioners. These principles centre on fostering dialogue, with a special focus for 
practitioners on listening. As the stronger party, listening is one way in which 
sentencers and practitioners can empower the offender (Pranis 2002, p.30), helping 
to overcome objectification problems. As the discussion of criminal practices 
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showed, it is possible to gather this information very disrespectfully. The principles 
developed from care ethics focus initially on respectful listening, before working 
through difficulties between sentencer and offender, to help inform an appropriate 
response in the light of the social context of the offences, and the offender’s 
personal context, including some social elements.  
 
This provides efficient access to instrumentally useful information to sentencers, 
from a ‘traditional’ punishment perspective: suggesting where moral education 
might be appropriate, or indicating what kinds of programme (rehabilitative, 
reformative, educational, healthcare, or psychological) and at what level they might 
be necessary; and also from a care perspective (how can the individual’s needs 
associated with the offence be met, and capabilities built). There will be overlap 
between these two instrumental benefits of more efficient information-gathering 
since, despite the harms present in punishment, I have argued that caring practices 
are essential for safe and effective contemporary punishment practices. There is a 
practical overlap since the caring aims of meeting needs, building capabilities and 
avoiding unnecessary harms are often the methods employed to meet punishment 
aims of rehabilitating, treating and training offenders.  
 
When engaging with offenders in order to gather information is achieved 
respectfully, as care ethics suggests, this provides respect for the individual’s self- 
knowledge and lived experience. This respect provides the interactional justice, also 
incompatible with objectification, which is not guaranteed in mainstream practices 
since these restrict the offender’s opportunities for speech. This inclusion and 
respectful interpersonal treatment, argues Tyler, is necessary for procedural justice 
and contributes to the support and acceptance of legal institutions and their 
decisions, an additional benefit of interactional justice from my perspective. The 
respectful, responsive engagement fostered by care ethics may then help 
contribute towards securing procedural justice.  
 
The principles I propose do not interfere with the existing necessary restrictions on 
the information that may be raised during trials, as I propose post-conviction 
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processes. I have noted the similarities between caring for citizens in general and 
offenders in particular, and the differences in the delivery of care to citizens. While I 
can only outline the limits to the principles I offer here, I have suggested that 
conflicting needs may be resolved the protection of basic rights, and the protection 
of the most vulnerable party, following the aims of care to meet the most serious 
needs, and avoid preventable harms.  
 
I have argued for responding to offenders without deliberate harm, and with care. A 
principled argument can be made for preferring care responses to harm responses 
from both the liberal and care ethics perspectives. Liberal and care ethics ends of 
concern and respect overlap and are not inconsistent. But the reading of care ethics 
that I employ offers stronger practical guidelines for achieving treatment as equals 
through a relational understanding of concern and respect, prioritizing connection 
and contextual information. For democratic politics, inclusion of all citizens is 
important. Offenders’ treatment as equals gains symbolical importance for securing 
democratic legitimacy, where convicted offenders are disenfranchised by their 
punishment. Pragmatically, harming offenders can only deplete the resources 
offenders have to co-operate with others, provide self-care and meet other caring 
responsibilities. This reduces offenders’ chances of becoming productive citizens 
post-punishment. By responding with care and strengthening offenders’ 
capabilities, offenders will have greater resources for care and for participating in 
social and economic activities, where they choose. 
 
I have argued that the care ethics approach should be used for all offenders, 
although I have discussed four types of offender responses, namely offenders who: 
 
1. Accept their conduct as legally wrong and regret their conduct;  
2. Do not accept conduct as wrong but nonetheless regret their 
conduct; 
3. Cannot accept their conduct as wrong and cannot therefore 
regret their conduct (offenders excused on mental health 
grounds); 
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4. Accept their conduct as legally wrong but nonetheless do not 
regret their conduct. 
 
The principles I propose encounter difficulties in the fourth case. There is more to 
punishment than care, and our care for offenders should be limited by the 
protection of basic rights, particularly for more vulnerable others. These principles 
can also help to guide our caring decisions when needs conflict. Some readers may 
be concerned that proportional punishments may become impossible if we include 
offender context. I have argued that by accepting a small revision, allowing the 
means of assessing punishment seriousness to become more context sensitive, a 
revised proportionality calculation following the proportionality intuition is still 
possible and beneficial.  I have retained the classical generalized assessment of 
punishment serious as anticipated harm as a starting point for considering 
punishment seriousness in particular cases.  
 
Classical, generalized proportionality might provide a maximum level of 
punishment. Classical ranking of punishments expected to cause more or less harm 
in general provides a starting point to minimize preventable harm in cases where 
offenders’ context indicates a risk of significantly more harm than the generalized 
approach expects. Offenders are exposed to additional risks of interference, 
prejudice and interpretations of their needs as risks to others once we take account 
of individuals’ contexts. Again, while I cannot outline a response in full to this 
concern here, I have suggested that, in addition to a maximum punishment from 
which only downwards departures are made, the principles of protecting the 
vulnerable and securing basic rights might also provide some protection for 
offenders from these risks. I have also noted the contradiction involved in 
describing compulsory punishments as care, since this denies the care-receiver 
involvement in decision-making. Yet I have argued that it is useful to retain this 
description, to acknowledge the central role of caring practices, and to judge our 
practice by the standards of care.  
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It is desirable that offenders should help, and be supported in helping, to repair 
harms caused to direct victims: offenders have an appropriate association as they 
bear some responsibility for the victim’s needs. Yet not all offenders will be willing 
or able to do so. I have suggested that, since punishment is a conduct censuring 
response to the offender, it may be misguided to expect punishment to also meet 
victims’ needs adequately. It may even be unhelpful to victims to insist that 
punishment is an appropriate setting for victim needs-meeting. However, since the 
positive limits of care suggest that the community should take some responsibility 
for victims’ high gravity needs, sentencers should be aware of the kinds of measures 
that will be used outside of the criminal justice system to respond to victim’s needs 
where offenders cannot or will not. Sentencers may be able to take steps to help 
offenders meet victims’ needs, most obviously by providing for restorative justice 
where this is the wish of both parties. Further, sentencers should avoid frustrating 
external needs-meeting for victims in their punishment decisions.  
 
There are similarities between the principles I offer and the theories of Duff, and 
Braithwaite & Pettit. I am particularly concerned with the treatment of offenders as 
equals. Braithwaite & Pettit are concerned for the inclusion of all citizens, victims 
and offenders to protect equal dominion, necessary for republican liberty (1990, 
pp.64–6). Duff, meanwhile, is concerned to avoid systematic social exclusion, since 
this threatens the legitimacy of the state later calling individuals to account as 
offenders (2001, p.183). Braithwaite & Pettit and Duff focus on the inclusion of 
citizens. However the criminal law’s protection and prohibitions applies to all 
persons within the jurisdiction. The approach I offer also includes treating non-
citizens as equals qua persons, and leaves room for citizenship status as part of the 
offender’s personal context.  
 
Duff’s concern is to reconcile offenders with victims (2001, p.109), and Braithwaite 
& Pettit seek to reintegrate both victims and offenders as full members of the 
political community (1990, pp.91–2). The approach I adopt also promotes the repair 
of harm and restoration of relationships. While I have been unable to discuss 
victims’ needs in full, since they deserve the same detailed treatment as offenders’ 
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needs, ultimately care ethics counsels connection and contains a moral injunction 
to identify and respond to needs. I have argued that care perspectives value 
contextual information, particularly when gathered through engagement with the 
‘care-receiver’.  
 
Duff’s communicative theory also expects dialogue (2001, p.177), although this has 
been criticized as overly scripted (Brownlee 2011, p.57). The pre-sentence dialogue I 
propose places no restrictions on offenders’ speech, but does include normative 
limits on what sentencers must take into account, in cases of offenders’ treatment 
of others as less than equal, denial of responsibility or gross lying. Practitioners’ 
interpretation and use of disclosed information is further limited by principles of 
protecting basic rights and vulnerable parties, in addition to the aims of care: to 
meet needs, build capabilities and avoid preventable harms. Duff’s theory expects 
existing formal procedural review, as does my approach. Braithwaite & Pettit 
demand power checking measures as essential for their republican freedom 
(Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, p.88).  
 
There are however limits to Braithwaite & Pettit’s power-checking, especially for 
the informal measures they expect will reduce the use of formal powers. I have 
suggested that the informal initial and ongoing review practices internal to the care 
ethics approach may help to strengthen Braithwaite & Pettit’s approach with self-
scrutiny and mutual moderation. However these cannot fully meet this concern. 
With Duff, I share a concern for past social exclusion as relevant to present 
punishment decision-making, although I include smaller social exclusions, as part of 
a broader concern to understand the offender’s personal and social context. In 
considering criticisms of Braithwaite & Pettit’s work, I note that there may be 
limitations to the care ethics principles I propose, if an attempt was made extend 
these to cover the question of criminal liability. I have not attempted to address this 
question and care ethics may be an inappropriate tool to apply. However, I have 
argued care ethics has many strengths when applied to punishment decision-
making and delivery.  
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The principles I have offered here resonate with three psychological models of 
offender rehabilitation, insofar as these value relationships, holistically understood 
offender needs, building offender capabilities and supporting choices. They also 
overlap with the conceptualization of blame without stigmatization, as advanced by 
Hanna Pickard (Pickard 2011), which Pickard & Lacey propose to export to the 
criminal justice arena (Lacey & Pickard 2013). Pickard suggests that elements of 
patients’ narratives (personal context) may be used by clinicians to help avoid 
stigma, and to help clinicians and patients explore adaptive responses for patients.  
 
Finally I considered the principles I have proposed in relation to some bottom-up 
responses to crime, beginning from either principles of inclusion and healing for 
communities and victims, or restoration and concern for offenders’ wellbeing. We 
saw in circle sentencing that unequal social positions outside of the circle might 
effectively prevent some circle members’ equal participation, masking their needs 
and failing to treat them as equals. This is especially troubling, given the expectation 
of inclusion. Practices of therapeutic jurisprudence that operate outside of 
mainstream criminal justice practices (for example operating as bail courts in 
America and outside of the usual due process protections) lack oversight, due 
process protections and opportunities for appeal. These concerns applied in part to 
problem-solving community courts. I anticipate the inclusion of the principles 
developed form care ethics as a part of a mainstream post-conviction, pre-sentence 
dialogue practices, where due process protections are still available. The creative 
consideration principle includes an element of sentencers’ reflection on their own 
competence to care, particularly when moving away from their (legal) area of 
expertise. I have suggested that in the same way sentencers are expected to explain 
their reasoning in sentencing, sentencers might also on occasion be called to 
explain their assessment of their own competence when applying extra-legal, 
problem-solving measures. This could provide an additional avenue of appeal.  
 
After proposing a practice of pre-sentence dialogue to replace pre-sentence 
reports, I considered the punishment delivery aspects of these bottom-up practices. 
Concerns about due process protection and oversight persist. Concerns about 
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coercion and confidentiality loom larger, given the repeated nature of review 
hearings in therapeutic and other problem-solving courts. I have suggested that 
external oversight could be introduced to problem-solving courts, providing 
monitoring of sentencers’ roles in punishment-delivery similarly to the oversight 
provided by the Prison and Probation Ombudsman. Once again, the initial and 
ongoing review practices, which I have argued are integral to good caring, may help 
to strengthen formal review practices.  
 
When respectful listening is employed, we are able to provide interactional justice, 
the ‘missing link in procedural justice’ (Tyler & Bies 1990, p.88). I recommend a care 
ethics guided approach not for efficiency, economic or procedural justice reasons, 
but rather because respectful listening enables us to treat offenders as equals. This 
reflects offenders’ moral status qua persons, and often a political status as equal 
citizens or community-members. In comparison with mainstream criminal justice 
practices, the guiding principles I have developed from care ethics enable us to: 
 
1. Acknowledge the moral significance of harms, to help avoid or 
address harms; 
2. Identify the essential presence of caring practices with 
contemporary punishment practices; 
3. Provide guidance principles for punishment decision-making 
and delivery; which 
4. Enhances our ability to provide treatment as equals. 
 
This thesis has been concerned with the risked partial exclusion, silencing and 
objectification of offenders qua offenders. I have argued that the personal and 
social contextual details, which the individual offender defines as relevant to their 
particular circumstances at sentencing, should be taken into consideration, 
recognizing the intrinsic value of offenders’ self-knowledge. The social context 
information about the individual will necessarily include intersecting socially 
constructed hierarchies. Sentencers should consider this information about 
offenders in ways which follow the care ethics aims of avoiding preventable harm 
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and meeting needs, the normative limits noted in Chapter four, and with a concern 
to protect the basic rights of more vulnerable parties in addition to the aims of 
These principles will limit the caring we are able to provide to offenders.  
 
Despite the distinctive development of contemporary care ethics beginning in the 
work of Carol Gilligan, there are interesting resonances between care and relational 
ethics and other ethical traditions. In the Introduction I noted that the work of 
David Hume might have been explored as an alternative route to conclusions similar 
to those reached in this thesis. Some writers have proposed some apparent surface 
similarities between care ethics and Confucian ethics (Li 2002). The differences as 
well as the similarities might be fruitfully explored. Other resonances are indicated 
between the values underpinning care ethics and Buddhist thought (Nelson 2004; 
White 1999, p.114), and other non-Western philosophies (Pio et al. 2013, chap.13), 
which I hope to have the opportunity to explore in future research. This tentatively 
suggests that the approach advanced here may have a broader application than 
simply the Western liberal democratic examples I have considered.  
 
A further advantage, then, of the approach which I provide and the definition of 
punishment which I offer, is that it is not tied to a specific culture, society or 
historical stage, barring some general assumptions: that human beings living in 
societies will collectively identify some actions as so wrongful or harmful that they 
ought to be prohibited, and that prohibited acts performance requires a collective 
community response (in short, that the society will have a criminal law). I have 
further worked on the ‘naked conviction’ (Dworkin 1998, p.86) that persons ought 
to be treated as equals. Since this is a disputed moral claim, and no individual has 
privileged access to moral truth, it is possible that this premise might be incorrect. 
However, I have not yet heard any argument sufficient to persuade me otherwise.  
 
There are two immediately obvious ways in which the work presented here could 
be extended. Firstly, we might explore the impact of gender and other socially 
constructed hierarchies as they intersect with an individual’s status as an offender. 
Secondly, a greater focus might be paid to offenders’ mental health concerns, since 
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this group are recognized as over-represented within, and as requiring care by, the 
prison system. The use of therapeutic communities within prisons, such as HMP 
Grendon, has been identified as beneficial to some of the most serious offenders. 
The intent of my present work has been to highlight the exclusion of offenders as 
persons, and the importance of including offenders as equals. I have not pursued 
either of these concerns here for three reasons.  
 
Firstly, research on these issues would benefit from an empirical approach, rather 
than the theoretical, normative approach I have employed. The normative approach 
may be a less helpful starting point when studying socially constructed hierarchies. 
Research might more fruitfully begin by asking those affected to tell us their 
experience. This echoes the theme of listening, which I have emphasized is 
important for including others as equals. Secondly, I did not feel there would be 
space to provide sufficient in-depth discussion, which these issues warrant, 
particularly given the constraints of time and the two very broad literatures, on care 
ethics and punishment, with which I was already dealing. Finally, I feel that the 
research I have presented stands together as a complete whole, from the point of 
view of considering the nature of our punishment practices and how the treatment 
of offenders as equals might be improved; and to raise the profile of the necessary 
caring practices in punishment, according caring in its proper place in punishment 
theory.  
 
The procedural-only definition I have offered for punishment allows normative 
reflection on the practice of punishment, and which practices it might be morally 
appropriate to apply to offenders who are persons. This is not to say that this is 
necessarily the most helpful definition to employ in practice, and there may be 
good political and practical reasons to offer an alternative, political community 
specific, definition of punishment. For example, stating the nature of practices and 
clear maximum levels of punishment, to assist individuals in using such instruments 
to assert their basic rights and provide protection from abuses of power.  
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This thesis has focused on contemporary criminal punishment practices as they are 
enacted in Western liberal democratic states, England & Wales in particular. This is 
not because these practices are any way superior to any other cultural 
understandings. I have focused on these examples for two reasons. Since I am most 
familiar with the practices in England & Wales, these are the practices of which I 
have the best understanding. Secondly, I focused on the theories and practices of 
Western liberal democratic states, such as England & Wales, since this is the society 
in which I live. The problems I have highlighted with these theories and practices 
are real problems for the society of which I am a member. It is my hope that the 
starting points for policy discussion which I propose can help to address these 
problems, assisting in the task of improving our society, by meeting needs, building 
capabilities and avoiding preventable harm in responding to offenders.  
 
The emphasis on harm in ‘tough on crime’ public discussion by politicians, the 
media and others  further reinforces the objectifying message that offenders may 
be acceptably harmed, not just to ‘offenders’ but to the ‘law-abiding’ public. The 
‘tough’ talk further implies this harm is not, or even ought not to be, trivial. When 
the tough talk drowns out the unspoken necessity of caring, it is easy to be 
dismissive of caring practices. When budgets are tight, it becomes easy to cut the 
apparently frivolous attempts to care for the ‘undeserving’. But the ethics of care 
responds primarily to needs, and sometimes ‘the undeserving’ will have the highest 
gravity needs. Even ‘undeserving’ persons should have their equal personhood 
recognized. Even Lai’s ‘notorious war criminal’ is brought to tribunal because, ‘in 
virtue of being a person’, they ‘deserve to be treated with dignity’ (Lai 2010, p.255).  
 
It is not that liberal trials cannot provide offenders’ dignified treatment as equals, 
indeed this is their intent and the practice is consistent with liberal understandings 
of concern and respect. However trial practices, and, of more concern, post-
conviction and punishment practices, are unable to acknowledge the moral 
significance of the harms that may arise, and the objectification risked, when these 
harms are ignored. It is this casually risked, invisible objectification that is 
inconsistent with liberal ends of providing dignified treatment as equals. The care 
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ethics understanding of individuals as interdependent informs the alternative 
context- and connection-prioritizing conceptualization of concern and respect. This 
allow the care perspective to contribute towards providing stronger opportunities 
to, at minimum, acknowledge and, where possible, address these harms; thereby 
avoiding objectification.  
 
In the Introduction to this thesis I noted that labelling individual as offenders might 
be unhelpful, since this defines a whole concrete person by one act in their past and 
fails to take account of the many law-abiding acts of the same individual. Even a 
prolific shoplifter will pay legitimately for some goods and services, including taxes. 
Conversely, only the minority of offenders are apprehended. A survey of American 
office workers found 58% of office workers admitted to taking office supplies for 
personal use (Harris Interactive 2006). The distinction between the ‘law-abiding’ 
and the ‘law-breakers’ is at best blurred. If this misleading distinction is pressed too 
hard and too often under present conditions, we construct another unquestioned 
social hierarchy, with the ‘law-abiding’ people at the top, and the ‘law-breaking’ 
objects at the bottom. The aim of this thesis has been to consider how offenders 
might be included as equal persons. This is not to say that different, less favourable, 
treatment of offenders is never appropriate. Nor does this hierarchy reflect the 
socially constructed hierarchies of gender, sexuality, ‘race’ etc, since these are 
based on unchosen individual traits. But different treatment may become 
discriminatory if it becomes an unquestioned, blanket response, and exclusionary or 
objectifying, as I have suggested is risked in mainstream criminal practices. 
 
It matters that the caring practices are obscured by theoretical definitions, because 
theory informs policy and practice. I have argued that caring practices are necessary 
to punishment as it is practised. Caring practices are essential for delivering the 
rehabilitative, deterrent, or reformative aims of punishment. Supportive caring 
practices, helping offenders find homes and jobs and remain in contact with 
families in particular, are also needed. Having homes, jobs and family support has 
been empirically shown to decrease recidivism (May et al. 2008, p.1). As the 
Halliday Report recognized, overcrowding and overstretched resources threaten the 
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ability of prisons to provide the care that is necessary for rehabilitation (Halliday 
2001, p.24).  
 
I am particularly troubled by the present Ministry of Justice plans for a ‘super 
prison’. I am concerned about the ability of a much larger facility to strengthen 
provision of personalized, context sensitive, individually supportive caring practices. 
As Liebling and colleagues’ report on their recent follow-up study at HMP 
Whitemoor shows, when the caring side of punishment practices is withdrawn, our 
prisons, the archetypal form of punishment in the public and politicians’ minds, 
become hostile, threatening, violent and unsafe places for offenders and staff 
(Straub et al. 2011, pp.iii–v).  
 
The proposals I have made are modest. I have not suggested changing trials, but 
have proposed changes to the ways in which sentencers gather information about 
offenders. The principles I have proposed speak more to the ways in which 
practitioners go about their duties of punishment decision-making and delivery than 
the type of sentence ordered, except insofar as this constrains the options of 
practitioners. If sentencing decisions are potentially similar: ‘100 hours unpaid 
work’, or ‘3 months imprisonment’ and so on, then why are my proposals important 
at all?  
 
Following Jerry Cohen, I have considered ‘what we should think, even when what 
we should think makes no practical difference’ (Cohen 2003, p.243). While we may 
arrive at similar punishment decisions, the principles I propose raise the chances 
that offenders will be included as equals during the processes of punishment 
decision-making and delivery. Liberal democracies claim that this is the case. Yet I 
have argued that desensitization to harms and the obscuring of care by the focus of 
definitions of punishment on harm, mean that we miss the risk of at least partly 
excluding, silencing and objectifying offenders when following classical liberal 
principles. These problems are harder to identify when we are desensitize to harms 
and the obscuring of care as I have argued. ‘What we should think’ might make ‘no 
practical difference’ (Cohen 2003, p.243) to the headline punishment decision. But 
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how we think about punishment informs the ways in which we carry out those 
decision-making and delivery practices and how we interact with offenders. The 
guidance offered by care ethics principles I have proposed offers an alternative 
framework for thinking differently about punishment decision-making and delivery.  
 
Thinking differently about punishment allows us to think well, since ’thinking well 
involves thinking charged with the right feeling’ (Diamond 1982, p.31). Thinking 
from the perspective of care allows us to recognize offenders as equals, to treat 
them as such by prioritizing respectful engagement to gather information, and to 
use this information to avoidance of preventable, morally significant harms. This 
helps reduce the risk of objectification. The care ethics perspective expects 
individuals who are interdependent and allows a different interpretation of the 
concern and respect necessary for treatment as equals. This permits the proper 
recognition of the necessary caring practices in punishment, and a more honest 
assessment of the harms caused to offenders during punishment decision-making 
and delivery. This gives us a chance to either consider in advance and avoid, or to 
acknowledge and attempt to address harms after-the-fact, thus better informing 
our caring. We will not always be successful, but the informal review practices that I 
have argued are implicit in care ethics strengthen our chances of identifying morally 
significant harms.  
 
Some readers may consider that to respond to offenders supportively is to unfairly 
offer a second chance, but this is mistaken. Crime always causes harms and is 
always lamentable. Would that we could ‘unhappen’ the offence: going back in time 
and persuading offenders to act lawfully, even constructively, or to respond 
differently to provocation. This however is not an option. I have not argued that 
offenders should be given ‘second chances’. We cannot offer another attempt at 
responding lawfully to a particular past situation. The present is a different 
opportunity. Our punishment practices happen in the present, neither in the past 
nor the future.  
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Previous criminal conduct tells us nothing of the offender’s future or present 
conduct. A criminal conviction, even a newly acquired one, only indicates that an 
individual behaved unlawfully on a previous occasion. A criminal record may even 
be a poor indicator of risk, since it is not dynamic, and cannot reflect the ways in 
which offenders’ personal and social contexts, their needs, capabilities, resources, 
relationships and responsibilities, change over time. I have argued that we should 
treat offenders inclusively and without objectification, as human beings, citizens 
and/or community members. This is to argue that in the present offenders should 
be offered a chance to demonstrate their non-criminal behaviour, during and 
especially after punishment, as employees, tenants, family members and 
community members. 
 
Nothing can be done to avert the harm that has already happened. We can however 
aspire to mend harms and avoid new harms in our response to offenders, limited by 
concerns to protect the basic rights of the vulnerable. The punishment of the 
offender may not be the only response that the community should make to the 
offence. For example, communities have some responsibility for victims’ needs. I 
suggested above that punishment may be an inappropriate place to expect victims’ 
needs to be adequately addressed. A development of how mainstream courts can 
better include and hear victims, in line with the care ethics informed practices I 
have suggested for offenders, would be an interesting way to develop the present 
work further. Helping to address victims’ needs and build their capabilities might 
also help to strengthen crime victims as individuals, and in their social co-operative 
relations.  
 
I have provided principled, political and pragmatic arguments for responding to 
offenders constructively; for punishing with care. This gives us a better chance at 
avoiding offender exclusion and objectification through providing interactional 
justice; treating offenders appropriately as human beings, recognizing and including 
citizens politically (especially if not democratically included), and ensuring 
community members have strengthened and not depleted resources with which to 
meet their own needs, support others and engage in social co-operation. I have not 
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argued offenders deserve second chances at the past, simply that offenders deserve 
a fair chance, as equals, in the present. 
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